81St Armored Brigade Combat Team Converting To Strykers?

[Ken Estes]

No kidding. But not with me.

 

You will recall I entered just to reassure FALightfighter that he had the right estimation.

 

As Prof EC Kiesling, from West Point, assured me, having no doctrine is a doctrine. And so it seems. Both major boards advocating permanent mechanized regts for the USMC in a 20 yr period were rejected, with the reasoning that ad hoc was good enough. It continued, because MajGen Mattis, when queried in early 2003 about nonexistant doctrine for mechanized forces retorted, "doctrine? we don't need any doctrine." Yet he had to relieve his 1st Regiment commander for failure to move fast enough in the March invasion.

Edited August 19, 2013 by Ken Estes

[Richard Lindquist]

I would go for an army made up of separate numbered BCT (of whatever mix). I also think that a corps could deal with 10-15 maneuver brigades administratively. Tactically, I see the need for a headquarters between the corps and the brigades. I would propose a "division" which amounts to little more than a tactical CP with associated commo. No need for intell units, they can get feeds from corps and brigade. No needs for any MPs other than a headquarters guard/security platoon. G-1, G-4, and G-5 are just liaison types. One van for G-2 maybe 5 off and 9 EM, one van for G-3 maybe 7 off and 12 EM. One van for CG/aides/SGS maybe 5 off and 9 EM. One van for G-1, G-4, G-5, and Arty LnO maybe 4 off and 8 EM. HHC with commo platoon (include Comm Ctr van), MP/scty platoon, transport section (half-a-dozen HMMWV and a couple of MTV), mess and supply section.

[Tony Evans]

1. As Prof EC Kiesling, from West Point, assured me, having no doctrine is a doctrine.

 

2. And so it seems. Both major boards advocating permanent mechanized regts for the USMC in a 20 yr period were rejected, with the reasoning that ad hoc was good enough.

 

3. It continued, because MajGen Mattis, when queried in early 2003 about nonexistant doctrine for mechanized forces retorted, "doctrine? we don't need any doctrine."

 

4. Yet he had to relieve his 1st Regiment commander for failure to move fast enough in the March invasion.

 

1. Like having no standards is a standard? Or having no car is a car? It's a meaningless quip, designed to make the utterer sound clever without ever having to say anything of substance.

 

Or, if he was saying something substantive, what he was likely saying is that one can be systematically unpredictable or unroutine, and take advantage of the surprise gained.

 

Would you like to provide a context?

 

2. One can have permanently constituted units and formations and still have no doctrine for their use. That argument was made about just about every army's mobile formations in WW2, at one time or the other, except for the Germans'. Just having formally constituted mechanized regiments would not have proven anything about Marine Corps mobile doctrine one way or the other.

 

Conversely, one can have a viable doctrine, even if it is only ever implemented in a task organized manner. Being a proof-is-in-the-pudding man myself, I would suggest that Marine mobile operations in both Gulf Wars pretty adequately demonstrate this.

 

3. Mattis actually said: "Doctrine is the last refuge of the unimaginative." And he applied it to everything, not just mobile warfare. How much of it he actually meant, and how much of it was just bluster for rhetorical effect, only he knows. In any case, invoking Mattis is like invoking any other loud-mouthed Marine general officer -- it doesn't prove anything about what field and company grade Marine officers know and do.

 

4. Non-sequitur, Ken. Holland Smith once famously relieved an Army division commander for not moving fast enough, and there wasn't a mobile formation within thousands of miles.

Edited August 20, 2013 by Tony Evans

[Ken Estes]

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You, zee American polizei? You are ridiculous and are ruining decent threads.

 

Pound sand

Edited August 20, 2013 by Ken Estes

[Rick]

Pardon the dumb question from an ex-sailor, but does "BCT" stand for Brigade Combat Team ?"

 

Ken,

Would I be able to purchase your book via you if possible.

 

Thank you,

[shep854]

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You, zee American polizei? You are ridiculous and are ruining decent threads.

 

Pound sand

Careful, Ken. The mask is slipping.

[FALightFighter]

Pardon the dumb question from an ex-sailor, but does "BCT" stand for Brigade Combat Team ?"

 

Yes, BCT is Brigade Combat Team.

 

It used to mean a task-organized Brigade (similar to Regimental Combat Team from the WW2 era) with its habitual combat support and combat service support elements.

 

Since 2004, in the US Army, it has meant the modular units that have those elements organic.

[Paul G.]

They currently come in three flavors: I (Infantry), S (Stryker) and A (Armored).

 

But what actually makes up a BCT has been evolving over the years. Number and composition of battalions, supporting organic units. The Army keeps tinkering in the pursuit of that fleeting wench known as perfection.

Edited August 21, 2013 by Paul G.

[Rubberneck]

1st CAV Div had 47 battalions under its span of control in Iraq when it was commanded by then MG Chiarelli in 04-05.

 

The 101st had between six and eight BCTs under its span of control in 10-11 in Afghanistan.

 

When I was a planner at the Corps in Afghanistan in 10-11, we had three US Division HQs, and 15-18 BCTs/RCTs under the span of control. This included a German Battlegroup in RC-North, a British BDE in RC-Southwest, a Polish BDE in RC-East, US Army and National Guard BCTs in RC-North, South, and East, and USMC Regiments in RC-Southwest. This does not include the Turkish BDE in RC-Capital or the combined Spanish/Italian BDE in RC-West nor does it include any SOF elements.

 

We also had multiple Combat Aviation Brigades and Sustainment BDEs in country.

 

 

One Corps had roughly 75,000 Coalition troops under its span of control. With modern C2 systems, it's more than capable of handling that level of command and control.

 

FA - no idea where the CSA got that number of BCTs from...I thought it was more like 10...4th ID, 2 ACR, and the 82nd BCT came in after 3rd ID and the Marines ripped through the country.

[Ken Estes]

Andy, don't forget that the 82d and 101st really did line up after the 3d ID and 3d ACR IOT perform a weakling version of Cobra after the WH/SecDef had killed the TPFDD and force plan for Cobra I, and the V Corps did execute a stunning success with Cobra II. There were even two of the three Bns of 3d BCT/1AD in action as V Corps reserve, sent to both 101st and 82nd at times. Having the Abn and Air asslt guys find 120mm and 25mm ammo and Class IX was a kick to say the least! Yet, this was the army in its finest hour since 1991.

 

I just sent you an e-mail with my 1AD mss and some V Corps stuff.

 

Cheers!

 

Ken

Edited August 23, 2013 by Ken Estes

[WRW]

Slightly off topic - are the thitd combat btn being added to BCT going to be Combined Arms - and how does combined arms worked - are they offiicially of the same btn or just attached

[FALightFighter]

Slightly off topic - are the thitd combat btn being added to BCT going to be Combined Arms - and how does combined arms worked - are they offiicially of the same btn or just attached

 

Combined arms BNs are only in the ABCTs. They are organic BNs, not attached, of HHC, 2 mech infantry COs and 2 tank COs. They had EN COs for a while, but those were consolidated into the BSTB (Brigade Special Troops BN) that is now changing into a BEB (Brigade Engineer BN). The CABs have a habitually attached FSC (Forward Support Company) from the BSB (Brigade Support BN).

[Ariete!]

 

Slightly off topic - are the thitd combat btn being added to BCT going to be Combined Arms - and how does combined arms worked - are they offiicially of the same btn or just attached

 

Combined arms BNs are only in the ABCTs. They are organic BNs, not attached, of HHC, 2 mech infantry COs and 2 tank COs. They had EN COs for a while, but those were consolidated into the BSTB (Brigade Special Troops BN) that is now changing into a BEB (Brigade Engineer BN). The CABs have a habitually attached FSC (Forward Support Company) from the BSB (Brigade Support BN).

 

 

Really quie a sound org, IMHO, once they hae a 'full' three0CAB structure.

[Rubberneck]

Ken - thanks for the data dump. Interesting stuff, especially the 1st Armored Div version of events.

[FALightFighter]

Really quie a sound org, IMHO, once they hae a 'full' three0CAB structure.

 

 

See post 68.

 

I don't mind the combined arms battalion organization, or even the ABCT organization, I just think the US currently has a force that is out of balance with the ABCT formation.

 

For the bulk of a general purpose force, a balance of tank to infantry of about 1:3 vs 1:1 is better, with a few formations (about 10%) that are 1:1 and optimized for breakthrough and exploitation.

[Ken Estes]

The heavy divisions of 2003 - 1AD,1CD, 4ID and 3ID, etc - all seemed to have two tk heavy and one inf heavy BCT, thus 5:4

 

Funny how the engineers keep drifting in/out of the BCT, but a BCT deploying separately from a division always took an EnBn from the DivEng, right?

[FALightFighter]

The heavy divisions of 2003 - 1AD,1CD, 4ID and 3ID, etc - all seemed to have two tk heavy and one inf heavy BCT, thus 5:4

 

Funny how the engineers keep drifting in/out of the BCT, but a BCT deploying separately from a division always took an EnBn from the DivEng, right?

 

3ID was 5 mech and 4 tank (1st BDE: 2-7 IN, 3-7 IN, 3-69 AR; 2nd BDE: 1-64 AR, 4-64 AR, 3-15 IN; 3rd BDE: 1-15 IN, 1-30 IN, 2-69 AR). The remaining 4 heavy divisions (1AD, 1CD, 1ID and 4ID) were 5 tank and 4 mech. http://www.history.army.mil/books/Lineage/reflag/appE-1.htm has the plan, as of 1995- I think this was essentially true through 2003, with the exception of 3/2 which was converting to Stryker from 2001 or so.

 

Of course, 1 ID was the result of re-flagging parts of 3 AD in Germany in the 90s, and 4 ID was the result of re-flagging parts of 2 AD at FT Hood in the 90s.

 

Essentially, during the 90s reductions and re-flaggings, the designation of ID(M) or AD (CD was organized as an armored division since the end of TRICAP in the 70s) was disconnected from the actual organization of the division. The US Army had 4 armored divisions (1AD, 1CD, 1ID, 4ID), 1 mech inf division (3ID), 4 light divisions (82 ABN, 101 AASLT, 25ID, 10MD) and 2ID was mixed, with 4 tank BNs, 3 mech BNs and 2 AASLT BNs.

[Ken Estes]

Thanks, great info. I should have looked up 3ID which would have left me going to 1ID as the other tank heavy div.

[Tony Evans]

I don't mind the combined arms battalion organization, or even the ABCT organization, I just think the US currently has a force that is out of balance with the ABCT formation.

 

For the bulk of a general purpose force, a balance of tank to infantry of about 1:3 vs 1:1 is better, with a few formations (about 10%) that are 1:1 and optimized for breakthrough and exploitation.

 

 

Yes, But I think the "heavy" formations should be 1:2 (i.e. 1 battalion of tanks per brigade), and the standard formation should be 1:6 or 1:9 (i.e. 1 battalion of tanks per division).

[FALightFighter]

Yes, But I think the "heavy" formations should be 1:2 (i.e. 1 battalion of tanks per brigade), and the standard formation should be 1:6 or 1:9 (i.e. 1 battalion of tanks per division).

 

 

I can live with 1:2 (which is simplistic, reference my earlier post, you also need to include recon and "direct fire support", although tanks can and do serve that role), but think 1:1 is sufficient for the ~10% of specialist "breakout and pursuit" formations.

 

I think that 1:9 is a little light for general purpose forces. I know that it is what the USMC uses, but they are at least partly optimized for expeditionary capability- as it should be. The Army should be optimized for the big slugging match, and I think more capability is required there- I could probably live with 1:6. There's also the balance between HQs. I'm a fan of 1:4+1: I'd organize my infantry BNs with 4 rifle companies plus a weapons company, and my BDEs with 4 maneuver BNs (plus fire support/FA & recon), to facilitate the building of reserves and other task forces for missions.

[Tony Evans]

I just don't think tanks should ever be a majority or even half of the maneuver battalions in a formation. Even half of the battalions is really too much. Just too much concentrated logistics needs. Also, in a war with high loss rates, tanks are expendable munitions. Their reserves should come out of the logistics system, not be kept at the unit level.

 

BTW, my opinion about the number of tanks in an infantry division doesn't come from my Marine experience. It has to do with what's more readily deployable and supportable.

[FALightFighter]

I just don't think tanks should ever be a majority or even half of the maneuver battalions in a formation. Even half of the battalions is really too much. Just too much concentrated logistics needs. Also, in a war with high loss rates, tanks are expendable munitions. Their reserves should come out of the logistics system, not be kept at the unit level.

 

BTW, my opinion about the number of tanks in an infantry division doesn't come from my Marine experience. It has to do with what's more readily deployable and supportable.

 

I guess maybe that's the difference- you're talking about the infantry division, and I'm talking about the force as a whole- "armor" BCTs (~10% of the force), "infantry" BCTs (~80% of the force) and "light" BCTs (~10% of the force). Readily deployable and supportable are not mutually exclusive- the Army has proven that it can (if required) support significant heavy forces. Those aren't, and don't need to be, readily deployable- if they are required to win the war, they need to be available.

[Tony Evans]

 

I guess maybe that's the difference- you're talking about the infantry division, and I'm talking about the force as a whole- "armor" BCTs (~10% of the force), "infantry" BCTs (~80% of the force) and "light" BCTs (~10% of the force). Readily deployable and supportable are not mutually exclusive- the Army has proven that it can (if required) support significant heavy forces. Those aren't, and don't need to be, readily deployable- if they are required to win the war, they need to be available.

 

 

I'm talking about all types of formations. I think history has demonstrated that the 3:1, 2:1, or even 1:1 tank:infantry division or brigade is simply unnecessary under any circumstance. Tanks are important, but they're not the core of combined arms operations. They're just one piece. And they are self-defeating if there are too many in too small an area.

 

WRT what the Army can support, well...the Army can't support anything without the logistics support of the available strategic lift, which is not the Army. The Army may have enough vehicles and personnel to move stuff from the port to the units in the field, but strategic lift has to get all of that infrastructure to the area of operations, and all the infrastructure that the infrastructure needs. It's important to understand that. One doesn't just build a port-to-unit logistics capability and expect it to work simply because it exists. It has to be a realistic package in terms of strategic lift.

[medicjim86]

From my point of view, as someone who has actually done natural disaster operations (no civvie unrest so far)....

 

Tank = useless, sit on your a$$

Striker = useless, sit on your a$$

5 ton truck = useful, work until your a$$ falls off

[FALightFighter]

Nope. The maneuver battalions will be going to other brigades. I doubt every single one of the three battalions being disbanded will come from a single brigade. (Though of course they could.) Even if the battalion members are reassigned as individuals, the epuipments sets would more likely be placed in an expended maintenance float, or just put in long-term reserve storage against future need.

Looks like we have our answer- conversion of an ABCT (1/4ID) into an SBCT.

http://www.armytimes.com/article/20140122/NEWS/301220019/Bring-Strykers-1st-BCT-4th-ID-switches-mission

 

So, as currently projected, the 33 BCT force will be:

8 x SBCT: 2/2ID, 3/2ID, 1/4ID, 1/25ID, 2/25ID, 1/1AD, 2CR, 3CR

14 x IBCT: 4/3ID, 4/4ID, 1/10MD, 2/10MD, 4/10MD, 3/25ID, 4/25ID, 1/82ABN, 2/82ABN, 3/82ABN, 1/101ABN, 2/101ABN, 3/101ABN, 173ABN

11 x ABCT: 1/1CD, 2/1CD, 3/1CD, 2/1AD, 4/1AD, 1/1ID, 2/1ID, 1/2ID, 1/3ID, 3/3ID, 3/4ID

This is a change from the 7 x SBCT, 14 x IBCT and 12 x ABCT announced last year http://www.army.mil/article/106373/

 

Note that I have used current designations. I suspect that 4/4ID, 4/3ID, 4/10MTN and 4/1AD will redesignate into lower numbered BCTs within their division when those lower number BCTs inactivate. 4/25ID could potentially redesignate in 3/1ID (1ID is deactivating 2 x BCTs, which makes the 33 BCT force 3 separates, 8 divisions with 3 BCTs each and 1 division each with 4 BCTs and 2 BCTs).

 

In the future, another BCT stationed overseas will be reduced, for a total of 32 BCTs. http://www.armytimes.com/article/20131021/NEWS/310210007/Army-accelerates-BCT-overhaul-by-2-years

 

I think that the ABCT in Korea (1/2ID) and the two overseas airborne BCTs (4/25ID in Alaska and 173ABN) are all candidates, as well as 3/25ID in Hawaii. These 4 BCTs are all projected to remain at 2 x maneuver BNs (the rest of the 33 BCTs will increase to 3 x maneuver BNs, for a total of 95 maneuver battalions in the 33 BCT force, as indicated in the second link from army.mil). The designation results of that final reduction remain to be seen- I predict that 3/25ID will de-activate in HI, and 4/25ID will redesignate into 3/25ID.

 

Of course, the 32 BCT force is based on a 490,000 endstrength. If that number is reduced to 420,000 (as may be coming, http://www.army.mil/article/118310/G_8__Soldier_levels_could_drop_to_420_000_by_2019/) then the number and types of BCTs, as well as their designations, will be rehashed again.

 

Personally, I see this as the perfect opportunity to implement a version of the "elevated echelon" COA, as outlined in slide 10 of this brief, and I hope this link works: http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CCsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Forbat.com%2Fsite%2Fcwa%2Fcwa_2009%2Famericas%2Fnorth%2520america%2Fword%2FAUSA_Briefing_26_Sep_05.ppt&ei=e3fgUuiyPMvNsQS024D4Bg&usg=AFQjCNE7PNXDjWfBILpFdsKapFOIgWmm6w