Was the S.B.C. a waste?

[Tony Evans]

Phil:

 

Regardless of the relative effectiveness, compared to later results, bombing did do damage. It caused reallocation of resources that otherwise would have gone to fighting fronts. The learnings that went into the strategic bombing of 1944-45 simply wouldn't have been learned. Once again, you're not making military nor startegic sense.

[Phil]

Bombing did indeed do damage but not decisive damage or anything like it until mid to later 1944. Organisational learning could clearly still have taken place even within a reduced frequency and intensity of raiding. I don't argue that there could have been a cessation of the effort. Economising your force until you are in a position to achieve decisive effect makes perfect sense. You'd have more of a point if we had believed we were making a reasonably effective contribution with bombing but we knew we were having only a minor effect and we certainly knew the costs in resources.

[baboon6]

Bombing did indeed do damage but not decisive damage or anything like it until mid to later 1944. Organisational learning could clearly still have taken place even within a reduced frequency and intensity of raiding. I don't argue that there could have been a cessation of the effort. Economising your force until you are in a position to achieve decisive effect makes perfect sense. You'd have more of a point if we had believed we were making a reasonably effective contribution with bombing but we knew we were having only a minor effect and we certainly knew the costs in resources.

Yeah great in theory but those resources would probably (definitely?) have been diverted away from the bomber forces and they would have had a hard time getting them back. That's certainly what Harris thought.

Edited July 4, 2013 by baboon6

[Tony Evans]

Bombing did indeed do damage but not decisive damage or anything like it until mid to later 1944. Organisational learning could clearly still have taken place even within a reduced frequency and intensity of raiding. I don't argue that there could have been a cessation of the effort. Economising your force until you are in a position to achieve decisive effect makes perfect sense. You'd have more of a point if we had believed we were making a reasonably effective contribution with bombing but we knew we were having only a minor effect and we certainly knew the costs in resources.

 

Who is this "we" kimosabe? You weren't there, and neither was I.

 

I have a question...what is this perceived imperative to think we know better than the men who were actually there? Let's not forget that the leaders and men on both sides were overwhelmingly intelligent, hard-working, and courageous. There weren't going to be any easy outs. Yet people think they can find easier (in terms of time, effort, casualties, etc) ways out of the problems faced by the actual historical actors. Yet I suspect that they were already trying to get through with as whole a skin as they could. Second-guessing them seems like bootless hubris to me.

 

WRT the idea that the men on the spot knew that they were only having a minor effect, yeah, and? Remember: intelligent, hard-working, and courageous. They took that information and used it to get better. That's how war works.

[RETAC21]

Intelligent, hard-working, corageous but at least one of them too ambitious, leading to the falsification of statistics to show a better balance sheet (IIRC it was Bomber Command's chief ACM Richard Peirse). Problem was the airmen were risking their lives and paying the price for little or no return and no lessons learned.

[RETAC21]

Well Bomber Command was always fighting a rearguard action against Coastal Command,

 

Coastal command was always the poor cousin, not the other way around. A few Lancasters or Halifaxes sent to CC would have worked wonders for the Battle of the Atlantic, even if they hadn't sunk any U boat. Instead, during 1942 they were wasted bombing mostly fields over Germany.

[Tony Evans]

Intelligent, hard-working, corageous but at least one of them too ambitious, leading to the falsification of statistics to show a better balance sheet (IIRC it was Bomber Command's chief ACM Richard Peirse). Problem was the airmen were risking their lives and paying the price for little or no return and no lessons learned.

 

Nothing's perfect. And problems in accuracy, procedures, equipment, etc did come to light, and were fixed. That was the whole point of operational research. But to do operational research, one needs data. To get data, one needs operations.

Edited July 4, 2013 by Tony Evans

[Phil]

We is simply shorthand for the obvious parties Tony. I'm typing on an iPhone.

 

I understand fully that they were intelligent hard working men. They also had no experience of strategic bombing and so had to learn and gain that experience. I don't deny that. I don't deny there was a fundamental political imperative to press the campaign. And nor do I deny that organisational factors will have played a strong role too.

 

It's just thinking out aloud about whether or not using economy of force whilst you're building your arm might have been an option if the political imperatives weren't there.

[Phil]

 

 

Intelligent, hard-working, corageous but at least one of them too ambitious, leading to the falsification of statistics to show a better balance sheet (IIRC it was Bomber Command's chief ACM Richard Peirse). Problem was the airmen were risking their lives and paying the price for little or no return and no lessons learned.

Nothing's perfect. And problems in accuracy, procedures, equipment, etc did come to light, and were fixed. That was the whole point of operational research. But to do operational research, one needs data. To get data, one needs operations.

 

I never argued for a cessation in operations. Merely a reduction in intensity to conserve resources.

[DougRichards]

 

Well Bomber Command was always fighting a rearguard action against Coastal Command,

 

Coastal command was always the poor cousin, not the other way around. A few Lancasters or Halifaxes sent to CC would have worked wonders for the Battle of the Atlantic, even if they hadn't sunk any U boat. Instead, during 1942 they were wasted bombing mostly fields over Germany.

 

 

Actually have Shorts build fewer Stirlings and more Sunderlands would have been a start. The Sunderland, in 1939, had the most horse power of any British aircraft in service.

[Tony Evans]

It's just thinking out aloud about whether or not using economy of force whilst you're building your arm might have been an option if the political imperatives weren't there.

 

I just don't see it. First of all, war is a politcal action to begin with. Wishing to figth a war without politcal imperatives denies war's nature. Second, war is an adaptive process. You can't adapt if you don't compete. COmpeting lesss means adapting less.

[Phil]

COmpeting lesss means adapting less.

 

 

That is simply not a generalisable statement.

 

Wishing to figth a war without politcal imperatives denies war's nature.

 

 

It wasn't a wish Tony. It was a muse out loud. I think I said "I wonder if" or something like that.

 

I have spent many an hour arguing with people who believe divisions on a map float around the battle-space with infinite supplies and space; and that enemy and friendly commanders had a birds eye view of the battlefield and can act with the freedom coming from being unrestrained by any number of organisational and political limitations and real world contexts. I understand the concept of treating historical events and decisions as "strange" and looking to see why they were made - nearly always for very good and compelling reasons.

 

It is why I know the Bomber Campaign had a massive political impetus which was reinforced by organisational pressures from the RAF and USAAF command who were convinced they could do it (in the end they were right).

 

It's merely a thought exercise that for me threw up a good few interesting facts like the relationship between Coastal Command and Bomber Command. If I truly believed that the Bomber Campaign could have been waged much differently, I'd argue it forcefully - after all it is me who is currently debating a pedantic subject on Bren guns and rifle groups with you because I think my position has merit.

Edited July 4, 2013 by Phil

[CaptLuke]

 

... Over those years, the Luftwaffe never really grew out of its initial form, either in doctrine or equipment... The Germans never managed to.

While I agree with your argument, this is not correct, the Germans invested a huge amount of resources for little return on the He-177 which was supposed to provide them with the strategic bombing capability and in 1944 has assembled a force to start a strategic bombing campaign against Soviet installations, but the plane was a dog, and events intervened to force a diversion of the assembled force into the operational arena, interdicting Soviet rail in the Ukraine. A strategic bombing force such as the one that was put together by the UK and the US was impossible to produce in Germany, being as they were continuously engaged since 1939.

 

 

Not just the He-177. The Germans put a huge amount of time and effort into their Bomber B program. Although the designs followed the classic German formula of twin engines and the crew in the nose, these planes (Ju-288, Fw-191, Do-317) would have been comparable to a B-17F in weight and power so the 2 engine vs. 4 engine argument seems moot.

 

Like the He-177, engine development was a huge problem; the Jumo 222 engine this time. The alternate engine for the Bomber B designs? The same DB-606/610 that was dogging the He-177 program, so they were pretty much screwed. While the US had could throw enough resources at the R-3350 to make it work and save their super advanced bomber program, the Luftwaffe could not do the same with the Ju-222.

 

So if we are talking about intent, the Germans were certainly working on a force capable of much greater strategic capability but both of their major design choices never got past their engine issues. There's 20/20 hindsight and the possibility of a 4 engined He-177 but it is worth noting that years later the US similarly bet the ranch on the R-3350 which powered not just the B-29 but also it's fallback alternative, the B-32.

[Tony Evans]

 

1. That is simply not a generalisable statement.

 

 

 

2. It wasn't a wish Tony. It was a muse out loud. I think I said "I wonder if" or something like that...

 

1. Of course it is. Institutions don't change unless presented with inescapable reasons to change. Pure physical inertia -- not ot mention psychological and social inertia -- will guarantee that. If you don't go out and do things to find out what you've got wrong, you'll never be presented with such reaons to change.

 

2. Then please don't be offended if I think it's a pointless muse -- for exactly the reasons you just outlined.

[Phil]

1. Of course it is.

 

 

1. There's no dearth of theories on organisational learning, but a good number agree that you need a requisite variety of information from which to learn.

 

Combat in my mind is one of those few phenomenons where high intensity can erode that pool of requisite variety because those bearing the information it are dead or captured. I think to a point organisational learning is improved in war with doing - it generate requisite varieties, and success and failures change what is considered to be respectable and acceptable in terms of changes and solutions.

 

But when it is of a very high intensity, a good chunk of information is lost.

 

As a case study consider Sydney Jarey's book, 8 Platoon. I don't know if you're familiar with him, possibly not but possibly since you're widely read. But he was a Subaltern in an infantry battalion from just after D-Day to VE Day. In Normandy he explains how the battalion struggled because even though they were operating at high intensity they were constantly haemorrhaging newly minted veterans and with them, their small contribution to the requisite variety needed to generate new solutions and change.

 

He states that the Battalion lost 239 KIA which suggests a near 100% turn over when you factor in wounded and sick and postings out. Once the intensity of the battle diminished the battalion became far more competent and combat effective.

 

I believe that is generalisable to USAAF and Bomber Command squadrons and operations.

 

2. Fine, I'm not offended but I don't think its a pointless muse. The muse has generated new information for me, and maybe others. Those facts are useful even if the narrative that gave rise to their jotting down isn't very.

Edited July 4, 2013 by Phil

[Tony Evans]

Phil:

 

The kind of learning I'm talking about was on the part of higher leaders and their staffs. The operational units would go out and generate data. This data would be analyzed and decisions made about what wokred and what didn't. Changes would be made to equipment, training, and plans. Then the operational units would go out again and generate more data to ponder.

 

As callous as it is to say, the accumulated experience of individual crews really didn't matter all that much. Their survival was essentially random. Little of skill and experience mattered when you had to stay in formation (in daylight) or stick to your assigned course and speed in the stream (at night). What mattered was what could be learned from the statistical results of their experiences.

[Meyer]

Or it lacked the doctrine and technological capabilities, which was the case. You are looking only at the range problem, but that's just one variable.

 

 

Doctrine? Are we still arguing with that? Sorry, but I take the words of J.Corum, R.Muller, H.Boog, et al, and the Luftwaffe own manuals over yours.

Technology: As mentioned, the Lw had the edge on strategic bombing for some time.

 

And range, I'm not looking only at it, was just answering the claim that the Lw lacked "range" to be consider strategic able force, or something like that. Guess you missed that.

 

 

 

There's the intelligence needed to target the enemy's resources (sorely lacking in 1940), there's finding targets despite enemy countermeasures (see how Knickebein was soon denied, then X-gërat, then Y-gërat), there's hitting the target once found and then there's flying back home, all of which had to be achieved without suffering prohibitive losses to night fighters. After the initial Blitz, German efforts went from bad to worse in the successive campaigns that eventually lost focus to become revenge attacks.

 

 

The WW2 was not only about the bombing of Britain. As far as being the main target of Lw bombers, Britain was only top priority for a very short period of time.

[Meyer]

What strategic campaigns did the Luftwaffe participate in for an extended period of time that had any effect on Allied production?

For pretty much the whole war, there were attacks on Allied shipping. I'm sure it had some effect, anyway the effort was pretty small against bigger priorities of the Lw.

[RETAC21]

 

Or it lacked the doctrine and technological capabilities, which was the case. You are looking only at the range problem, but that's just one variable.

 

 

Doctrine? Are we still arguing with that? Sorry, but I take the words of J.Corum, R.Muller, H.Boog, et al, and the Luftwaffe own manuals over yours.

Technology: As mentioned, the Lw had the edge on strategic bombing for some time.

 

And range, I'm not looking only at it, was just answering the claim that the Lw lacked "range" to be consider strategic able force, or something like that. Guess you missed that.

 

 

 

There's the intelligence needed to target the enemy's resources (sorely lacking in 1940), there's finding targets despite enemy countermeasures (see how Knickebein was soon denied, then X-gërat, then Y-gërat), there's hitting the target once found and then there's flying back home, all of which had to be achieved without suffering prohibitive losses to night fighters. After the initial Blitz, German efforts went from bad to worse in the successive campaigns that eventually lost focus to become revenge attacks.

 

 

The WW2 was not only about the bombing of Britain. As far as being the main target of Lw bombers, Britain was only top priority for a very short period of time.

 

 

A leading edge that lasted, what, less than 6 months and was never regained? And was barely used before? A doctrine that wasn't applied at all?

 

As for Britain, lessee, they bombed it in 1940, 1941, 1942 (Baedeker raids), 1944 (Operation Steinbock) and then came the V-1 attacks. In 1940 the aim was to neutralise the RAF (failed), in 1941 to bomb Britain into submission (failed), in 1942 and afterwards it was just "revenge", guess we can mark that one as a "success" because they killed people. And in betweem there were fighter bomber raids which achieved.... very little. They could be called "strategic" as they had the effect of inflicting unsustainable losses on the LW, but I guess the aim was not to finish off the bomber arm...

 

What other strategic attacks were carried by the LW in this period? none. The priority for most of the LW bomber force was the East, where they were employed tactically most of the time, operationally some of the time, with small periods of focus in the Mediterranean, where they were bombing ships and Norway. The overall impact of both was tactical and time limited.

[Ken Estes]

Neutralizing Malta by air attack was certainly a strategic air campaign. It waxed and waned as did strat bombing of the USSR. I think we need to see LW strategic air as a servant of the major land campaign. After all, as the BoB reaches its peak, squadrons are already being redeployed to the East.

 

In a like fashion, Eaker, Doolittle and the 8thAF complained through 1944 that Ike's priorities for prepping and supporting Normandy kept the strategic bombing campaign from reaching fruition until late in that year.

[RETAC21]

Hm, I´ll have to disagree there, neutralising Malta wouldn't affect Britain's war making capability at all, if we accept the wiki's definition: "defeating an enemy nation-state by destroying its economic ability and public will to wage war rather than destroying its land or naval forces."

[RETAC21]

While Malta was quite significant in reducing the supply of the Axis armies in Africa, loosing Malta doesn't mean a free passage as that will do nothing about submarines, mines and air interdiction of the supply routes from Tripoli, nor does it anything about the capacity of North African ports, which was a huge limiting factor.

 

Even in the best of alternative history scenarios, having the Axis advance into the Nile valley puts them on a dire supply situation and even conquering Alexandria (presumably destroyed) wouldn't solve that.

 

Come Torch, their situation becomes untenable, so Malta's impact was mostly operational IMO.

[RETAC21]

Stuart, all ships went the long way to India after Italy's entry into the war, so any effect is not going to be any worse than it was. As for India collapsing, I´ll note that having the Japanese at the doorstep didn't have that effect.

 

Further, if the Germans advance up to Cairo they still have to cross the Nile, and when done with the Nile, there's the Suez canal. Once across that, they have a huge expanse of desert before getting anywhere worthwile like Basra. It makes conquering the Soviet Union look easy due to the lack of railroads, which meant the Germans needed to expend fuel they really couldn't afford if they were at war with the USSR.

[MiloMorai]

Neutralizing Malta by air attack was certainly a strategic air campaign. It waxed and waned as did strat bombing of the USSR. I think we need to see LW strategic air as a servant of the major land campaign. After all, as the BoB reaches its peak, squadrons are already being redeployed to the East.

 

In a like fashion, Eaker, Doolittle and the 8thAF complained through 1944 that Ike's priorities for prepping and supporting Normandy kept the strategic bombing campaign from reaching fruition until late in that year.

Well it depends on when the BoB reached its peak.

 

The British consider Sept 15 as the peak and was over at the end of Oct.

 

13 Aug

42 1/3 Kampfgruppen 9 Stukagruppen 1 Schlachtgruppe 26 Jagdgruppen 9

Zerstrergruppen

 

7 Sept

43 Kampfgruppen 4 Stukagruppen 2 Schlachtgruppe 27 Jagdgruppen 8 Zerstörergruppen

[Phil]

What might be interesting is listing the innovations that saw the greatest contribution to the effects of the campaign and investigating who and how they came about. Were there any innovations that proved decisive that originated from any bomber crewmen - especially at Sqn Ldr level.