Why So Few German Tanks In Ww1

[firefly1]

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Having picked up on a remark from Glen239 on the WW1 thread, WHY were the Germans so slow in picking up on tanks in WW1, why only one pretty awful operational design, and why so few ?

 

I realise that the British tanks evolved and only the later marks were really just about operationally useable, but the Germans had GOOD mechanical engineers and very good engineering manufacturers.

 

Thanks

[DougRichards]

British had better connections with the Holt Tractor company, using Holts for towing artillery, so the use of tracks was quite evident.

 

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holt_tractor

 

Ironically the track seems to have been a British invention, pre war: http://www.firstworldwar.com/atoz/holttractor.htm

 

The caterpillar track was in fact invented by a British company named Hornsby based in Grantham in 1905. In 1909 they demonstrated a tracked tractor to the British Army; impressed, the army awarded Hornsby a prize for their idea: however their idea was not taken up.

 

Consequently Hornsby sold on the patent for the caterpillar track to a U.S. company, Holt Tractors (now the Caterpillar Tractor Company), based in Stockton, California. Holt's in turn produced a series of agricultural tractors which proved commercially viable in the mid-west.

 

Ironically with the advent of the First World War the British and French governments bought several Holt tractors for use in heavy goods haulage. It was during Christmas 1914 that Colonel Swinton, viewing the tractors in action, considered the possible benefits of modifying an armoured vehicle to carry caterpillar tracks, making it ideal for static battlefield conditions.

 

Swinton set about convincing the British government of the merit of his idea - and within a year (with Churchill and Lloyd George's backing) the tank was unveiled.

 

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Germany didn't actually have a gun suitable for early tanks. The Britsih used an adapted naval 6pdr, the Germans used captured guns:

 

quote http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A7V#Armament

 

The A7V was armed with six 7.92 mm MG08 machine guns and a 5.7 cm Maxim-Nordenfelt cannon mounted at the front. Some of these cannons were of British manufacture and had been captured in Belgium early in the war; others were captured in Russia in 1918 and appear to have included some Russian-made copies.

 

-----------------------------------

 

so Germany was starting from behind: no history in tracked vehicles, no suitable guns.

[bojan]

...

Germany didn't actually have a gun suitable for early tanks. ...

 

They had weapon identical to UK naval 6pdr.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_5cm-40_skc93.htm

 

There was also 6cm L/21 anti-torpedo boat gun that could be used.

 

Plus they could have used Austro-Hungarian 7cm (66mm) L/30.

[DougRichards]

 

...

Germany didn't actually have a gun suitable for early tanks. ...

 

They had weapon identical to UK naval 6pdr.

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_5cm-40_skc93.htm

 

There was also 6cm L/21 anti-torpedo boat gun that could be used.

 

Plus they could have used Austro-Hungarian 7cm (66mm) L/30.

 

 

But they used captured British and Russian guns.

 

and that 5cm gun you mentioned had a projectile 60% in weight of the 6pdr.

Edited July 11, 2014 by DougRichards

[bojan]

You stated "They had no suitable guns". I showed that they did.

Re shell weight, FT-17 was way more useful then Mks, and had peashooter 37mm (or just MG).

[Markus Becker]

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Having picked up on a remark from Glen239 on the WW1 thread, WHY were the Germans so slow in picking up on tanks in WW1, why only one pretty awful operational design, and why so few ?

 

 

The economy was struggling with the demands of the war and the A7V was not suited for mass production. And the Germans were on the defensive in the west almost all of the time. Novel gadgets to break through the enemy trenches were not needed.

 

 

 

But they used captured British and Russian guns.

 

and that 5cm gun you mentioned had a projectile 60% in weight of the 6pdr.

 

 

 

So what? A 5cm HE shell will take out a machine gun nest just as well as a 57mm shell.

 

 

 

 

[Mikel2]

 

 

Funny thing, I dont recall reading of their using captured French types. They presumably must have done?

 

I suspect the number of St. Chamonds and Schneiders was far smaller and the FTs came very late in the war.

[glenn239]

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Having picked up on a remark from Glen239 on the WW1 thread, WHY were the Germans so slow in picking up on tanks in WW1, why only one pretty awful operational design, and why so few ?

 

Good question. The German army seemed to be technically savvy in other departments - poison gas, terror bombing, flamethrowers, light automatic weapons and mortars, aircraft design. Not sure why tanks slipped through the cracks. Maybe the first Allied tanks didn't make a favorable impression on the high command?

[DogDodger]

In Ocotber 1916, the OHL suggested to the Prussian War Office that a German fighting machine should be developed ASAP. But as noted, tracked vehicles were almost unknown in Germany, the A7V was dictated to be designed as both a tank and a transport vehicle, no firms wanted to build--or could spare production for--the vehicle, and perhaps most importantly: indifference at the highest levels. Ludendorff wrote after the Armistice, "Tanks were merely a weapon of attack, and our attacks were successful without them." The Germans were entrenched in the west until 1918, when stormtroop attacks often moved faster than British tanks were capable, and the war of movement in the east was largely successful without the use of tanks. According to Hindenburg, "[Tanks] probably won't help us much, but as we happen to have them, we might as well employ them."

[Al]

Re; DogDodger

 

I had read that too. The stormtroop attacks were working so why divert resources to something else?

[Colin Williams]

I suppose the obvious point to note is that, with all the British tanks they captured after Cambrai and the Somme, they didnt really need to make tanks of their own.

 

Funny thing, I dont recall reading of their using captured French types. They presumably must have done?

 

Yes they did - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YGkGKUdAFRM

 

We may know more about German use of British tanks because

(1) The British left more of their stuff lying around the battlefield

(2) The French tanks appeared later and certainly the St Chamond and Schneider had reliability and usability issues

(3) (My favorite) We are limited in our knowledge by being reliant on English language histories.

[Colin Williams]

.

 

Having picked up on a remark from Glen239 on the WW1 thread, WHY were the Germans so slow in picking up on tanks in WW1, why only one pretty awful operational design, and why so few ?

 

I realise that the British tanks evolved and only the later marks were really just about operationally useable, but the Germans had GOOD mechanical engineers and very good engineering manufacturers.

 

Thanks

 

Because the German General Staff was brilliant, far-sighted, and without flaw, they could see that tanks would never amount to anything.

[GPMG]

 

 

Because the German General Staff was brilliant, far-sighted, and without flaw, they could see that tanks would never amount to anything.

 

Because a small time portal opened and this headline was sucked back through time http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-highlands-islands-22951548 and the German General Staff saw that the future is in horses not tanks.

Edited July 11, 2014 by GPMG

[Mikel2]

It's interesting that as limited as their domestic tank efforts were, they went through considerable effort to refurbish and reuse captured -mainly British- tanks. How many did they end up using?

[DougRichards]

I suppose the obvious point to note is that, with all the British tanks they captured after Cambrai and the Somme, they didnt really need to make tanks of their own.

 

Funny thing, I dont recall reading of their using captured French types. They presumably must have done?

 

They use captured French tanks in the second half of the game.

[cbo]

Supplement to DogDodgers post #10

 

According to Nebelins book on Ludendorff, the appearance of British tanks in 1916 caused the OHL to initiate a tank-programme. So you could say that the Germans were already behind at this point as they were only reacting to British and later French use of tanks.

 

The programme immidiatly ran into problems:

 

- No suitable engine was available and all engine design, construction and production resources were tied up in a programme for increasing the number of trucks in the German Army, which was also falling behind the allies in terms of motorization.

 

- Resources for a tank-programme would have to be taken from other programmes, which were considered more important. Like aircraft production and notably submarine production. The latter was a major issue as the OHL was pressing for unlimited submarine warfare against the UK in the autumn of 1916 and had very high hopes for it, thinking that it would end the war by the summer of 1917.

 

The OHL didn't really see the potential in tanks until Cambrai in November 1917 and again in the summer of 1918, at which point the German war economy was in an even worse state to do anything about it.

 

What is perhaps more surprising, given that the Germans were defending against British and French armour from September 1916 onwards, was the omission to design a usefull anti-tank weapon and thus failing to decrease the impact of allied tanks.

 

As for Ludendorff and Hindenburgs post-war statements, they may not be the most trustworthy sources. Ludendorffs reputation was in tatters after his dimissal and flight to Sweden in 1918 and he spent the rest of his life trying to distance himself from any responsebility for the German defeat. Hindenburg was trying to maintain his good standing with the German public and keep his reputation in good order, so probably wasn't very keen on admitting his errors either.

 

Ludendorff was acutely aware of the impact of allied tanks in September 1918 when he wrote: "Warfare on the Western Front has become a game of chance, primarily because of the effect of the tanks. The OHL can no longer count on well know factors." The last part could be interpreted as the effect of the allied tanks made warfare a lot more unpredictable than it had been previously.

Edited July 12, 2014 by cbo

[glenn239]

 

- Resources for a tank-programme would have to be taken from other programmes, which were considered more important. Like aircraft production and notably submarine production. The latter was a major issue as the OHL was pressing for unlimited submarine warfare against the UK in the autumn of 1916 and had very high hopes for it, thinking that it would end the war by the summer of 1917.

 

 

Therein lies the contradiction - the submarine war was intended to win the war in 1917, but much of the resources poured into the program would translate into frontline boats in 1918 or 1919.

 

 

Ludendorff was acutely aware of the impact of allied tanks in September 1918 when he wrote: "Warfare on the Western Front has become a game of chance, primarily because of the effect of the tanks. The OHL can no longer count on well know factors." The last part could be interpreted as the effect of the allied tanks made warfare a lot more unpredictable than it had been previously.

 

 

DogDodger's quote,

 

"Tanks were merely a weapon of attack, and our attacks were successful without them."

 

Might be on the right track. In Italy and on the Eastern Front the new infantry tactics had worked very well. But that wasn't the Western Front, which was a whole different league of hurt. In Michael were too high and the results insufficient for a strategic decision. Ludendorff may have overestimated his new tactics in 1917 in relation to the lethality of the western armies.

[Ken Estes]

The Germans managed to field only a few dozen machines for lack of incentive and materials, plus captured vehicles. Although the Allies developed faster machines, the tanks put into action remained, in general, walking-speed, limited-endurance fighting vehicles, tied to an infantry support role and serving as a form of armored battering ram or siege machine.

By 1918, both the German and French armies planned a new generation of tanks that would play a decisive role in 1919, each hoping to break the deadlock on the battlefield. The German General Staff took little interest initially in tanks, which had not proved decisive at the outset, and in any case the plan for 1917 was to defend in the West while the decisive moves took place in the East. However, improvements in the British tanks and the need to return to the offensive in the West provoked new policies in 1917. Their slowly evolving A7V was ordered into low-rate production in early 1917, but further efforts were foreseen before it was ready. A supporting giant tank was proposed to augment the A7V, the GrossKampf-Wagen (K-Wagen), with a planned size of 150 tons, sporting four 77mm fortress guns and seven machine guns, and powered by two marine diesel engines. Finally, ten vehicles were ordered on June 28, 1917, taking shape as somewhat smaller vehicles of around 120 tons. Two bridge-building firms were contracted for their assembly, estimating a year to build. The track was adopted from excavation machinery.

 

 

The German equivalent of Plan 1919 thus consisted of some 700 A7V, the ten K-Wagen and about a thousand supporting light tanks, armored cars, supply tanks, etc.

 

 

Schneider, Wolfgang and Rainer Strasheim, Deutsche Kampfwagen im 1. Weltkrieg. Der A7V und die Anfänge deutscher Panzerentwicklung (Das Waffen-Arsenal. Band 112) (Podzun, 1988)

 

Zaloga, Steven J., German Panzers 1914–18 (Oxford, 2006)

[DougRichards]

The Germans managed to field only a few dozen machines for lack of incentive and materials, plus captured vehicles. Although the Allies developed faster machines, the tanks put into action remained, in general, walking-speed, limited-endurance fighting vehicles, tied to an infantry support role and serving as a form of armored battering ram or siege machine.

By 1918, both the German and French armies planned a new generation of tanks that would play a decisive role in 1919, each hoping to break the deadlock on the battlefield. The German General Staff took little interest initially in tanks, which had not proved decisive at the outset, and in any case the plan for 1917 was to defend in the West while the decisive moves took place in the East. However, improvements in the British tanks and the need to return to the offensive in the West provoked new policies in 1917. Their slowly evolving A7V was ordered into low-rate production in early 1917, but further efforts were foreseen before it was ready. A supporting giant tank was proposed to augment the A7V, the GrossKampf-Wagen (K-Wagen), with a planned size of 150 tons, sporting four 77mm fortress guns and seven machine guns, and powered by two marine diesel engines. Finally, ten vehicles were ordered on June 28, 1917, taking shape as somewhat smaller vehicles of around 120 tons. Two bridge-building firms were contracted for their assembly, estimating a year to build. The track was adopted from excavation machinery.

 

 

The German equivalent of Plan 1919 thus consisted of some 700 A7V, the ten K-Wagen and about a thousand supporting light tanks, armored cars, supply tanks, etc.

 

 

Schneider, Wolfgang and Rainer Strasheim, Deutsche Kampfwagen im 1. Weltkrieg. Der A7V und die Anfänge deutscher Panzerentwicklung (Das Waffen-Arsenal. Band 112) (Podzun, 1988)

 

Zaloga, Steven J., German Panzers 1914–18 (Oxford, 2006)

 

I wonder if anyone who helped design the GrossKampf-Wagen (K-Wagen) had anything to do with the Maus?

[Ken Estes]

In that case, K-Wagen, Krupp and Porsche were not to blame....

[Yama]

Wasn't there some Austrian tank-y design which was offered to both A-H and German armies, but didn't spark interest?

 

Ofc there was always the Tsar Tank...

 

[swerve]

According to Achtung Panzer, the German LK II light tank (too late for the war) was adopted in small numbers by Sweden after the war, as the Strv m/21.

[Markus Becker]

The Munster tank museum got their LK II from Sweden.

[Ken Estes]

Comparison of A7V and K-Wagen: neither was suited to mass production methods.

 

 

Models and photo from Steve Zaloga

[Mikel2]

I'm always amused at the K-wagen, considering how Porsche struggled to build a workable vehicle in the Maus, with the benefit of 1940s technology.