1935 German Tank Exercise

[John_Ford]

When Leo , SSnake and I got together for dinner, SSnake alluded to a display at Munster depicting an exercise done in 1935 with the newly formed or revealed Armored/Motorized Force. Unfortunately the descriptions are all in German and SSnake described how there was a second part of the exercise that demonstrated the flexibility of the Panzer Force to react to Changes in Situation.

 

 

Anybody care to fill in the Details on just how the Exercise went and any Oxes gored or Feelings trampled by Guderion who was the Ground Forces Commander.

[lastdingo]

from General W.K. Nehring's post-war book:

 

He calls it "Augustübung 1935" (august exercise 1935)

 

first time: complicated umpire scheme and wire/radio communication scheme

air force participated under v.Greim

some vismod pseudo-tanks still in use

troops still in training, but had been prepared to show four kinds of tactical vignettes systematically

skepticism and denigration among superior staffs ahead of the exercise

many generals were ordered to observe it to familiarize them with the new armoured forces

General F. v. Fritsch had decided to insert a surprising tactical change during a scripted breakthrough attack

this required a quick transfer of orders, cooperation and agility

at the end of the supposed end of the exercise (after a breakthrough) the division had to turn towards a surprising new threat at one flank

(while the division was dispersed in depth and in disorder due to the fight)

the scripted exercise part was a success

the non-scripted and surprising part succeeded as well; armoured recce moved into the direction the other division forces turned in several marching groups to the new direction as well

much astonishment and praise afterwards

Hitler was not present

 

That's all that he wrote. He was biased in favour of the tank troops, so his summary may have been overly positive.

[Ken Estes]

Sounds like the same developmental process fostered by vSeeckt and his successors of the Reichswehr. The use of the fast units reflected his earlier doctrinal emphasis on improved mobility and firepower for the infantry divisions allowed under Versailles limitations, and their use in high mobility scenarios to defeat more numerous forces such as the Poles in war games.

 

Introducing unexpected situations was old hat since vMoltke and the Great General Staff. Gen. Blummetritt wrote of the use of 'impossible situations' as well in the pre-WWII War College map exercises, in which there was no solution and one had to direct forces with little hope of avoiding defeat.

 

Nehring was of course a Guderian acolyte and wrote not a single critical word postwar about his master. 'Biased in favor of tank troops' is putting it mildly. Interestingly, nobody seems to have ever noted anything about the two officers commanding the other of the three Panzer Divisions: 1. PzDiv commander logically was still commanded by the commander, 3d KavDiv, from which it converted, LtG Graf Weichs von der Glom. He went on the command AG B at Stalingrad, later AG F in the Balkans, as a field marshal. 3. PzDiv was commanded by MG Fessmann, who relinquished it to Geyr vSchweppenberg. Fessmann was another cavalryman, commanded the first PzLehr Brigade before the division was formed. He retired as a LtG of tank troops in 1937, age 56, but reactivated in WWII to command an infantry div in the 1940 western campaigns, retired again in 1943.

 

Guderian had command of the 2. PzDiv as a colonel, but the army trusted the others to old school cavalrymen.

Edited June 24, 2015 by Ken Estes

[Thonar3]

I think to remember that Guderian himself wrote something about this exercise in "Die Panzertruppen"... but I'm not home currently so I can't check it, maybe someone else can take a look into it.

[lastdingo]

Sounds like the same developmental process fostered by vSeeckt and his successors of the Reichswehr. The use of the fast units reflected his earlier doctrinal emphasis on improved mobility and firepower for the infantry divisions allowed under Versailles limitations, (...)

 

Germany was allowed to have much more cavalry divisions than sensible. They were costly (horses), ill-suited for the heavy artillery (150 mm heavy howitzers) that was understood to be almost all-important in 1919, cavalry divisions were personnel-inefficient (many horsemen stay behind with horses while others dismount for infantry combat) and cavalry divisions were obsolete as a concept.

The enhancement of mobility was largely about a partial motorization of the cavalry divisions, not infantry divisions.

[Ken Estes]

Yet, ~80% of the German divisions in WWII were ultimately dependent upon horses for mobility.

 

The ability of the German infantry divisions to march 40 miles/day+ is what settled the issue in 1940. Not so easily done in late 1941 and after. Seeckt's reforms of the 1920s made the German infantry divisions more mobile and suitable for what was later termed Blitzkrieg, while encouraging the true Panzerwaffen theorists of the time [well before Guderian]

 

cf. Richard Dinardo. Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II. (Stackpole, 2008)

Edited June 24, 2015 by Ken Estes

[Panzermann]

Yet, ~80% of the German divisions in WWII were ultimately dependent upon horses for mobility.

 

 

Vehicle production was never enough, especially lorries. And a wild mix of anything that was able to drive was used. No real standard (well there was the Opel Blitz produced by other firms than Opel). So they had to use what was there, which were horses and carts. In comparison a US Division had standard trucks and lots of them.

 

Ironically the Autobahn was more useful to the invading Allies than to the Nazis in the end.

[Rich]

 

Yet, ~80% of the German divisions in WWII were ultimately dependent upon horses for mobility.

 

 

Vehicle production was never enough, especially lorries. And a wild mix of anything that was able to drive was used. No real standard (well there was the Opel Blitz produced by other firms than Opel). So they had to use what was there, which were horses and carts. In comparison a US Division had standard trucks and lots of them.

 

Ironically the Autobahn was more useful to the invading Allies than to the Nazis in the end.

 

 

Possibly the single most WTF?!? decisions made by German industrial mobilization planning was to take the vibrant and expanding German motor vehicle industry and convert most of its operations to the production of sub-components for other industries. Of course, then they did the same effectively with the French and Italian motor vehicle plant they acquired later in the war. Mind you, given the limitations of German POL production, there may not have been much other choice.

[Richard Lindquist]

 

Sounds like the same developmental process fostered by vSeeckt and his successors of the Reichswehr. The use of the fast units reflected his earlier doctrinal emphasis on improved mobility and firepower for the infantry divisions allowed under Versailles limitations, (...)

 

Germany was allowed to have much more cavalry divisions than sensible. They were costly (horses), ill-suited for the heavy artillery (150 mm heavy howitzers) that was understood to be almost all-important in 1919, cavalry divisions were personnel-inefficient (many horsemen stay behind with horses while others dismount for infantry combat) and cavalry divisions were obsolete as a concept.

The enhancement of mobility was largely about a partial motorization of the cavalry divisions, not infantry divisions.

 

Pictures I have seen (mostly cavalry platoons of Inf Div) show German horse holders with two other mounts meaning one in three men were not on the firing line. US cavalry procedures were one in four troopers as horse holders and three other mounts. Comments from our European contributors?

[lastdingo]

 

 

Sounds like the same developmental process fostered by vSeeckt and his successors of the Reichswehr. The use of the fast units reflected his earlier doctrinal emphasis on improved mobility and firepower for the infantry divisions allowed under Versailles limitations, (...)

 

Germany was allowed to have much more cavalry divisions than sensible. They were costly (horses), ill-suited for the heavy artillery (150 mm heavy howitzers) that was understood to be almost all-important in 1919, cavalry divisions were personnel-inefficient (many horsemen stay behind with horses while others dismount for infantry combat) and cavalry divisions were obsolete as a concept.

The enhancement of mobility was largely about a partial motorization of the cavalry divisions, not infantry divisions.

 

Pictures I have seen (mostly cavalry platoons of Inf Div) show German horse holders with two other mounts meaning one in three men were not on the firing line. US cavalry procedures were one in four troopers as horse holders and three other mounts. Comments from our European contributors?

 

 

That's what I meant (and wrote about before).

[Ken Estes]

and still irrelevant to the topic. The motorization had to await other reforms of the Seeckt era, and first the development of lighter and more effective weapons increased infantry firepower and mobility: this became the foundation of the Blitzkrieg era. The doctrine for mobile operations preceded the formation of Panzertruppen.

 

[John_Ford]

Yet, ~80% of the German divisions in WWII were ultimately dependent upon horses for mobility.

 

The ability of the German infantry divisions to march 40 miles/day+ is what settled the issue in 1940. Not so easily done in late 1941 and after. Seeckt's reforms of the 1920s made the German infantry divisions more mobile and suitable for what was later termed Blitzkrieg, while encouraging the true Panzerwaffen theorists of the time [well before Guderian]

 

cf. Richard Dinardo. Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism? Horses and the German Army of World War II. (Stackpole, 2008)

 

40 Miles per day reminds me of Stonewall's Foot Cavalry in the ACW. Did 25 miler's in Korea with 2nd Division, Everybody was LPC there. (Leather Personnel Carrier)

[Junior FO]

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Edited September 23, 2024 by Junior FO

[Ssnake]

Thanks. Said diorama of the exercise is no longer on display in Munster, but if you didn't knew what you were looking at it wasn't very instructive, so I support their decision.

[Junior FO]

...

 

Edited September 23, 2024 by Junior FO

[Junior FO]

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Edited September 23, 2024 by Junior FO