Market Garden Through The Eyes Of A German War Photographer

[wendist]

Ok! Ok! It's saturday evening and I have had some scotch. So sue me!

 

 

Edit: Removed a joke that was not nearly as funny as I first thought.

Edited January 6, 2019 by wendist

[Rich]

One other point on 30 Corps would be that an American Corps really would've had more supply and accessory equipment. That's just how the US does things. 30 Corps should've had twice the engineers and if the extra support wasn't available then the op shouldn't have happened. Even at the time it should have been obvious that the Germans would blow every bridge they could. It's what Germans do!

 

You'd think, but not in this case. The requirements of the pursuit meant that scads of units were grounded so their transport could be used to haul supplies, especially fuel. Meanwhile, U.S. supply was a mess with inadequate QM Truck companies (too many 2.5 ton truck companies and not enough heavier and more efficient companies) and not enough truck companies of any kind.

[Markus Becker]

But you still have a one road advance over the Rhine. Into that you have to bring up more forces to widen the gap, bring up fuel to continue the advance. And this is getting towards October, with the weather starting to go south. And 2 Months hence we know the Germans were up to launching a counterattack in the Ardennes. The failure might have prevented a far bigger disaster if we had stuck with it.

I wonder if the Ardennes offensive had been launched with Tommies one step away from the heart if the Ruhrgebiet. It's just 90km from Arnheim to Oberhausen.

[Adam_S]

IIRC the direct road from Nijmegen was very exposed, raised up relative to the surroundings and with very little cover. Advancing over it with unsupported armor would have been inadvisable.

 

Something that doesn't get enough attention IMO is the role that German infantry played all along the advance in launching counterattacks that either held up supplies or forced Allied infantry to stay and defend the line of advance rather than to support the main spearhead pushing forward.

[BillB]

Oh lord, I wish Bill B was still here.

You called? Haven't been away, I take a turn through here most days, just don't post much.

 

Apposite thread revival as I've just finished the rework of my Arnhem book after 8+ years work. Covers the whole thing airborne & ground day-by-day and often hour by hour, and lots of digging into the official records shows that all my speculation & conclusions from the first book were right, and in some instances it was worse than I suspected...

 

In short, the Arnhem bit failed due to poor leadership and planning at the division & brigade level, the Nijmegen bit succeeded despite poor leadership at the Airborne Corps level and the ground bit failed due to poor leadership at the Corps level.

 

BillB

[Stuart Galbraith]

Its been a while since I read the book (that you very kindly gave me). Do you think this could ever have worked? Ive always figured the German resurgence made it impossible anything worthwhile would be achieved when it was clear they were going to stand and fight.

 

Good to see you still here BTW. Look forward to seeing the rework.

Edited January 6, 2019 by Stuart Galbraith

[BillB]

I have always felt that the attempt was worthwhile. The Dutch suffered greatly that winter.

Agreed, especially as they came so close to pulling it off. Agree with Stuart that the cracking about on the North German Plain was never going to happen so late in the year and with the logistic & replacement problems though, although MARKET GARDEN did provide a perfect springboard for pushing up to & across the Rhine later.

 

BillB

[BillB]

 

Tim the Tank Nut wrote: SNIP

Is is true that Urquhart beat up Browning after the battle?

No, unfortunately. Urquhart did abandon his men during the evacuation to run back and apologise to Browning though, and he didn't find time to visit his men at the reception centre in Nijmegen either (although Browning did), partly because he was busy attending a dinner in his honour thrown by 1st Airborne Corps HQ. Which was nice.

 

One other point on 30 Corps would be that an American Corps really would've had more supply and accessory equipment. That's just how the US does things. 30 Corps should've had twice the engineers and if the extra support wasn't available then the op shouldn't have happened. Even at the time it should have been obvious that the Germans would blow every bridge they could. It's what Germans do!

I don't think supply was really a problem. Ref the bridges,apart from the Arnhem rail bridge the Germans only blew three of the dozen or so of those assigned to the Airborne divisions. The one at Son was repaired in a matter of hours and the three over the Maas-Waal Canal at Hatert, Malden & Honinghutie near Nijmegen didn't make all that much difference as they got the fourth at Molenhoek. Ref the bridging equipment, 30 Corps had more than enough Sappers and bridging equipment on hand:

 

The GARDEN order of battle included a Special Bridging Force (SBF) made up largely of Engineer and Service Corps units gathered from across 21^st Army Group and included the only Canadian units involved in MARKET GARDEN, in all totalling approximately 9,000 personnel and 2,277 vehicles. This force was...divided into three Army Group Royal Engineers (AGRE), each of which was assigned to crossings on specific watercourses; the 11^th AGRE was responsible for the River Maas, the 1^st Canadian AGRE for the Maas-Waal Canal and River Waal, and the 10^th AGRE for the Lower Rhine. The AGREs in turn controlled specifically configured bridging columns for each crossing. The column assigned to the Mass-Waal Canal contained 483 vehicles carrying the components for two Class 40 Bailey pontoon bridges while that for the River Waal consisted of 380 vehicles carrying nine Class 40 rafts to be followed by a single Class 40 Bailey pontoon bridge within seven days. The column assigned to the Lower Rhine consisted of 536 vehicles carrying a single Class 9 Folding Boat Equipment (F.B.E.) bridge to be followed by a single Class 40 Bailey pontoon bridge within twelve days; the initial arrangements on the Waal and Lower Rhine were to be augmented with additional Class 40 Bailey barge bridges within thirteen to eighteen days.

Some of these units & equipment was available within striking distance of the Lower Rhine as it was brought up to Nijmegen in case the 82nd Airborne didn't manage to get the road & rail bridges over the River Waal, and they were there from 20 September; why they weren't used is unclear.

BillB

[Tim the Tank Nut]

it's a shame about Browning. I seem to recall he wasn't the best man in his position but I may be getting confused and thinking of Urquhart.

 

When you say that you've reworked the book does that mean new stuff coming into print? that can be bought?

[Harold Jones]

I checked Amazon, they are pre-selling what I assume to be the book https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1848681097/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i0No idea how accurate their publication date (June 2019) is since they have been known to pull those out of their fifth point of contact from time to time.

[Rich]

 

Oh lord, I wish Bill B was still here.

You called? Haven't been away, I take a turn through here most days, just don't post much.

 

Thank God the expert arrived, I was winging it on general impressions.

 

Good to see you're still hanging around Bill. Happy New year!

 

 

Apposite thread revival as I've just finished the rework of my Arnhem book after 8+ years work. Covers the whole thing airborne & ground day-by-day and often hour by hour, and lots of digging into the official records shows that all my speculation & conclusions from the first book were right, and in some instances it was worse than I suspected...

In short, the Arnhem bit failed due to poor leadership and planning at the division & brigade level, the Nijmegen bit succeeded despite poor leadership at the Airborne Corps level and the ground bit failed due to poor leadership at the Corps level. []

BillB

 

Yep...always been my impression too. Urquhart never seemed to have much "grip" on the planning or execution, but Browning's directives to Gavin left the Nijmegan operations a mess.

 

Of course, it didn't help the logistics picture that 30 Corps had to figure out how to supply the Yanks after landing. Have you found if there was any truth to the story about them delivering ammo for 105mm M2 Howitzers to the Glider FA Battalions with the M3 Howitzers?

[bojan]

...

Of course, it didn't help the logistics picture that 30 Corps had to figure out how to supply the Yanks after landing. Have you found if there was any truth to the story about them delivering ammo for 105mm M2 Howitzers to the Glider FA Battalions with the M3 Howitzers?

 

Wasn't ammo actually compatible with M3 just having less charges in the case or was the case shorter for M3 also?

[BillB]

Its been a while since I read the book (that you very kindly gave me). Do you think this could ever have worked? Ive always figured the German resurgence made it impossible anything worthwhile would be achieved when it was clear they were going to stand and fight.

 

Good to see you still here BTW. Look forward to seeing the rework.

Yes mate, I do think it could have worked, at least as far as getting across the Lower Rhine but not all the stuff about pushing straight on into northern Germany (although it would have opened the possibility of a two-pronged thrust into the North German Plain). I think it could have worked simply because when you consider the sheer number of interlinked factors there were, how few actually went wrong and how so very close they came to pulling it off. And all that in spite of the poor leadership & planning, tardiness and lack of application...

 

BillB

[Stuart Galbraith]

I trust your judgement, you have read far more on it than I have.

 

At the very least, I guess it would have forced the Germans to commit many more forces to that area than they did, which would have made even the small gains of the Battle of the Bulge difficult to achieve.

Edited January 8, 2019 by Stuart Galbraith

[BillB]

it's a shame about Browning. I seem to recall he wasn't the best man in his position but I may be getting confused and thinking of Urquhart.

 

 

Easy to see why you'd get them confused. Browning was a ruthless empire building bureaucrat par excellence who got to the highest Army rung on the Allied Airborne ladder with no Airborne experience and a stint as a platoon commander during the First World War as his sole combat experience; from an operational perspective Ridgway would have been a sounder choice I suspect, although personally I'd have given the job to Gale. Urquhart was just a victim of the British Army patronage system and more specifically of being a Montgomery protege within that system who was placed far out of his depth with no time to gain experience and no properly qualified subordinates to rely on..

 

 

 

When you say that you've reworked the book does that mean new stuff coming into print? that can be bought?

 

Sorry, by rework I mean it is on the same subject. The first book was c.230 pages/80,000 words, new one is c.1130 pages/290,000 words so yes new stuff in print backed up with a lot more primary source stuff. The general findings are the same as the first book but better supported with evidence rather than speculation & there is other stuff I discovered/deduced while writing; I changed my mind about the importance of the distance between the 1st Airborne Div's landing areas and the Arnhem bridges for example. All my end (writing, proof reading, index etc.) is done and last I heard just before Chrimble the publisher was almost ready to send it to the printers. Thought it might be earlier than the June date Harold found on Amazon but that stuff is above my paygrade.

 

BillB

 

Edited to add: new book is c.1130 pages/429,000 words, not what is says above, fat finger syndrome...

[BillB]

I checked Amazon, they are pre-selling what I assume to be the book https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1848681097/ref=dbs_a_def_rwt_bibl_vppi_i0No idea how accurate their publication date (June 2019) is since they have been known to pull those out of their fifth point of contact from time to time.

Yes, ref the last bit I suspect the publishers just bung out a date that givees them plenty of wriggle room and it's tea & biccies all round if it comes in sooner.

 

Altho to be fair I was on my last broken deadline warning (which turned the last lap into a mega marathon but that's another story! ) and the publisher had given Amazon at least two duff dates due to me not meeting the deadlines...

 

BillB

[BillB]

 

Rich wrote: Thank God the expert arrived, I was winging it on general impressions.

Good to see you're still hanging around Bill. Happy New year!

Happy New Year to you too Rich. Don't believe you were winging it tho, with your background you must have a mathematical formula or similar to fall back on.

 

Yep...always been my impression too. Urquhart never seemed to have much "grip" on the planning or execution, but Browning's directives to Gavin left the Nijmegan operations a mess.

Yes, Urquhart was in thrall to Browning and absolutely agree, Browning's interfering with Gavin going about his business came the closest to losing the whole shooting match. Am always impressed by Gavin's forbearance at the time and in his memoir.

 

Of course, it didn't help the logistics picture that 30 Corps had to figure out how to supply the Yanks after landing. Have you found if there was any truth to the story about them delivering ammo for 105mm M2 Howitzers to the Glider FA Battalions with the M3 Howitzers?

Didn't come across that, was it after 30 Corps crossed the Waal and adroitly handed responsibility for the Island to the 101st Airborne? From what I read I assumed that the US Airborne divs looked after their own resupply via parachute or the airfield they built near one of the landing areas.

BillB

[Tim the Tank Nut]

When a copy is available can I buy one and send it to have autographed? I'd be happy to pay whatever costs are involved.

 

I had a whole bunch of signed books die in a flood. I just liked having them and wish the basement hadn't filled with water.

[Rich]

 

...

Of course, it didn't help the logistics picture that 30 Corps had to figure out how to supply the Yanks after landing. Have you found if there was any truth to the story about them delivering ammo for 105mm M2 Howitzers to the Glider FA Battalions with the M3 Howitzers?

 

Wasn't ammo actually compatible with M3 just having less charges in the case or was the case shorter for M3 also?

 

 

That's a good question I've never seen fully resolved. In theory, yes, but... When question I was once asked was why was there a "shortage" of M2 105mm ammunition in the ETOUSA when they simply could have used 105mm M3 rounds for shorter range fires? Plus, shouldn't they have been able to just produce additional Zone 6 and 7 Charges to add to the M3 rounds for use in the M2 Howitzer? Why produce two different designations of ammo at all? I suspect the difference was in the propellant; the M2 powder used seven perforations per grain and a 0.025" web, while the M3 used single perforations and a 0.014" web. I'm just not sure how the difference would affect ballistics.

[Rich]

 

 

Yep...always been my impression too. Urquhart never seemed to have much "grip" on the planning or execution, but Browning's directives to Gavin left the Nijmegan operations a mess.

Yes, Urquhart was in thrall to Browning and absolutely agree, Browning's interfering with Gavin going about his business came the closest to losing the whole shooting match. Am always impressed by Gavin's forbearance at the time and in his memoir.

 

I like that description...in "thrall". I recently went through a cycle arguing with a "Gavin was just a young inexperienced jumped up incompetent who couldn't see how important the Nijmegen Bridge was and so wasted his time defending against a nonexistent counterattack from the Reichswald" guy on WW2 Forums.

 

 

 

 

Of course, it didn't help the logistics picture that 30 Corps had to figure out how to supply the Yanks after landing. Have you found if there was any truth to the story about them delivering ammo for 105mm M2 Howitzers to the Glider FA Battalions with the M3 Howitzers? []

Didn't come across that, was it after 30 Corps crossed the Waal and adroitly handed responsibility for the Island to the 101st Airborne? From what I read I assumed that the US Airborne divs looked after their own resupply via parachute or the airfield they built near one of the landing areas.

 

I don't remember where I ran across the administrative details that mentioned that. It may have been in the 21st AG Admin History? I'll see if I can dig it back up.

[BillB]

When a copy is available can I buy one and send it to have autographed? I'd be happy to pay whatever costs are involved.

 

I had a whole bunch of signed books die in a flood. I just liked having them and wish the basement hadn't filled with water.

Sure, check your PMs. Sorry about the flood, bit of a bummer even if the books weren't signed.

 

BillB

[BillB]

 

 

Rich wrote: I like that description...in "thrall". I recently went through a cycle arguing with a "Gavin was just a young inexperienced jumped up incompetent who couldn't see how important the Nijmegen Bridge was and so wasted his time defending against a nonexistent counterattack from the Reichswald" guy on WW2 Forums.

 

Oh FFS, I assume he was a Brit. Sometimes my fellow countrymen's level of ignorance is embarrassing given the truth about that has been in plain sight for decades. It's interesting to speculate how Gavin would have done it without Browning's interference and how it might have turned out.

 

 

 

I don't remember where I ran across the administrative details that mentioned that. It may have been in the 21st AG Admin History? I'll see if I can dig it back up.

 

Cheers, be interesting to hear & prolly relevant now I've finished...

 

BillB

[DB]

Time to get the corrigenda website ready...

[BillB]

I trust your judgement, you have read far more on it than I have.

 

At the very least, I guess it would have forced the Germans to commit many more forces to that area than they did, which would have made even the small gains of the Battle of the Bulge difficult to achieve.

C'mon Stuart, you aren't going to ignite a proper Old Skool TankNet tearup with that attitude...

 

BillB

[Stuart Galbraith]

Lets just say Im aware of how fractious the site has now become, and im trying (very trying!) not to contribute to it. For all our disagreements, when it comes to military history and many other things, you clearly know what you are talking about.

 

And yes, its damned unEnglish, so dont expect it to last long.

Edited January 8, 2019 by Stuart Galbraith