Pacific 1941/2 What If ?

[Marek Tucan]

Taking airfield on Oahu would be worse for IJN than taking Midway... Even more logistical hog, closer to major enemy base... It COULD be doable for some time at the cost of submitting much more resources in a campaign of attrition which would go better for the US.

[Ken Estes]

Only two CVs could have been sunk at PH, thus Saratoga, Yorktown, Hornet and Wasp would have been sufficient to conduct the delaying, harassing operations as in RL. Ranger might have been pressed into duty as well, however unfortunate that might have been.

[Rich]

It opens with:

 

Pearl Harbor came as no great surprise to United States naval officers. Wardroom talk for years had centered on war possibilities in the Far East.

 

Ken,

 

While I don't exactly disagree with it, Wheeler's statement isn't exactly correct either. It should have read:

 

WAR came as no great surprise to United States naval officers. Wardroom talk for years had centered on war possibilities in the Far East.

[R011]

a. Possible that the carriers would be sunk IF they were in port at the time.

b. Taking Oahu was probably impossible, but IF the Pearl Harbor attack was accompanied by an invasion force, an air base on one of the other islands was a distinct possibility which would have threatened US use of Oahu as a base.

c. Was probably not doable unless there was a massive broad-based pro-Japan Indian uprising against the Brits (to include mutinies of Indian Army units).

d. Not burned to the ground, but there may have been hit-and-run raids against US coastal cities.

 

 

a. Perhaps, but only the Pacific Fleet carriers would have been in Pearl.

 

b. They didn't have the logistics to take and hold a Hawaiian island. Note that they barely took Wake.

 

c. Beyond Japan's ability to arrange. A major rebellion and mutiny was always possible, but on an Indian timetable if at all. That none occurred even when the Raj was at it's lowest point during the war suggests it was not in the cards.

 

d. Again, logistics were against them. At nest, they might have organized a few submarine-transported platoon-sized raids.

[Ken Estes]

Rich, the heightened alerts had been given, the seaplanes [too few, because of exercises, general overuse] patrolled what they thought were the approaches to PH, radar was semi manned, the ASW patrol was out and the channel entry was netted. The surprise attack did not make attack on PH unthinkable by any stretch. This is why Kimmel and Short had to take it for the team, despite calls decades later for restoration of their ranks and good names.

[Rich]

Rich, the heightened alerts had been given, the seaplanes [too few, because of exercises, general overuse] patrolled what they thought were the approaches to PH, radar was semi manned, the ASW patrol was out and the channel entry was netted. The surprise attack did not make attack on PH unthinkable by any stretch. This is why Kimmel and Short had to take it for the team, despite calls decades later for restoration of their ranks and good names.

 

Ken,

 

The root problem was that the two war warnings issued simply made no mention of Pearl as a direct target. The 24 November warning only mentioned the Philippines and Guam, while the 27 November warning repeated them while adding only Malaya, Borneo, and American Samoa. That allowed Short and Kimmel - and their staffs - to assume the only threat to the Hawiaan Islands in the event of war would be sabotage. What made it so much worse was that for 12 days they treated the war warning seriously and put everyone in the field, but then decided since there was no threat of direct attack it was okay to slack off for a day.

 

So yes, of course they had to take it, because they deserved it.

[Colin Williams]

 

Rich, the heightened alerts had been given, the seaplanes [too few, because of exercises, general overuse] patrolled what they thought were the approaches to PH, radar was semi manned, the ASW patrol was out and the channel entry was netted. The surprise attack did not make attack on PH unthinkable by any stretch. This is why Kimmel and Short had to take it for the team, despite calls decades later for restoration of their ranks and good names.

 

Ken,

 

The root problem was that the two war warnings issued simply made no mention of Pearl as a direct target. The 24 November warning only mentioned the Philippines and Guam, while the 27 November warning repeated them while adding only Malaya, Borneo, and American Samoa. That allowed Short and Kimmel - and their staffs - to assume the only threat to the Hawiaan Islands in the event of war would be sabotage. What made it so much worse was that for 12 days they treated the war warning seriously and put everyone in the field, but then decided since there was no threat of direct attack it was okay to slack off for a day.

 

So yes, of course they had to take it, because they deserved it.

 

Not an unreasonable perspective, although of course taking to its logical conclusion means Brereton should have been drawn and quartered.

[Brian Kennedy]

What say this grate site about Germany and Japan trying more of a coordinated effort -- Japan pulls off Pearl to knock the U.S. off their feet and then charges West and tries to meet Germany somewhere near Iran?

[John_Ford]

 

 

Rich, the heightened alerts had been given, the seaplanes [too few, because of exercises, general overuse] patrolled what they thought were the approaches to PH, radar was semi manned, the ASW patrol was out and the channel entry was netted. The surprise attack did not make attack on PH unthinkable by any stretch. This is why Kimmel and Short had to take it for the team, despite calls decades later for restoration of their ranks and good names.

 

Ken,

 

The root problem was that the two war warnings issued simply made no mention of Pearl as a direct target. The 24 November warning only mentioned the Philippines and Guam, while the 27 November warning repeated them while adding only Malaya, Borneo, and American Samoa. That allowed Short and Kimmel - and their staffs - to assume the only threat to the Hawiaan Islands in the event of war would be sabotage. What made it so much worse was that for 12 days they treated the war warning seriously and put everyone in the field, but then decided since there was no threat of direct attack it was okay to slack off for a day.

 

So yes, of course they had to take it, because they deserved it.

 

Not an unreasonable perspective, although of course taking to its logical conclusion means Brereton should have been drawn and quartered.

 

How that Rat Bastard survived when better men were Pilloried is beyond my understanding.

[Brian Kennedy]

Although Mac's biggest pet douchebag was http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_A._Willoughby

[iamcanjim]

Here's the question then. What would it have taken in 1941 to delay the eventual US victory. I would wager that if the Japanese

a. Sunk all the ships in Pearl Harbour and the Carriers.

b. Took the Hawaiian islands.

c. Took Calcutta

d. Burned LA to the ground in a daring amphibious raid.

e. Took Kunnming

 

Nothing would be different by early 1945.

Note I wasn't saying any of these were possible. Just about all were far beyond the reach of Japan's power in 1941-42. I am saying that even if Japan did all these miraculous things, by 1945 the situation would have been virtually identical to how it turned out in real life by early 1945.

 

Oddly enough, d, a raid on a US Pacific city or large town would have been probably the most effective thing to slow the US down a bit, as the citizens would have demanded massive naval, air and army forces to guard the West Coast.

 

Imagine the Japanese send 5 destroyers, loaded with troops on suicide missions to Port Angeles, Astoria, Monterrey, Prince Rupert BC and Juneau. If even one managed to offload the troops it would cause a bit of a panic all along the west coast.

 

After something like that, I expect the US would have to use at least 4 carrier groups to guard the coast.

Edited November 15, 2014 by iamcanjim

[DougRichards]

 

Here's the question then. What would it have taken in 1941 to delay the eventual US victory. I would wager that if the Japanese

a. Sunk all the ships in Pearl Harbour and the Carriers.

b. Took the Hawaiian islands.

c. Took Calcutta

d. Burned LA to the ground in a daring amphibious raid.

e. Took Kunnming

 

Nothing would be different by early 1945.

Note I wasn't saying any of these were possible. Just about all were far beyond the reach of Japan's power in 1941-42. I am saying that even if Japan did all these miraculous things, by 1945 the situation would have been virtually identical to how it turned out in real life by early 1945.

 

Oddly enough, d, a raid on a US Pacific city or large town would have been probably the most effective thing to slow the US down a bit, as the citizens would have demanded massive naval, air and army forces to guard the West Coast.

 

Imagine the Japanese send 5 destroyers, loaded with troops on suicide missions to Port Angeles, Astoria, Monterrey, Prince Rupert BC and Juneau. If even one managed to offload the troops it would cause a bit of a panic all along the west coast.

 

After something like that, I expect the US would have to use at least 4 carrier groups to guard the coast.

 

 

A raid on the Panama Canal may have been just as useful.

[DougRichards]

What say this grate site about Germany and Japan trying more of a coordinated effort -- Japan pulls off Pearl to knock the U.S. off their feet and then charges West and tries to meet Germany somewhere near Iran?

 

I think that Khalkhin Goh may have taught the Japanese that a war with the Soviets may not have been a good idea.

 

Having said that, Stalin brought the Siberian divisions west for use against German forces 1941-1942, which may have created opportunities for the Japanese to again try their hand in Mongolia.

[JasonJ]

I remember there being large amounts of oil storage tanks on PH which would have been targeted for bombing if Japan stayed committed to PH for a few more hours. Maybe that oil was critical for early American operations in the Pacific.

[Brian Kennedy]

 

What say this grate site about Germany and Japan trying more of a coordinated effort -- Japan pulls off Pearl to knock the U.S. off their feet and then charges West and tries to meet Germany somewhere near Iran?

 

I think that Khalkhin Goh may have taught the Japanese that a war with the Soviets may not have been a good idea.

 

Having said that, Stalin brought the Siberian divisions west for use against German forces 1941-1942, which may have created opportunities for the Japanese to again try their hand in Mongolia.

Oh, I don't think the Japanese army could have done squat in Siberia -- I was thinking more about them going more southerly and either focusing on knocking out India or wiping out the RN in the Indian Ocean and going toward the Middle East.

[Rich]

 

Not an unreasonable perspective, although of course taking to its logical conclusion means Brereton should have been drawn and quartered.

 

 

 

Well, yeah, of course.

[Ken Estes]

Sorry, but professional officers in major commands, should not be required to have specific warnings of dangers to their commands IOT take requisite actions under the general conditions specified. This is why Washington hung them out to dry. No further need for the same.

[GPMG]

Japan and Germany didn't realy have much of a common intrest appart from both wanting to carve out an Empire.

The way I see it the Middle East was not an easy place for Japan and Germany to get to and the only thing it offered was to denie it to the allies.

The options for the Germans to get to Iran were either through Egypt Palantian, and Iraq. Or Turkey and Syria. Or through Russian and over the Caucasus Mountains. The transport infrastructure on any of these routes in the early 40s was not great.

[glenn239]

 

Note I wasn't saying any of these were possible. Just about all were far beyond the reach of Japan's power in 1941-42. I am saying that even if Japan did all these miraculous things, by 1945 the situation would have been virtually identical to how it turned out in real life by early 1945

 

 

The only possible IJN operation for delaying the onset of the USN 1944 offensive was for KB with about 12 fleet tankers in support to go into the Atlantic and attack the USN’s carriers while under construction on the US east coast. Outside the IJN's comfort zone to be sure, but at the same time more feasible than, say, landing strong amphibious forces in California, taking Calcutta, or taking Hawaii.

Edited November 15, 2014 by glenn239

[Rich]

Sorry, but professional officers in major commands, should not be required to have specific warnings of dangers to their commands IOT take requisite actions under the general conditions specified. This is why Washington hung them out to dry. No further need for the same.

 

I agree, but again that is not strictly what happened. When the USN moved to Pearl under Presidential orders it was because of the ongoing deterioration of U.S.-Japanese relations. The actions taken by both the Army and Navy commanders up to the November war warnings were appropriate - they took the requisite actions: developed the search programs, defensive zones, and so forth, requesting assets as needed, while working with what they had. What is jaw-dropping is that when they were told the war they were expecting to happen was going to happen momentarily; instead of carrying on with the requisite actions they carried on with them until they decided it wasn't appropriate to be ready on Sunday 7 December because their troops and sailors needed a rest. That's what I condemn Short and Kimmel for. Up to then their actions were sensible and appropriate under the general conditions specified.

[Rich]

 

 

Note I wasn't saying any of these were possible. Just about all were far beyond the reach of Japan's power in 1941-42. I am saying that even if Japan did all these miraculous things, by 1945 the situation would have been virtually identical to how it turned out in real life by early 1945

 

 

The only possible IJN operation for delaying the onset of the USN 1944 offensive was for KB with about 12 fleet tankers in support to go into the Atlantic and attack the USN’s carriers while under construction on the US east coast. Outside the IJN's comfort zone to be sure, but at the same time more feasible than, say, landing strong amphibious forces in California, taking Calcutta, or taking Hawaii.

 

 

Okay, parse that out for me please? Instead of a roughly 8,500 nautical mile round trip you propose a 32,000 nautical mile one, by using "about 12 fleet tankers" instead of eight? Have you been hanging around robdab's Alt Alien Space Bats posts too much again?

[glenn239]

Okay, parse that out for me please? Instead of a roughly 8,500 nautical mile round trip you propose a 32,000 nautical mile one, by using "about 12 fleet tankers" instead of eight?

 

Parse what out for you? Why invading California as an ASB strategy would be more difficult than sailing a TF into the Atlantic as an ASB strategy? You're good with the ASB idea of the IJA just somehow marching into Los Angeles to burn the place down, that nonsense you don't blink an eye at, but when KB ASB sails into the Atlantic, suddenly, look out, for this ASB suggestion you now want a detailed logistic report of whether its 12 tankers or more?

Edited November 15, 2014 by glenn239

[Rich]

 

Okay, parse that out for me please? Instead of a roughly 8,500 nautical mile round trip you propose a 32,000 nautical mile one, by using "about 12 fleet tankers" instead of eight?

 

Parse what out for you? Why invading California as an ASB strategy would be more difficult than sailing a TF into the Atlantic as an ASB strategy? You're good with the ASB idea of the IJA just somehow marching into Los Angeles to burn the place down, that nonsense you don't blink an eye at, but when KB ASB sails into the Atlantic, suddenly, look out, for this ASB suggestion you now want a detailed logistic report of whether its 12 tankers or more?

 

 

Sorry, but you're still about as brilliant as a box of hammers. Where did I ask anything about California, Gomez? I asked you to explain how you got 50% more "fleet tankers" to do four times as much resupply. However, if you are simply trying to come up with a more outlandish idea than a Japanese attack on California why don't you just say so instead of wording it like it is a better option? That way people will just ignore you as usual instead of suffering a WTF moment as your inanity increases beyond even its normal level.

[Markus Becker]

 

 

Ken,

 

The root problem was that the two war warnings issued simply made no mention of Pearl as a direct target. The 24 November warning only mentioned the Philippines and Guam, while the 27 November warning repeated them while adding only Malaya, Borneo, and American Samoa. That allowed Short and Kimmel - and their staffs - to assume the only threat to the Hawiaan Islands in the event of war would be sabotage.

 

 

Officers are supposed to think for themselves, flag officers even more so. The fact that the most important US base in the Pacific could be a potential target for any kind of attack should not have escaped Kimmel and Short.

 

Their staffs should and could have made a list of all possible threats, the damage each threat could do and the countermeasure it takes the defeat the possible threats. Then the Navy and Army should have compared the two lists and combined assets.

 

Together they had what they needed. The Navy was short of seaplanes, Short had not excatly short legged B-17s and B-18s. *pun intended*

[Rich]

 

 

 

Ken,

 

The root problem was that the two war warnings issued simply made no mention of Pearl as a direct target. The 24 November warning only mentioned the Philippines and Guam, while the 27 November warning repeated them while adding only Malaya, Borneo, and American Samoa. That allowed Short and Kimmel - and their staffs - to assume the only threat to the Hawiaan Islands in the event of war would be sabotage.

 

 

Officers are supposed to think for themselves, flag officers even more so. The fact that the most important US base in the Pacific could be a potential target for any kind of attack should not have escaped Kimmel and Short.

 

Their staffs should and could have made a list of all possible threats, the damage each threat could do and the countermeasure it takes the defeat the possible threats. Then the Navy and Army should have compared the two lists and combined assets.

 

Together they had what they needed. The Navy was short of seaplanes, Short had not excatly short legged B-17s and B-18s. *pun intended*

 

 

Exactly, and that is exactly what they and their staffs did, which is why there were three types of Alert planned.. And, until it came down to the decision regarding 7 December they pretty much did everything right. Even the decision to be at Alert 1 wasn't a killer...standing down the nascent Air Warning Center and the mobile radar stations was though. It was the dumb decision they made after they did everything right that they were very rightly censured for.

 

BTW, only six of the B-17 on Hawaii were operational, along with 21 of the B-18. And the B-18 was "short-legged", which is one reason it was declared obsolescent so soon.