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Cold War, The Reimagined Series


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56 minutes ago, Josh said:

It seems unlikely Russia picks a fight with NATO directly. Its units are not positioned for a major fight on NATO fronts. About the only thing I could foresee is a salami slice type operation to take a small area of a Baltic nation to dare NATO to try to take it back, or else risk the alliance decomposing as irrelevant. But again, should NATO actually step up, Russian units are out of place to respond, even assuming they aren't directly engaging the Ukraine. If that were to occur, it would be a pre-meditated hail marry play to destabilize NATO, with all of the risks that entails. It doesn't fit in well with Putin's previous behavior of opportunism and low resource commitments.

NATO is playing a game of "NATO, Not NATO" where one minute it's the alliance, the next minute its members of the alliance pretending not to be the alliance, 

Britain, Poland and Ukraine in cooperation talks over Russian threat | Reuters

It's not possible for Russia to avoid 'picking a fight' with NATO because Not NATO is in Ukraine.  If and when its on there, you have to account for the possibility that they will destroy any satellites over the exclusion zone, and any recce platforms within some sort of aerial military exclusion zone.  And they will go after any Not NATO troops in Ukraine, who will presumably leave the country as the Russian army comes straight at them, and never come back.  In terms of Belarus, obviously the posture of Russian forces there will be defensive, because Russia has no beef with NATO, it's beef is purely with Not NATO.  If NATO votes to go article 5 because Not NATO is playing silly buggers in Ukraine, then presumably the war will take on a vastly more alarming and dangerous character.  

In terms of potential military Russian objectives, this,

Ukraine Trade Arteries Show Putin’s Options Short of All Out War (gcaptain.com)

Suggests that control of Ukrainian ports might be a key consideration.

Edited by glenn239
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The satellites would be mostly US DoD and US firms. And as I've said before, you'd have to engage a very large number of them to significantly decrease DoD's ability to gather EO intelligence, since they contract with most every private remote sensing operator. But if Russia took that step, then it would be definitely a 'NATO' fight, or at the very least a US one. I can't see them making that move given what an escalation it would be and how little effect it would have without a full court effort. Every EO satellite will wander over the 'exclusion zone'; that is how polar orbits work.

I suspect the 'not NATO' alliance will continue to focus on support and resupply efforts, possibly with some training efforts as in the case of the NLAW donation. I suspect if 'not NATO' troops are killed in the Ukraine, it will be chalked up to the cost of doing business. It certainly wouldn't invoke Article 5. I think the chances of escalation are minimal unless that was Russia's plan all along. US-Russian operations in Syria have generally been very well deconflicted, as an example of a region that probably has a lot more potential for random acts of escalation.

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a house on chicken feet, a trojan hen , probably filled with little green airborne chicks. 

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In Slavic folklore, Baba Yaga (Russian: Баба Яга) is a supernatural being (or one of a trio of sisters of the same name) who appears as a deformed and/or ferocious-looking woman. In Russian fairytales Baba Yaga flies around in a mortar, wields a pestle, and dwells deep in the forest in a hut usually described as standing on chicken legs

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baba_Yaga

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Sweden's Gotland gets ready for anything amid rising Russian threats

By Teri Schultz (Gotland, Sweden) | 18h ago

Suspicious of Moscow's territorial ambitions, Sweden is preparing for worst-case scenarios. Teri Schultz visits the island of Gotland that's being remilitarized to protect the region key to Baltic Sea security.

Henrik Hellvard, just finishing up lunch in a cozy cafe in Gotland's capital Visby, thinks back to his mandatory military service on the island decades ago, learning to fight "the enemy." 

"It was always the Russians," he chuckles. "We aimed our guns and spoke about the Russians."

There's always been good reason to practice defending this geo-strategic gem: Seize the Baltic Sea island of Gotland and you control the airspace and sea access to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania along with Finland.

"The Russians" didn't try to take over Gotland (save for an occupation of a couple of weeks in the early 1800s). On the contrary, as the Cold War thawed, the Swedish government assessed its relations with Moscow as so solid that it decided to completely disarm the island. By 2005, there were no permanent military units there anymore.

Three years later, Russia attacked Georgia, but Niklas Granholm, the director of studies at the Swedish Defense Research Agency, says the reaction from the West was too tepid to serve as a deterrent. "The alarm bells went off," he told DW, "but we pressed 'snooze' and went back to sleep." 

Only in 2016, two years after Moscow illegally annexed the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, did the Swedish government send troops and tanks back to Gotland. "That Russia is prepared to use military force against its smaller neighbors — that changed the assessment here," Granholm explained.

In 2019, amid heightened tensions, Sweden's military deployed an updated surface-to-air missile defense system on Gotland. 

'We are ready to defend Sweden'

That changing assessment has gathered pace in the months since Russia began massing troops on its border with Ukraine. Russian warships have been conducting drills in the Baltic Sea. Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist says an attack on his country cannot be ruled out.

"You have 100,000 soldiers around Ukraine. You have immediate full military access for the Russians too in Belarus. We have a history [of] hybrid attacks towards Lithuania and Poland and we have very brutal language from the Kremlin," he explained.

"So that has a real impact on the total security situation. What we want to do now is to be very clear that we are ready to defend Sweden and because of that, we are also doing what we're doing on the island of Gotland."

What Sweden is not doing is rushing to change its non-aligned status and join NATO. Hultqvist himself is opposed to that, saying it's not necessary since Stockholm has some 20 defense cooperation agreements with other countries, including the US; has security guarantees within the European Union; and a "very deep relationship" with neighboring Finland.

"We have prepared for a situation when we need interoperability and the possibility to work with other countries," Hultqvist told DW. "And if something happened here in our region, all of the countries here will have a direct impact and NATO will also have a direct impact from that, so we have to deal with the situation together."

Good neighbors not good enough?

The country can't count on NATO's self-interest spurring it to action on Sweden's behalf, says the chair of the parliamentary defense committee, Pal Jonson.

"We can hope, we can assume, we can wish that we get the support from NATO, but we cannot know until we join the alliance," he told DW. "We can have defense cooperation, but that's something qualitatively different from being a member of the alliance. That's crucial for Sweden because our security environment has severely deteriorated during the last years."

Jonson notes increased cyberattacks, disinformation, propaganda, and foreign direct investment into critical infrastructure as examples of rising threats. He believes the Swedish public has "significantly" changed its views about NATO from a few years ago as a result. "Today, about one-third support NATO membership, one-third are undecided and one-third are against [it]," he said. "So things are going in our direction." 

Jonson is lobbying his colleagues to get a majority in the Swedish parliament in favor of joining NATO.

[...]

https://m.dw.com/en/swedens-gotland-gets-ready-for-anything-amid-rising-russian-threats/a-60620892

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19 hours ago, Josh said:

I suspect the 'not NATO' alliance will continue to focus on support and resupply efforts, possibly with some training efforts as in the case of the NLAW donation. I suspect if 'not NATO' troops are killed in the Ukraine, it will be chalked up to the cost of doing business. It certainly wouldn't invoke Article 5. I think the chances of escalation are minimal unless that was Russia's plan all along. US-Russian operations in Syria have generally been very well deconflicted, as an example of a region that probably has a lot more potential for random acts of escalation.

US-Russian interactions in Syria have not been to the purpose of killing each other.  In Ukraine, the Americans are there to kill Russians if they invade, or kill them in the Donbass Pocket if they do not.  Killing tends to invoke retaliatory killing, so the capacity for escalation is inherent regardless of what Biden intends.

Looks to me that the Russian buildup is just placing the option for invasion on the table going forward, and the rest is the usual media hype.  Nonetheless, the situation looks zero sum going forward - either Russia wins in Ukraine or the West does, and judging from previous Russian incursions, any move by the Ukrainian army on Donbass will trigger the invasion the Ukrainians claim to fear.

 

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Russia and the US have often trained and equipped each other's opponents. It's never resulted in a direct conflict, or at least not one above the small unit level that couldn't be swept under the rug. If there ends up being a Russo-NATO war, it will be almost certainly because Putin decided to have a Russo-NATO war. The Ukraine isn't going to engage Donbas. Perhaps it was before the build up started last spring, but it certainly isn't going to give Russia a blank check now.

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US offered disarmament measures to Russia in exchange for deescalation of military threat in Ukraine

In documents accessed by EL PAÍS, the responses from Washington and NATO to Vladimir Putin’s demands reject closing the door on future incorporations to the Alliance but do pave the way for mutual trust-building measures

HIBAI ARBIDE AZA | MIGUEL GONZÁLEZ

Kiev / Madrid - FEB 02, 2022 - 07:37 CET

The United States and NATO reject signing a bilateral agreement on security in Europe with Russia and also closing the door on the future incorporation of Ukraine into the Atlantic Alliance. Those were two of the main demands presented by Moscow to put an end to the crisis in Ukraine at a moment of maximum tension between Russia and the West and that threatened Euro-Atlantic security. By contrast, both Washington and the Alliance offer Putin negotiations on disarmament agreements and trust-building measures in different forums – such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the US-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue, and the NATO-Russia Council – the success of which are conditioned on the start of a deescalation of the Russian military threat to Ukraine. That is according to two confidential documents sent last Wednesday by Washington and NATO to Moscow, and to which EL PAÍS has had access.

“Considering the substantial, unprovoked, unjustified, and ongoing Russian military build-up in and around Ukraine and in Belarus, we call on Russia to immediately de-escalate the situation in a verifiable, timely, and lasting manner,” NATO states. “It is the position of the United States government that progress can only be achieved on these issues in an environment of de-escalation with respect to Russia’s threatening actions towards Ukraine,” warns Washington.

The Russian authorities demanded a written response to their proposal to sign a deal that gave security guarantees to Moscow regarding the expansion of NATO to the east. Moscow even included a draft version of the hypothetical deal. The response was two texts: one titled “Confidential/Rel Russia” (consisting of an introduction, seven points and some brief conclusions) on the part of Washington; and another, under the heading “NATO-Russia Restricted” (with 12 sections), from the Atlantic Alliance. The texts capture to a large extent – albeit in a much more detailed form – the messages that the Western leaders have conveyed in public to the Kremlin. The US and NATO have coordinated their responses, which are complementary but do contain some differences.

The main difference between both texts is that Washington is prepared to discuss the concept of “indivisibility of security,” which the OSCE approved at its summit in Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan in 2010. Moscow has included this in the first article in its draft deal, using this principle to allege that the eventual entry of Ukraine into NATO would affect its security. The text from the US warns that it does not share the Russian point of view and notes that the concept of indivisibility of security “cannot be viewed in isolation.” Even so, it expresses willingness to deal with the “respective interpretations” of the same. And it points out that “the United States and Russia also reaffirmed the inherent right of each and every participating state to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance.”

From the beginning, the document from Washington makes clear that it “continues to firmly support NATO’s Open Door Policy,” and so does not exclude the future incorporation of Ukraine or Georgia into the Alliance. And it clarifies that whatever the case this issue should be dealt with at the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NATO text also reinforces its open-door policy and underlines the right of all states to choose their agreements in terms of security “free from outside interference.”

[...]

With relation to Ukraine, the Biden administration is offering Russia “conditions-based reciprocal transparency measures” under which Russia and the US would agree to “refrain from deploying offensive ground-launched missile systems and permanent forces with a combat mission in the territory of Ukraine.” For this, Washington announces its proposal to consult with Kiev.

These mutual trust agreements, together with the disarmament pacts, are the two keys of the texts sent by Washington and the Alliance. The US document begins stating that it is “prepared to work toward reaching an understanding with Russia, along with our Transatlantic Allies and partners, on security issues of interest.” And it lays out a series of issues on which it is “ready to discuss reciprocal commitments or actions” and the fora at which they should be addressed. The US states that it is prepared to deal with this process “in good faith,” while reproaching Putin for having deployed more than 100,000 soldiers on the border with Ukraine, for having occupied the Crimean Peninsula, and encouraging the conflict in Donbas (the eastern region of Ukraine, mostly Russian-speaking).

Washington complains that, in its draft deal on security in Europe, “Russia made certain demands that undermine principles Russia has committed to in prior documents.” “It is imperative”, it continues, “that discussions take place on the basis of the core founding documents on European security”, such as the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Paris and United Nations charters, “which enshrine the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and every state’s right to choose its security agreements and alliances [...].”

Limit on missiles

A number of US proposals imply limits on missiles that could culminate in new disarmament agreements. Washington has said it is prepared to start bilateral conversations with Russia on the control of short- and medium-range missiles and their launchers, although it criticizes the breaking of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the production and deployment of SSC-8 missiles and other systems. The US government reaffirms its commitment to the New START treaty for intercontinental missiles, which is in force until 2026, but it proposes the inclusion of new launchers, non-strategic arms and undeployed nuclear warheads. What’s more, it suggests beginning “discussions immediately on follow-on measures to New START” and discussing how future deals “would include all US and Russian nuclear weapons.” The document shows the concern of Washington and its allies given the efforts of Russia to diversify and increase its nuclear arsenal, develop new intercontinental missiles and deploy dual and non-strategic missiles near NATO borders.

One of the most novel proposals is the offer to Russia of a “transparency mechanism” to verify the absence of Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are capable of reaching Russian territory, at the NATO anti-missile shield bases in Romania and Bulgaria, and which house the Aegis system. In return, Washington calls for an identical approach with two missile-launching bases of its choice in Russian territory. Moscow had proposed limiting the deployment of short- and long-range missiles and expressed its concern for the fact that the anti-missile shield bases in Romania and Bulgaria could house Tomahawk missiles.

Given the unease of the European Union over its exclusion from these negotiations, the United States guarantees that it will discuss all of the issues that affect the security of Europe with its allies.

https://english.elpais.com/usa/2022-02-02/us-offers-disarmament-measures-to-russia-in-exchange-for-a-deescalation-of-military-threat-in-ukraine.html

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52 minutes ago, Josh said:

The Ukraine isn't going to engage Donbas. Perhaps it was before the build up started last spring, but it certainly isn't going to give Russia a blank check now.

Significant part of pro-Ukrainians, following their Western masters information campaign over years, are convinced that Russian troops buildup is bluff since, they believe, 1)Russia is petrol state ruled by corrupt cronies who only care about their bank accounts and palaces and London and 2)Ukrainian army is strong enough to give Russians bloodbath. After all President Saakashvilli of Georgia decided to attack even in less comfortable balance of forces. So pro-Ukrainian offensive Donbass is quite possible.

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32 minutes ago, Roman Alymov said:

Significant part of pro-Ukrainians, following their Western masters information campaign over years, are convinced that Russian troops buildup is bluff since, they believe, 1)Russia is petrol state ruled by corrupt cronies who only care about their bank accounts and palaces and London and 2)Ukrainian army is strong enough to give Russians bloodbath. After all President Saakashvilli of Georgia decided to attack even in less comfortable balance of forces. So pro-Ukrainian offensive Donbass is quite possible.

I'd say the UA attack was inevitable, right up until the Russians buildup.  The question is, will Biden give the green light to attack Donbass now that the Russian buildup is in place?

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Posture Updates in Support of Allies in Europe

February 2, 2022

As part of our commitment to upholding the principles of the rules-based international order and to the security of our NATO Allies, the United States maintains significant combat-capable forces in Europe.

These forward-deployed forces help to deter aggression and if deterrence fails, stand shoulder to shoulder with our Allies to maintain security and stability in Europe. At the President’s direction and following Secretary Austin’s recommendation, the Department of Defense will reposition certain Europe-based units further east, forward deploy additional U.S.-based units to Europe, and maintain the heightened state of readiness of response forces to meet these commitments.

These forces are not going to fight in Ukraine. They are not permanent moves. They respond to current conditions.

We will adjust our posture as those conditions evolve, and we will continue to consult closely with NATO Allies to ensure an appropriate collective posture of deterrence and defense. We welcome the announcements in recent days by other Allies - including France, Spain, UK, the Netherlands, and Denmark - of their consideration to provide additional contributions to enhancing NATO’s posture on the eastern flank. 

1,000 Forces Repositioned from Germany to Romania: 

As a part of our broader effort to demonstrate our commitment to our NATO Allies and deter Russian aggression, the United States is repositioning a Stryker squadron of approximately 1,000 U.S. service members already in the European theater to Romania. The 2nd Cavalry Regiment, a mounted unit based in Vilseck, Germany, will send a Combi arms force equipped with wheeled armored fighting vehicles to deter aggression and enhance our defensive capabilities in frontline Allied states during this period of elevated risk. These forces will augment the more than 900 U.S. service members already on regular rotation in Romania. 

2,000 Multi-Mission “Assure and Deter” Forces Deployed to Poland and Germany: 

Additionally, the Secretary is deploying approximately 2,000 forces from the United States to Europe in the next few days. These include approximately 1,700 service members of the 82nd Airborne Division and key enablers who will deploy from Fort Bragg, North Carolina to Poland and approximately 300 service members of the 18th Airborne Corps will move from Fort Bragg to Germany. The 82nd Airborne Division is deploying components of an Infantry Brigade Combat Team and key enablers to Poland. The 18th Airborne Corps is moving a Joint Task Force-capable headquarters to Germany. Collectively, this force is trained and equipped for a variety of missions to deter aggression and to reassure and defend our Allies during this period of elevated risk. We worked closely with our Polish and German Allies to set the stage for these movements, and we appreciate their support. 

8,500 Forces Remain in the United States on Heightened Readiness: 

The 8,500 personnel in the United States on heightened alert posture since January 24 remain in the United States. They are not currently being deployed, but remain ready to move if called to support the NATO Response Force (NRF), if it is activated, or as needed for other contingencies as directed by the Secretary or the President. We continue to review our force posture and the situation in Europe, as the gravity of this situation demands our full attention.

https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/02/2002931655/-1/-1/0/EUROPE-POSTURE-UPDATES-FACT-SHEET.PDF

Edited by BansheeOne
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On 1/29/2022 at 2:48 PM, BansheeOne said:

Looking at the planned upcoming rather than current structure of the British Army, you're right if either deployment is supposed to be mostly heavy mech. Though it might work even if the French leave for Romania, but the Danes keep contributing and Boxer comes through for the light mechanized role.

Okay, I just really looked at the British and Danish armies and find that between two entire national armed forces they are going to have

- nine active tank squadrons;

- 18 mechanized infantry companies, tracked;

- 18 mechanized infantry companies, wheeled.

I'm sorry, but I can't work like this.

supernatural-enough-internet.gif

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13 minutes ago, BansheeOne said:

Okay, I just really looked at the British and Danish armies and find that between two entire national armed forces they are going to have

- nine active tank squadrons;

- 18 mechanized infantry companies, tracked;

- 18 mechanized infantry companies, wheeled.

I'm sorry, but I can't work like this.

Britain is island, Denmark is as close to island as it can be (the inly land border is with Germany). So, unless UK is in need for heavy mech to counter Scotish uprising and Denmark is preparing to defend itself from German invasion, their land forces are for “Global Britain” and “Global Denmark” games, Effectively, it is toys for their politicians. And nine tank squadrons is quite a number for toys. If their tax payers want more – well, it is up to them to decide.

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2 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Interestingly the PM said only last year that large Tank Battles in Europe was a thing of the past...

So it was in 1919, 1946, 1991, in 2001 for Canada - I culd go on nad no.

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Yeah, well its Bojo you know?

Well ive been wrong before, but we have a CDS in Admiral Radakin whom is actually a fairly smart egg. Im not convinced he is going to prioritize the RN, just because that is his personal organization. For the first time in 2 decades we have a technocrat heading the organization, not an empty headed light infantryman.  I remain hopeful.

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