Evaluating The Armies And Generals Of 1914

[JWB]

Dish schedule:

 

http://tvschedule.zap2it.com/tv/apocalypse-wwi/EP01932005?aid=tvschedule

[BillB]

 

Harold Jones wrote: Yes there was such a proposal. Here's one example (the easiest one to quote from volume 3

http://www.history.a...23-8/index.html ) I'll leave the question as to why the US High Command repeated many of the mistakes that the British and French had made to better minds.

 

Thanks for that linky Harold, took some time to download but well worth the wait, fascinating stuff. Sorry for the delay getting back to you, been away wandering around Belgium & France.

 

Having read through it tho I see there was a bit more to it:

 

- the idea wasn't to use US troops as individual replacements but as full battalions inserted into British brigades

- the French were in on it too until they realised how long and how resource heavy it was going to take/be

- it was driven by the very real manpower shortage the BEF was facing by the end of 1917

 

That said, I dunno if it would've worked out in practice on the political level altho Pershing did do a good job of stonewalling the arch-fibber and conniver Lloyd George. However, it's not quite as it's been presented then, as Perfidious Albion seeking to shield its sons with the bodies of former colonials on an individual basis.

 

BillB

[BillB]

Bill B, its the reason Canada fought as a Corps and the rest of the Empire got slotted in. Canada delayed its declaration of war so that it did not look like an automatic affair... canada was starting to use its new Country muscles. We fought in S Africa as part of the Empires army... returning soldiers swore never to do that again. The other problem the Canadian Gov;t had to deal with is a pacifist Quebec, that did not want to fight in another Europe War.

 

So yes it was a very real threat, and Canada had its own ideas on how to conduct it, its why Hague let Canada take the lead on Vimy Ridge, and afterwards fought as a Corps.

 

but in 1914, we had only started to figure out how to be a Country in War, by 1918 we had it down pat...

Not sure about the bit about Vimy mate, but I'm still interested in any details of practical schemes to do this, and why it was considered such a bad thing post-Boer War. I'm not aware of Canadians getting the short end of the stick in South Africa any more than home-grown troops, altho I'll give you there was no apparent shortage of short end going around. Not trying to b obtuse, am genuinely curious as I hear this stuff about the Brits deliberately using its Dominion troops as cannon-fodder but I've yet to come across a clear-cut unambiguous example despite looking quite hard which is why it looks like post-event political nation building stuff for home consumption to me.

 

BillB

[BillB]

Professor Holmes is bitterly missed by me. His War Walks series was one of the finest doc series I have ever watched.

Indeed. I had the privilege to attend one of his public lectures given at Glasgow Uni a bit before he died. No sign there was anything wrong healthwise, he just stood up in front of an audience of 400+ and talked for the better part of two hours. No notes, no crib cards, no PowerPoint, just him wandering about in front of the podium talking.

 

BillB

[BillB]

Joffre - Joffre earns a split grade for the campaign culminating in the Battle of the Marne - C-/A-.

 

Even allowing for inadequate intelligence, his opening moves were reckless given the relative strength of the forces involved and the lack of maneuver space in the Ardennes and Lorraine (something French units needed to meet the Germans on relatively equal terms). However, his stable temperament in the face of near disaster and his almost flawless operational moves once he realized the true German threat make him the outstanding commanding general of 1914, hence the A- for the second part.

I think you missed the bit where he steadfastly refused to even countenance intelligence saying the Germans were coming through Belgium. Even after the French units in the north were in sustained contact with them and it was clear the Huns had fought his cherished Plan XVII to a standstill. OTOH he did put himself about a bit and handled French very well when the latter was all for legging it for the coast and home after Mons & Le Cateau.

 

BillB

[BillB]

 

Colin Williams wrote: Classic problem for all the Dominions, but especially Canada, in WW1 and WW2. The minuscule professional officer corps was inadequate to provide the army with properly trained generals and higher level staff officers, yet the British demonstrated again and again a surprising ability to mishandle higher level formations.

And how exactly was that really any less applicable to an Army of just 247,432 men primarily trained and equipped for Imperial Policing, over three-fifths of which were out on those duties in August 1914?

BillB

[baboon6]

 

I hate those kinds of restrictions websites have. So much for the internet.

 

I still would quite happily beat to death the fucker who invented 'regions' on DVDs, I so I know what you mean.

 

 

Absolutely. My sister bought me Withnail and I for Christmas and I can't watch it!!

 

anyway here is another good WW1 documentary series, the Canadian one For King and Empire, presented by Norm Christie. Or should we start a separate WW1 video thread? Moderator please advise.

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-Ynvu6AE0k

[baboon6]

 

Bill B, its the reason Canada fought as a Corps and the rest of the Empire got slotted in. Canada delayed its declaration of war so that it did not look like an automatic affair... canada was starting to use its new Country muscles. We fought in S Africa as part of the Empires army... returning soldiers swore never to do that again. The other problem the Canadian Gov;t had to deal with is a pacifist Quebec, that did not want to fight in another Europe War.

 

So yes it was a very real threat, and Canada had its own ideas on how to conduct it, its why Hague let Canada take the lead on Vimy Ridge, and afterwards fought as a Corps.

 

but in 1914, we had only started to figure out how to be a Country in War, by 1918 we had it down pat...

Not sure about the bit about Vimy mate, but I'm still interested in any details of practical schemes to do this, and why it was considered such a bad thing post-Boer War. I'm not aware of Canadians getting the short end of the stick in South Africa any more than home-grown troops, altho I'll give you there was no apparent shortage of short end going around. Not trying to b obtuse, am genuinely curious as I hear this stuff about the Brits deliberately using its Dominion troops as cannon-fodder but I've yet to come across a clear-cut unambiguous example despite looking quite hard which is why it looks like post-event political nation building stuff for home consumption to me.

 

BillB

 

 

I agree with that, the numbers simply make that impossible to be true. For example more British troops took part and were killed at Gallipolli than Anzacs. And of course on the Western Front the numbers are far more skewed. What i think there may have been to an extent is some unwanted paternalism and perhaps a bit of patronising behaviour on the part of a few British officers.

 

You won't find that kind of myth-making here, most South Africans (including many of the supposedly educated ones) are barely aware that WW1 occurred, never mind that South Africa took part in it or sent a brigade to fight on the Western Front. I recently read a good book about SA's participation in the war, called Springboks on the Somme by Bill Nasson.

 

http://bookslive.co.za/blog/2007/09/12/book-excerpt-springboks-on-the-somme-by-bill-nasson/

 

http://www.litnet.co.za/Article/paul-murray-reviews-i-springboks-on-the-somme-south-africa-in-the-gr

 

http://www.amazon.com/Springboks-Somme-Bill-Nasson/dp/014302535X

Edited August 20, 2014 by baboon6

[Archie Pellagio]

Only a brigade?

 

Surprising, I figured it would've been bigger...

[baboon6]

Only a brigade?

 

Surprising, I figured it would've been bigger...

And several batteries of heavy artillery.

 

We also had an infantry brigade and some mounted units in German East Africa, most of whom became casualties of various fun tropical diseases, and were eventually withdrawn. Two battalions of Cape Corps infantry served with the British forces in the Middle East.

[BillB]

Only a brigade?

 

Surprising, I figured it would've been bigger...

Yes, that came as a surprise to me too when I was nosing around Delville Wood last year. For no good reason I'd always assumed an SA division.

 

BillB

[baboon6]

 

Only a brigade?

 

Surprising, I figured it would've been bigger...

Yes, that came as a surprise to me too when I was nosing around Delville Wood last year. For no good reason I'd always assumed an SA division.

 

BillB

 

 

 

Remember too that this was not that long after the Boer War and many Afrikaners were not too keen to fight for Britain. Some of the more die-hard anti-Brits staged a rebellion in 1914:

 

http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/responses-south-africa-outbreak-wwi-afrikaner-response-and-1914-rebellion

 

It was only after this was put down that the campaign to take German South West Africa could really begin. Volunteers among white soldiers for overseas service (i.e. in France and East Africa) were about 75% English-speaking, 25% Afrikaans/Dutch-speaking, as opposed to in WW2 when the ratio was about 50/50. The white population was around 60% Afrikaans/40% English. We should not forget the 20 000 men of the SA Native Labour Contingent who served in France and as I mentioned above the Cape Corps battalion (sorry I thought it was two at one time) in East Africa and the Middle East

 

http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/world-war-i-and-south-african-native-labour-contingent

 

http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/cape-coloured-corps-and-first-world-war

 

1 SA Infantry Brigade served briefly in Egypt before going to France where for most of its service it formed part of 9th (Scottish) Div. In Sept 1918 it joined 66th (West Lancs) Div.

 

http://www.1914-1918.net/south_africa.html

 

Another correction, there were two SA infantry brigades in East Africa (and a couple of mounted regts and engineers, service troops of various kinds etc), so with the attrition rate there through sickness and in France through casualties, and a limited pool of volunteers, it was often a problem keeping units at anything like operational strength. Once most of the SA troops were withdrawn form East Africa (late 1917 IIRC) some men volunteered to go to France.

 

http://www.1914-1918.net/south_africa.html

 

http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/294

 

http://samilitaryhistory.org/vol072iu.html

 

About 3000 South Africans served in the RFC/RAF and included one of the highest-scoring aces, Capt Andrew Beauchamp-Proctor VC DSO MC DFC.

 

http://www.theaerodrome.com/aces/safrica/beauchamp.php

Edited August 20, 2014 by baboon6

[Tony Evans]

 

 

In other words, maneuver warfare also has to be mechanized warfare to some good extent before it can accomplish its goals.

 

At what point between 1918 and 1938 did enough mechanization occur for maneuver warfare to become sufficiently enabled operationally and logistically?

 

 

Uhhh...sorry, but that wasn't the problem. The problem was the ridiculously high force to space ratio that mass politics and industrial economies can generate in such confined spaces. (The straight line distance from Dunkirk to Mulhouse is a little over 300mi/500km. That's within a few miles/kilometers of the distance from New York to Pittsburgh. It took mechanization to overcome high force to space ratios, supported by railroad logistics. The Eastern Front was much more fluid during WW1.

[Ken Estes]

Scott, the 1914 campaign in the West was perfectly fluid until the 'race to the Sea' ended the period of maneuver. After that, exhaustion and munitions shortages led the way to the long deadlock extending into 1918. The tank-plane team of 1940 enabled the German military success to be achieved before any such assembly of mass industrial armies could be even contemplated. It would be difficult to imagine creating such an operational capability before 1940 however, and the Germans themselves had to make serious changes after the lesser 1939 campaign and the first test run at the time of the annexation of Austria.

 

Even then, the Germans never exceeded roughly 10% motorized/mechanized forces on the ground and their WWII army remained otherwise a modified WWI army with mostly horse drawn transport and arty.

 

HTH re your Q.

[ScottBrim]

 

Even then, the Germans never exceeded roughly 10% motorized/mechanized forces on the ground and their WWII army remained otherwise a modified WWI army with mostly horse drawn transport and arty. HTH re your Q.

 

Some of my Dutch relatives were living in the area around Arnhem in WWII, and had the unfortunate experience of being present for the start of Market-Garden; then having their hopes for liberation dashed at the conclusion of the battle; and then witnessing the Germans impose a famine on the Dutch populace which didn't really end for them personally until Arnhem was liberated months later.

 

In 1977, while they were visiting on a vacation trip to the Northwest, we took some time to see A Bridge Too Far at a local theater.

 

Afterwards, when we were talking about their experiences in 1944 and 1945, and how Market Garden had set the stage for the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, they remarked at some length about how much the Germans in their area had relied on horse-drawn transport.

 

At the time of Market Garden in 1944, my relatives had expected the British and the Americans, with all their tanks and airplanes and their motor transport, to roll up the Germans in short order. But it didn't turn out that way.

Edited August 26, 2014 by ScottBrim

[T19]

Billb. U should read Pierre Butons Vimy Ridge. It gives a good account of te politics and the rational of the Canadian thought process at this time.

[Tony Evans]

The reason the mostly horse-drawn Germans could stand up to the Western Allies for a few months at the end of 1944 was simply that the Allies were hundreds of miles from their supply sources on the Continent. The Germans were within a hundred miles (if not closer) of their railheads. (Note that the fully motorized Western Allied armies, once deep into the Continent, became as dependent on rails for bringing up supplies as anybody else.)

 

To bring this back around to WW1, one of the big problems for an attacker on the Western Front was the density of the rail networks and their proximity to the front. This allowed defenders to shift troops and supplies to threatened areas faster than attacking troops could make decisive advances.

[DougRichards]

The reason the mostly horse-drawn Germans could stand up to the Western Allies for a few months at the end of 1944 was simply that the Allies were hundreds of miles from their supply sources on the Continent. The Germans were within a hundred miles (if not closer) of their railheads. (Note that the fully motorized Western Allied armies, once deep into the Continent, became as dependent on rails for bringing up supplies as anybody else.)

 

To bring this back around to WW1, one of the big problems for an attacker on the Western Front was the density of the rail networks and their proximity to the front. This allowed defenders to shift troops and supplies to threatened areas faster than attacking troops could make decisive advances.

 

Which was open for all to see in the ACW 50 years before.

 

And which is also sometimes offered as the reason for the rush to war in August 1914: the mobilisation schedules depended on railway schedules and capacities.

[Tony Evans]

Which was open for all to see in the ACW 50 years before.

 

Not really. It took a combination of high force-to-space and very dense rail networks. That didn't exist in North America in the 1860s. In fact, rails were used more for concentrating force to conduct offensives.

[Ken Estes]

Rail took the rest of the war to catch up for the Western Allies, especially with the ports being so damaged and locomotives & rolling stock so scarce. Nor was any other WWII front very rich in rail services, except for the Russians and Germans on the defense. I'd be more interested in what Rich has unearthed on that, post-Normandy. The pressure was all on motor transport line haul, for good reasons.

 

If we ever get back on topic, we ought to consider the eastern fronts and how their leadership and forces held up. The Austro-Hungarian forces were practically finished by the end of 1915, joining Italy as a least of the great powers. Part of the A-H catastrophe lay in the multinational army and its incalculable casualties made replacements an especial nightmare, so many ending up in units where they did not even speak the language of command. The Austrian generals, led by Conrad v Hoetzendorf in Galicia and Potiorek in Serbia miserably failed in both strategy and leadership, starting with Conrad's decision to send his Second Army south instead of into Galicia before the war started. Then came his indescribable blunder in detraining the troops in Galicia 100 miles short of the frontlines, leaving the troops to march. The campaign to defend the fortress of Przemysl proved horribly inept.

 

According to Geoffrey Wawro, "Austro-Hungarian decision-making in 1914 was arguably the most senseless -- and the most reprehensible. [p.385, A Mad Catastrophe]" For all their own failures, the Rus were not slow to pick up on this and the Serbs also proved the most able at that point.

[MiloMorai]

Billb. U should read Pierre Butons Vimy Ridge. It gives a good account of te politics and the rational of the Canadian thought process at this time.

 

Also these books by Ron Cook

 

At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1916 Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918

 

Have you read them Andrew?

[Al]

 

The Austrian generals, led by Conrad v Hoetzendorf in Galicia and Potiorek in Serbia miserably failed in both strategy and leadership, starting with Conrad's decision to send his Second Army south instead of into Galicia before the war started. Then came his indescribable blunder in detraining the troops in Galicia 100 miles short of the frontlines, leaving the troops to march. The campaign to defend the fortress of Przemysl proved horribly inept.

 

That's kind of interesting as Conrad is (or maybe, was) held up as the best of the A-H generals yet he failed to translate his abilities into positive results. There's lots of books out there about the A-H Army during WW1. Having a hard time deciding which one to get. Suggestions appreciated.

[T19]

 

 

Billb. U should read Pierre Butons Vimy Ridge. It gives a good account of te politics and the rational of the Canadian thought process at this time.

Also these books by Ron Cook

At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1916 Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918

 

Have you read them Andrew?

No but will look for them

[Tony Evans]

It seems like rails were pretty important in NWE in 1944-45. You can find considerable mention of them in some of the Green Books. For example, in the volume on the QM Corps in the war against Germany, rail movement of supplies is a constant topic of discussion. During the XYZ Express trucking operations in the last month of the war, railheads were kept no further than 175 miles from the front. (And this was, let's not forget, during the breakneck advance into Germany.)

 

Also, rails were not only valuable to defenders. (And this pertains to both wars.) Rails enabled offensive concentration and offensive logistics buildup. This feature of military railroading was probably most valuable to the Soviets in 1944-45, when they monotonically attacked, advanced to the limit of their support, brought up the railheads, reinforced and restocked, then did it again -- from Byelorussia to Berlin.

[Ken Estes]

Rail took the rest of the war to catch up for the Western Allies

 

Pretty much covers the last month of the war that you cite, eh?

 

Rail is easily exaggerated, as is this silly notion of "high force-to-space," so that's why I'd prefer to see what Rich has found. I have the Green Books too.

 

It sounds like a borrowing from Ovary, IOW a firm grasp of the obvious. Napoleon's operational method also worked well, but mostly in the dense road network of W Europe.

 

Ho hum.