Meanwhile In Afghanistan

[JWB]

 

 

There is a very good case for saying the reasons for stagnation in Afghanistan are purely political, and very little to do with the military. Lets see.

 

I disagree sort of. The generals in the USA and USMC don't believe in nor do they understand defensive warfare which is what VN was and A-stan is. The result being failures to disrupt and interdict enemy movements across the respective borders. Instead the command went pursuing "pacification". In both wars such follies not only were useless but in some cases made things worse.

 

You are right in one sense. The US political system is rarely capable of putting an effective C-in-C in the White House.

 

 

They got it right, belatedly admittedly, in Iraq.

 

The war in Iraq was won largely to the efforts of captain Travis Patriquin.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-tribute-to-captain-travis-patriquin

 

He conceived,organized, and put into effect the Anbar Militia which shut down the insurgencies and destroyed the crime gangs.

[Daan]

Ucko devotes a whole chapter to the British belief that its military possessed a special knowledge of counterinsurgency and convincingly dismisses it as a harmful myth. In summary, the British military tended to overemphasize its historically successful campaigns at the expense of the rest, inducing an institutional sense of complacency about such missions. Moreover, the recollection of even the successful campaigns was superficial with an exaggerated focus on the benign aspects of the strategies employed ("hearts and minds"). The knowledge, where extant, tended to be confused with the ability to put it into practice. Furthermore, the invocations of past successes tended to underappreciate the radical contextual changes between the past and present and therefore the need to rethink both ways and means. In addition, "in part because of its sense of confidence with counterinsurgency the British military either deliberately or unwittingly let its counterinsurgency-relevant capabilities fade, so much that by the end of the 1990s counterinsurgency had become a peripheral concern, marginalized in both training and education." Prior to going into Afghanistan, the Brits seemed to have held the mistaken view that "operational approaches and best practices, even if properly implemented and understood, could substitute for a viable strategy."

[NickM]

I have to say it RE: A'stan that regardless of how well we and our allies do, in the end, 'foreigners' always leave Afghanistan eventually--and the locals know that.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Ucko devotes a whole chapter to the British belief that its military possessed a special knowledge of counterinsurgency and convincingly dismisses it as a harmful myth. In summary, the British military tended to overemphasize its historically successful campaigns at the expense of the rest, inducing an institutional sense of complacency about such missions. Moreover, the recollection of even the successful campaigns was superficial with an exaggerated focus on the benign aspects of the strategies employed ("hearts and minds"). The knowledge, where extant, tended to be confused with the ability to put it into practice. Furthermore, the invocations of past successes tended to underappreciate the radical contextual changes between the past and present and therefore the need to rethink both ways and means. In addition, "in part because of its sense of confidence with counterinsurgency the British military either deliberately or unwittingly let its counterinsurgency-relevant capabilities fade, so much that by the end of the 1990s counterinsurgency had become a peripheral concern, marginalized in both training and education." Prior to going into Afghanistan, the Brits seemed to have held the mistaken view that "operational approaches and best practices, even if properly implemented and understood, could substitute for a viable strategy."

There is a very good book by the late historian Richard Holmes called 'Dusty Warriors'. Its about the armoured infantry battlegroup deployed to Al Amarah in Iraq in 2004, to restablize the area. There are two conclusions I take from that. Firstly, they didnt commit enough troops. Secondly, the Foreign office WAS present, but was underresourced and seemingly had poor connectivity back with the UK, and seemingly with the MOD. It did have connectivity on the ground, but seemingly on an ad hoc basis. Somebody suggested in the Iraq inquiry that int he days of Empire, the Police Special Branch would have been a good emplacement, but again, we do not have enough of them to start including them in military operations, as we used to do in say, Malaya or Kenya or Northern Ireland.

 

That to my mind showed probably a lot of the things that went wrong in Afghanistan. But on a wider basis, the British were a junior partner on an American led alliance. This was certainly true in Iraq, and to a lesser extent, still true in Afghanistan. And if the senior commander says 'occupy those bases', the British did so. Even though it tied them to a fixed basis, and denied them an opportunity to interact with the population. Greater forces would have allowed both roles to be undertaken, but no forces were available because we were doing it on the cheap.

 

Once should not conclude from all this British counter insurgency doctrine simply doesn't work. As seen in Northern Ireland, it does work. The problem is, in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army didnt really use it, because there was not the time, the opportunity, or the forces to do it. And being a junior partner, who would have listened anyway?

[Stuart Galbraith]

I have to say it RE: A'stan that regardless of how well we and our allies do, in the end, 'foreigners' always leave Afghanistan eventually--and the locals know that.

Alexander didnt. His people are arguably still there...

 

In more recent times? Yes, I dont disagree with you. To my mind, it shows that any solution has to be an Afghan one. So bombing the Taliban and refusing to negoitate with them, as Obama did, does not strike me as the smartest action. They will be there long after we leave.

[Daan]

I have Holmes' book, but have never managed to finish it. I thought Rory Stewart's Prince of the Marshes was also quite nice and good testimony to the well-intentioned but utterly naive approach taken towards Southern Iraq.

 

The deployments at center stage in Ucko's book are those in Basra and Helmand. In my view more troops would have been unlikely to have made much difference in Southern Iraq given the poor overall strategy and early policy mistakes. I really recommend Ucko's book; he is an analytical writer and gives credit where it is due.

[Stuart Galbraith]

I have Holmes' book, but have never managed to finish it. I thought Rory Stewart's Prince of the Marshes was also quite nice and good testimony to the well-intentioned but utterly naive approach taken towards Southern Iraq.

 

The deployments at center stage in Ucko's book are those in Basra and Helmand. In my view more troops would have been unlikely to have made much difference in Southern Iraq given the poor overall strategy and early policy mistakes. I really recommend Ucko's book; he is an analytical writer and gives credit where it is due.

I really mean to get something of Rory Stewarts. He did a very fine programe about 10 years ago on Lawrence of Arabia, and his summing up of the Arab mindset was masterful. Holmes book is good, please give it another try. The impression I get is of soldiers too busy fighting to do any COIN work because they were outnumbered, due to bureaucratic inertia presumably. When you read of the defence of CIMIC house, which was supposedly the jumping off point for allied civilian restablization efforts in Al Amarha, you grasp the problem. It was surrounded like the alamo. There was no possibility of engagement with the local civilians, because they were stuck in a defensive position continually shooting back at contacts.

 

Thanks ill look into that one.

Edited December 13, 2019 by Stuart Galbraith

[Panzermann]

I have to say it RE: A'stan that regardless of how well we and our allies do, in the end, 'foreigners' always leave Afghanistan eventually--and the locals know that.

 

Having no real idea what to do, no real goals and changing them every few years and stumbling around for nearly to decades does not help either. And yes, the Afghans have to make up their minds how they want to govern their country. The so-called"west" or any other bigger power or the Un can lend a hand, but first the Afghans have to know what they want. But as long as it is a good opportunity for local warlords, taliban, tribe chieftains, whoever else to act as they do, it won't get anywhere peaceful.

[Stuart Galbraith]

It has to be their solution. But see, I remember back in 2001, the US going in there was the idea it was going to export a Democracy. Now you can export the foundation of Democratic values, rule of law, things like that, but the idea that everyone initially seemed to have that they could just make Afghanistan into a clone of the US self evident wasnt going to work. So they scaled the ambitions back, but even then, lacked the resources to make even that work. The ambition was out of wack, but there was a complete under appreciation of the requirement of how many troops it was going to need to ensure stability.

 

I remember reading one book on Afghanistan on the British experience. Supposedly there was a dam (Kajaki maybe?) that had been derelict since the Soviets were there. So the British had the idea they were going to put a generator (or maybe it was a power transformer, I would have to double check) in this dam to run off the water, so they could bring power to the region. Big coin success. Unfortunately the generator was so big, there was no prospect of getting it there except by road, and they didnt have the security in the region to locate it by the dam. One soldier said he was there when it arrived, and it was still there when he left over 6 months later. They were just too busy fighting to do anything about it.

It reminds me of a dispiriting story of the Soviets in Afghanistan, where when they were cleaning up to leave in 1988, they found on the bottom of a big pile of boxes a cake, baked in Moscow, to give to the local leadership to affirm friendship with their Afghan brothers. It had been cooked in 1979, and had long since gone rotten. Just one more thing lost in the chaos of things to do.

 

Its worth remembering at this point, the Soviets never had enough forces to do the things they wanted to do either. They complain about it in a general staff study edited and published by Lester Grau, which is well worth a read. The impression I get is they were too busy fighting tactical battles to have a strategy at all.

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Soviet-Afghan-War-Superpower-Fought-Studies/dp/070061186X/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=general+staff+study+afghanistan&qid=1576250964&sr=8-1

Edited December 13, 2019 by Stuart Galbraith

[Panzermann]

The impression I get is they were too busy fighting tactical battles to have a strategy at all.

​

 

Which seems the USA's and their retinue's problem as well.

[TTK Ciar]

I have to say it RE: A'stan that regardless of how well we and our allies do, in the end, 'foreigners' always leave Afghanistan eventually--and the locals know that.

The Taliban began as a foreign invasion, but managed to recruit many native mujahideen to their side, eventually. They're firmly ensconced, now.

 

I'm not saying westerners could or should do the same, but it has at least been demonstrated possible.

[RETAC21]

 

I have to say it RE: A'stan that regardless of how well we and our allies do, in the end, 'foreigners' always leave Afghanistan eventually--and the locals know that.

The Taliban began as a foreign invasion, but managed to recruit many native mujahideen to their side, eventually. They're firmly ensconced, now.

 

I'm not saying westerners could or should do the same, but it has at least been demonstrated possible.

 

 

Actually, the taliban started out as locals fed up with the chaos of post-Soviet Afghanistan.

 

When the Soviets pulled out, no one thought Najibullah would last out the year, yet he managed to hang on until 1992, and when he was kicked out, the mujahideen groups soon were at each other's throat. The anarchy lasted until the Taliban took over the country in 96 amid popular support which they squandered away with their application of Sharia, but which terrorised and pacified the place, mostly. They have never really gone away, coming up as it was obvious that the western powers didn't GAS and put a just-as-corrupt regime in power. Afghanistan is never going to be pacified through hearts and minds, and the cost of pacifiying by the sword is not worth it.

[Brian Kennedy]

It's always amazed me how Bush's foreign policy team (which was probably one of the best lineups in history, at least in terms of job experience/intelligence/education/etc.) made so many, er, bush-league errors in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rumsfeld, Cheney, Armitage, Powell, Rice, Wolfowitz and the rest were basically an all-star team, they just apparently had a major deficit of common sense.

[TTK Ciar]

Actually, the taliban started out as locals fed up with the chaos of post-Soviet Afghanistan.

"Locals", from Pakistan?

[EchoFiveMike]

It's always amazed me how Bush's foreign policy team (which was probably one of the best lineups in history, at least in terms of job experience/intelligence/education/etc.) made so many, er, bush-league errors in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rumsfeld, Cheney, Armitage, Powell, Rice, Wolfowitz and the rest were basically an all-star team, they just apparently had a major deficit of common sense.

 

You should consider the possibility that they didn't "fail" at what they told you they were doing, they succeeded at what they intended, which wasn't what they told you they were doing.

 

How many globalists have been killed? Zero. How many have lost money? Zero. How many have profited massively from the past twenty years of chaotic fuckery and rampant sodomy upon the American taxpayer? S/F...Ken M

[RETAC21]

 

Actually, the taliban started out as locals fed up with the chaos of post-Soviet Afghanistan.

"Locals", from Pakistan?

 

 

Locals locals and some from the border region claimed by Pakistan but not actual Pakistan.

[NickM]

 

 

Actually, the taliban started out as locals fed up with the chaos of post-Soviet Afghanistan.

"Locals", from Pakistan?

 

 

Locals locals and some from the border region claimed by Pakistan but not actual Pakistan.

 

Let's be clear that the Tallywhackers were the only Afghan faction who actually got a 'foreign' Patron supplying them-Pakistan's Intelligence Agency.---their open line of supply probably explained why they were able to push all the other factions to the frontiers, because the other factions were scavenging the 'scraps' of the left over arms caches left behind by the US and The USSR supported government.

[Panzermann]

 

Actually, the taliban started out as locals fed up with the chaos of post-Soviet Afghanistan.

"Locals", from Pakistan?

 

 

The Taliban recruit themselves mostly from the Pashtun tribe, which lives in AFG and PAK. And they have never really acknowledged the border anyways. The Pashtuns had long been there before any modern "nation state" was drawn on a map. They are certainly more local than all the global jihadists that came in the eighties.

 

 

---

 

The Uzbek government rented out only the best of properties as a base in prime location:

 

 

U.S. special operations forces who deployed to a military site in Uzbekistan shortly after the 9/11 attacks found pond water that glowed green, black goo oozing from the ground and signs warning “radiation hazard.”

Karshi-Khanabad, known as K2, was an old Soviet base leased by the United States from the Uzbek government just weeks after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks because it was a few hundred miles from al Qaeda and Taliban targets in northern Afghanistan.

(...)

But K2 was contaminated with chemical weapons remnants, radioactive processed uranium and other hazards, according to documents obtained by McClatchy.

​

https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article238510218.html

Ah yes, Stalin's late revenge. And Veteran Affairs of course does not pay hospital bills and the Pentagon knew beforehand of the conditions.

Edited December 20, 2019 by Panzermann

[Roman Alymov]

(...)

But K2 was contaminated with chemical weapons remnants, radioactive processed uranium and other hazards, according to documents obtained by McClatchy.

​

https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/article238510218.html

Ah yes, Stalin's late revenge. And Veteran Affairs of course does not pay hospital bills and the Pentagon knew beforehand of the conditions.

 

Stalin? Karshi-Khanabad AB was only constructed in 1954, when Stalin was allready dead. And it was not some kind of research facility or Uraniam plant - just airbase. Now this place is in use by Rus AF again, and there is no information about contamination etc. - as well as nothing like this mentioned in Karshi-Khanabad veterans talks (see here https://www.forumavia.ru/t/52679/1/ ) Also, ? Karshi-Khanabad AB is immediately bordering heavily populated area. So it is interesting what US SOF was REALLY doing in Uzbekistan to suffer from high level of cancer - can't rule out they were scouting old Soviet chemical and nuclear sites there....

[Panzermann]

Stalin? Karshi-Khanabad AB was only constructed in 1954, when Stalin was allready dead. And it was not some kind of research facility or Uraniam plant - just airbase. Now this place is in use by Rus AF again, and there is no information about contamination etc. - as well as nothing like this mentioned in Karshi-Khanabad veterans talks (see here https://www.forumavia.ru/t/52679/1/ ) Also, ? Karshi-Khanabad AB is immediately bordering heavily populated area. So it is interesting what US SOF was REALLY doing in Uzbekistan to suffer from high level of cancer - can't rule out they were scouting old Soviet chemical and nuclear sites there....

 

 

Who knows what toxic wastes are floating around the base? The GSSD left quite the toxic mess behind in their former stations. So why should it be better with other old soviet bases.

[BansheeOne]

Afghan plane crash: US jet comes down in Taliban territory

 

27 January 2020

 

The US military has confirmed one of its planes crashed in eastern Afghanistan on Monday.

 

Officials told the media there were no indications it had been brought down by enemy activity.

 

The aircraft crashed in Deh Yak district, Ghazni province, an area with a strong Taliban presence.

 

Afghan authorities initially said it belonged to state-owned airline Ariana, but the company issued a denial, saying all its planes were accounted for.

 

The Pentagon has not released further details and it is unclear how many people were on board.

 

Taliban social media accounts have posted unverified footage showing a burnt-out plane with US Air Force markings.

 

The video shows a Bombardier E-11A - the type of jet used by the US Air Force for electronic surveillance over Afghanistan.

 

[...]

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51264744

[bojan]

We will see in few days how situation develops, was it an accident or a shutdown.

Edited January 27, 2020 by bojan

[glenn239]

Let's hope accident, because if it was a shootdown, then somebody may have recently started to upgrade Taliban AA missile capability unless the plane was flying low enough for AAA. And not too hard to come up with a short list for who might have supplied the Taliban with better AA missiles recently.

[BansheeOne]

Official: Remains of 2 US troops recovered from Afghan site

 

Lolita Baldor and Robert Burns, The Associated Press

 

3 hours ago

 

WASHINGTON (AP) A U.S. defense official says the United States has recovered the remains of two American service members killed in the crash of an Air Force plane in Afghanistan.

 

They were the only two people aboard the Air Force E-11A electronic surveillance aircraft when it went down on Monday in Ghazni province, the official said, speaking Tuesday on the condition of anonymity ahead of an official announcement of the recovery. The identities of the two have not been publicly announced, pending notification of their relatives.

 

The official said the American recovery team met no Taliban resistance in reaching the crash site and said there is no indication that the plane was downed by hostile action.

 

The Taliban hold much of Ghazni province. Monday's plane crash there is not expected to derail U.S.-Taliban peace talks if the crash investigation determines, as expected, that it was not the result of hostile action.

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-military/2020/01/28/official-remains-of-2-us-troops-recovered-from-afghan-site/?utm_expid=.jFR93cgdTFyMrWXdYEtvgA.1&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.militarytimes.com%2F#jwvideo

Edited January 28, 2020 by BansheeOne

[Burncycle360]

Attack on US and Afghan troops in Afghanistan, initial posts suggest 5-6 US fatalities, details still pending. Newer article doesn't mention number

https://twitter.com/ELINTNews/status/1226208104863457281

https://apnews.com/ed573fec92465305a5e3256cda62160c?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_medium=AP&utm_source=Twitter

 

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — American and Afghan military personnel were fired on while conducting an operation in Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar province, the U.S. military said Saturday.

Several U.S. personnel were either injured or killed, but the exact number and other details were not provided, said a U.S. official who agreed to discuss the incident only on condition of anonymity.

A U.S. military spokesman, Col. Sonny Leggett, said in a statement that both Afghan and U.S. personnel were “engaged by direct firing.”

“We are assessing the situation,” Leggett said, without providing any information on possible casualties or other details.

The Taliban and the Islamic State group affiliate both operate in eastern Nangarhar province. The incident comes as Washington seeks to find an end to Afghanistan’s 18-year war, America’s longest.

Washington’s peace envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has been meeting with Taliban representatives in the Middle Eastern state of Qatar in recent weeks. He’s seeking an agreement to reduce hostilities to get a peace deal signed that would start negotiations among Afghans on both sides of the conflict.

In his State of the Union Address on Tuesday, President Donald Trump referenced the peace talks, saying U.S. soldiers were not meant to serve as “law enforcement agencies” for other nations.

“In Afghanistan, the determination and valor of our war fighters has allowed us to make tremendous progress, and peace talks are now underway, ” he said.