rmgill Posted November 19, 2014 Posted November 19, 2014 I have over the past years seen numerous references and complaints about issue with the Rules of Engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some have revolved around high level approval for supporting indirect fires for targets of opportunity and the problems with that. I've seen other references but was unable recently to pin down the exact gist of what I'd heard of or what was at issue. So I put it to the hive mind here, based on your direct or indirect experiences and knowledge of this and past conflicts what were the obvious or not so obvious implications of the various ROE used by the Coalition on Iraq and Afghanistan?What of these ROE may have contributed to the success or failure of the coalition forces? I suppose there's a political angle here, but it's specifically tangential to the way in which the ROE are formulated and directly bear upon the success or failure of those particular ROE.
Paul G. Posted November 20, 2014 Posted November 20, 2014 There is no one ROE per se. There is the theatre level ROE, but at every echelon commanders may make them more restrictive (not less) based on the circumstances on the (their peice of) ground. ROE in COIN is different from other types of warfare because it is a constant balance between the popultion you are trying to secure and your own solder's protection. The operational center of gravity in COIN is the population and NOT the enemy force. good discussion on the subject here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=7639
EchoFiveMike Posted November 20, 2014 Posted November 20, 2014 I had this post typed up about ROE's, but frankly it's boring and pointless. There is no convincing people, there's only the exercise of power. We failed to do so, as we lost. And will continue to lose, because we refuse to win. because we have a shit ton of people who are more concerned with the enemies wellbeing than with our own. Which is about as textbook a definition of a traitor as you can find. S/F....Ken M
rmgill Posted November 20, 2014 Author Posted November 20, 2014 Well, small point Ken, but you and others convinced me over years of reading posts here and on Sci.Military.whatever. I used to be a bright eyed bushy tailed leftist (highschool and part way through college) but a deeper reading of history showed me that it was all bullshit. Reality helps you grow up. I still deal with and interact with lots of leftists who have not yet grown up and data is useful.
EchoFiveMike Posted November 20, 2014 Posted November 20, 2014 Well, that's something. I suspect that the hundreds of young adults I trained to be proficient in small arms use will be more pertinent to future history. S/F....Ken M
Phil Posted November 20, 2014 Posted November 20, 2014 (edited) In Afghan we had the right to self defence (which was the least restrictive option ironically). There were also several other types of ROE that were devolved down to sub-unit commander. We used to use the other ROE quite often which whilst less restrictive in some senses, were more in others. I don't think we ever had any real issues in practice on the ground - people who needed killing more often than not got killed once they made themselves known to be bad men. I know questions were asked at TF level when our small FOB had lobbed 3,500 mortar bombs within 4 months but the leaf eaters were told they were welcome to go on an advance to contact without the promise of mortar fire. The mortaring continued. Really taught me how powerful those things are when they're being used properly. Edited November 20, 2014 by Phil
JWB Posted November 20, 2014 Posted November 20, 2014 I had this post typed up about ROE's, but frankly it's boring and pointless. There is no convincing people, there's only the exercise of power. We failed to do so, as we lost. And will continue to lose, because we refuse to win. because we have a shit ton of people who are more concerned with the enemies wellbeing than with our own. Which is about as textbook a definition of a traitor as you can find. S/F....Ken M I think it has more to do with various professional agendas than anything else. The best way to do coin is to ambush the enemy before they get near civilians. That requires large scale widespread use of drones to watch the A/P border 24/7. That won't happen because GOs/politicians would rather use drones for publicity stunts like blasting some irrelevant Taliban mid level manager.
nigelfe Posted November 21, 2014 Posted November 21, 2014 Actually the key to all COIN is tactical intelligence and this means recruiting sources at many levels in the insurgent organisation and those with useful contacts with it. If you are unable to do this then I suggest going home because you have Buckley's chance of success. If you haven't got the source recruiters and handlers with the necessary experience and language skills then you are up shit creek sans paddle. That said I totally agree that ambushing is the way to go (guided by good tactical intelligence), but would note that successful ambushing is a military skill that varies considerably across armies - individual self-discipline is critical, and not all military cultures are good at this. However, it is also easier said that done when it comes to separating the insurgents from the civpop. In some ways the easiest solution to this is night-time curfew, but night-time ambushing is particularly vulnerable to poor self-discipline. The reason for ROE is very simple, it is to avoid pissing off the locals who are not whole-hearted insurgents by killing their families and friends. It's not a good move for encouraging source recruitment either.
Phil Posted November 21, 2014 Posted November 21, 2014 (edited) Agree with nigelfe, the ROE were suitable for the context. And in reality it depended a lot on the sanity / insanity of the chain of command. An aggressive and competent commander with an eye and ear for the local conditions and context, and who was able to tune into the locals and influence them would use the ROE to their advantage. Weak commanders would use them as an excuse. It's very difficult to ambush insurgents in the old fashioned sense. We used to manage it by using ISTAR and IDF from our mortars because they were responsive and under local control. But if you tried to do the whole lie in a ditch and wait thing, you'd just get the kids coming up and asking for pens with the inevitable comedic effect. No point doing it at night either because you wouldn't see many people because they knew they stuck out like a bulldogs bollocks in our night vision whilst we couldn't be seen so they'd just get their heads down. Edited November 21, 2014 by Phil
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