Kiev Is Burning

[Stuart Galbraith]

1 hour ago, ink said:

Strong claim! I imagine you have some evidence for that. Everything I've ever read suggests that Halifax and Chamberlain grew increasingly distant as war approached - and especially after Churchill became PM.

Its the narrative i heard when listening to 'You you the war is over' podcast.

There is a lot about that period that is conjectural, not least what did Churchill say in his conversation with Halifax in the No10 Garden, that won him some time to win the battle of Britain. We dont know, because neither side talked about it. The impression I get is that Chamberlain was not strongly on Churchills side, and was after all, the architect of appeasement with Halifax.

I dont get the impression that attitude changed greatly. They all thought Churchill would come to terms and ultimately he didnt. Chamberlain died befor he was completely disgraced, and Halifax resigned.

 

[mkenny]

5 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Read what I said, the declaration of war was dependent upon Hitler not doing something. Ergo, for us (Not for Poland clearly), Hitler created the war by not acquiesing to our demands.

Yeah, you should look up realistic, I dont think it means what you think it means.

Absurd. Chamberlain drew his line in the sand and honoured his commitment. He stood directly in front of Hitler and said this far and no further. Hitler thought he was bluffing but, as well all now know, he was not bluffing. I am not saying Chamberlain wanted a war but in 1939 he  finally accepted that it was inevitable. He also increased defence spending in anticipation of that war. At no time did Chamberlain  suggest any form of deal with Hitler after Sept 1939.

 

 

 

5 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Once again, the public booted out Churchill's party, which considering it was their mismanagement that led to the war seems entirely reasonable enough. Churchil could always have become a Socialist.....

And no matter which way you desperately try and spin it Churchill, and the party he represented were comprehensively rejected by the voters. He was  seen as yesterday's man representing all they had no intention of returning too. People were sick of him/them and they got the boot. 

[txtree99]

 Can we move the ww2 discussion to a different thread

[Stuart Galbraith]

34 minutes ago, mkenny said:

Absurd. Chamberlain drew his line in the sand and honoured his commitment. He stood directly in front of Hitler and said this far and no further. Hitler thought he was bluffing but, as well all now know, he was not bluffing. I am not saying Chamberlain wanted a war but in 1939 he  finally accepted that it was inevitable. He also increased defence spending in anticipation of that war. At no time did Chamberlain  suggest any form of deal with Hitler after Sept 1939.

 

 

 

And no matter which way you desperately try and spin it Churchill, and the party he represented were comprehensively rejected by the voters. He was  seen as yesterday's man representing all they had no intention of returning too. People were sick of him/them and they got the boot. 

And there we go, there we have it. Exactly my point. He was quite happy to keep throwing Eastern Europeans under the bus, but there were limits. It seemingly finally occurred to him that if we were going to fight Hitler, better to do it with allies. It wasnt about drawing a line arbitrarily. It was narrow minded self interest, the same thing the Conservatives had been doing all through the 1930's.

However you want to spin it, Churchill was not rejected. And besides, isnt it curious that for someone decisively rejected, just 7 years later he was Prime Minister again of the same Conservative party.

[Stuart Galbraith]

2 minutes ago, txtree99 said:

 Can we move the ww2 discussion to a different thread

I dont see any reason to, he is just going to keep ploughing his narrow minded furrow and Im going to ignore it.

[glenn239]

18 hours ago, urbanoid said:

If only everyone kept saying 'yes, Herr Hitler', so many people would have lived instead of dying. Damn warmongers, not knowing when to surrender.

The best time to take out Hitler was in 1934.  Oddly, the same posters that argue about whether war was the best option in 1938 never talk about the fact that the best opportunity had occurred 4 years previous.

[mkenny]

21 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

 

However you want to spin it, Churchill was not rejected.

1945:

Labour 393 seats 11,967,211 votes.

Conservative 197 seats  8,716,211 votes

 

[ink]

1 hour ago, mkenny said:

Absurd. Chamberlain drew his line in the sand and honoured his commitment. He stood directly in front of Hitler and said this far and no further. Hitler thought he was bluffing but, as well all now know, he was not bluffing. I am not saying Chamberlain wanted a war but in 1939 he  finally accepted that it was inevitable. He also increased defence spending in anticipation of that war. At no time did Chamberlain  suggest any form of deal with Hitler after Sept 1939.

That's the line that, from my reading at least, most historians appear to take. Which seems reasonable given how isolated Halifax was after the declaration of war.

[glenn239]

1 hour ago, mkenny said:

Absurd. Chamberlain drew his line in the sand and honoured his commitment

Chamberlain's geopolitical strategy was to try to manage the Nazis with negotiations while at the same time never giving up the key elements of the Anglo-French 'Anaconda' of blockade to eliminate the Nazis if war were to occur.  Where it fell apart was in the Battle of France, where it was shown that a key assumption in British planning was wrong, (ie, the capacity of the Maginot LIne and French army to contain the Germans).  Had the Germans lost the Battle of France in 1940, there's little question but that the Nazis would have been in serious trouble, with the French army intact on one side, the Soviets on the other, and their economy faltering to the blockade.

So, what Stuart is essentially arguing is that in 1938 Chamberlain should have gotten into Dr. Who's phone booth and flown to June 1940 to see that the military strategy he was following was going to fail.  You know, a reasonable argument.

[urbanoid]

40 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

The best time to take out Hitler was in 1934.  Oddly, the same posters that argue about whether war was the best option in 1938 never talk about the fact that the best opportunity had occurred 4 years previous.

There have been Polish proposals of preventive war against the Reich in 1933, France was not interested, obviously. 

Then again, not doing the correct thing in 1933/34 doesn't mean that the correct course of action up to 1939 and beyond was doubling down on concessions.

The same rule applies today, not just wrt Russia, but in general. E.g. the rise of China was largely avoidable, if it wasn't for Western greed they'd be an economic and military midget compared to what they are today. Does it mean that Taiwan or Japan shouldn't be defended? No, it doesn't.

[ink]

9 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

There have been Polish proposals of preventive war against the Reich in 1933, France was not interested, obviously. 

Then again, not doing the correct thing in 1933/34 doesn't mean that the correct course of action up to 1939 and beyond was doubling down on concessions.

There was also a much bigger occasion where France failed to step up. 

9 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

The same rule applies today, not just wrt Russia, but in general. E.g. the rise of China was largely avoidable, if it wasn't for Western greed they'd be an economic and military midget compared to what they are today. Does it mean that Taiwan or Japan shouldn't be defended? No, it doesn't.

But who's going to step up and stop the West with it's destructive crusade of wars around the world? 😉

[urbanoid]

18 minutes ago, ink said:

There was also a much bigger occasion where France failed to step up. 

But who's going to step up and stop the West with it's destructive crusade of wars around the world? 😉

You mean 1939? If yes then I can't fully agree tbh.

I think the West has largely learned its lesson in the aftermath of 2003. 

[Josh]

Back to the actual topic: Xi wags his finger at Putin.

 

https://www.spacewar.com/m/reports/China_Brazil_urge_against_nuclear_threats_over_Ukraine_999.html

[Roman Alymov]

1 minute ago, Josh said:

Back to the actual topic: Xi wags his finger at Putin.

 

https://www.spacewar.com/m/reports/China_Brazil_urge_against_nuclear_threats_over_Ukraine_999.html

There is obvious reasons for that i have allready explained

 

[ink]

19 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

You mean 1939? If yes then I can't fully agree tbh.

I do indeed mean 1939. That was the time for a proper country to do the right thing, and they could have, easily, if it wasn't for the political decline they were experiencing at the time.

19 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

I think the West has largely learned its lesson in the aftermath of 2003. 

That would be true, had it not been for Libya and Syria (and a handful of African interventions). But I really think they 'learned their lesson' after the withdrawal from Afghanistan or the Russian/Iranian intervention in Syria. Given that was just a decade ago, there's actually no proof they learned their lesson at all.

[Stuart Galbraith]

1 hour ago, ink said:

That's the line that, from my reading at least, most historians appear to take. Which seems reasonable given how isolated Halifax was after the declaration of war.

It wasnt isolated in 1940 when the BEF was coming back in boats, and the Nazi's were expected to be right behind them. Suddenly he looked right.

There is a school of thought thats why he turned down the prime ministership. He expected winston to take the fall for the ensuing disaster, and he could be peacemaker.

[mkenny]

1 hour ago, urbanoid said:

There have been Polish proposals of preventive war against the Reich in 1933, France was not interested, obviously. 

Poland refused to have any dealing with The Soviets who were the only ones who could prevent any German invasion. 

[ink]

2 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

It wasnt isolated in 1940 when the BEF was coming back in boats, and the Nazi's were expected to be right behind them. Suddenly he looked right.

There is a school of thought thats why he turned down the prime ministership. He expected winston to take the fall for the ensuing disaster, and he could be peacemaker.

Even looking right doesn't mean he wasn't isolated. He may have had some support from the odd aristocrat here or there but not from any actual politicians or powerful political actors. 

[Roman Alymov]

P.S. Also, as i have said many times, China leadership is well aware that Russian elite (who are de-facto pro-Western colonial administration) are not fighting real war agaisnt West - they continue providing West with fuel, are not launching mobilsation etc., in other words still hope to return of "business as usual" with West, to have their London palaces back. Threats to use nukes while continuing with pumping NG to Europe is clearly the sign that is is just negotiation process. Obviously, it is not in China's interests to have Russian elite surrendering to West (as they dream to), so quite logically they are taking steps to not allow use of nukes as element of this negotiations. Effectively Chinese are saying "Don't even hope we will allow you to achieve your conditional surrender dream. Start fighting real war".

[Stefan Kotsch]

8 minutes ago, Roman Alymov said:

Russian elite (who are de-facto pro-Western colonial administration) are not fighting real war agaisnt West ... in other words still hope to return of "business as usual" with West,

Then why was the war even started? And why isn't it over yet? Questions after questions.
 

Edited September 28 by Stefan Kotsch

[Stuart Galbraith]

7 minutes ago, ink said:

Even looking right doesn't mean he wasn't isolated. He may have had some support from the odd aristocrat here or there but not from any actual politicians or powerful political actors. 

There you go. Tell me, have you seen 'Remains of the Day'? It may have been fiction, but it was describing an actual truth.

Mosley was an aristocrat as well remember. This wasnt the postwar years when a peoples vote meant something. At this point in history, everything was in flux, and that included the possiblity of appointing a PM, a Lord, that wasnt chosen at the ballot box. It wasnt THAT long ago we had a foreign secretary whom didnt have to pass that test either.

[urbanoid]

17 minutes ago, mkenny said:

Poland refused to have any dealing with The Soviets who were the only ones who could prevent any German invasion. 

The Soviets weren't needed for anything in 1933/34, Polish-French preventive war against Germany at that time would be a walk in the park.

And yes, we Poland has refused any dealings with the Soviets in 1938, because it didn't want to end up as a Soviet republic.

[urbanoid]

23 minutes ago, ink said:

I do indeed mean 1939. That was the time for a proper country to do the right thing, and they could have, easily, if it wasn't for the political decline they were experiencing at the time.

That would be true, had it not been for Libya and Syria (and a handful of African interventions). But I really think they 'learned their lesson' after the withdrawal from Afghanistan or the Russian/Iranian intervention in Syria. Given that was just a decade ago, there's actually no proof they learned their lesson at all.

Offensive against Germany from the West likely would have been disastrous and a total failure. 

Not my text, just taken from a good Polish facebook profile about WW2 and autotranslated:

Quote

THE BETRAYAL THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN

Abbeville.

A town in northeastern France, which according to most Poles is synonymous with Targowica, Brutus, Judas, the worst kind of betrayal and baseness, where the heroically fighting Poles were stabbed in the back to the hilt by the cowardly French and British, deciding that they would not help because they did not feel like it.

This is the official version, repeated by state institutions, including patriotic images, reaching deep into the Polish People's Republic and even further - to Soviet-Nazi propaganda.

How was it really?

I recently mentioned that Poland had been theoretically bound by an alliance with France since 1921. In theory, since the May Coup in 1926, Polish-French ties had loosened, among other things due to the attitude of Marshal Piłsudski, who fought the supporters of the pro-French option in Poland. The deaths of two great friends of the Polish cause and, in my opinion, the most outstanding Frenchmen of the 20th century, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and Marshal Ferdinand Foch, who passed away in 1929, also had a serious impact. They were known for their unusually warm and friendly attitude to Poland, seeing it as an ally in the fight against Germany. Piłsudski was satisfied with non-aggression pacts with Germany and the USSR, not taking sides.

Another problem was the very conciliatory attitude of Great Britain, which turned a blind eye to German attempts to revise the Treaty of Versailles. Alone, France did not intend to fight the war with Germany alone and from 1932 adopted a defensive course, building the Maginot Line, although the German Reichswehr at that time had a modest 10 divisions. It should be remembered that World War I had ended only 15 years earlier, decimating French and British societies. The effects were long-term: throughout the 1930s, the British put pressure on successive governments to limit armaments and avoid war in every possible way. The trauma of Verdun and the Somme affected the entire policy of the great powers. In the absence of decisiveness on the part of Great Britain and France, Belgium broke off its alliance with France and declared itself a completely neutral state, which worsened the situation of the Allies even more.

As a result, France, whose foreign policy had always focused on neutralizing the German threat, decided to get closer to Czechoslovakia and the USSR. In 1935-1938, an anti-German bloc was formed with the participation of these countries. However, during the Sudeten crisis, Great Britain and France considered that German military potential was much higher than their own (and this was indeed the case - in 1938, the French and British armies were completely unprepared for any confrontation with Germany). The situation was complicated by the fact that Poland refused to allow Red Army units to enter Czechoslovakia, and then entered Zaolzie itself.

As a result, efforts began to build a strong anti-German front, which was planned to include, in addition to Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, and then force Germany to fight on two fronts. A feverish modernization of the army was also launched, increasing spending on armaments - Great Britain from 3 to 6% of GDP, and France to 8% of GDP.

At the beginning of 1939, Poland itself refused German demands. It was assumed that Berlin was bluffing in its threats and that a firm refusal would stop Adenoid Hynkel. At that time, Poland had already decided to use arms to resist German demands if necessary. On March 31, Neville Chamberlain's government promised assistance to Poland, although it did not specify it in any way. Warsaw immediately agreed to the proposal, without establishing any details - it tried to join any anti-German option. It was hoped that the alliance of the Allied states would deter Berlin from war.

The emergence of a very improvised British-French-Polish alliance alarmed the Germans, who in the spring of 1939 began to develop plans for an attack on Poland.

As I mentioned before, Polish-French talks began on May 17 in Paris, during which the French committed to launch an offensive 15 days after the announcement of mobilisation. In addition, deliveries of equipment to Poland and air support were discussed. Deliveries and orders continued throughout 1939, and the Poles ordered, among other things, 50 Renault R35 tanks, 100 Morane-Saulnier MS 406 aircraft, 14 Hurricane aircraft, and even one Spitfire.

But what good is it if implementing the equipment into service takes time, a lot of time, and that was not the case...

The Poles were warned that the offensive would be limited. The problem, however, was where to launch the offensive - in fact, the only point where the French could strike was the so-called Saar Gate, between the Rhine and the Moselle. The Germans were aware that this was the only possible direction of attack, and that was why the Siegfried Line was strongest there. Belgium's neutrality was an additional gift for the Germans, because it significantly narrowed the Allies' room for maneuver. The battle for the Saar Basin was to be a multi-week campaign of attrition, not a blitzkrieg. Nevertheless, the attack was planned, but it was assumed in advance that it would be relieving. The French were not to storm Berlin or do other cosmic things.

It is also nonsense that the Allies ''did not inform'' the Poles about the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. The pact itself was already known on 23 August, and on the morning of 24 August Minister Bonnet informed the Polish ambassador in Paris, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, about the secret annex to the pact, although he did not know its details. The Americans knew them, but they were not eager to reveal them to the Poles.

The supposedly terrible delay in the mobilization in Poland by the Allies is also a myth. In reality, the intervention of the Allied ambassadors concerned only the general overt mobilization and it lasted only one day - August 29. In a conversation with me, Professor Wojciech Mazur stated that the bigger problem was the announcement by the Polish authorities of the secret mobilization only on August 24. It was because of this decision that most Polish reservists did not reach their units in time. Here, however, it must be noted that Poland could not afford to maintain mobilization for a longer period. A month of mobilization cost as much as two years of normal functioning of the state.

During a visit to Poland, General Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, prepared a report in which he wrote: ''The Poles realize that they are geographically isolated and must hold out on their own for a long time.'' The Anglo-Polish agreement of August 25 obliged both sides to provide assistance, but did not specify the form or amount of assistance. It only meant that Great Britain would support Poland only with what it could afford.

On August 28, Marshal Rydz-Śmigły wrote: "Based on talks with Generals Gamelin and Ironside, help from the Allies will arrive slowly and not immediately in sufficient intensity."

When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, the alarm was raised in London and Paris and preparations for mobilisation began, which was announced at midnight on 2 September. With a slight delay, limited offensive operations began on the night of 6–7 September, as I have already written. Pressure to start military operations was immediately exerted by the French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, but General Maurice Gamelin, the commander of the French army, was more withdrawn. Gamelin feared that breaking through the last serious frontier of Polish defence on the Narew-Vistula-San line could lead to the transfer of larger forces to the Western Front and the acceleration of full-scale fighting with the French army, which was not ready for it.

On September 12, a meeting was held in Abbeville between the British delegation, represented by Prime Minister Chamberlain, and the French delegation, represented by Prime Minister Daladier. The general outline of the conference is known, but there are four protocols, three of which are known only in fragments to this day. Importantly, the decisions on Poland were just one of many topics at the conference. The conference also discussed the attitude of Italy, Spain, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, the issue of mobilizing industry and the army, and the attitude of public opinion.

During the conference, Chamberlain and Gamelin were skeptical about Poland continuing to fight. They had reason to be - the day before, the Polish defense on the Vistula had been broken, and for three days the Germans had been standing at the gates of Warsaw and it seemed that they would take it any day now. There were also fears of Italy's reaction. Prime Minister Daladier had a different opinion and fought to gather much more means for the fight and called for a strong offensive. The French Prime Minister pressed for the immediate sending of military equipment to Poland via Romania, emphasizing that even if Poland did not receive this equipment, Romania could be the next country to be attacked. However, he was alone and was stopped by Chamberlain.

The pointlessness of naval action in the Baltic was also emphasised due to the lack of any bases from which British ships could operate.

Let us clearly emphasize what is most important: NO BINDING DECISIONS WERE MADE IN Abbeville REGARDING POLAND.

After the conference, Chamberlain's actions were heavily criticized by the French press. Most importantly, it was not decided to suspend operations against Germany. The French army chiefs argued that continuing operations was in France's interest, because most of the offensive forces were engaged in Poland. Chamberlain's defeatist approach was not shared by the British military, who believed that attacks on Germany should not only be continued but intensified, and that Poland should be supported with war materials. After the conference, Gamelin also changed his mind and supported offensive operations against Germany in the Saar, which had not been suspended so far.

The RAF Chief of Staff, Air Marshal Cyril Newall, wrote on 14 September: "I think it was Mr Daladier's intention, as it certainly was Mr Chamberlain's, that we should do what we could to help the Poles to prolong their resistance to the Germans. That, I believe, is the agreed policy."

The Soviet aggression on September 17th destroyed any hopes of continuing resistance. Until then, it had been hoped for a repetition of the "Serbian variant" and long-term resistance on the so-called Romanian bridgehead. However, the Polish Army had already been defeated even without Soviet aggression, retreating to Hungary and Romania. During this period, the remnants of the "Krakow" and "Lublin" armies capitulated. The Poles no longer had any strategic reserves. The campaign took the form of extinguishing isolated points of resistance. It was not until September 21 that Great Britain and France decided to halt offensive operations against the Germans on land, because it was already realized that Poland was not able to launch a counterattack. In Poland, an offensive action was expected after September 16th, but the following days destroyed this chance.

Interestingly, there is no evidence that Stalin knew about the Abbeville arrangements. Besides, the USSR planned the aggression against Poland much earlier than September 12, and the initial date - set for September 9 - was September 14. The delay in the Soviet aggression resulted solely from the organizational chaos and logistical deficiencies typical of the Red Army, which could not be completely eliminated anyway, and many Soviet units had neither vehicles, nor fuel, nor even uniforms and food.

As I mentioned before - no betrayal simply took place. Neither Paris nor London were prepared for the fact that the country that was the fourth military power in Europe would lose so quickly. It was no one's fault - the plans fell apart due to the German speed of attack. The planned deliveries of equipment largely did not even have time to reach Poland.

General Tadeusz Kutrzeba wrote in 1938:

"It can be assumed without fear of a great mistake that France's military pressure on Germany will not be able to begin earlier than two weeks after the outbreak of the war, which will be felt in Poland at the earliest 4-6 weeks later."

4-6 weeks after the beginning of even a limited French offensive, the campaign in Poland was long over. In a report prepared with Col. Stefan Mossor, General Kutrzeba stated that Poland would be forced to fight on its own for at least 6-8 weeks.

If Poland had held out for 6-8 weeks, would the situation have changed? In my opinion, no. The Allies underestimated the military potential of Germany, which could easily beat the Poles and protect its western border at the same time. Positional warfare would have begun in western Germany, lasting for weeks. A prolonged ''imperialist'' war would have been a dream gift for Stalin, waiting for a repeat of the massacre of 1915-1917, so that the Red Army could triumphantly enter the West.

The Allies' thinking was well-founded. France and Great Britain, bled dry only 20 years earlier, preferred to build up their own military potential and wait on a strong line of fortifications instead of unsuccessfully attacking the mighty Siegfried Line, then stop and bleed the enemy there, and then launch a counter-offensive. However, no one expected that in May 1940, the Allies' plans would once again be thwarted by inept Belgium, stubbornly remaining neutral.

And finally - France and Great Britain declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. A war that cost them their empires, after which they were pushed to the role of pawns on the world chessboard. Slightly bigger and stronger, but still pawns. Neither the French nor the British ever agreed to the German proposals to recognize the partition of Poland. They decided to go into the trenches of a war that destroyed their possessions and buried hundreds of thousands of citizens. Dying "for Gdańsk" from the first day.

I don't know if you can even call it ''betrayal''.

In conclusion, I do not know whether the statements of people who believe that France could have easily defeated the Germans in 1939 and who at the same time consider the French to be cowards who allegedly "surrendered without a fight" in 1940 are more funny or more pathetic.

https://www.facebook.com/WojnawKolorze2.0/posts/pfbid0Q8eEyb7KEqp798rNJNa4ASbDeX5HeahbKsK2AXnTvL6oA6keJYdBcJ7upHmQigqml

PS. 'Adenoid Hynkel' is obviously another 'AH', but since fb algorithms are crazy sometimes...

[Josh]

40 minutes ago, Roman Alymov said:

P.S. Also, as i have said many times, China leadership is well aware that Russian elite (who are de-facto pro-Western colonial administration) are not fighting real war agaisnt West - they continue providing West with fuel, are not launching mobilsation etc., in other words still hope to return of "business as usual" with West, to have their London palaces back. Threats to use nukes while continuing with pumping NG to Europe is clearly the sign that is is just negotiation process. Obviously, it is not in China's interests to have Russian elite surrendering to West (as they dream to), so quite logically they are taking steps to not allow use of nukes as element of this negotiations. Effectively Chinese are saying "Don't even hope we will allow you to achieve your conditional surrender dream. Start fighting real war".

That’s an interesting fantasy. I doubt Xi remotely cares about your internal politics or which oblasts Russia controls when the war is over. What would it possibly matter to China? Russia is just a gas station and a nuclear chess piece for China. Take away those two things and it becomes almost completely irrelevant.

[urbanoid]

@ink And another one, about French doctrine, the state of the French military and its comparison to the Wehrmacht. And yes, we were fully aware of that when we were accepting French guarantees, we were fully aware that the whole country may end up occupied (Serbian WW1 variant with gov in exile was considered long before 1939), what we were not fully aware of was the genocidal nature of the Reich (as opposed to USSR, which we already knew as such) - which is understandable, as it wasn't particularly genocidal PRIOR to the war. 

Quote

As promised - an entry about the alleged French treason of 1939. For the sake of clarity, I would like to point out that this entry appeared on my blog every year from 2016 to 2020 and I am publishing it today unchanged.

DYING FOR GDAŃSK

French soldiers from the 42nd Infantry Division in the town of Lauterbach, September 9, 1939. [A]

Because in connection with another anniversary of the outbreak of World War II, the topic of alleged ''cowardice'' and ''betrayal'' of Poland's allies in 1939 is coming back like a boomerang. For years, people in Poland have been saying that the French could have ended the war in a week, only they didn't want to, that they had ''110 divisions'' on the border with Germany, and ''the Germans didn't have a single armored division.'' All to cheer up hearts. Roger Moorhouse has repeated this myth in his latest book, and it has fallen on fertile ground. After all, it is more convenient to blame someone else...

Today we will only discuss the military aspect of this matter, tomorrow we will deal with the political one.

The basis of Poland's alliances were agreements - it was concluded with France in February 1921. However, since the May Coup in 1926, Polish-French ties had weakened significantly, when the Sanation took power in Poland. Only in the situation of a threat from Germany was the agreement renewed on May 19, 1939.

The French army in the 1930s had the reputation of being the most powerful army in the world. However, it was just an opinion. Both in 1939 and in 2020, people are delighted with numbers, forgetting that the strength of an army is measured in something other than filled to the brim warehouses of old weapons. Despite the impressive numbers of guns, tanks and aircraft, it was an army still based on the system of mobilizing reservists. Of the 16,680 guns in the French army, 1/3 did not have sights or additional equipment. Of the 2,850 tanks in possession, 1,000 were obsolete and useless Renault FTs, and most of the rest were light tanks, created on the anachronistic concept - Renault R35 and Hotchkiss H38. Treated like ''Deus ex Machina'' heavy tanks Char B1, the French had exactly 129 pieces in their units. Somua S35 tanks - 246. On an army scale it was next to nothing.

It was no different in aviation - the 1,600 aircraft it had were mostly outdated. The French, sensing the approaching conflict, began rapid modernization and made purchases abroad, but it was not enough. In 1939, France had only 17 (yes, seventeen) modern LeO 451 bombers and 513 MS 406 fighters, American H-75s and Potez 630s, plus 162 Bloch MB. 131 and Potez 631 reconnaissance-bomber aircraft. Bomber aviation was represented by 359 Amiot 143s and Bloch MB. 210s. This means that in 1939 France had almost ten times fewer modern bomber aircraft than Poland. A large part of the listed aircraft were already considered outdated in 1939 and were mainly directed to night operations. Modern D.520 and MB fighters. The 152s were just entering production and even in May 1940 there were far from enough of them. The first French (or any) raid on Berlin was only possible in... June 1940, using a single, specially modified Jules Verne bomber from the French Navy.

Many planes and tanks were also located in the extensive colonies of the French empire (about 1/3 of the total).

In theory, the French army had 81 infantry divisions, two motorized cavalry divisions, two mountain cavalry divisions, and 11 brigades. In practice, however, as many as 49 divisions were reserve units that had yet to be mobilized, and a large part of the forces were stationed in the colonies.

France, by the way, had less than half metropolitan citizens as the Third Reich (42 million to 86 million; even when France and Poland were added together, Germany had the upper hand) and produced less than half as much steel per year (7.9 million tons to 26 million tons). Germany was an economic powerhouse, second only to the USA. That is why the Third Reich could afford astronomical spending on armaments, which absorbed 22% of its GDP in 1938, while France and Great Britain spent 7% and 6.5% of GDP, respectively. In 1935, Germany spent more on armaments than Poland, Great Britain and France combined, as much as 2.23 BILLION dollars.

When the Germans attacked Poland, the French set a date for the start of the mobilization in the north for September 2nd. When they declared war on Germany on September 3rd, the French had 12 divisions on the border with Germany. The end date of the mobilization was estimated for the third decade of September (September 20-30).

The Polish-French agreement (which I will discuss in more detail shortly) obliged France to begin limited offensive operations three days after the announcement of mobilization (September 5) and to begin a full-scale offensive 15 days after the announcement of mobilization (September 17). But such tasks were impossible - no army in the world in 1939 was able to go from mobilization to offensive in two weeks. The offensive was not to save Poland or storm Berlin; it was to relieve the front so that the Polish Army could regroup and counterattack. The Poles were to buy the necessary time. General Kutrzeba and Colonel Stefan Mossor assumed in 1938 that 6-8 weeks would have to pass for Poland to feel the effects of the French offensive. This would not happen until the end of October 1939, while Polish ammunition supplies were sufficient for 60 days of fighting. In Poland it was perfectly clear that British-French aid would only be felt after a long time.

By September 16, the French had mobilized 36 divisions. Not any "110s" as Alfred Jodl had imagined in Nuremberg.

The situation could have been improved by the British, but they had illusory forces - the British Expeditionary Force was only just forming and on September 4 its first echelon sailed for France, where it arrived on September 10. In October, the Corps had only four divisions. The entire British Army had two armoured divisions - one of which was in Egypt and the other was being transferred to France. The basic British tank in 1939 was 1,002 Vickers-Armstrong Mark VI light tanks, armed only with a machine gun. The only ones armed with 40 mm cannons were 77 Cruiser Mark I fast tanks. Many units were still in the forming phase and were scattered throughout the Empire.

The French had deployed British divisions in the auxiliary sector near Arras. The only support the British could provide was air support. However, Guy Gibson, ace of Bomber Command, wrote directly in his memoirs that the British bomber force was drastically unprepared for any kind of combat. Bomber Command in 1939 had 280 machines (yes, roughly the same number as Poland), Fighter Command - 373. Besides, the bomber forces were equipped with either weak Fairey Battle planes (whose uselessness was proven by the Battle of Sedan in May 1940) or already aging medium bombers Hampden and Whitley. There were few modern Wellingtons, unsuitable for a bomber offensive anyway. The powerful Lancasters, which later reduced entire cities to ashes, were only just being created on the drawing boards.

What was it like on the other side of the front?

It is often said that the Germans had "weak forces" on the Western Front, that they "had no armored divisions," creating the impression that Germany's western border was guarded by some untrained, rear-guard motley crew.

Heeresgruppe "C" under General Wilhelm von Leeb consisted of 42 divisions grouped into three armies.

- General Dollmann's 7th Army occupied the Rhine line and numbered 6 infantry divisions, an SS regiment, supported by artillery regiments.

- The 1st Army of General von Witzleben occupied the Saar Basin and numbered 7 infantry divisions and 4 artillery regiments. It was supported by the ''Saarpfalz'' group, numbering 3 infantry divisions, reinforced with three regiments and two infantry battalions, four artillery regiments, three machine gun battalions and three border guard regiments. In reserve there were 6 infantry divisions and three artillery regiments. It was the strongest of the armies and occupied the main axis of the expected attack.

- General Liebmann's 5th Army on the border with Luxembourg numbered 11 infantry divisions, supported by artillery and border guard regiments.

In the depths was the front reserve, numbering 13 divisions. The Germans also had fortress units, anti-tank battalions and 400 tanks, concentrated in companies and tank battalions, as mobile reserves. Out of 42 divisions, 12 belonged to the first wave of mobilization, i.e. the absolute elite of the Wehrmacht. The rest were the second and third waves of mobilization, i.e. not any "old men with rifles", but fully trained reservists. They had slightly fewer machine guns, but the number of artillery equaled the first-line divisions.

This meant that from September 3 onwards the Germans simply had a numerical advantage over the French in the west.

The Germans also kept half of their air force in the West from the beginning of the war in the form of the 2nd and 3rd Luftflotten. Both fleets had fewer bombers and destroyers - directed to attack Poland - but they had 600 of the most modern Luftwaffe fighters - Bf-109, far superior to their French counterparts.

The German defense was based on the Siegfried Line - an ''elephant in the menagerie'' that is persistently ignored in Polish historiography. The Western Wall was one of the most powerful lines of fortifications in the world, although still unfinished, and had 15,560 concrete objects, protected by 150,000 mines. Only the Maginot Line was stronger. It is worth adding that five years later, in 1944, the very outdated and incomplete Siegfried Line defended itself against American and French attacks for half a year. Moreover, the Germans were aware that the French attack could only occur through the so-called Saar Gate, which is why the strongest section of the Siegfried Line was located there: 4,100 bunkers, 340 minefields, 100 km of anti-tank ditches and 90 km of concrete barriers.

The Allies were not aware of the real strength of the Wehrmacht, which was stronger than the combined armies of France, Great Britain and Poland, and that the Wehrmacht could simultaneously beat the Poles without weakening its western border.

The French initially planned to attack from Belgian territory (as proposed on September 1! by the commander of the French army, General Maurice Gamelin), but the country did not agree to the march of troops. In 1936, Belgium broke the defense pact that connected it with France and declared complete neutrality. And this was guarded by its solid army of 600,000 soldiers and numerous forts, built not only on the border with Germany, but also with France.

The only option left was to attack directly on the Siegfried Line. This was not very good terrain, not allowing the use of tanks and difficult to transport artillery, requiring numerous engineering troops, which - as we know from the above - the French did not have on site. What is more, it threatened a German attack from the flanks and was fortified by two major obstacles: the Rhine and Moselle rivers. Offensive operations began with a slight delay on the night of 6-7 September with the forces of 9 divisions in two armies - the 3rd and 4th. The objectives were the Warndt forest and the Saar Basin. The French entered 8-12 km into Germany and reached the main line of fortifications of the Siegfried Line, pushing the Germans out in several fierce skirmishes, including in the Brenschelbach and Bilesbrück areas. In most cases, however, no serious resistance was encountered. The Germans simply withdrew and waited for the French in their bunkers. The French advance, however, was slow, partly because of the numerous mines and traps left by the Germans, especially in the Warndt Forest area. The aim of the operation was to clear the approaches to the Siegfried Line and check the level of resistance.

The fight also continued in the air - contrary to myths, the Allies dropped leaflets only twice - on September 3 and 8 over Bremen and Hamburg. However, real air raids began at the same time. On September 4, 50 aircraft were thrown into air raids on Cuxhaven, Dortmund and Wilhelmshaven. The cruisers ''Admiral Scheer'' (called a "pocket battleship") and ''Emden'' were damaged then. Out of 30 aircraft, 7 were lost. The air raids continued until September 10. Reconnaissance flights and mining of the waters around German bases were also conducted. Further operations were thwarted by bad weather, grounding the air force until September 24. The last week of September 1939 was dubbed ''Black Week'' due to high losses. During three weeks of fighting, the Allies lost 97 aircraft in combat over Germany, the Germans - 56. For the British Bomber Command, with only 280 aircraft, the loss of 39 machines was quite serious.

It is also worth adding that the war continued at sea. On September 3, 1939, the German submarine U-30, commanded by Captain Fritz-Julius Lemp, torpedoed and sank the British liner S/S ''Athenia'', killing 117 people. On September 14, U-39 attacked the aircraft carrier HMS ''Ark Royal'', which only by chance avoided sinking, as German torpedoes exploded prematurely. Three days later, U-29, commanded by Captain Otto Schuhart, torpedoed and sank the aircraft carrier HMS ''Courageous'', killing 519 sailors including the commander. In turn, the ''pocket battleship'' ''Admiral Graf Spee'' sank nine British merchant ships, and over 20 ships were involved in its search, including three battleships and aircraft carriers.

When the French reached the main line of the Siegfried Line fortifications, they stopped their attack and tried to bring up heavy artillery 220 and 280 mm, as well as anti-concrete shells. There were also no engineer units that could clear the areas occupied by the Germans, which were riddled with traps. Preparations began for the offensive planned for September 17.

On September 17, three French armies were to shell and try to break the Siegfried Line. But that day the Red Army entered Poland, and the government and General Staff moved to Romania. Paris understood that it was impossible to carry out an offensive plan, especially since the Polish Army had fallen into disarray and the campaign took the form of extinguishing individual pockets of resistance. Until then, they had been counting on the "Serbian variant", i.e. repeating the long-term defense of weak Serbia against Austria-Hungary in 1914, but the Soviet aggression stripped the Allies of any remaining illusions. French troops withdrew from the occupied areas. Operations were suspended, hoping that the military potential of France and Great Britain would be able to increase enough to bleed the Germans on the Maginot Line and give them a battle on their own terms. The situation was further complicated by the role of the Soviets - neither France nor Great Britain planned to wage war with Germany and the USSR simultaneously, and no pact obliged them to do so. No one knew how further cooperation between Moscow and Berlin would develop.

No one in London or Paris was prepared for the fact that the seemingly powerful Polish army would allow itself to be defeated so quickly. After two days, the Germans broke through the border defense, and after eight days they were already near Warsaw and were breaking into its streets with tanks. On September 11, the Germans broke the last hope of Polish defense - the Narew-Vistula-San line (which Gamelin insisted on taking). As a result, the Germans defeated the strong Polish Army in the first weeks of the war, because Marshal Rydz-Śmigły placed the Polish armies in a cordon along the border. The airports that were to receive French bombers and the ports that were to receive British ships were lost within a week.

The only thing that could have saved the Poles in '39 was an atomic bomb dropped on Berlin. Along with a time machine. I will repeat this very clearly: the French offensive was NOT SUPPOSED to either storm Berlin or save the Poles. It was only supposed to relieve the Polish Army so that it could regroup and launch a counterattack.

The alleged ''betrayal'' became a source of fuel for both German (famous posters ''England, your work!'') and Soviet propaganda (for example in Molotov's speeches, when he said: ''(...) As we know, neither English nor French guarantees helped Poland. To date, to be precise, it is not known what those guarantees were'').

Finally, it is worth adding that another lie is that the Soviets were supposed to wait for the Allies to withdraw. The Red Army was originally supposed to enter Poland on September 12, but this date was first postponed to September 14, and then, finally, to September 17. The concentration of troops began on September 7. There is not the slightest evidence that Stalin cared about Paris and London in his plans for aggression against Poland.

The French offensive claimed 2,000 French soldiers - dead, wounded, missing. Those ''cowardly French'' who went to die for Gdańsk...

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