Italian Army Ww2

[RETAC21]

While I reckon it's impossible to get an accurate assesment of how good/bad the Italian Army was in WW2, its performance seems to be one of continued incompetence in which a few troops fought to the death displaying amazing valour but eventually the fight goes off its officers followed by mass surrender. The campaigns can be sumed as:

 

Abysinia: colonial warfare, WW1 style.

Spanish Civil War: Franco wasn't impressed, he only wanted their arty and their planes.

France: achieved nothing, suffered lots of casualties, learned nothing of WW1

Greece: same

North Africa: Apparently tried to apply the lessons of colonial warfare, got into a static position and was defeated piecemeal, then fell apart in the withdrawal until the allies cut their line of retreat at Beda Fomm and then another incompetently led battle ended up in disaster. After Rommel dropped by their performance improved (though Rommel couldn't be impressed by their performance in both wars until 41) and more or less held their own in the final disaster.

East Africa: they held their own for a time, but then the whole house came crashing down. No plans to establish a landline to Libya, and no hope of relief.

Russia: outclassed on all counts

Italy: what can be worse than loosing your own country when everyone goes home?

 

Certainly there were some fine units (Ariete, the Paras, Bersaglieri and Alpini) but overall they suffered a massive systemic failure, why?

 

 

 

[Colin]

Logistic, leadership, lack of good equipment and a questionable motivating cause.

[RETAC21]

Poor logistics also hit the Germans and the Russians, not to speak about the Japanese. Leadership, sure but why?, regarding equipment they had good and bad weapons like everyone else, but it wouldnt bite them initially, and poor causes were galore in ww2 but it didnt hinder the Soviets ir the Germans.

[swerve]

Mussolini seems to have been interested in numbers, & not understood that effectiveness needs real, expensive, training (& not just drill), logistics, & proper procedures. Give him an extra million lire & he'd hire more troops, or buy more guns, not spend it on training, transport, ammunition stocks, etc.

 

I get the impression (but can't substantiate it) that many army generals acted as if they thought that their eventual victory at Vittorio Veneto against an outgunned, under-supplied, hungry Austria-Hungarian army with its country collapsing behind it proved that they didn't need to learn anything from WW1.

[Richard Lindquist]

I wonder just how much WWI did to take the starch out of both the French and the Italians. The Italian CO in WWI (Cadorna) made Joffre and Haig look like military geniuses.

[lucklucky]

Oh well...

 

First thing to understand is that Italy only really entered WW2 in late 1941 or 1942.

 

Until then it was political act by Mussolini thinking that after France collapse there will be a Peace Conference. Reportedly he said "give me 1000 casualities to have a seat at peace conference"

That is why he declared war without any kind of plan or idea and the general orders to Italian Army was to be in a defensive position after declaring war to France and England.

 

When Mussolini got afraid Germans will get to Nice too fast, ordered a general offensive without even major artillery being prepared because the army was said to be in defensive position. 5 days land war in the Alps followed and armistice.

 

 

 

France: achieved nothing, suffered lots of casualties, learned nothing of WW1

 

 

Did you read anything about it? it was a land battle of 5 days against Maginot Line, without heavy artillery being deployed.

 

Greece: same

 

 

Well the invasion of Greece, another political design, born at first by Mussolini being irritated with Hitler after learned that Romania had German troops.

Navy and Air Force were only informed at last moment since this was an Army project that violated even the Army plans concerning the attack against Greece.

So there wasn't even a real preparation. It was another bet.

So it was started in Autumn, the start of rain and snow season with 1:1 in land forces in mountainous territory without real roads.

 

Sometimes the debacle is overplayed, Allies didn't moved much either in Italy against Germans in wet season. With much more/better superiority and better roads.

 

North Africa: Apparently tried to apply the lessons of colonial warfare, got into a static position and was defeated piecemeal, then fell apart in the withdrawal until the allies cut their line of retreat at Beda Fomm and then another incompetently led battle ended up in disaster.

 

It didn't got into static position, static position is the normal non motorized units.

An ad.hoc Armored Brigade was formed with newly build M13/40 but never trained as whole, or even parts and its units were drawn to any place that commander said.

 

At war start Italy had 3 armored divisions on tankettes. 2 motorised divisions and an independent tank regiment of 72 M11/39. All of them in Italy except one of armored division in Albania. Until end of 1940 around 100 M13/40 arrived but no radio and not trained.

 

 

No plans to establish a landline to Libya, and no hope of relief.

 

 

First part doesn't make any sense. There are thousand of kilometers between East Africa and North Africa.

Second part, the answer is the supposed September Peace Conference.

 

 

Some stuff people don't know much about:

Until late 1941, the fortifications in the border with Austria(Germany) were still being increased and prepared.

Regia Aeronautica ended the war almost same number aircraft bombs than those that it start.

The quantity of dropped bombs in WW2 were comparable of those dropped in Spanish Civil War a theater 2000km away with a much smaller bomber force.

Regia Aeronautica had around 150 bombers in Sicily at war start, they only dropped 700 t of bombs in Malta in 1940.

More than 1/3 of fighter force was still in Fiat Cr.32.

Navy started the war with only 2 operational Battleships - if we can call Battleships to 320mm gun units.

 

------------------------

 

Some of what was said is correct. Bayonets was what mattered to Mussolini. Or more correctly Propaganda. Training was not priority.

 

Italy didn't wanted war. Not even Mussolini.

[Marek Tucan]

Do not forget that the initial debacle in Africa went by large part to the units involved being basically "colonial policing force". Heck, the antitank defense relied on 65mm mountain guns from pre WWI firing HE!

 

Still if the commander of theater was good, even outgunned and outnumbered the Italians managed to hold for a long time (Abyssinia). And Italian units saved Rommel's bacon on more than one occasion while he was off playing at battalion commander.

[irregularmedic]

Poor logistics also hit the Germans and the Russians, not to speak about the Japanese. Leadership, sure but why?, regarding equipment they had good and bad weapons like everyone else, but it wouldnt bite them initially, and poor causes were galore in ww2 but it didnt hinder the Soviets ir the Germans.

 

What good systems did they have?

Edited October 21, 2014 by irregularmedic

[lucklucky]

Their bombers and fighters had 12.7mm from outset. Brandt based 81mm mortar, 8mm machine gun were okay, 90mm gun was good, the Carcano was okay , their torpedoes usually exploded even if the charge was weak. Trucks were good. Battleships and late cruisers were good, Gabbiano ASW corvette was good, MC200 was okay while MC 202 and the 5 series were good - due also to German engine -. Naval Special Forces were the better there was around.

[Marek Tucan]

Apart from 90mm, there were also good 75mm AA guns around.

[Detonable]

Their twin engine torpedo bomber probably wasn't bad, compared to current single engined USN and IJN machines.

[bojan]

SM.79 was good but becoming rapidly obsolete.

[Brian Kennedy]

Like lucklucky pointed out, all of the 5-series fighters were considered by western pilots who flew them to be the equal of anything out there. (I think eric brown raved about at least one of them).

[alejandro_]

Like lucklucky pointed out, all of the 5-series fighters were considered by western pilots who flew them to be the equal of anything out there. (I think eric brown raved about at least one of them).

 

He tried them one after the other. IIRC they were lined up for him to test. He said he felt like if you are given a Lamborghini, Bugatti and Ferrari to test...

[swerve]

The top-scoring MC.205 Veltro pilot is still alive, aged 97 - Luigi Gorrini.

[lucklucky]

 

Their twin engine torpedo bomber probably wasn't bad, compared to current single engined USN and IJN machines.

It wasn't a twin, it was a three engine torpedo bomber Savoia S.79 .

It was very good but in 1943 a design from 1934 is outdated even using ethanol to reach 470km/h , that is almost 200km/h slower than the best fighters at time.

But i think the concept of medium bomber that could not reach at least fighter speed was outdated. Without air superiority what could survive at that time could be only Mosquitos types.

 

S.79 points to the one of biggest issues with Italian Armed Forces: Engines. Based on foreign designs, lacking power.

Also Italian Airforce and Army were caught in a transition period.

 

DH Clarke also liked one of 0 serie C.200 while lamenting not have access to one of series 2 : C.202

 

 

"Acid Test"

As soon as Rommel began to retreat from Alamein, nearly every pilot in 239 Wing was determined to find a serviceable German or Italian aircraft to play with. It was not long before a Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79 - "Desert Lily" - and later a Heinkel 111, were making regular Cairo runs taking Wing personnel on leave and returning loaded with luxuries of food and drink to share around the five squadrons (Nos. 450,250,3,260 and 112).

Bf.109's,Fiat C.R.42's and Stukas became commonplace; a Bf.108, Fiat G.50, Fieseler Storch and a Henschel 126 were amongst the rare acquisitions; but the one type which everybody wanted to fly remained elusive until the Italian capitulation in 1943 - the exceptional, but to us, accursed, Macchi C.202.

 

Sleek, supremely fast - the sight of their high, white-crossed fin would have struck fear into our hearts had the Italians pressed home their attacks. The odd pilot proved that the 202 was capable of mixing it in a dogfight - out-turning our P-40s with ease; but the majority would pull away effortlessly into a climbing roll or a roll off the top when things became at all hectic. There is nothing more exasperating, when you are caning fifty-four inches of boost out of an engine, than to see your enemy indulge in carefree aerobatics; but although we did our damnedest to get near enough to shoot at them,we seldom succeeded. Their aircraft was superior to ours on all counts. No wonder we wanted to fly one.

 

Throughout the advance I made a point of being the first to arrive at any captured airstrip, but the 202's had always been systematically destroyed: axes, sledge-hammers - even acid was used. There were always plenty of other types left in serviceable condition, but the Italians seemed to know that we wanted a 202 and they destroyed the lot! As far as I know only one was found - by the SAAF's - but they kept it to themlselves and I never had a chance to fly it.

Still, I did discover the next best thing - a Macchi C.200.

 

I found it at Sorman, an attractive palm-surrounded aerodrome on a hard-surfaced salt lake, halfway along the coast between Tripoli and Zuara. There were some 30/40 C.R.42's and Macchi 200's parked around the two white stucco hangars, every one badly damaged; but a 200 stood in solitary splendour, apparently newly delivered, and the only damage was a smashed windscreen, as though the pilot had childishly heaved a spanner at it before fleeing with the rest of the ground staff. Happily I chalked the squadron markings - LD - on its shiny fuselage, organised a fitter and rigger to give it a thorough check, and three days later I ferried it to our temporary airstrip at El Assa: Macchi C.200 MM 5285 was mine!

 

And what a beauty she was! Although in the end she tried to kill me, it was not her fault, and even now I look back on the few hours I flew in her with considerable pleasure.

The cockpit was roomy and open, with no sliding roof to obstruct vision. Instead, two Perspex flaps closed on each side so that when you were shut in it seemed as if your head was part of the external fittings, and that the rest of you was entirely separate inside.

With only a slim headfairing behind, visibility was perfect: without effort you could see right under the tail - a feat which could only be accomplished in a P-40 by sxcessive weaving or by opening the hood.

There was no bullet-proof windscreen, and although the seat of moulded armour-plate looked pretty it did not give the protection we had in British aircraft. Armament was poor, too: only two machine guns, which were concealed in the fuselage and fired through the airscrew - but ammunition indicators in the cockpit (a useful luxury), registering up to 370 round per gun, showed that a poor shot would have plenty of chances. The finger trigger to fire the guns was on the simple stick-type control column.

 

There were two airspeed indicators, with a pitot head on each wing-tip; rather confusing, but very interesting during a gliding turn. The rest of the instruments were efficient, but not so elaborate as in our fighters, and the only real peculiarity was the throttle lever which worked in reverse: a difficult point to remember when taxying! The engine, an 840 hp Fiat A.74 RC38 radial, was a joy of a sewing machine. I remember being astonished when, at only 1,700 revs, the indicator speed was 365 kms/h - nearly 230 mph! My impression was, and still is, that she was as fast as a Hurricane I, and certainly more manoeuvrable.

The take-off run was fantastically short after being used to our heavy P-40's. The handling qualities were finger-light under all conditions. I had some practice dogfights with Hurricane IIs, Kittyhawk III's and Spitfire V's and found I could turn inside all of them.

Although they were faster - the Hurricane only just - the Spitfire was the only one which could outclimb the Macchi 200.

 

The only bad habit I found in her was the way she dropped her starboard wing - suddenly, without warning - just before touch-down. It was odd, because she did not do it when test-stalled in the air. But it was her only vice, and the wide undercarriage prevented damage providing the hold-off was not too high. Otherwise it was best to make a wheel landing - a performance I have never liked.

Summing up, if the 202 bore any resemblance to my 200, then the Eyeties should have been knocking down our Kittyhawks like ninepins; and , earlier on in the war, the 200's should have done much better than they did.

I lost my Macchi on March 5th, 1943.

 

I taxied out for an exhibition dogfight, turned into wind, pulled the throttle open and eased the stick forward. The tail bumped once, twice, but instead of lifting as it should have done, it suddenly dropped and the nose cocked high into the air. I slammed the throttle forward and switched off, thinking I had hit a soft patch of sand.

But when I scrambled out of the cockpit and saw that the whole tail assembly had broken away from the canted fuselage I knew that I had been very, very lucky.

The Italians HAD used acid after all!

 

 

 

 

And if i am not mistaken Fiat G.50 another 0 series which was not much liked by Italian pilots gave one of the best air-air ratios Finish hands.

[RETAC21]

When Mussolini got afraid Germans will get to Nice too fast, ordered a general offensive without even major artillery being prepared because the army was said to be in defensive position. 5 days land war in the Alps followed and armistice.

So? it's still incompetence, specially for an Army that apparently didn't learn anything on the Isonzo.

 

 

Well the invasion of Greece, another political design, born at first by Mussolini being irritated with Hitler after learned that Romania had German troops.

Navy and Air Force were only informed at last moment since this was an Army project that violated even the Army plans concerning the attack against Greece.

So there wasn't even a real preparation. It was another bet.

So it was started in Autumn, the start of rain and snow season with 1:1 in land forces in mountainous territory without real roads.

 

Sometimes the debacle is overplayed, Allies didn't moved much either in Italy against Germans in wet season. With much more/better superiority and better roads.

Another case of poor planning and execution then. "Bad" weapons or a poor cause didn't play a part, it was an incompetent Army with a poor plan badly executed. You can't blame Benito for that.

 

 

It didn't got into static position, static position is the normal non motorized units.

An ad.hoc Armored Brigade was formed with newly build M13/40 but never trained as whole, or even parts and its units were drawn to any place that commander said.

 

At war start Italy had 3 armored divisions on tankettes. 2 motorised divisions and an independent tank regiment of 72 M11/39. All of them in Italy except one of armored division in Albania. Until end of 1940 around 100 M13/40 arrived but no radio and not trained.

If you are referring to the Maletti Group, it was destroyed on a static position at Nibiewa (see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maletti_Group). Other had the excuse of lack of experience, but not the Italians who had just wrapped up a "modern" war in Spain from which they failed to draw lessons.

 

 

No plans to establish a landline to Libya, and no hope of relief.

First part doesn't make any sense. There are thousand of kilometers between East Africa and North Africa.

Second part, the answer is the supposed September Peace Conference.

 

Thousands of empty kilometers, which actually amount to about 400 Km more than Tripoli to Cairo.

 

 

Some stuff people don't know much about:

Until late 1941, the fortifications in the border with Austria(Germany) were still being increased and prepared.

Regia Aeronautica ended the war almost same number aircraft bombs than those that it start.

The quantity of dropped bombs in WW2 were comparable of those dropped in Spanish Civil War a theater 2000km away with a much smaller bomber force.

Regia Aeronautica had around 150 bombers in Sicily at war start, they only dropped 700 t of bombs in Malta in 1940.

More than 1/3 of fighter force was still in Fiat Cr.32.

Navy started the war with only 2 operational Battleships - if we can call Battleships to 320mm gun units.

 

------------------------

 

Some of what was said is correct. Bayonets was what mattered to Mussolini. Or more correctly Propaganda. Training was not priority.

 

Italy didn't wanted war. Not even Mussolini.

It should be noted though that the convenience of blaming Mussolini also masks the incompetence of the High Command. When Mussolini was not around, they managed to hand over the country to the Germans.

[RETAC21]

Another success story were the MAS boats, which managed to get the biggest bag for a torpedo boat in WW2 when they torpedoed HMS Manchester.

[baboon6]

Another success story were the MAS boats, which managed to get the biggest bag for a torpedo boat in WW2 when they torpedoed HMS Manchester.

The near-suicidal explosive motor boats operated by 10 MAS ( mostly of course known for their underwater operations) crippled HMS York at Suda Bay:

 

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raid_on_Souda_Bay

[Yama]

And if i am not mistaken Fiat G.50 another 0 series which was not much liked by Italian pilots gave one of the best air-air ratios Finish hands.

Fiat was reportedly a delight to handle, supposedly even compared to Macchi. It was also extremely durable airframe, with structural limit no less than 14G's, and capable of dive speeds up to 800km/h. However, the performance was not really up to the snuff: range was short, and top speed was about on par with MS.406, much slower than Macchi or Hurricane. Worse, it was a maintenance nightmare: especially the engine which used ricin oil. That stuff might have worked on Mediterranean, but not on Arctic Winter.

[Marcello]

Note that italian 12.7mm was a 12.7 x 81 mm with MV around 765 m/s. Further, on fighters it was typically synchronized to fire through the propeller, so ROF was lower too. The only advantage vs allied equivalent was an explosive round that was available in some quantity.

Further, while most armies were stuck with bolt action rifles they often had something decent to back it up, like the MG34, the Bren or whatever. The Breda 30 was a collection of scrap metal pretending to be a support weapon, or so one hears.

But really, these are details, big picture is what matter. And big picture is that Italy lacked the industrial capacity and raw materials to wage war on a grand scale. Still, if Mussolini had focused on preparing for an European war, avoiding wasting resources in empire building in eastern Africa etc, stockpiling strategic materials, making serious plans, fighting on a more limited number of fronts etc. etc it might still have been possible to put up a decent performance until supplies lasted and/or the americans showed up with overwhelming amounts of materials. That was not done either.

 

As for the MAS, that is a typical situation. The MAS 500 built before the war were really fit only for calm sea, apparently no one saw the problem with that, it is not like they could expect to fight mostly in the Adriatic again. After the initial "Oh @#$" moment german Schnellboot captured from Jugoslavia had to be copied. A sizable oceanic submarine fleet was built pre/war with only pretty vague ideas about what it was supposed to do and minimal testing in oceanic conditions. And so on, even when some resources were available they were often wasted.

Edited October 22, 2014 by Marcello

[lucklucky]

 

And if i am not mistaken Fiat G.50 another 0 series which was not much liked by Italian pilots gave one of the best air-air ratios Finish hands.

Fiat was reportedly a delight to handle, supposedly even compared to Macchi. It was also extremely durable airframe, with structural limit no less than 14G's, and capable of dive speeds up to 800km/h. However, the performance was not really up to the snuff: range was short, and top speed was about on par with MS.406, much slower than Macchi or Hurricane. Worse, it was a maintenance nightmare: especially the engine which used ricin oil. That stuff might have worked on Mediterranean, but not on Arctic Winter.

 

Yes another Italian plane made with too strong fuselage.

The numbers tell that in Finish hands was a successful machine, and they could use other kind of oil. The engine was the same as the Macchi and considered super reliable in Mediterranean temperatures.

The Bis version increased the range from late 1940. The first version was designed with an integral grenade dispenser and in Bis this was for a fuel tank.

[Markus Becker]

Their twin engine torpedo bomber probably wasn't bad, compared to current single engined USN and IJN machines.

 

Wasn't the SM.79 the most successful land based torpedo bomber of the war?

[Ken Estes]

That would have to be the IJN G4M Betty.

[Al]

 

Their twin engine torpedo bomber probably wasn't bad, compared to current single engined USN and IJN machines.

 

Wasn't the SM.79 the most successful land based torpedo bomber of the war?

 

 

Osprey just recently released the latest in their Combat Aircraft series that covers the SM.79 (one of Osprey's better productions, IMO ). Not having read much about the plane I was surprised how much success it did have. The book also has some pretty remarkable photos of the SM.79 in action.