Official Firefly Testing.

[Edmund]

only suffered a back fire on AMX30 with 105mm, while firing very old HE ammo (there were older than me by 8 years)

 

Good to see your still around Froggy.

[Manic Moran]

And part 3. http://worldoftanks.com/en/news/21/The_Chieftains_Hatch_Firefly3/

[Rich]

And part 3. http://worldoftanks.com/en/news/21/The_Chieftains_Hatch_Firefly3/

 

I hope you don't mind me commenting, but "the HVAP ammunition was sitting in storage, not in high-rate production in the US" is quite simply incorrect. The entire HVAP project did not begin until July 1944. U.S. Army Ordnance Department, Limited Procurement Projects of the Ordnance Department, "Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 3", T4E17, Shot, Fixed, HVAP, 76mm, T4E17, (Washington, D.C.: Research and Development Division Office, Chief of Ordnance, ND [c. July 1947]) Box A744, Entry 646A, Record Group 156, Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Executive Division Historical Branch, Military Historical Files, U.S. National Archives and Record Service

[Manic Moran]

Hmm. Not sure how I ballsed that one up. Changing it.

[Manic Moran]

OK, fixed, thank you. For some reason I had thought that a batch had already been produced by then.

[Rich]

OK, fixed, thank you. For some reason I had thought that a batch had already been produced by then.

 

You're welcome. I'm working at going through all the stuff I found in RG 156; some of it is fascinating.

[Marek Tucan]

Tanks!

 

The summary kinda confirms that my basic feeling in the 76mm vs 17pdr debate was generally right (re. practical battlefield impact), about the only tank the 17pdr might make a difference against would be Tiger I frontally it seems (with the flat surfaces the higher penetration would be higher enough)...

 

Anyway will share, should lead to some fun discussions

[Garry Redmon]

Besides the reference to the information in the National Archives, are there any other sources in print or Internet that detail the design and development of the T4E17 ammunition?

 

Thanks,

Garry

[scotsman]

From US testing - there are some notes floating around that part of the issue with the 17pdr ammo was simply due to manufacturing and not due to the round itself (also due to the conditions in which the tested batch was stored). Not seeing the document on DTIC any more....it and some others seem to have magically evaporated over the years but I do have a copy of the written material somewhere...trouble is its still not publically releasable.

[richard g]

There was only one way to carry out objective and accurate tests between the 17pdr and it's US competitors and that was to hold impartial tests involving both parties which never happened. But of course we had two completely different agendas involved, the British had decided to go with the 17pdr and they were at full capacity making their own conversions and really had no reason to care what the US did while US Ordinance on the other hand was under pressure to produce a gun which would, in effect, do a comparable job to the 17. To underestimate or ignore the above facts simply leads to a Ordinance favoured conclusion because, if you have not caught on yet, they were the ones under the pump, not the British, they were the ones who in their own interests were trying to justify their own existence.

 

Interesting background on all this from a, gasp, non US source is The Business of Tanks which as always when you are truly looking for a potential unbiased and agenda less source is worth considering. I particularly like Bradley's recollection of Ike's comment about the failure of Ordinance's final effort To put it bluntly, Americans need to realise that they usually have this 'Murrica is best' thing where they have this inbuilt bias favouring their own and excluding others, unless they are German of course. Strange.

[Rich]

There was only one way to carry out objective and accurate tests between the 17pdr and it's US competitors and that was to hold impartial tests involving both parties which never happened. But of course we had two completely different agendas involved, the British had decided to go with the 17pdr and they were at full capacity making their own conversions and really had no reason to care what the US did while US Ordinance on the other hand was under pressure to produce a gun which would, in effect, do a comparable job to the 17. To underestimate or ignore the above facts simply leads to a Ordinance favoured conclusion because, if you have not caught on yet, they were the ones under the pump, not the British, they were the ones who in their own interests were trying to justify their own existence.

 

Not this crapola again. There were at least four head-to-head tests conducted of the 17-pdr and 76mm in the summer of 1944. All were "impartial" in that the weapons were fired under the same circumstances with the results recorded for all to see and analyze. At least three of the four were inter-Allied and included both American and British Army Ordnance personnel. In at least one, personnel from both armies did the actual firing.

 

NONE OF THEM led to what I infer you think the "favored conclusion" was, which apparently you think was the 'Murrians saying 76mm gun was "better". In fact, except for the August Isigny test (usually referred to as the "third" test), which found the 76mm firing HVAP the most accurate, ALL of the tests found major problems with the 76mm and tended to favor the penetration capability of the 17-pdr.

 

The initial finding in May in the first test was the poor performance was a result of the design of the 76mm M61 APC-T round, wherein the BDF detonated on impact too frequently, causing penetration failures, and/or the projectile itself deformed and failed. The first was attributed to fuze design defects and the second to weakness caused by the HE cavity itself.

 

It appears that the May data was also used to extrapolate the conclusions found in the AFV&W Memorandum of 5 June 1944, which first raised the red flag about the Panther:

 

Frontal Attack.

a. Glacis Plates

1. 17 pdr and 76mm APC are ineffective against this plate even at 200 yards, due to high degree of tilt (57^o)

b. Turret Front

1. 17 pdr APCBC will penetrate at 1250 yards.
2. 76mm APC will penetrate at 200 yards.
3. 75mm APC ineffective.

c. A hit by 75mm, 76mm, 17pdr APC or 75mm, 76mm, 105mm HE on the area under or at the side of the gun mantlet will cause lethal damage. The probable success of HE attack in this area is due to weakness in the supporting of the roof plate over the driver and co-driver and in the design of the escape hatches.

d. With the Panther advancing at angles between 30^o and 60^o, attack at fighting range by either 75mm, 76mm or 17pdr APC in the corner of the pocket at each side of the hull nose will damage the final drive.

e. Firing at tracks should prove effective.

3. Side Attack.

a. Turret

1. The turret sides will be defeated at the following ranges:
   1. 76mm and 17 pdr APC over 2000 yards.
   2. 75mm APC over 1750 yards.

b. Hull

1. Superstructure (42^o slope)
   1. 76mm and 17 pdr APC over 2000 yards.
   2. 75mm Shot APC over 1000 yards.
2. Sides (0^o slope)
   1. 75mm, 76mm, 17 pdr APC over 2000 yards.

c. HE Attack.

This should be directed between the upper length of the track and the floor of the sponsons.

4. Rear Attack.

a. 76mm and 17 pdr APC will penetrate turret at and hull at ranges over 2000 yards.

b. 75mm APC will penetrate turret at 1750 yards and hull at 1600 yards.

 

The two tests done at Isigny in July (the First Army "informal" test) and the Anglo-American "third" test in August did not significantly change those conclusions. A follow-up test in September further confirmed them, as did various unit tests in the fall.

 

WO 291/1263 and WO 165/135 recorded yet another test on 22nd September 1944, which was an all-British affair. It's findings were:

 

"These trials were conducted with two tanks - a IC (T263317) and a VC (T148506). The report does state that these figures might be sympathetic "... a maximum range of engagement at which every second round will hit appears under these conditions to be a generous one". It was noted (referring to targets such as hull down tanks) that using APDS "... there is no use in attempting to pin-point vital zones in targets at ranges over about 200-300 yards...APC shot does not possess sufficient accuracy for pin-point shooting at vital zones in targets at ranges over about 300 yards". The report did not consider the tests with APC as typical and that "... the accuracy of fire with APC can be better than that obtained in this and the preceding trial...The first batch of 17-pdr appear not only to be inaccurate, but also have a disappointing performance". Contrary to this and other reports, Sergeant Moat regarded the 17-pdr as very accurate and did not agree with the accuracy problems. He conceded that the HE round was not as good as the 75mm M3."

 

Please let me know how any of those are "Ordinance [sic] favoured" conclusions?

 

 

Interesting background on all this from a, gasp, non US source is The Business of Tanks which as always when you are truly looking for a potential unbiased and agenda less source is worth considering. I particularly like Bradley's recollection of Ike's comment about the failure of Ordinance's final effort To put it bluntly, Americans need to realise that they usually have this 'Murrica is best' thing where they have this inbuilt bias favouring their own and excluding others, unless they are German of course. Strange.

 

Interesting. Let me see if I have this right, so the takeaway is that if it is an American source it is biased, but if it is a British source it isn't, and objective analysis of the facts be damned. That seems to cover it. Why was George MacLeod Ross (Major on the outbreak of war, then Colonel, and later Brigadier) an unbiased source? Why? Because you like The Business of Tanks? Where his central thesis is that the British War Office erred by separating the development of tanks from guns, which led to poor British tank design. He should know, since he was Deputy Director of [Tank] Design...until April 1943. Afterwards, he was British Technical Liaison Officer to the Ordnance Department at the Detroit Tank Arsenal and made some cogent observations on American Ordnance development. But how does he speak personally to events in Britain and on the Continent afterwards, including the various head-to-head tests that were done? Yes, he states, "The sum and substance was, a basic principle of tank design had been ignored because the answer to the riddle which comes first, the gun or the tank? is always the gun and neither 75, nor 76, nor 90 mm U.S. gun qualified at the bar of battle." (p. 293) Of course that is simply a mirror of his criticism of British tank design, so it appears in his "unbiased" opinion honors were about even. As he also said with regards to British design, "We still pursued our love affair with ‘craftsmanship’, which may be defined as, ‘the ability to fit two things together which do not fit’. There was no place for craftsmanship in an American production plant, even the presence of a vice or a bench in such factories was regarded as a sign of incompetence. Accuracy was invariably the enemy of craftsmanship."

 

So anyway, sure, if you want the British side of things American - outside looking in - then read Ross. However, if you truly want a, gasp, "unbiased" opinion you might want to consider consulting other sources instead of your favorite. For example, you could read Charles Baily's Faint Praise, which is a much more in-depth and factual critique than Ross' memoir vis a vis the American side. Also if you want to further eliminate bias, you might want to consult a more modern scholarly overview of the matter, such as John Michael Muller's MA thesis, Ronsons, Zippos, and Tommycookers, the M4 Sherman Tank and American Armored Development during World War II. Of course, since he's a 'Murrican he's obviously biased - you can see it in the title right?

 

Oh, and then, gasp, you might actually want to look for what the actual "facts" were. Such as realizing that "Bradley's recollection of Ike's comment" was just that, what Bradley's said happened in his self-serving biography, A Soldier's Story and his later ghost-written memoir, rather than what the evidence tells us actually happened. Many likely don't even realize when they read Ike's famous line, "You mean our 76 won't knock these Panthers out?... Ordnance told me this 76 would take care of anything the Germans had. Now I find you can't knock out a damn thing with it." it isn't really Ike speaking - its Bradley paraphrasing Ike's cable to Marshall, which actually read "My dear General [Marshall]: I have just returned from a visit to the First Army where I found them deeply concerned over the inability of our present tank guns and anti-tank weapons to cope successfully with the German Panther and Tiger Tanks." (Eisenhower to Marshall 5 July 1944) There is actually no evidence, other than Bradley's memoir, that Eisenhower ever expressed himself that way. He may have, since he never objected to Bradley's memoirs directly, but then he was happy to let Bradley become the point man for Army postwar hagiography.

[Manic Moran]

US Ordinance on the other hand was under pressure to produce a gun which would, in effect, do a comparable job to the 17.

They did produce such a gun, the 90mm. It was the contemporary to the 17pr, and did quite well in a side-by-side comparison test in Aberdeen Proving Ground.

 

The difference was that the Americans were not willing to accept a cramped, inefficient poorly laid out turret in the tanks that they would be churning out by the thousand. They rejected the smaller 76mm in the basic M4 turret in 1942, they were certainly not going to look favorably upon the much bigger 17pr in the same turret. Nationalism had nothing to do with it.

 

You can make the argument that the American pursuit of perfection delayed the tank's fielding to an unreasonable amount and that the British were correct to produce something inefficient now as opposed to a good thing later (Not that they had anything more or less contemporary ready to enter service) but given the US still felt no pressing need to even bring their own 76mm tanks across the water, let alone develop hot ammo for them, one cannot lay the non-adoption of a foreign (i.e. Not in the supply system at all) low-volume weapon system on at the feet of nationalism. Not that the Americans were averse to taking and building British equipment anyway, be it the 57mm gun, ASDIC, or P51.

[Marek Tucan]

the other thing is that, in the realities of combat, the bigger 17pdr penetration mattered basically only against Panther turret from the front - and most tank-killing usually happened from the flanks no matter what was the gun/target ratio. British "final" tank gun of WWII - the 77mm of Comet - did have less penetration than 17pdr, but fitted better into the confines of tank turret.Moreover... The main Panther problem was during the fight in confines of Normandy. Once breakout happened, big cats were far easier to tame.

 

Where the American side erred (but then again so did the Brits for a long time) was projectile testing, esp. not testing against "enemy-grade" armor, leading to all the shatter business, and in not producing HVAP for 76mm guns in suitable quantities.

[whelm]

Interesting conversion they tried.

 

"An M4 turret with the 17 pdr mounted has been received at Fort Knox, and it is understood that tests will be undertaken in the near future, mounting the turret on a M26 heavy tank. This appears to be a fruitful line of investigation which might well be Followed up by D.T.D.

 

It would be useful to see whether this combination of smaller internally dimensioned turret can be satisfactorily fought. if such proves feasible, then a calculation as to the overall weight of a turret brought up to M26 turret armour standards should be made.

 

It seems probable that with the reduced dimensions of the M4 turret, a heavy tank could be composed comparable in armour to the M26, but lighter in overall weight. Such a tank would consist of an M4 turret suitably thickened externally with a new mantlet, the 17 pdr. gun and the M26 hull and power plant."

 

 

and just for fun. turret model switch from WoT, Jumbo turret on the M26 hull, just imagine the 17lbr in the guns place.

 

http://imgur.com/a/1w5tM

Edited February 27, 2016 by whelm

[zaarin7]

I think you also have to look at all of this in light of accepted doctrine at the time, tanks didn't fight tanks, tank destroyers did. So tanks don't need a gun to fight tanks they need a gun to kill troops, trucks, thin skinned vehicles and towed guns.

 

We all know now that was a flawed doctrine. But on 6/5/44 they certainly didn't. IMHO it wasn't until the Lorraine fighting in September and the Bulge that winter that really showed up the flaws in the doctrine.

[Damian]

I think you also have to look at all of this in light of accepted doctrine at the time, tanks didn't fight tanks, tank destroyers did. So tanks don't need a gun to fight tanks they need a gun to kill troops, trucks, thin skinned vehicles and towed guns.

 

We all know now that was a flawed doctrine. But on 6/5/44 they certainly didn't. IMHO it wasn't until the Lorraine fighting in September and the Bulge that winter that really showed up the flaws in the doctrine.

 

This is actually not true, and Nick Moran talked about this. In the US doctrine, tanks were meant also to fight tanks. I wonder if ever this idiotic myth will eventually end in trash bin...

 

Edited February 27, 2016 by Damian

[zaarin7]

I've seen that video I'm talking to attitudes of the time.

[zaarin7]

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/index.html

 

Scroll down to FM-17 for tanks and FM-18.5 for the tank destroyer series.

[Rich]

 

US Ordinance on the other hand was under pressure to produce a gun which would, in effect, do a comparable job to the 17.

They did produce such a gun, the 90mm. It was the contemporary to the 17pr, and did quite well in a side-by-side comparison test in Aberdeen Proving Ground.

 

The difference was that the Americans were not willing to accept a cramped, inefficient poorly laid out turret in the tanks that they would be churning out by the thousand. They rejected the smaller 76mm in the basic M4 turret in 1942, they were certainly not going to look favorably upon the much bigger 17pr in the same turret. Nationalism had nothing to do with it.

 

 

The other insanity is Ross' business of the British providing the US with 200 17-pdr tank guns per month. In 1942, just two (2) 17-pdr tank guns were produced - while the US produced 637 76mm tank guns. In 1943 the British produced 259 17-pdr tank guns, the US 203 76mm and 50 90mm tank guns. In 1944 the British produced 3,789 17-pdr tank guns, the US 8,502 76mm and 238 90mm tank guns. In 1945 (to the end of May) the British produced 1,139 17-pdr tank guns, the US 3,580 76mm and 1,877 90mm tank guns.

 

There seems to be a problem with the Ross narrative.

[Rich]

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/index.html

 

Scroll down to FM-17 for tanks and FM-18.5 for the tank destroyer series.

 

Yes, do so...but read them carefully and compare the evolution of language in the Armor and TD doctrine from 1942 to 1944.

[Rich]

I've seen that video I'm talking to attitudes of the time.

 

How do you channel the "attitudes of the time"?

[zaarin7]

By a life time of reading letters and diaries and meeting notes and summaries that have survived.

[Manic Moran]

The vehicles were built to suit the doctrine. The doctrine was that tank destroyers were the mobile fire brigade to deal with massed enemy armored assaults, which is why they were lightly armored, with a big gun. Tanks and infantry (with anything from AT guns to bazookas) were expected to deal with tanks that they encountered at the front line themselves, with whatever other assets happened to be nearby or on the end of the radio. I only quote some of the FM references in the video, there are others as well.

[Rich]

By a life time of reading letters and diaries and meeting notes and summaries that have survived.

 

Whose and which? Certainly not Devers, who arguably had the greatest influence on the Armored Force before it entered combat. From the Ordnance side, certainly not Barnes, who was determined to upgun American tanks to improve their "punching" ability. So whose letters and diaries and which summaries (summaries of what?)

 

It was always expected that tanks would fight tanks, but it was not the tanks preferred role. It was always expected using tank destroyers to destroy tanks was the best use of their capabilities and was its preferred role. However, there was never a decision that "tanks do not fight tanks, tank destroyers do". Unless you have found that phrase in a letter, diary, meeting note, or summary?

[Manic Moran]

 

By a life time of reading letters and diaries and meeting notes and summaries that have survived.

 

It was always expected that tanks would fight tanks, but it was not the tanks preferred role. It was always expected using tank destroyers to destroy tanks was the best use of their capabilities and was its preferred role. However, there was never a decision that "tanks do not fight tanks, tank destroyers do". Unless you have found that phrase in a letter, diary, meeting note, or summary?

 

 

McNair was very clear on that being a preference, in fairness. However, he did not write the Armored Force doctrine, and was willing to support his subordinates.