Nuclear Surety

[Paul in Qatar]

Major General Michael Carey has been fired from his position as the commander 450 nukes (20th Air Force). Do not confuse this with the Number Two man at United States Strategic Command Vice Admiral Timothy M. Giardin who was fired last week due to an investigation of counterfeit poker chips.

 

This is separate from the failure of the surety force in August at Malmstrom. Nor should you confuse this issue with the nineteen officers relieved of nuclear duties at Minot in May.

 

​All of this was preceded by the mistaken movement of live nukes in 2007 that cost the air force secretary and his chief of staff their jobs. (This was the incident that cost Minot its certification. It took them several tries to get it back.)

 

Before that was the widespread use of drugs by nuclear personnel in the Vietnam era.

 

It is easy to mix these incidents up in your mind.

 

But of course we never know what we do not know. Makes you wonder how the Russian surety thing is going. After all, our nukes are aimed at them. Worry about their nukes which are aimed at us.

[nigelfe]

During the Cold War there was never a defector from the USSR nuclear custodial organisation. Of course this does not mean that they didn't have a high intake of alcohol.

[Paul in Qatar]

Really it is a hell of a problem. Anyone who has ever been the Officer of the Guard knows how hard it is to keep your guys focused even for just a week or two. How can you keep your reaction force ready to go when they have been on RF duty for the last couple of decades?

 

How can you keep launch crews up to speed when they seem to do correspondence courses down there? Nobody on active duty can remember a real alert.

 

I suppose this is why the USAF relies so much on electronics to protect nukes. You got to have smart people in these jobs, but putting smart people in dull routine, very important jobs is probably a heck of a leadership challenge.

[LeoTanker]

Nobody on active duty can remember a real alert.

 

Now, it that a bad thing or a good thing one might ask himself?

 

All in all, I bet you can chill down Paul. Sure these guys might be on the lazy sloppy side (to much GTA-5 and dougnuts in those lonely silo controll rooms from time to time one might guess) but I bet you my left arm they do not have that code-thingy you need to arm (and fire?) the toys... The World will be here tomorrow too, prommise!

[Tony Evans]

Well, the security portion of surety is a challenge, but there are ways to keep the troops alert and on the job. What's troubling is not that people make mistakes -- they always do and always will -- but the cavalier attitude being taken in that last decade or so to the Defense Nuclear Surety Inspection (DNSI). DNSI used to be like the Commanding General's Inspection -- you prepared for it for months and didn't f*ck it up. Period. Nowdays, not so much. That suggests institutional disregard for the nuclear mission. AFAIAC, the recent high level reliefs are actually a positive sign that somebody's interested in getting things right.

[Paul in Qatar]

Probably so. The mission is getting more attention and it ought to.

 

All in all, the Soviet/Russian design of two launch crews, one for the missile and one for the nuke seems better, if more expensive.

[Tony Evans]

Probably so. The mission is getting more attention and it ought to.

 

All in all, the Soviet/Russian design of two launch crews, one for the missile and one for the nuke seems better, if more expensive.

 

Never heard of that, but assuming its accurate, our Permissive Action Links (PAL) perform the same purpose as the Russian weapon surety crew. The missile crew may be technically capable of firing the missile, but they can't arm it without positive authorization from the National Command Authority. The purported Russian system would accomplish the same purpose, just with more humans in the loop. One could suppose that the extra humans could maybe add as a hedge against unauthorized release, but the reality of a nuclear crisis would likely be so overwhelming, and the weapon crew's information be so limited, that they would just follow their orders and arm the weapon, just like the PAL mechanism would do.

Edited October 14, 2013 by Tony Evans

[nigelfe]

Perhaps the weapon control team had to be party members?

[Tony Evans]

Perhaps the weapon control team had to be party members?

Doesn't change their function in system terms.

[Paul in Qatar]

The launch crew (in one crew capsule) was with the Rocket Forces. The two guys arming the nuke were KGB and were in another crew capsule. Seems a better system on the face of it.

[Tony Evans]

The launch crew (in one crew capsule) was with the Rocket Forces. The two guys arming the nuke were KGB and were in another crew capsule. Seems a better system on the face of it.

 

A PAL system is at least as politically reliable as a secret policeman.

[Paul in Qatar]

Of course there are two risks. One is that the crew will go nuts and launch. The other is that the crew will go nuts and not launch. The Soviet/Russian system seems to give four people the final veto. This increases the chance they will not launch. It also decreases the chance they will launch on their own.

[nigelfe]

But were the Special Units of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defence actually KGB?

[Paul in Qatar]

All I know is from The Hunt for Red October. But that is what Mr. Clancy said.

[Tony Evans]

Of course there are two risks. One is that the crew will go nuts and launch. The other is that the crew will go nuts and not launch. The Soviet/Russian system seems to give four people the final veto. This increases the chance they will not launch. It also decreases the chance they will launch on their own.

 

Launching on their own, if the weapon isn't armed, is hardly a nuclear surety issue in the overall scheme of things. A warhead may cause damage where it lands, but it doesn't cause nuclear damage, except maybe for some local contamination. It can be plausibly denied as an act of war.

 

A weapon that doesn't launch, because all of the people who have to agree can't agree, is a serious nuclear surety issue, because surety is about reliability in all circumstances, not just reliability in avoiding an unauthorized launch. If nuclear forces can't be reliably commanded to attack, deterrence breaks down.

 

That's why the US settled on the two-man rule, later backstopped by PAL. No single person could do anything with a nuke, but, by the same token, no conference of war had to take place in every control room to launch an authorized attack.

[Paul in Qatar]

We spend a lot of money (and do an amazing amount of research) on making the launch system reliable. Either an accidental launch, or a failure to launch is a big deal.

 

Supposedly, I cannot recall where I read this, bored missile crewmen did figure out at least one way to do a one-man launch. It involved taping a spoon to the launch key and then a long string to the whole contraption.

 

I have rarely reflected upon it. It seems the Soviet/Russian system is less prone to an accidental launch (but more prone to a failure to launch an armed missile). The American system seems more likely to produce a mistaken launch of an armed missile (but less likely to fail to launch when ordered to do so). It comes down to the number of guys who have a final veto.

 

An interesting little leadership problem, isn't it?

[Tony Evans]

An interesting little leadership problem, isn't it?

 

Except it's not about leadership per se. It's about systems -- including human systems -- reliability. Having seen the system from the inside (at the level of local physical security), I'm pretty confident in the two man rule.

[Ivanhoe]

 

http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/20/us/michael-carey-investigative-report/index.html?hpt=hp_c2

 

(CNN) -- A U.S. general who oversaw nuclear weapons boozed, fraternized with "hot women" and disrespected his hosts during an official visit to Russia this year, an investigative report shows.

 

Maj. Gen. Michael Carey led the 20th Air Force responsible for three nuclear wings.

 

He was relieved of duty in October because of loss of confidence in his leadership, the Air Force said at the time without providing specific details.

 

...

 

In addition, Carey announced he'd "met two hot women the night before," and continually interrupted a monastery guide during a tour, the report says, his speech slurred the entire time.

 

"At one point, he tried to give her (the guide) a fist bump," the report says, citing a witness. "She had no idea what he was trying to do. It was again, very, very embarrassing."

 

The names of the witnesses are redacted in the report.

 

During dinner at a Mexican restaurant, he drank more alcohol and wanted to perform with the live band, which wanted no part of it, the report says. He later left his delegation and joined the two women he'd met the night before at a different table.

Well, props to MG Carey for going out with a bang. You've made your mark when your swan song is described as "shenanigans". Impressed!

[Archie Pellagio]

But his shenanigans aren't like our shenanigans.

Ours are fun, harmless shenanigans.

His are cruel and mean shenanigans.

Eeevil shenanigans.

In fact not really shenanigans at all.

[RETAC21]

[BansheeOne]

The shenanigans generals get fired for today. Ken Estes should tell the tale of the visit of the outgoing Commander, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic to LANDJUT some time.

[Paul in Qatar]

Investigation of missile crews and narcotics. Not a good combination.

----

http://www.stripes.com/2-on-nuke-missile-crew-implicated-in-drug-probe-1.261272

----

 

 

By Chris Carroll

Stars and Stripes

• 
  

The insignia of the 341st Missile Wing.

WASHINGTON — In the latest headache for the Air Force’s nuclear mission, two missile combat crew members in the 341st Missile Wing atMalmstrom Air Force Base, Montana, have been implicated in a narcotics investigation, a defense official speaking on the condition of anonymity said Thursday.

[Kenneth P. Katz]

The words "nuclear" and "narcotics" should never, never, ever be in close proximity. If it's otherwise, it's bad.

[baboon6]

Just finished reading Eric Schlosser's book Command and Control, which looks at the history of US nuclear weapons safety, framed by the story of the Damascus, Arkansas incident in 1980. Scary stuff.

 

 

http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2013/09/30/130930crbo_books_menand?currentPage=all

 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-19/eric-schlosser-moves-from-big-macs-to-nuclear-accidents.html

[RETAC21]

I am less than impressed by the review:

 

"One crucial fact must be kept in mind: none of the roughly 70,000 nuclear weapons built by the U.S. since 1945 has ever detonated inadvertently or without proper authorization”

 

but:

 

“thousands of missiles are hidden away, literally out of sight, topped with warheads and ready to go” -- and “every one of them is an accident waiting to happen.”

 

uh??