"lions Led By Donkeys" - Topic Close To Billb's Heart

[Richard Lindquist]

The corps commanders in Virginia at the end of the war were Humphreys, Griffin, Wright, Parke, Gibbon, and Weitzel. When these officers ceased to be generals of US volunteers, they reverted to field grade in their original branches. Humphreys, Wright, Parke, and Weitzel reverted to the Corps of Engineers and performed engineering duties the rest of their careers. Humphreys became Chief of Engineers in 1866 and, when he retired, was succeeded by Wright. Parke and Weitzel remained field grade officers the rest of their careers. Griffin died in 1867, so Gibbon was the only one to have significant field experience after the war.

[Colin Williams]

Ord voluntarily retired in 1880 after 41 years of service. Ord and Sherman were roommates at West Point and life long friends. As long as Sherman was Commanding General of the Army, Ord was not getting oversluffed.

 

It wasn't voluntary. I dug out my copy of Utley's book and found this -

 

After a section mentioning that Sheridan was frustrated with Ord's habit of bypassing him and communicating directly with Sherman, Utley writes "With border troubles subsiding, Sherman probably would have found a way to transfer Ord gracefully to another assignment. But late in 1880, in a move that outraged Sherman and sent shock waves through the army, President Hayes forcibly retired Ord in order to give his star to Nelson A. Miles. Easing the blow somewhat, a grateful Texas congressional delegation secured passage of an act elevating Ord to full major general on the retired list."(Note 26)

 

Note 26 reports the following - "In Sherman's observation, President Hayes was easily moved by personal appeals, and he had bowed to the continued imprecations of Miles' many friends and promised to promote him to brigadier general. He could do this before leaving office on March 4, 1881, only by forcibly retiring a general who had reached the age of sixty-two. Major General McDowell and Brigadier General Ord were the two who qualified. Of the two, McDowell was the older, more senior, and by far wealthier. But he also enjoyed the friendship of Hayes and President-elect Garfield.

 

...Sherman wrote to Terry '...the moment I heard that the President had called Miles here I saw that Ord's commission was in danger. I was Ord's chum at West Point, served with him side by side ten years in Florida, the South, and California, and am familiar with his career since. He is a rough diamond, always at work on the most distant frontier; has a far better war record, and is a hardier, stronger soldier than McDowell in every way; his is as poor as a rat, having been all his life taxed with the care of parents and a large family. I was, therefore, bound as a man to go to his rescue, when I feared that neglect would result in an act of palpable, gross injustice. I put it in writing that if the President would retire McDowell and Ord, I and all would say amen, but if Ord alone would be forced out, I believe the Army and the world would cry shame!'...

 

Later in December, Sherman wrote to President-elect Garfield: 'I entertain for General McDowell the same friendly feeling which I know you do, but I then believed, and now believe that his retirement would have saved you in time the delicacy of action in McDowell's case which must arise in your administration, for I have such faith in your sense of manly justice, that you cannot go on sparing McDowell, to retire others equally or more meritorious to give places to young vigorous Colonels, who are moving heaven and earth to secure promotion, among whom I will name Getty, Mackenzie, Hatch, Grierson, Merritt, Gibbon, Willcox, &c, &c, who commanded corps and Divisions during the war, and who properly claim recognition. My judgement was and is that the passing over of McDowell to reach Ord was a terrible discrimination, calculated to shake the faith of the Army in what is construed Justice, without which no officer or soldier will strive for excellence, or be disposed to serve his country in distant stations with fidelity and zeal, preferring to seek promotion by intrigue and favor.'"

[Mikel2]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRyqu0wdRR0

[DB]

Well, that made me want to punch Laffin in the face, repeatedly.

 

This may be worth a read http://www.johndclare.net/wwi3_laffin_polemic.htm

[baboon6]

Well, that made me want to punch Laffin in the face, repeatedly.

 

This may be worth a read http://www.johndclare.net/wwi3_laffin_polemic.htm

 

Me too. Thanks for the link, definitely worth reading.

[Colin Williams]

Even some Americans were fans of Haig (although I have to say I find many other WW1 generals more interesting and admirable). This American WW2 veteran, Earl Pampeyan - http://www.losaltosonline.com/news/sections/community/177-features/48195-war-veteran-to-visit-d-c-memorial-on-honor-flight

has the full name of Earl Haig Pampeyan, so in 1925 there were still a few folks in the fan club.

[Adam_S]

I know Haig gets a bad press but was he really any worse than the likes of Falkenheyn, Joffre, Nivelle etc?

[BillB]

I know Haig gets a bad press but was he really any worse than the likes of Falkenheyn, Joffre, Nivelle etc?

Nail head interface, and one that is routinely ignored.

 

BillB

[Colin Williams]

I know Haig gets a bad press but was he really any worse than the likes of Falkenheyn, Joffre, Nivelle etc?

I think all of these generals have been subjected to serious criticism in the standard historical works. Haig simply has the added benefit of having been commander of the BEF, so he gets most of the attention in the English language literature. That being said, there are some important distinctions to be drawn here.

 

It seems to me that one of the most important characteristics of the generals who occupied high level positions for significant periods of time was a certain imperturbability. Simply put, men like Joffre, Haig and Falkenhayn could stand up to the pressure of sending thousands of men to their deaths through decisions that could determine the course of the war and the future of their respective countries. Von Moltke and French couldn't stand up to the pressure. Neither could Nivelle nor, in the end, Ludendorf.

 

Nivelle of course was elevated for political reasons to a position he was not prepared to fill. We shouldn't underestimate the value of his tactical innovations, but unfortunately that led the French government to believe he could handle diverse strategic and operational problems while also standing up to the intense pressure of the position.

 

Joffre's primary failure lay in pursuing large-scale, costly offensives before the army had the weapons and techniques for pursuing them effectively. He was capable of recognizing his mistakes and both ending failed offensives and changing his tactical and operational approach. Unfortunately he cost the French Army far too many casualties in 1914 and 1915 while learning on the job.

 

Falkenhayn made the fundamental mistake of taking on the Verdun offensive when he should have concentrated his efforts on defeating Tsarist Russia. Otherwise his management of the German Army was relatively skillful, and too much credit has been given to Hindenburg and Ludendorf for the accomplishments on the Russian Front.

 

Haig of course lacked the opportunity to act at the level of strategy or grand strategy, except in the negative sense when he would oppose strategies that could only go forward with the cooperation of the BEF. If he had had some political/diplomatic skill he may have been able to have a positive influence on strategy, but that wasn't meant to be. Perhaps his greatest failings as a general were his reluctance to break off offensive operations long after they had become net losses to the British and his tendency to narrow his focus on small-scale objectives as his offensives started to fail.

 

All of these generals suffered to some extent from intelligence failures, but they tended to be intelligence failures amplified by wishful thinking on the part of each general.

[Mikel2]

If it's not replaced by "Donkeys led by lions" it would be fine. It interesting that the French, who suffered as much the "marching-into-machine-gun-fire" syndrome never went as far.

 

This has always puzzled me, since the French army suffered large scale mutinies, which didn't happen in the British military. I would have expected the French post-war narrative to have been much more critical of their leadership.

[RETAC21]

They didn't wait until the war was over, they replaced them during the war. Hence Petain became a hero because he cared for his men's lives, while Foch nearly ended the war in obscurity had he not been called after the Kaiserschlacht

[Murph]

What about Maxwell, Archibald Murray, and Edmund Allenby? They seem to have been a little more "energetic", or at least did not get the horrific blame that Haig got for the bloodletting on the Western Front.

[Mikel2]

 

http://www.greatwar.co.uk/somme/cemetery-devonshire.htm

[BillB]

 

http://www.greatwar.co.uk/somme/cemetery-devonshire.htm

Nice one. That cemetery is bit of a bugger to find, but worth it as it is very atmospheric even amongst those round about.

 

BillB

[Mikel2]

Different war - "El Cementerio de los Ingleses" at San Sebastian (Spain) - (The cemetery of the Englishmen).

 

 

It's in the fortified citadel of San Sebastian (Mt. Urgull), dedicated to the British fallen during the 1st Carlist War (1833-39). Sadly the place has been vandalized several times.

 

 

Edited December 3, 2017 by Mikel2

[Murph]

I am watching They Shall Not Grow Old, and I cannot imagine the carnage and butchery from the First World War. And generals who did not care about casualties apparently. "Throw another 20,000 men into the attack, Rupert!"

[Argus]

I am watching They Shall Not Grow Old, and I cannot imagine the carnage and butchery from the First World War. And generals who did not care about casualties apparently. "Throw another 20,000 men into the attack, Rupert!"

The only British General who I can recall being openly dismissive of casualties was Hunter-Weston and I've always thought it a grave injustice that he never managed to drown in a privvy or be buried alive in a hair shirt.

It may well be ignorance, but I'd nominate the Austro-Hungarians as the best candidate to be Lions led by donkeys. I developed an interest in the Austro-Hungarian WWI experience a year or two back, its largely a black hole to the Anglophonic world and really quite central to the whole business. But I couldn't stick it for more than a couple of books, the relentless dejection of disastrous disaster after disasterous victory after catastrophic catastrophe, just got too much.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Haig, for all his faults, immediately saw the potential of the tank, and was one of the driving forces in getting it to the front line. Before probably it ought to have been, but give the guy credit,he could see the potential it had in getting casualties down. He was quite right.

 

it strikes me the British General staff may have had something of a lack of imagination, but their main crime was in not integrating their command fully with the French until 1918, which proved immensely useful in breaking the back of the German offensive, and launching our own. That was their main mistake. I think yes, they didnt spend as much time in the front lines as some of them ought, but the idea none of them did is not true. According to this 78 died at the front.

https://www.greatwarforum.org/topic/143753-british-generals-killed-in-ww1/

 

I think they should have been more imaginative, in that we never really developed anything like the German Stormtroopers. Although fairs fair, we got REALLY good in the use of Artillery, so in technical matters we were good, in strategy and tactics we reflected the small army the BEF had grown from.

[Rick]

I admit to not having much army knowledge of WW1. Did the American contribution make a difference? My great-grandfather made it back.

[Stuart Galbraith]

They certainly fought and died and it was appreciated. I think the historical belief has been that the American injection of manpower precipited the German 1918 offensive, designed to destroy the allies before American manpower could tell. That failure broke the back of the German Army, and allowed the allies to advance, with the American component took part. So it made a difference, but possibly just a morale,not a physical difference.

 

Im sure BillB would put that more authoritatively.

[Murph]

The 'lions led by donkeys' thing was obvious at the time and it was recorded as such at the time. Not in those words of course but in the more polite words of the times. Revisionism won't change that. The simple fact is that at the beginning there was no real and universal understanding of what would happen when modern weapons were involved, something which I find incredible but apparently that was the situation. Brit generals were not idiots but as the war progressed some adapted and learnt, some were incapable and then we had the cavalry man in charge who thought/dreamed that just one more push would bust the front wide open.

WWII had similar, the US Infantry generals were mostly unable to keep up mentally with the increased pace of war. But at some point, you have to look at what is NOT working , and tell your self that "one more push (except in sex)", just is not going to work, and come up with the Plan B. It seems that too many general officers (and politicians) never had a plan B.

[Stuart Galbraith]

But there was no plan B. Even the 1918 offensive involved throwing a lot of warm bodies at the British line, so its not as if the Germans were THAT much more innovative, even if they had developed infiltration tactics. That was small beer compared to Plan 1919, which really didnt get a full trial by our 1918 offensive.

 

If we hadnt kept throwing people at the German lines, which killed Germans about as many as it killed allied soldiers on average, the Germans could have built up their manpower. They already received a massive influx of troops from the east by the Russians leaving the war, we could have easily have made that effect worse by just defending.

 

The sad truth is, for most of the war there wasnt much alternative to what they were doing. In much the same way as General Grant knew that all he had to do was wear down the enemy with superior numbers of troops, the allies knew they could do the same thing. It looks apalling now, but what alternative was there?

 

I dont defend all the excesses of the British way of making war in WW1, and clearly the troops knew they were being stiffed. But at that point one has to offer an alternative, and other than Fishers completely barking Baltic plan, there wasnt one on offer.

[Murph]

But there was no plan B. Even the 1918 offensive involved throwing a lot of warm bodies at the British line, so its not as if the Germans were THAT much more innovative, even if they had developed infiltration tactics. That was small beer compared to Plan 1919, which really didnt get a full trial by our 1918 offensive.

 

If we hadnt kept throwing people at the German lines, which killed Germans about as many as it killed allied soldiers on average, the Germans could have built up their manpower. They already received a massive influx of troops from the east by the Russians leaving the war, we could have easily have made that effect worse by just defending.

 

The sad truth is, for most of the war there wasnt much alternative to what they were doing. In much the same way as General Grant knew that all he had to do was wear down the enemy with superior numbers of troops, the allies knew they could do the same thing. It looks apalling now, but what alternative was there?

 

I dont defend all the excesses of the British way of making war in WW1, and clearly the troops knew they were being stiffed. But at that point one has to offer an alternative, and other than Fishers completely barking Baltic plan, there wasnt one on offer.

That may be true, but I still contend that most Allied and German generals were unable to mentally adapt to the changes in warfare to effectively do other than "Hey diddle, diddle, straight up the middle" sort of plans. Also in reading it appears they were also somewhat addicted to the grand offensive, instead of the small bites method. We saw it in WWII with US generals like Hodges and Bradley, they just for the most part could not get their minds out of the trenches and it showed, especially in the Huertgen Forest debacle. Smith-Dorrien seems to have been the most able to adapt, and he was gotten rid of by the "Chateau Generals".

[Stuart Galbraith]

Well outflanking was impossible. You couldnt go North, unless you envisaged an amphibious landing, which nobody was keen on post Gallipolli, even if the HSF magically disappeared You couldnt go south without invading Switzerland or advancing out of italy. And the British DID send troops to Italy, but there was no way to advance there, so that was worthless. Gallipolli failed. There was no point sending troops to Russia with their army falling apart. So all you had left was going over, and we did bombing, or going under, and blowing up mines. After that, there isnt a lot left for strategic innovation.

 

We did have a way out of the impasse, and that was plan 1919. But it took time to get all the components together, and it took time to get the tanks to make it work. In the interim all that was left was standing still, and that isnt the way you win wars. I dont have much sympathy for WW1 generals, but at least from the allied side, there wasnt a lot else that could be done but trust technical innovation would get them out the mud. And that innovation took time.

[bojan]

...I developed an interest in the Austro-Hungarian WWI experience a year or two back, its largely a black hole to the Anglophonic world and really quite central to the whole business. But I couldn't stick it for more than a couple of books, the relentless dejection of disastrous disaster after disasterous victory after catastrophic catastrophe, just got too much.

 

I will second a book by one of the few competent A-H officers, Alfred Krauss "Root cause of our defeat". Unfortunately English translation is very hard to find, as it was printed only once in the 1930s in a limited numbers. Note, he was an ardent Nazi*, and his views show in his books, but he summarizes problems that plagued AH army well enough.

*Probable reason he was forgotten in Austria, as he was a vocal proponent of anschluss.

Edited August 20, 2020 by bojan