Cold War, The Reimagined Series

[urbanoid]

Quote

At an unofficial, "discreet" dinner in Brussels hosted by Poland, senior officials from the finance ministries of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom discussed a plan to establish a new defence fund that would bypass the European Commission. The idea is to establish a supranational bank which, thanks to its specialized nature and clever financial engineering by the City of London, would offer exceptionally favorable lending conditions. The bank would have the ability to directly purchase weapons on behalf of a group of members in order to reduce costs. Importantly, the project includes Great Britain, currently excluded from any plans proposed by the EU.

https://x.com/PawelSokala/status/1908161935738380568

A good initiative, hope it works out. I vastly prefer that to anything that Brussels is coming up with.

[urbanoid]

This new Cold War is kinda cool, Strayans are coming to help.

https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/1938271514580902060

 

[Stuart Galbraith]

Needs painting black, with sharks teeth on the nasceles. Otherwise, fine effort.

[futon]

Intel sharing pact. Probably to be particular handy towards polar activity.

Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and his Canadian counterpart, Anita Anand, have signed a bilateral agreement on information security.
   Based on the pact, inked at the ministers' meeting in Tokyo on Tuesday and designed to facilitate the sharing of classified information, the two countries hope to strengthen their security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region amid China's growing hegemonic moves and North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons development.
   "It was meaningful for us to sign the agreement at a time when the geopolitical situation remains severe," Iwaya said at a press briefing later in the day, adding that Japan wants to further reinforce its cooperation with Canada in the security field.
   Anand said: "It is a critical step forward on all counts. It gives Canada and Japan the tools that we need to strengthen our security partnership, which is so very important in times of global challenge."
   Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and his Canadian counterpart, Mark Carney, confirmed at their meeting in June that the two countries would conclude early an information security agreement and a pact enabling mutual exports of defense equipment.

https://sp.m.jiji.com/english/show/41263

[JWB]

Naughty, naughty.........

 

[futon]

The JASDF will dispatch four F-15Js, two C-2s, a KC-767, and a KC-46A for a two week trip to the US, Canada, the UK, and Germany. They depart on September 14th.

https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2025/0912a.html

[JWB]

The Kremlin is escalating its rhetoric, threatening NATO states in parallel with the kinetic escalation of Russia’s recent drone incursion into Poland. 

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/G07u8LiXEAAme9s?format=png&name=small

[urbanoid]

A few words from Mateusz Morawiecki, previous Polish PM.

Quote

The Żółkiewski Doctrine – Europe’s Answer to Russian Aggression

Mateusz MORAWIECKI

Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland 2017-2023.

Europe has thus reached the point of no return. Russia has no intention of ending the war – from the first day of the invasion Putin has not taken a single step towards peace. We must therefore be prepared for a long road ahead. That is the very purpose of the Żółkiewski Doctrine,’ writes Mateusz MORAWIECKI

History will remember the night of 9–10 September 2025, when nineteen Russian drones violated Polish airspace. This was no mere incident. It was an act of aggression against Poland, NATO and the entire free world – yet another reminder that Russia’s imperial instincts remain unchanged.

This act cannot pass without consequences. We need an immediate response, but above all a long-term strategy. That is why I am presenting the Żółkiewski Doctrine – a plan for a comprehensive answer to Russian aggression. A plan for Poland, and for all of Europe. For if we act together, the problem of an aggressive Russia can be resolved once and for all.

Understanding the Nature of the Russian Threat

Unless we first understand how Russia operates, our response will be ineffective. That is why we must take to heart three fundamental truths about Russia.

First, Russia is in thrall to war. Conflict, violence, blackmail and territorial expansion define its very existence. It provokes, infiltrates, subverts and sets societies against each other. It takes one step at a time, stopping only when it hits a wall. Concessions are perceived as a sign of weakness and an invitation to strike.

Second, Russia does not change. In the words of Oscar Wilde, ‘nothing is impossible in Russia but reform.’ From Ivan the Great to Putin, the mechanism of power has been the same: a tyrant on the throne with cowed subjects at his feet. The costumes may be different, but the essence of rule has remained unchanged.

Third, Russia is a state of the secret police. Its strength does not lie in resources but in its gargantuan machinery of control. From the oprichnina and the Okhrana to the NKVD, the KGB and, today, the FSB and the GRU, Russia’s history is the history of its security services. For a quarter of a century, the state has been governed by a former KGB officer who views politics as merely a performance, a game of deception to which the West remains susceptible.

We must therefore recognise that we cannot wait for a miraculous transformation in the Kremlin. Instead, we must communicate with them in the only language they understand: strength. Only then will it retreat, as it did after the defeats of 1856, 1905, 1920 and 1989.

Russian Masks and Europe’s Naïveté

For centuries Russia has been a lie in which Europe has willingly believed. So it has been from the ‘Potemkin villages’ to the Soviet fiction of a ‘workers’ and peasants’ state’ to the illusions of the 1990s, when Yeltsin – and later a young Putin – were supposedly steering the country towards democracy. Decades of dependence on Russian raw materials swelled the Kremlin’s coffers and strengthened its hand: by buying Russian gas and oil, the West was in effect financing the resurrection of the Russian empire.

Today all of Europe pays the price of that naivety, Ukraine most of all. President Lech Kaczyński warned: ‘Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic States, and later maybe it will be time for my country, Poland!’ Seventeen years later, that vision is materialising, point by point. Russia has attacked again, this time intentionally, through repeated violations of Polish airspace.

Yet the illusion persists. Three years into the war, Europe’s imports of Russian LNG have reached record levels. In the first half of 2025 the European Union’s gas purchases rose by 29%, reaching €4.48 billion. The EU has given Russia $105.6 billion since February 2022 – that is 75% of the Kremlin’s 2024 defence budget. 87% of that gas was taken in by Spain, France and Belgium, only to be resold, including to Germany. Let it be a sobering reminder for all those who now celebrate Western Europe’s stance, just three and a half years after Chancellor Scholz’s infamous offer of ‘five thousand helmets’ to Kyiv.

The pattern repeats itself with oil. India buys Russia’s crude at knock-down prices, refines it and resells it as its own product. The refinery in Schwedt operates on so-called Kazakh oil pumped through the same Druzhba pipeline that carries Russian crude. Ultimately, it is but a change of labels, with the fuel itself remaining Russian.

Still more dangerous are the loopholes in trade. Brazil, the largest Mercosur member, imports more than $11 billion worth of fuels and fertilisers annually from Russia, subsequently exporting foodstuffs produced with these to Europe. In effect, we are bankrolling Putin’s war in exchange for cheaper imports. Still, Europe is contemplating an agreement that would only deepen this dependence. There is no room for doubt: Mercosur must be stopped.

The stakes in ‘derussifying’ Europe’s economy have never been higher. Donald Trump stated plainly that the United States will only implement real sanctions when NATO completely ends its reliance on Russian raw materials. This is the ultimate test of the West’s credibility.

The Żółkiewski Doctrine: Repelling Russia, Defending Europe

Europe has thus reached the point of no return. Russia has no intention of ending the war – from the first day of the invasion, Putin has taken not a single step towards peace. We must therefore be prepared for a long road ahead. That is the very purpose of the Żółkiewski Doctrine.[ER1] 

Its name is no accident. Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski proved that Moscow could not only be halted but driven back. In 1610, after his victory at Klushino, he marched with his banners into Moscow, demonstrating that the empire was not invincible. What continues to be a national tragedy for Russians can now be our inspiration.

The point is not, of course, to repeat past expeditions, but something far more important: to push Russia out of Europe’s economic system once and for all. That is the essence of the Żółkiewski Doctrine. Its foundations can be set out in several cardinal principles.

Economic Isolation of Russia

The primary objective is to completely cut off Russia from the European economy. Poland should unilaterally shut its airspace to Russian passenger and cargo planes. Then demand the same of the European Union. This step would cripple Russian logistics and manufacturing, while signalling no more ‘business as usual.’

Energy is no exception. Poland has already demonstrated that independence is possible – during my government we all but eliminated our reliance on Russian oil and gas. Now it is Europe’s turn to follow the same path. For the fact remains – and I emphasise this with all force – that the mechanisms for circumventing sanctions are still at work: crude from the Druzhba pipeline rebranded as ‘Kazakh,’ Indian refineries reselling Russian oil as their own, and the EU–Mercosur agreement opening a back door for the Kremlin into European markets. Each such contrivance yields profits for intermediaries and hard currency for Russia’s war economy.

Within the European Union we must press for decisive action: extending sanctions to all Russian banks and establishing the principle of confiscating Russian-origin goods imported through third parties. Just days after the war in Ukraine began, I urged the European Council to seize Russian assets and redirect them to the victims of aggression. Yet the wealthy capitals of the West still hesitate. Freezing assets is not enough. At the very least, I called for the interest on frozen bonds to be put to use. Instead, Europe’s elites remain paralysed by fear that such measures might harm the interests of satraps, criminals and dictators whose capital has long flowed into their markets. That is not strategy – it is temporising.

This must end. We must come to the negotiating table with President Trump openly and with confidence. We must be deal-makers. Now is the time to fight for the future, not only for Ukraine but for the entirety of Europe. If we persist in hypocrisy, we shall suffer a double defeat: Ukraine will lose the war, and we shall forfeit our own future.

From Passive to Active Deterrence

Poland must now move to the next stage of sovereignty. Defence cannot be conceived solely in terms of purchased equipment or allied presence – vital though both remain. We must shift to active deterrence, built on three pillars.

New defensive capabilities. We need a genuinely integrated, multi-layered air defence, protecting not only the armed forces but also cities and critical infrastructure, including airports, power plants and transport hubs. Poland’s Air Shield must fuse advanced systems such as the Patriot with thousands of cheaper sensors, radars and neutralisation assets, from interceptor drones to jammers and conventional artillery. Only then will defence be dense and cost-effective, sparing us the absurdity of shooting down drones with missiles worth millions of dollars apiece. Much of this network can be built in Poland, creating jobs and exportable products.

New offensive capabilities. Poland must possess the means to strike deep into Russian territory. Through cooperation with Ukraine and expansion of our defence industry we can develop long-range cruise missiles and drones. What once seemed beyond reach has been made possible by Ukraine’s example. The modern arms market, increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence, drives down the costs of production and scaling. Poland must seize this opportunity, including with the acquisition of F-35s and other systems designed to penetrate enemy defences.

A culture of strategy. Security must become a shared undertaking of the state and society. We need a unified system of situational awareness, integrating data from all levels – central government, provinces, municipalities and uniformed services. The state cannot operate through paperwork and procedure; it must act in real time. A developed mObywatel platform could serve as both a channel for crisis communication and a tool for rebuilding manpower reserves. Think tanks already propose a model of Universal Public Service, enabling citizens to contribute through the armed forces, civil defence or fire services without returning to conscription. A society prepared for a crisis cannot be cowed – and intimidation is the very foundation of Russia’s strategy.

Polish Production and the Defence Industry

One of our most urgent tasks is to expand national defence production dramatically – above all in unmanned and anti-drone systems. We must harness the potential of Polish companies engaged in their design and production and reinforce their manufacturing and research capacity with consistent state support. Our engineers, working alongside the Armed Forces and drawing lessons from the Ukrainian front, could develop new systems in Poland at a safe distance from the battlefield. This would provide Ukraine with a more stable supply and give us access to technologies forged directly from priceless battlefield feedback. It is not only a transfer of technology, but a chance to build new partnerships that would enhance our security, yield returns on investment and strengthen innovation in our defence sector.

The pace of development in unmanned systems – aerial, land and naval – is unprecedented. Poland is not without advantages: we have our own experience and competences. But if we wish to enter the technological premier league, we must accelerate. That requires political will, bold investment and the determination of politicians, soldiers, engineers and entrepreneurs alike. Drones are not the future of war; they are its present. Miss this moment, and we surrender the initiative to others.

Agency of the Region

Lasting security demands that the Three Seas become an actor in its own right. Poland cannot act alone – we need a belt of resilience spanning the Baltic–Black Sea area: from Sweden and Finland in the north, through the Baltic States and the Visegrad Group, to Romania and Turkey, which likewise has no wish to see Russia prevail. This natural north–south axis can serve as the foundation for joint projects in defence, energy and infrastructure.

Essential to this is the creation of genuine financial instruments – such as the Three Seas Fund and the Three Seas Bank – able to finance strategic investments across the region. Without its own capital base, the Intermarium will remain an idea, not an institutionalised force with real impact. At the same time, we must complete Via Baltica and Rail Baltica, expand the regional gas pipeline network on the GIPL model and push forward projects under the banner of military mobility.

But building agency cannot be confined to reaction. In an age of global turbulence we must anticipate events. The world is moving rapidly into a new era of regionalism – macro-regions capable of acting autonomously within the global system. Economic ties are increasingly formed through nearshoring and friendshoring, meaning relocating production closer to allies and shortening supply chains. This could be Poland’s great opportunity.

In such a world the Three Seas initiative will not be merely a regional format, but a new axis of the West – a motor of growth and a pillar of resilience for the entire continent.

Belarus: Between Poland and Russia

An independent Belarus is a strategic interest for both Poland and Europe. The country’s freedom and prosperity will only be possible once the Lukashenko regime falls, or radically alters its course. Today Minsk grows ever more dependent on Moscow, yet it still clings to vestiges of autonomy. Any form of independence is preferable to its reduction to a Russian province. For Belarus is not Russia – not historically, not culturally, not socially. Our task is to ensure that when the moment of trial comes, Belarusians look to Warsaw rather than to Moscow.

Poland must prepare for three scenarios: full subordination of Minsk to the Kremlin, partial emancipation of the regime or political upheaval. In each case, our support – economic, infrastructural and defensive – will be essential. We must be firm with the regime, yet open to society. Nor should we ignore moments when even an authoritarian Minsk seeks distance from Putin. To close every channel of contact would be to yield the field to Russia.

Turning Belarus towards Poland requires tangible instruments: scholarships and research centres, visa and tax preferences, support for independent media and infrastructure projects ready for the moment of change. Such a network, when the breakthrough comes, will act as a political magnet.

In short, we must hinder Russia’s absorption of Belarus and support every manifestation of Minsk’s resistance. At the same time, we must keep alive the hope that Belarus will win its independence and become a state that strengthens the security between Poland and Russia.

Cybersecurity and the Fight against Disinformation

Last but not least is cyber-resilience. Russia strikes not only with missiles but also in cyberspace. Poland must build its own ‘cyber dome’ to shield critical infrastructure from infiltration and sabotage. Every institution responsible for national security and the protection of citizens’ data must be able to recruit the best experts. Our Cyber Defence Forces must have the capacity not only to defend effectively but to strike offensively. Nothing deters an adversary more than the certainty that every attack will meet with an immediate and punishing response.

The second pillar is a change of philosophy – cybersecurity by design. Similar to how strict regulations forced banks to implement robust safety measures, providers of other essential services also need to prioritise user safety. We cannot allow a world in which global technology giants leave us to face deepfakes and identity theft alone. Poland has already shown that it can pioneer innovative tools to protect the less cyber-literate. That model must be strengthened and extended.

A social aspect is also necessary. I propose an information reserve for young people that would prepare them to live in the age of information warfare. They would acquire practical skills, such as identifying manipulation, countering propaganda and shaping narratives that bolster communal resilience, in an engaging format drawing on digital culture and gamification. It would be a school of civic responsibility, raising a generation able and ready to defend Poland’s information space.

Strategy, Composure, Solidarity

The Żółkiewski Doctrine is not merely a set of military or economic prescriptions. Above all it is a new philosophy of security: strategy instead of improvisation, composure instead of panic, solidarity instead of selfishness.

Like every effective doctrine, it rests on systematic action placed beyond the quarrels of day-to-day politics. It is not a matter of grand words but of concrete programmes, procedures and decisions. It is a rulebook, a roadmap for this and every future government in the months and years ahead.

Poland and the Intermarium must break free from the role of passive spectators. We cannot merely react to Moscow’s moves – we must set the pace ourselves. We cannot wait for decisions from Brussels, Berlin or Paris – we must take our own.

We must act now. In just a few years, the fate of Poland and Europe could be sealed for the coming decades. We must make haste to prevent it.

Mateusz Morawiecki

https://wszystkoconajwazniejsze.pl/mateusz-morawiecki-the-zolkiewski-doctrine-europes-answer-to-russian-aggression/

[Stuart Galbraith]

Very interesting essay that proposes a truth that increasingly is self evident. The cold war never ended.

 

[JWB]

French police has prevented an assassination attempt against Vladimir Osechkin, a journalist, human rights activist, founder of Gulagu. net - Le Parisien.

The French National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor's Office has arrester four men aged 26 to 38. Three of them are from Russian Dagestan and claim to be in France on vacation.

Investigation is in progress.

https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1979070746249879576

 

[Ssnake]

Good old GRU tourists, again. Visiting France to admire church steeples, no doubt.

[futon]

Exercise Iron Fist 2026 starts in a few days which will train along the Okinawan islands mostly by USMC and JGSDF.

https://news.usni.org/2026/01/21/1500-u-s-marines-and-japanese-troops-to-train-on-first-island-chain-defense-next-month

[urbanoid]

The Chinese are protesting against the might is right. That’s how the weaker ones react.

The Russians are protesting too. In 2014 and 2022 they didn’t just protest—they attacked and intimidated. Since 2022 the situation has shifted a bit. The Russians are powerless on the global stage; they’ve staked everything they had on Ukraine.

The Chinese didn’t even manage to place any bets, because once they saw how the Russians drowned, they decided to hold off. They waited... And they’re no better positioned for an attack on Taiwan.

The Americans do whatever they want, wherever they want. The Russians sit quietly or try to tweak the narrative. Very softly. The Chinese have been hit a few times with tariffs, they’ve swung back with rare earth metals, but they don’t feel nearly as secure.

Iran’s been bombed (and there could be a repeat), Venezuela without Maduro, the shadow fleet isn’t sailing to China, the Americans are bombing in Africa too. Beijing—on a global scale—is powerless as well, even more so than the Russians. It’s a genie in a bottle. Supposedly all-powerful and mighty, but uncorking that daft stopper is beyond it.

So the Russians are protesting timidly, the Chinese are protesting, the Europeans are wailing, the Ayatollah is issuing threats, and Trump couldn’t care less—he’s just testing the waters. Seeing where he can gain something, where others are powerless, where he can buy cheap, and who he can sell something else to at a markup.

Of course this won’t last forever. I reckon Europe—winning the Greenland issue (for now)—might’ve unwittingly sped up certain processes. Diplomacy hasn’t got the Russians anywhere yet, so in 2026—seeing Trump back off under pressure—they might go off the deep end. China might also tire of being reactive and try to seize the initiative over events. Because 2025 showed that backing down before Trump doesn’t stop him at all.

Washington can’t even keep up consuming the deals it’s struck before opening new fronts of dispute. The pace is deliberately ramped up so others can’t keep up. This isn’t about some intricate strategy of a thousand cuts and 5D chess moves. It’s about action. Initiative. Strike after strike, wherever you can, wherever the opportunity arises. Let the others chase and get swallowed by the chaos. Action is everything. If action is everything, then Moscow and Beijing might finally twig that they can’t just stand still, hold back, or chase Washington. They’ve got to start moving themselves. And introduce new equations into the global jigsaw.

I’m not sure if I’ve conveyed my thoughts precisely, but to wrap up. I reckon 2025 will be nothing compared to what we’ll be watching in 2026. But you can probably already see it from the first few weeks.

https://x.com/KWojczal/status/2015203476008042588

 

[glenn239]

The Chinese perspective seems to be more that the US is thrashing around attacking its own allies while conducting various military adventures whose sum total will be failure.  Not sure who Wojczal is, but he doesn't sound Chinese and has no authority to speak or think for them. 

[urbanoid]

Anyone has a right to analyze and make predictions, including you and me, a right which we're both exercising often. 

So does he and he's usually quite good with his predictions*. You, not so much, always inhaling copium about whatever 'Sino-Russians' will do and how this time surely, inevitably the West will be shown its place.

*like this one for example:

Quote

By 2022, Russia will start a war in Europe or the Middle East.

September 24, 2019 Krzysztof Wojczal Analyses , Eastern Europe , Geopolitics , Russia 

https://www.krzysztofwojczal.pl/geopolityka/europa-wschodnia/rosja-europa-wschodnia/do-2022-roku-rosja-wywola-wojne-w-europie-lub-na-bliskim-wschodzie/

[Josh]

I think most of Trump’s impact is a net negative, but the military capabilities he’s throwing around globally probably are a little disquieting to the Chinese since they have no equivalents. Just taking a president from a country that nominally has a reasonable capacity for air defense probably was a bit of a shock. The Iran strike probably less so because it was more or less expected Iran could not prevent it, but it never the less was a rather large demonstration of power. Seven B-2s is enough to deliver 560 JDAMs in one go.

[glenn239]

19 hours ago, urbanoid said:

Anyone has a right to analyze and make predictions, including you and me, a right which we're both exercising often. 

So does he and he's usually quite good with his predictions*. You, not so much, always inhaling copium about whatever 'Sino-Russians' will do and how this time surely, inevitably the West will be shown its place.

I wasn't aware that the West has been doing so well for the past two decades.  Perhaps you can pass around whatever it is you are smoking and we can inhale then try to see the pattern you're referring to?  Is Western global domination in the room with us now, urbanoid?

In terms of the article you posted, Poland has its own agenda that is unique and different in some ways from Europe's or the United States.  Analog (but not identical) examples exist in Israel and Turkey, that is, strong regional powers with the ambition to using American power as leverage to their own regional agenda.   This is not a bad thing in and of itself, but you need to understand that when cogs in this Polish industry post opinion pieces about China and America, that it's best to view the opinions from a lens of Polish national agenda.  Your commentator writes,

 

Beijing—on a global scale—is powerless as well, even more so than the Russians. It’s a genie in a bottle. Supposedly all-powerful and mighty, but uncorking that daft stopper is beyond it.

 

What he's saying to Americans is, "do worry, you've got this, you can take China".  Not because they actually can, but because the Poles fear a world in which the Americans and Chinese cut a deal based on spheres of interest.  In that world whatever the status of Eastern Europe, it will not be in the American sphere, and Poland does not have the national power to leverage a policy of the same scale in Eastern Europe if based only on its own strength. 

Josh says Trump's frantic moves are a "net negative" for the United States, and I agree with him.  So do the Chinese.  They obviously think that Trump is doing damage, and you will recall Napoleon's adage to never interrupt your enemy while he is making a mistake.

Edited January 26 by glenn239

[urbanoid]

10 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

I wasn't aware that the West has been doing so well for the past two decades.  Perhaps you can pass around whatever it is you are smoking and we can inhale then try to see the pattern you're referring to?  Is Western global domination in the room with us now, urbanoid?

In terms of the article you posted, Poland has its own agenda that is unique and different in some ways from Europe's or the United States.  Analog (but not identical) examples exist in Israel and Turkey, that is, strong regional powers with the ambition to using American power as leverage to their own regional agenda.   This is not a bad thing in and of itself, but you need to understand that when cogs in this Polish industry post opinion pieces about China and America, that it's best to view the opinions from a lens of Polish national agenda.  Your commentator writes,

 

Beijing—on a global scale—is powerless as well, even more so than the Russians. It’s a genie in a bottle. Supposedly all-powerful and mighty, but uncorking that daft stopper is beyond it.

 

What he's saying to Americans is, "do worry, you've got this, you can take China".  Not because they actually can, but because the Poles fear a world in which the Americans and Chinese cut a deal based on spheres of interest.  In that world whatever the status of Eastern Europe, it will not be in the American sphere.  Josh says Trump's frantic moves are a "net negative" for the United States, and I agree with him.  So do the Chinese.  They obviously think that Trump is doing damage, and you will recall Napoleon's adage to never interrupt your enemy while he is making a mistake.

Yes, Western global domination is still very much in the room with us now. Russia is banging its head against the wall in Ukraine for 4 years now, China is still a genie in the bottle, but the cork is being controlled by the United States. 

Wherever Chinese and Russian interests have recently been challenged they showed themselves to be basically powerless - Syria, Venezuela, AZ/Armenia, Iran. Especially the Russians are receiving a bitchslap after a bitchslap and none of what you've been crying wolf about for 4 years now has materialized, a red line after a red line has been crossed. 

He's not saying anything to the Americans, just like I'm not saying anything to any government. I say things to TankNet members and he says things (including writing books) to the Polish audience. In yout twisted view everyone is basically conducting foreign policy. Maybe everyone judges by himself, so for whom are you conducting yours?

Edited January 26 by urbanoid

[Josh]

I think the situation is more complex, Glenn. You seem to think that the U.S. losing control of the West Pacific is the end of all U.S. hegemony everywhere. I think that infact the USN will continue to dominate everywhere else regardless of what happens there, and any military confrontation that sees the U.S. defeated in China’s back yard is simply the beginning of an open ended global economic conflict and likely hot war of varying degrees that never completely ends…something akin to a frozen conflict. And for decades to come, the U.S. will still control the major sea trade choke points.

For Poland, that is enough…they can lose Taiwan so long as the U.S. can still put Russia in its place, and checking Russia is a rather minor effort for the U.S.

[glenn239]

3 hours ago, Josh said:

I think the situation is more complex, Glenn. You seem to think that the U.S. losing control of the West Pacific is the end of all U.S. hegemony everywhere. 

Trump is making moves now to assure US hegemony in the Americas.

Quote

 And for decades to come, the U.S. will still control the major sea trade choke points.

Surface naval power is one the wane in comparison to coastal defense complexes and submarines. 

Quote

For Poland, that is enough…they can lose Taiwan so long as the U.S. can still put Russia in its place, and checking Russia is a rather minor effort for the U.S.

Poland seems to fear that the US is losing interest in their part of the world.  

 

[Josh]

7 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Trump is making moves now to assure US hegemony in the Americas.

As if the U.S. ever had any issues projecting power into the western hemisphere for the last century.

 

7 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Surface naval power is one the wane in comparison to coastal defense complexes and submarines.

Carriers still can control large swaths of ocean, even if they have vulnerabilities to land based missiles in some select cases (really only mainland China in the western pacific). CSGs would still operate freely basically everywhere else.

 

7 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Poland seems to fear that the US is losing interest in their part of the world.  

 

I am sure it is a core concern for them, yes. With US on their side Russia is hard pressed to threaten Poland in a meaningful way (assuming post Ukrainian war; right now Russia cannot threaten anyone).

[glenn239]

13 hours ago, Josh said:

As if the U.S. ever had any issues projecting power into the western hemisphere for the last century.

It would be unwisefor any policy makers in Washington to assume that a country as powerful as China would be incapable of making serious inroads politically, economically, militarily into South and Central America.  That being said, I'm not certain Trump's efforts are making things better.

Quote

Carriers still can control large swaths of ocean, even if they have vulnerabilities to land based missiles in some select cases (really only mainland China in the western pacific). CSGs would still operate freely basically everywhere else.

Carriers will be increasingly unable to operate within striking distances of contested coasts.   In the case of China, they are able to make much of the Arabian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea such areas.  This goes back to the difference between "can't" and "won't"

Quote

I am sure it is a core concern for them, yes. With US on their side Russia is hard pressed to threaten Poland in a meaningful way (assuming post Ukrainian war; right now Russia cannot threaten anyone).

The United States has never had any particular interests in Eastern Europe.  If the Poles thought or think that they could base an outsized foreign policy on manipulating Washington into overcommitting in their region, then they're likely to be soon disappointed.

 

Edited January 27 by glenn239

[Josh]

1 hour ago, glenn239 said:

 

Carriers will be increasingly unable to operate within striking distances of contested coasts.   In the case of China, they are able to make much of the Arabian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea such areas.  This goes back to the difference between "can't" and "won't"

China could hypothetically throw missiles that far. Whether it actually could accurately track and engage targets in those areas is suspect. Again, it would have to depend mostly on satellite targeting, and said satellites will be subject to a number of counter measures. Additionally, most of China’s orbital infrastructure is specifically set up for Western Pacific operations, so some capabilities would be of reduced ability or simply absent altogether (for instance remote sensing satellites in GEO or relay satellites in Molniya orbits).

Regardless, China’s ability to engage surface ships globally pales in comparison to the U.S., which can use CSGs, SSNs, and bombers to attack pretty much anything anywhere.

 

1 hour ago, glenn239 said:

The United States has never had any particular interests in Eastern Europe.  If the Poles thought or think that they could base an outsized foreign policy on manipulating Washington into overcommitting in their region, then they're likely to be soon disappointed.

 

The U.S. clearly has had an interest in Eastern Europe until the current administration, and likely will again after Trump is gone.

Edited January 27 by Josh