Market Garden Through The Eyes Of A German War Photographer

[Stuart Galbraith]

Incidentally, im constantly amazed how many 'Bridge too far' fans there are out there....

[Rich]

 

Rich wrote: I like that description...in "thrall". I recently went through a cycle arguing with a "Gavin was just a young inexperienced jumped up incompetent who couldn't see how important the Nijmegen Bridge was and so wasted his time defending against a nonexistent counterattack from the Reichswald" guy on WW2 Forums.

 

Oh FFS, I assume he was a Brit. Sometimes my fellow countrymen's level of ignorance is embarrassing given the truth about that has been in plain sight for decades. It's interesting to speculate how Gavin would have done it without Browning's interference and how it might have turned out.

 

 

 

I don't remember where I ran across the administrative details that mentioned that. It may have been in the 21st AG Admin History? I'll see if I can dig it back up.

 

Cheers, be interesting to hear & prolly relevant now I've finished...

 

BillB

 

 

Interestingly enough, no, he is an American in the Southwest, who likes to shoot rattlesnakes from his porch. Not sure where he got the hairshirt regarding Gavin, but he was really vehement about it. He also believed Gavin had a vendetta against the M1 Carbine and had all his troops armed with the Garand because of it, which somehow caused them to turn in a "poor performance". Oh, and in Normandy "everybody performed poorly" although he didn't blame Gavin directly for that, but rather the poor drops. It was truly all a bit surreal. Anyway, here's a bit from the Admin History 21 Army Gp...

 

9. Operation MARKET GARDEN

This operation, which was really a combination of two, merits special mention for three reasons; firstly that it was undertaken at a time when the administrative resources of Second Army were strained to the utmost, but the administrative risk involved was considered to be worth the tactical advantage that might be gained; secondly it was the first large-scale operation by airborne troops in front of forces already established on the ground in an attempt to secure a large slice of enemy-held territory to which the advancing ground troops could come up to re-organise; thirdly two US airborne divisions were involved as well as 1 British Airborne Division. The airborne part of the operation was entitled operation MARKET while that of the ground forces was operation GARDEN for which 30 Corps was made responsible.

(a) build-up

In the middle of September stocks in No 6 Army Roadhead were not only low but the roadhead itself was too far behind and suffered from the dis-advantage of having BRUSSELS interposed between it and the forward troops. As already stated, the lines of communication to the RMA at BAYEUX were stretched to the limit. It would have been desirable to have had a pause in order to re-establish the administration of both Second Army and First Canadian Army on a sound footing. However, no such pause was possible if operation MARKET GARDEN was to be launched successfully before the enemy had fully recovered from the effects of their retreat. The administrative build-up was not helped by the fact that the operation involved heavy bridging commitments which meant that in addition to the bridging companies which had to be transported forward it was necessary to make available nearly eight hundred three-ton vehicles to assist in lifting forward bridging equipment from the RMA. This involved six and ten-ton lorries being employed on lifting supplies and other uneconomical loads for such vehicles. However, part of a fast road convoy designated "Red Ball" was made available by US forces to bring five hundred tons daily into No 6 Army Roadhead. The main delivery from this method consisted of MT 80 and special requirements of ammunition and stores for 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions. Tank transporters modified for load carrying were also successfully employed and actually, in the eight weeks commencing on 14 September, they lifted a total of 22,450 tons over a distance of 194,000 loaded miles. These methods in conjunction with the air lift mentioned in para 6 proved successful in mitigating the administrative difficulties of the operation.

( maintenance of US forces

82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions were maintained from BRITISH stocks as far as common user items were concerned eg POL and supplies, although later US rations were obtained and issued. Non common user items such as ammunition, ordnance, signal and engineer stores were delivered from Communication Zone in daily packs either by the "Red Ball" route or by rail to No 6 Army Roadhead whence they were lifted to 161 FMC at BOURG LEOPOLD.

© general maintenance

Until 16 September all formations and corps troops under command 30 Corps were based on 160 FMC in the BRUSSELS area while ammunition was drawn from No 6 Army Roadhead. On 17 September 161 FMC was to be opened in the BOURG LEOPOLD area for the maintenance of the US airborne divisions, corps troops and the seaborne element of 52 Division. It was planned to open 162 FMC in the ARNHEM area on D+3 for the maintenance of Guards Armoured Division, 43 and 50 Divisions, 1 Airborne Division, 8 Armoured Brigade and corps troops forward of the river WAAL. The maintenance of corps, army and GHQ RE attached to divisions was the responsibility of the divisions concerned. With the exception of Guards Armoured Division who were ordered to hold eight days' supplies and two hundred miles of POL and all corps troops who were restricted to four days' supplies and one hundred and fifty miles of POL, all the formations within 30 Corps were to hold six days' supplies and two hundred and fifty miles of POL per vehicle. They were also ordered to carry double second line holdings of 25 pr ammunition but were warned that after that they might have to carry on with depleted second line holdings due to shortage of stocks.

(d) maintenance of airborne troops

The airborne formations were to be maintained by air from D to D+5 but plans were also made for maintenance in an emergency of 82 and 101 US Airborne Divisions from 161 FMC with effect from D-day and of 1 Airborne Division from 162 FMC with effect from D+3. In the event of extreme emergency First Allied Airborne Army were prepared to land one hundred and fifty tons of US ammunition at BRUSSELS airport which would then be carried forward to the US formations by road.

(e) transport

Owing to lack of army transport still stretched to the limit along the L of C, 30 Corps were made responsible for their own third line transport lift from the roadhead to FMCs. This extra responsibility was partially met by ordering first and second line transport of the seaborne element of 52 Division to dump its commodities and G1098 equipment, thereby providing eight platoons of transport lift. All troop carrying transport less DUKWs was ordered to revert to 30 Corps control after transporting formations to their areas. Each division was also ordered to be prepared to accept corps tasks for five platoons of transport for an indefinite period. In addition to the above four US truck companies had been ordered to report by 18 September to 161 FMC whence they would be used to deliver commodities to US airborne divisions.

(f) medical

An interesting point to note is that in addition to the normal medical arrangements on a corps level the help of the DUTCH civilian authorities was obtained through the medium of Prince Bernhardt. Evacuation from divisional medical units was to be initially to civilian installations at BOURG LEOPOLD and later to CCSs to be established at ARNHEM and NIJMEGEN. For airborne units evacuation was to be initially into field ambulances of 30 Corps or direct to the CCSs mentioned above, while 9 Troop Carrier Command prepared to evacuate up to 750 casualties daily from BRUSSELS on the return journeys from supply missions. Medical supplies for airborne troops were to be dropped until D+4 inclusive.

(g) ordnance

Ordnance stores were received by both road and air, and arrangements were made for maximum loads to be forwarded to divisional, armoured and infantry ordnance sub parks. These sub parks were attached to their formations and supplemented the tank and MT spares position. Arrangements were made for delivery by air of urgent demands such as MT spares, wireless valves etc. In addition, approximately one hundred tons of ordnance stores were landed at BAYEUX in three "bricks" each of about thirty-four tons. The critical transport situation delayed the arrival of these "bricks" in the operational area, but at least one was expected by D-day.

(h) REME

For repair work not more than one brigade workshop was to move with each formation but certain formation workshops were to remain on wheels while the remainder stayed in existing locations. The principle for recovery was that all casualties were to be removed from the road for forward recovery only. The APM 30 Corps was allotted two light recovery sections for work at traffic control posts.

(j) the movement problem

The movement problem for 30 Corps was a very difficult one as it involved the tactical movement of approximately 20,000 vehicles across HOLLAND along one route supplemented by a subsidiary route. This subsidiary route did not avoid bottlenecks and so was not a complete second route. Quite clearly the whole essence of the success of the operation lay in an efficient traffic control organisation and good march discipline. Traffic control was exercised through three regulating HQs each of which controlled three traffic control posts with wireless communications between the TCPs and the regulating HQ. The importance of speed in the advance was impressed on all ranks. It was laid down that movement would take place by day only. Formations and units would harbour along the road each night retaining their order of priority. They would be fed into the axis as road space became available. For the first forty-eight hours rearward movement was to be restricted to an absolute minimum.

(k) the operation

D-day was 17 September and the automatic drop for all formations of the airborne corps was successfully carried out. On 18 September, however, maintenance by air of 1 British Airborne Division was not successful owing to intense enemy flak making the dropping inaccurate. 82 US Airborne Division was successfully supplied while 101 US Airborne Division had taken with them sufficient supplies and ammunition for the first forty-eight hours. By 20 September the US truck companies had arrived. All three airborne divisions continued to be maintained by air although not adequately due to inaccurate dropping as a result of heavy flak and misty weather. On 21 September it was obviously operationally impossible to establish 162 FMC in the area of ARNHEM and so an alternative site was chosen in the GRAVE area. During this day the L of C was cut by the enemy but luckily a large GERMAN supply dump was captured at OSS and this proved of great value. On 22 September the maintenance lift for 82 US Airborne Division was held up owing to the "cut" across the L of C but the lift to 101 US Airborne Division arrived successfully. The L of C was cleared on 23 September and the lift was then delivered to 82 US Airborne Division. Tour platoons carrying POL which had been held up until the L of C was clear and seven ammunition platoons were despatched to stock 162 FMC at GRAVE. 10 CCS was established at NIJMEGEN as also was 3 CCS which had been originally scheduled for ARNHEM. 163 Field Ambulance moved forward to DRIEL (6875) to evacuate airborne casualties in DUKWs over the River NEDER RIJN. The L of C was again cut on 24 September and three of the ammunition platoons despatched the previous night failed to reach 162 FMC while the other four were prevented from returning. A Gilbertian situation occurred on this day at the GERMAN supply dump at OSS as the second line RASC company of 8 Armoured Brigade took seventy-five prisoners of war from enemy elements they routed whom they discovered trying to use the dump at the same time as they were. As forward maintenance was proving impossible, all available transport resources were concentrated on the task of building up stocks in 161 FMC. The L of C to GRAVE was eventually restored on the evening of 25 September but by this time it had been decided to withdraw 1 British Airborne Division and the operation came to a halt. The total number of prisoners of war captured during the period was, officers - 26, ORs - 1,040.

[RETAC21]

If we are going to get serious I would like to contrast something I read some time ago. Apparently German recovery was "helped" by the failed coup of July 20th as Fromm and the people involved in Valkyrie had been cooking the books to be sure they had enough manpower, so once the coup failed, the plotters were shot, etc. and the administration sorted itself, the Fuhrer suddenly found he had plenty of bodies lying idle, ready to beef up cadre units and set up new ones. Thoughts?

[Rich]

If we are going to get serious I would like to contrast something I read some time ago. Apparently German recovery was "helped" by the failed coup of July 20th as Fromm and the people involved in Valkyrie had been cooking the books to be sure they had enough manpower, so once the coup failed, the plotters were shot, etc. and the administration sorted itself, the Fuhrer suddenly found he had plenty of bodies lying idle, ready to beef up cadre units and set up new ones. Thoughts?

 

I would be surprised if that was truly the case. I believe it is an inference.

 

The Ersatzheer breakdown as of 1 February 1944 was:

1,062,884 Wehrmacht and OT personnel in headquarters, administration, ordnance, veterinary, and medical organizations, cadre in replacement and training units, school personnel, and regional security units (306,701 alone)

541,000 were recruits and replacements

82,000 were convalescents

129,000 were hospitalized men fit for garrison duty

88,000 were officer and NCO candidates in schools, men at training courses, in prisons etc.

20,000 were recruits for the 21 Welle divisions

258,401 were convalescents in units

628,211 were wounded and sick in hospitals

85,822 were hospital medical personnel

150,000 were civilian workers and employees

3-million

 

The Ersatzheer breakdown as of 1 September 1944 was:

680,745 Wehrmacht and OT personnel in headquarters, administration, ordnance, veterinary, and medical organizations, cadre in replacement and training units, school personnel, and regional security units (237,886 alone)

452,467 were Wehrmacht replacements including convalescents in the Reich

30,414 were OT replacements including convalescents outside the Reich

161,377 were Wehrmacht convalescents in units

17,079 were OT convalescents in units

657,910 were Wehrmacht in hospitals

27.304 were Wehrmacht on work leave (critical personnel released from front service)

110,677 were administrative overhead including officers, officials (Beamte), and technical command (Sonderfeuhrer)

127,685 were civilian workers and employees

2.26-million

 

Unfortunately, not perfect congruence in categorization. The main difference appears to be in the reduction of static security forces inside and outside of Germany, but the change really reflects that the large number of Reserve-Divisionen in the Ersatzheer were transferred to the Feldheer in August 1944, not so much as a result of the Putsch, but because they had been serving outside the Reich as operational occupational units for years.

[bojan]

...I suspect the difference was in the propellant; the M2 powder used seven perforations per grain and a 0.025" web, while the M3 used single perforations and a 0.014" web. I'm just not sure how the difference would affect ballistics.

 

One hole = constant rate of burn - as an outside diameter decreases inside one increases.

Seven holes = progressive propellant - while outside diameter decreases inside one increases multiple times faster.

Projectiles and case were the same.

This was probably done in order for charges 1-5 to have same MV from both weapons, so same ballistic tables could be used.

 

So if M3 M2 charges muzzle velocity would have been lower, so ballistic tables could not be used.

M2 using M3 charges would lead to the overpressure (through M2 could handle it as it would be lower than it' top charges,), resulting in the higher muzzle velocity, and again not compatible with ballistic tables.

 

So does not look really interchangeable, but I will see if I have any local sources for those two, as those usually notes explicitly if something was or was not interchangeable...

[Rich]

T. Moffatt Burriss just died.

[bojan]

...

So does not look really interchangeable, but I will see if I have any local sources for those two, as those usually notes explicitly if something was or was not interchangeable...

 

 

Stranger and strange - 1967. manual (only one I have, 1954. one would be more useful ) says that M3 can use M2 ammo, with a loss of 10% of the muzzle velocity. Ballistic calculator (I guess it was a slide-rule?) will give you new ranges for those, since they have correction for a velocity. Special care must be taken to never fire those with charges 6 and 7.

So M3 could use M2 ammo, and efficiently if they were provided with a "ballistic calculator".

 

OTOH nothing in either 1967th manual for M2, M56 or M18/61 says anything about M3 ammo use in those. My guess is that original M3 ammo was used by that time and what little (if any) use M3 howitzers saw after that was with M2 ammo.

[BillB]

Rich wrote: Interestingly enough, no, he is an American in the Southwest, who likes to shoot rattlesnakes from his porch. Not sure where he got the hairshirt regarding Gavin, but he was really vehement about it. He also believed Gavin had a vendetta against the M1 Carbine and had all his troops armed with the Garand because of it, which somehow caused them to turn in a "poor performance". Oh, and in Normandy "everybody performed poorly" although he didn't blame Gavin directly for that, but rather the poor drops. It was truly all a bit surreal. Anyway, here's a bit from the Admin History 21 Army Gp...

 

 

Well that's a surprise, assumed it would be a Brit as I've seen the same misguided criticism over Nijmegen & the Groesbeek Heights levelled at Gavin a few times by Brits. i suppose we have eccentrics & weirdos on both sides of the Pond, ours just tend not to be armed...

 

Cheers for putting up the stuff from 21st Army Group history, seen most of that but not in one lump like that. Ref the bit about 30 Corps need for speed, I note there is no mention of the 30 Corps order forbidding any vehicle movement whatsoever on the main axis during the hours of darkness, which reduced the window for movement to just twelve hours in every twenty-four hour period.

 

BillB

[BillB]

If we are going to get serious I would like to contrast something I read some time ago. Apparently German recovery was "helped" by the failed coup of July 20th as Fromm and the people involved in Valkyrie had been cooking the books to be sure they had enough manpower, so once the coup failed, the plotters were shot, etc. and the administration sorted itself, the Fuhrer suddenly found he had plenty of bodies lying idle, ready to beef up cadre units and set up new ones. Thoughts?

 

To add to Rich's detail, I'm not sure there is any evidence to support this during MARKET GARDEN. AFAIK most of the German units employed were already in Holland backed with a few reinforcements from training establishments in Western Germany or detachments directed to Holland from units en route to somewhere else. Overall the Holland thing was fought on a shoestring, which doesn't suggest plenty of spare bodies, although the latter might have been directed elsewhere I suppose.

 

BillB

[BillB]

T. Moffatt Burriss just died.

 

Oh dear, that's a shame. He must have been knocking on a bit. RIP.

 

BillB

[Rich]

 

Rich wrote: Interestingly enough, no, he is an American in the Southwest, who likes to shoot rattlesnakes from his porch. Not sure where he got the hairshirt regarding Gavin, but he was really vehement about it. He also believed Gavin had a vendetta against the M1 Carbine and had all his troops armed with the Garand because of it, which somehow caused them to turn in a "poor performance". Oh, and in Normandy "everybody performed poorly" although he didn't blame Gavin directly for that, but rather the poor drops. It was truly all a bit surreal. Anyway, here's a bit from the Admin History 21 Army Gp...

 

 

Well that's a surprise, assumed it would be a Brit as I've seen the same misguided criticism over Nijmegen & the Groesbeek Heights levelled at Gavin a few times by Brits. i suppose we have eccentrics & weirdos on both sides of the Pond, ours just tend not to be armed...

 

Cheers for putting up the stuff from 21st Army Group history, seen most of that but not in one lump like that. Ref the bit about 30 Corps need for speed, I note there is no mention of the 30 Corps order forbidding any vehicle movement whatsoever on the main axis during the hours of darkness, which reduced the window for movement to just twelve hours in every twenty-four hour period.

 

BillB

 

 

He is a bit of a queer egg...I understand he got mauled by a grizzly at one point in his life, so he has an excuse.

 

Cheers back at you. I was not aware of that odd restriction.

[Rich]

 

If we are going to get serious I would like to contrast something I read some time ago. Apparently German recovery was "helped" by the failed coup of July 20th as Fromm and the people involved in Valkyrie had been cooking the books to be sure they had enough manpower, so once the coup failed, the plotters were shot, etc. and the administration sorted itself, the Fuhrer suddenly found he had plenty of bodies lying idle, ready to beef up cadre units and set up new ones. Thoughts?

 

To add to Rich's detail, I'm not sure there is any evidence to support this during MARKET GARDEN. AFAIK most of the German units employed were already in Holland backed with a few reinforcements from training establishments in Western Germany or detachments directed to Holland from units en route to somewhere else. Overall the Holland thing was fought on a shoestring, which doesn't suggest plenty of spare bodies, although the latter might have been directed elsewhere I suppose.

 

BillB

 

 

I think part of the confusion is with regards to the Walküre divisions of the 17. and 20. Welle in late 1941 and early 1942 and then later the Walküre units earmarked as part of the 20 July Attentat. They were ten regimental-sized KG and absorbed 14,000 Ersatz in January 1944 and another 7,000 in February, totaling some 50,000 by August ...when to confuse things even more they instituted another Walküre program, which along with Gneisenau and Blücher began stripping the Ersatzheer of manpower from its administrative and training units, combined them with Landesschützen and Feldheer units to create new units for the Feldheer...instead of acting as replacements for existing units.

[Rich]

 

T. Moffatt Burriss just died.

 

Oh dear, that's a shame. He must have been knocking on a bit. RIP.

 

BillB

 

 

I'm waiting for someone to opine he was done in by the Trilateral Commission.

[RETAC21]

 

Rich wrote: Interestingly enough, no, he is an American in the Southwest, who likes to shoot rattlesnakes from his porch. Not sure where he got the hairshirt regarding Gavin, but he was really vehement about it. He also believed Gavin had a vendetta against the M1 Carbine and had all his troops armed with the Garand because of it, which somehow caused them to turn in a "poor performance". Oh, and in Normandy "everybody performed poorly" although he didn't blame Gavin directly for that, but rather the poor drops. It was truly all a bit surreal. Anyway, here's a bit from the Admin History 21 Army Gp...

 

 

Well that's a surprise, assumed it would be a Brit as I've seen the same misguided criticism over Nijmegen & the Groesbeek Heights levelled at Gavin a few times by Brits. i suppose we have eccentrics & weirdos on both sides of the Pond, ours just tend not to be armed...

 

Cheers for putting up the stuff from 21st Army Group history, seen most of that but not in one lump like that. Ref the bit about 30 Corps need for speed, I note there is no mention of the 30 Corps order forbidding any vehicle movement whatsoever on the main axis during the hours of darkness, which reduced the window for movement to just twelve hours in every twenty-four hour period.

 

BillB

 

 

Re your last, have you read Corps Commanders. Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-45 by Douglas E. Delaney? has a shot bio on Horrocks but also compares him to other Corps commanders (mainly of Canadian persuasion).

 

One mistake that is repeated is trying to cram too much traffic through too few roads, and that happened on both sides at different times as a commander tries to put more combat power to achieve an objective as fast as possible creating massive traffic jams.

[Rich]

 

 

Rich wrote: Interestingly enough, no, he is an American in the Southwest, who likes to shoot rattlesnakes from his porch. Not sure where he got the hairshirt regarding Gavin, but he was really vehement about it. He also believed Gavin had a vendetta against the M1 Carbine and had all his troops armed with the Garand because of it, which somehow caused them to turn in a "poor performance". Oh, and in Normandy "everybody performed poorly" although he didn't blame Gavin directly for that, but rather the poor drops. It was truly all a bit surreal. Anyway, here's a bit from the Admin History 21 Army Gp...

 

 

Well that's a surprise, assumed it would be a Brit as I've seen the same misguided criticism over Nijmegen & the Groesbeek Heights levelled at Gavin a few times by Brits. i suppose we have eccentrics & weirdos on both sides of the Pond, ours just tend not to be armed...

 

Cheers for putting up the stuff from 21st Army Group history, seen most of that but not in one lump like that. Ref the bit about 30 Corps need for speed, I note there is no mention of the 30 Corps order forbidding any vehicle movement whatsoever on the main axis during the hours of darkness, which reduced the window for movement to just twelve hours in every twenty-four hour period.

 

BillB

 

 

Re your last, have you read Corps Commanders. Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-45 by Douglas E. Delaney? has a shot bio on Horrocks but also compares him to other Corps commanders (mainly of Canadian persuasion).

 

One mistake that is repeated is trying to cram too much traffic through too few roads, and that happened on both sides at different times as a commander tries to put more combat power to achieve an objective as fast as possible creating massive traffic jams.

 

 

 

Er, somehow George Patton managed to put seven divisions in three corps through the Pontabault Bridge bottleneck - a single major road from Avranches feeding into it - over the course of three days, without major hiccups or traffic jams. I suspect it may have had something to do with high quality staff work and preparation, which is something a good commander needs to do if they want to put maximum combat power to bear to achieve an objective.

[RETAC21]

 

 

 

Rich wrote: Interestingly enough, no, he is an American in the Southwest, who likes to shoot rattlesnakes from his porch. Not sure where he got the hairshirt regarding Gavin, but he was really vehement about it. He also believed Gavin had a vendetta against the M1 Carbine and had all his troops armed with the Garand because of it, which somehow caused them to turn in a "poor performance". Oh, and in Normandy "everybody performed poorly" although he didn't blame Gavin directly for that, but rather the poor drops. It was truly all a bit surreal. Anyway, here's a bit from the Admin History 21 Army Gp...

 

 

Well that's a surprise, assumed it would be a Brit as I've seen the same misguided criticism over Nijmegen & the Groesbeek Heights levelled at Gavin a few times by Brits. i suppose we have eccentrics & weirdos on both sides of the Pond, ours just tend not to be armed...

 

Cheers for putting up the stuff from 21st Army Group history, seen most of that but not in one lump like that. Ref the bit about 30 Corps need for speed, I note there is no mention of the 30 Corps order forbidding any vehicle movement whatsoever on the main axis during the hours of darkness, which reduced the window for movement to just twelve hours in every twenty-four hour period.

 

BillB

 

 

Re your last, have you read Corps Commanders. Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-45 by Douglas E. Delaney? has a shot bio on Horrocks but also compares him to other Corps commanders (mainly of Canadian persuasion).

 

One mistake that is repeated is trying to cram too much traffic through too few roads, and that happened on both sides at different times as a commander tries to put more combat power to achieve an objective as fast as possible creating massive traffic jams.

 

 

 

Er, somehow George Patton managed to put seven divisions in three corps through the Pontabault Bridge bottleneck - a single major road from Avranches feeding into it - over the course of three days, without major hiccups or traffic jams. I suspect it may have had something to do with high quality staff work and preparation, which is something a good commander needs to do if they want to put maximum combat power to bear to achieve an objective.

 

 

Indeed, but this is one aspect that is often overlooked when assessing a commander.

Edited January 16, 2019 by RETAC21

[Tim the Tank Nut]

General Patton was an exceptional commander who had a fine staff even though they were regularly disparaged by First Army and General Bradley.

[BillB]

Sorry, been a bit busy.

 

RETAC21 wrote: Re your last, have you read Corps Commanders. Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-45 by Douglas E. Delaney? has a shot bio on Horrocks but also compares him to other Corps commanders (mainly of Canadian persuasion).

No mate not read that, might have to look it up. That said, I think Horrocks' problem was that he was unfit as he had't fully recovered from the effects of his wounding in Tunisia in June 1943. He got command of 30 Corps at the beginning of August 1944 by playing the Montgomery protege card with Alanbrooke, was taken ill at the end of that month, observers reported him not looking too good during MARKET GARDEN and he was ordered back to the UK on sick leave on 28 December 1944 where he remained for several weeks. I think his illness impaired his preparations for GARDEN and his ability to impress his will on his subordinate senior commanders; the commanders of the Guards Armoured Division and the 43rd Division repeatedly watered down or simply ignored his orders for haste without censure, which was in turn the primary reason for the failure of GARDEN.

 

RETAC21 wrote: One mistake that is repeated is trying to cram too much traffic through too few roads, and that happened on both sides at different times as a commander tries to put more combat power to achieve an objective as fast as possible creating massive traffic jams.

Actually I think this is only true of the very initial stages of GARDEN, and over the stage between the jump off point at Neerpelt and Eindhoven. The official records refer to bad traffic jams there on the night of 17-18 September, although that's not surprising given the proximity of the fighting and the Guards Armoured Division's failure to meet it's own timetable for progress. Thereafter the problem was the Germans temporarily cutting the Airborne Corridor between Eindhoven & Nijmegen on 22 & 24 September. By that point traffic was already flowing freely and reliably along the entire seventy-two mile length of the Airborne Corridor. 204 Field Company RE and 260 Field Company covered the entire length in c.16 hours on 20-21 September for example, while the 20th Field Company RCE did it in 8 hours 30 minutes on 21 September. IMO the traffic problems stuff is one of the red herrings subsequently manufactured to deflect blame for the failure of MARKET GARDEN, along with the single road (manufactured by the Guards Armoured Division to excuse not pushing on once the Nijmegen road bridge was secured and before anyone had seen the area north of the bridge due to it being dark) and the 1st Airborne Division landing on top of two SS Panzer Divisions...

BillB

[BillB]

 

 

 

Rich wrote: Interestingly enough, no, he is an American in the Southwest, who likes to shoot rattlesnakes from his porch. Not sure where he got the hairshirt regarding Gavin, but he was really vehement about it. He also believed Gavin had a vendetta against the M1 Carbine and had all his troops armed with the Garand because of it, which somehow caused them to turn in a "poor performance". Oh, and in Normandy "everybody performed poorly" although he didn't blame Gavin directly for that, but rather the poor drops. It was truly all a bit surreal. Anyway, here's a bit from the Admin History 21 Army Gp...

 

 

Well that's a surprise, assumed it would be a Brit as I've seen the same misguided criticism over Nijmegen & the Groesbeek Heights levelled at Gavin a few times by Brits. i suppose we have eccentrics & weirdos on both sides of the Pond, ours just tend not to be armed...

 

Cheers for putting up the stuff from 21st Army Group history, seen most of that but not in one lump like that. Ref the bit about 30 Corps need for speed, I note there is no mention of the 30 Corps order forbidding any vehicle movement whatsoever on the main axis during the hours of darkness, which reduced the window for movement to just twelve hours in every twenty-four hour period.

 

BillB

 

 

Re your last, have you read Corps Commanders. Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-45 by Douglas E. Delaney? has a shot bio on Horrocks but also compares him to other Corps commanders (mainly of Canadian persuasion).

 

One mistake that is repeated is trying to cram too much traffic through too few roads, and that happened on both sides at different times as a commander tries to put more combat power to achieve an objective as fast as possible creating massive traffic jams.

 

 

 

Er, somehow George Patton managed to put seven divisions in three corps through the Pontabault Bridge bottleneck - a single major road from Avranches feeding into it - over the course of three days, without major hiccups or traffic jams. I suspect it may have had something to do with high quality staff work and preparation, which is something a good commander needs to do if they want to put maximum combat power to bear to achieve an objective.

 

Indeed, and apart from the very initial stages 30 Corps managed to do pretty much the same up the Airborne Corridor from Neerpelt to Nijmegen over 4 days. Horrocks' staff were fine, see my reply to RETAC. It was his subordinate senior commanders that were the problem, specifically Major-General Allan Adair and Major-General Ivor Thomas.

 

BillB

[RETAC21]

 

Sorry, been a bit busy.

 

RETAC21 wrote: Re your last, have you read Corps Commanders. Five British and Canadian Generals at War, 1939-45 by Douglas E. Delaney? has a shot bio on Horrocks but also compares him to other Corps commanders (mainly of Canadian persuasion).

No mate not read that, might have to look it up. That said, I think Horrocks' problem was that he was unfit as he had't fully recovered from the effects of his wounding in Tunisia in June 1943. He got command of 30 Corps at the beginning of August 1944 by playing the Montgomery protege card with Alanbrooke, was taken ill at the end of that month, observers reported him not looking too good during MARKET GARDEN and he was ordered back to the UK on sick leave on 28 December 1944 where he remained for several weeks. I think his illness impaired his preparations for GARDEN and his ability to impress his will on his subordinate senior commanders; the commanders of the Guards Armoured Division and the 43rd Division repeatedly watered down or simply ignored his orders for haste without censure, which was in turn the primary reason for the failure of GARDEN.

 

Indeed, he suffered from a elongated stone in the liver caused by a piece of fabric that was left there after his wounding. it was only removed in 1947, but his health issues were significant enough that he retired from the Army shortly after WW2 and had to pay for his surgery in order to get the stone removed. In December it was noted that he was uncommonly grumpy and Monty sent him on leave. It could be that it wasn't in his character to stomp on subordinated as he had to thread lightly in Africa with Freyberg, being senior and NZ, who wasn't thrilled to have him as commander.