Was the S.B.C. a waste?

[MiloMorai]

A waste as in material and manpower that could have been better used elsewhere for the results the SBC achieved.

 

For example, would these resources and manpower of RAF BC have been put to better use in a larger tactical air force and especially dive bombers?

[shep854]

Strategic Bombing Campaign?

[Sardaukar]

They should have concentrated on oil industry, power stations and transport grid more, instead of city bombing....but admittedly, that'd be difficult during night.

[mnm]

Do you mean the SB2C?

 

[EchoFiveMike]

Yeah, the Small Block Chevy has always been a weak sister powerplant, the only thing it had going for it was quantity which made it cheap. S/F.....Ken M

[Sardaukar]

Do you mean the SB2C?

 

 

Son of a Bitch 2nd Class?

[rmgill]

Thats why I get so irritated with the claims a strategic bombing campaign could have stopped the holocaust. Strategic bombing worked well against big targets or narrowly defined targets by terrain (such as Peenemunde). Pinpointing something like Auschwitz and wiping out the gas chambers is an exercise in wishful thinking. We couldnt even hit all the prime targets at Peenemunde and most of them were well defined.

 

What about Operations Jericho and Carthage?

[T19]

You had to bomb for the three years between Dunkirk and d day otherwise the people would start to wonder about the why.

 

The average joe did not care. All they new was Goring said it was impossible to bomb Berlin and the Brits did it all the time. That helped on the home front. That oiled te war machine until the army was ready to battle again.

[MiloMorai]

Do you mean the SB2C?

 

 

For whatever reason when posting the title changed from 'Was The SBC a Waste' to 'Was The Sbc A waste'.

[MiloMorai]

The British had identified the importance of Germany's fuel supplies before the war in their "Western Air Plan 5©" but targets changed repeatedly in 1940 due to directives from the Air Ministry.

[baboon6]

The only off

 

 

Do you mean the SB2C?

 

 

For whatever reason when posting the title changed from 'Was The SBC a Waste' to 'Was The Sbc A waste'.

 

The official name eventually was the Combined Bomber Offensive.

[baboon6]

 

Thats why I get so irritated with the claims a strategic bombing campaign could have stopped the holocaust. Strategic bombing worked well against big targets or narrowly defined targets by terrain (such as Peenemunde). Pinpointing something like Auschwitz and wiping out the gas chambers is an exercise in wishful thinking. We couldnt even hit all the prime targets at Peenemunde and most of them were well defined.

 

What about Operations Jericho and Carthage?

Very impressive in some ways but ultimately strikes against small and not very heavily defended targets of limited strategic value by a small, highly-trained force. And even then things didn't go entirely according to plan.

Edited June 17, 2013 by baboon6

[rmgill]

True, but I suspect the locals were rather heartened to see the Gestapo taking one on the chin.

And I suspect those Gestapo were not happy to be so specifically targeted.

The reactions of the locals, even when things went poorly as in the case of the Copenhagen raid, was not one of anger towards the RAF.

Edited June 17, 2013 by rmgill

[baboon6]

True, but I suspect the locals were rather heartened to see the Gestapo taking one on the chin.

 

And I suspect those Gestapo were not happy to be so specifically targeted

 

The reactions of the locals, even when things went poorly as in the case of the Copenhagen raid, was not one of anger towards the RAF.

I agree. But hitting and keeping out of action stuff like oil facilities, power stations, bridges, tunnels etc was harder. Having said that once in 1944 more effort was made on fuel and transport targets it did make a difference. [edited to add- of course bombing technology and tactics had improved vastly by this time making these targets more viable]

 

Not mentioned yet is how much of the Luftwaffe (both air and ground components- remember most flak was under LW control) had to be used to counter the bombing offensive. Those aircraft could have been bombing or strafing the Russians or shooting down their aircraft, those 88s could have been shooting out Russian (or British or American) tanks.

Edited June 20, 2013 by baboon6

[Adam_S]

They should have concentrated on oil industry, power stations and transport grid more, instead of city bombing....but admittedly, that'd be difficult during night.

 

Given that they couldn't even hit a city in 1941...

[shep854]

Do you mean the SB2C?

 

No, silly...this:

 

SBC

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curtiss_SBC_Helldiver

Edited June 20, 2013 by shep854

[Bob B]

 

True, but I suspect the locals were rather heartened to see the Gestapo taking one on the chin.

 

And I suspect those Gestapo were not happy to be so specifically targeted

 

The reactions of the locals, even when things went poorly as in the case of the Copenhagen raid, was not one of anger towards the RAF.

I agree. But hitting and keeping out of action stuff like oil facilities, power stations, bridges, tunnels etc was harder. Having said that once in 1944 more effort was made on fuel and transport targets it did make a difference.

 

Not mentioned yet is how much of the Luftwaffe (both air and ground components- remember most flak was under LW control) had to be used to counter the bombing offensive. Those aircraft could have been bombing or strafing the Russians or shooting down their aircraft, those 88s could have been shooting out Russian (or British or American) tanks.

 

Years ago a similar topic came up and I remember reading In Alfred Price's book on the last year of the Luftwaffe that more than half of all Me 262 produced were lost in transit do to the allies bombing the German railway system. I could dig up the book and get the exact figure if there is interest. IIRC, it also mentioned that the bombing campaign also shut down the oil industry long enough to force the Germans to use up reserves that could not be replaced causing the LW to become very scarce over the Eastern front. The bombing campaign also kept a huge number of troops occupied manning the guns

[Rick]

Well, it doesn't look this thread is about the SBC Helldiver so I'll guess it is about the UK and the USA 4 engine bombers over Germany. From somewhere I remember that the German power/electrical grid was very? susceptible to damage from bombing. Don't know if true or not.

[MiloMorai]

Well, it doesn't look this thread is about the SBC Helldiver so I'll guess it is about the UK and the USA 4 engine bombers over Germany. From somewhere I remember that the German power/electrical grid was very? susceptible to damage from bombing. Don't know if true or not.

 

This is what the USSBS said:

 

Electric Power

The German power system, except for isolated raids, was never a target during the air war. An attack was extensively debated during the course of the war. It was not undertaken partly because it was believed that the German power grid was highly developed and that losses in one area could be compensated by switching power from another. This assumption, detailed investigation by the Survey has established, was incorrect.

 

The German electric power situation was in fact in a precarious condition from the beginning of the war and became more precarious as the war progressed; this fact is confirmed by statements of a large number of German officials, by confidential memoranda of the National Load Dispatcher, and secret minutes of the Central Planning Committee. Fears that their extreme vulnerability would be discovered were fully discussed in these minutes.

 

The destruction of five large generating stations in Germany would have caused a capacity loss of 1.8 million kw. or 8 percent of the total capacity, both public and private. The destruction of 45 plants of 100,000 kw. or larger would have caused a loss of about 8,000,000 kw. or almost 40 percent, and the destruction of a total of 95 plants of 50,000 kw. or larger would have eliminated over one-half of the entire generating capacity of the country. The shortage was sufficiently critical so that any considerable loss of output would have directly affected essential war production, and the destruction of any substantial amount would have had serious results.

 

Generating and distributing facilities were relatively vulnerable and their recuperation was difficult and time consuming. Had electric generating plants and substations been made primary targets as soon as they could have been brought within range of Allied attacks, the evidence indicates that their destruction would have had serious effects on Germany's war production.

 

http://anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#tfdo

 

It would appear that attacking generating stations would have had paid large dividends in shutting down German production more than some of the other targets chosen.

[Meyer]

 

 

As for tactical, the problem is that that, its in support of a tactical objective. We could have dominated the airspace over france in 1942 and 43, and how much difference would it have made to the war in Russia? Absolutely none.

No, the RAF tried to do that, but couldn't.

 

Bomber Command took the war to Germany and whilst one can argue how effective it was, it had a far greater effect on the war than just a tactical one that wasnt supporting an army to its front, would have had in that kind of campaign. After all, the Luftwaffe was a tactical airforce, and a pretty good one. Yet ever strategic objective it set it failed.

 

The Lw was not a tactical force, and, as a matter of fact, was way more able strategically than the RAF early in the war.

[APF]

Me armchair strategist thinks that it would have been better to concentrate solely on a few resources which couldn't be hidden easily, so oil/fuel production, power grid and maybe transportation.

 

Fuel production because those refineries tend to be huge, some spares need a long time to deliver, for example huge converter tubes (don't now how long if somebody would really put pressure on it, though) and due to the tubing they are quite sensitive to bombs and splinters, not to mention that they tend to bring their own flammable liquids with them.

 

Power grid has been cited here before. Just like to add that transformator stations need lots of copper which is only salvageable if you can find it again afterwards...

 

Transportation: well, if you've got enough resources it's certainly a way to disrupt the production, but I' not so sure wether it doesn't need much more resources per not-delivered tank than ex. bombing the power grid. Steel and wood aren't that scare after all, and besides them all you need is mostly unskilled labor with a few people to do the thinking.

 

But that's probably 20/20 hindsight.

[Chris Werb]

In Speer's biography he mentions that an analysis of US pattern bombing accuracy indicated that the USAAF could easily destroy all the major bridges in Germany. This led to the rapid building of ferries for emergency use should the bridges be taken down, but they were very vulnerable until such time as those ferries were built and to a great extent thereafter.

[Kenneth P. Katz]

In my opinion, there are two big things that make the strategic bombing campaign questionable.

1. The technology simply wasn't there to have significant results from strategic bombing until late in the war.

2. Using four-engine bombers with a crew of 10 as bait to lure the Luftwaffe fighters so that they could be destroyed (a pretty good description of the successful strategy to achieve Allied air superiority over the continent) was incredibly expensive in both material and human terms.

[Kenneth P. Katz]

I believe that the strategic bombing campaign had four principle benefits:

1. Indirectly, it led to Allied air superiority over the Continent (see previous posting).

2. It opened a Second Front, when it was the only plausible way to do so.

3. It diverted enormous amounts of German resources towards air defense of the Reich, in a war where the Allies had more resources than the Axis did.

4. By devastating the German homeland, it brought home to the German people that Nazism was weaker than the Allies (thus discrediting an ideology and party built on a myth of strength and will) and brought ruin to Germany. This made it much easier to democratize at least West Germany and reintegrate it into the the community of civilized nations.

[Meyer]

 

The Luftwaffe was predominantly a tactical airforce.

 

No, it wasn't. Ground attack units were pretty neglected at the start of the war, having just a few units using adapted older fighter/dive bomber planes, the arm only gained more importance and specific designed aircraft with the advance of the war. Dive bomber units were never much numerous.

But, unlike the RAF, did not put all its eggs in the strategic basket (and then, was totally unprepared to put it in practice), and did not neglect tactical missions, or cooperation with the army.

 

Its medium bombers were designed for destroying airfields and small towns. They were NOT capable of travelling strategic distances an carrying strategic payloads until very late in the war, and the lack of strategic damage to locations in Scotland is evidence of this. I think they did one strategic mission off the east coast of the US, took some photos and went home. Then the sole long range bomber they used to do it they parked up for use by Hitler to fly to Shangri la. This is not an airforce that considered Strategic work the top of its objectives, even early in the war.

 

 

The "tactical" German bombers at the start of the war, could carry as heavy or heavier loads than the "strategic" British bombers. Range could be higher with the later, but still enough to reach most of Britain from bases on Germany.

Anyway, distance or payloads are not what define a bombing as strategic, for the Germans most of the strategic objectives against the most probable enemies before the start of the war (Poland, Czechoslovakia, France), were within the range of even the Stuka.

 

Yes, they may have been used for strategic work long before this. But they had no strategic doctrine, and their failure in my view, against a relatively easy to attack target as the UK, speaks volumes of the Luftwaffes weakness. The only thing it did worse than strategic bombing was its naval cooperation.

 

 

Wrong about the lack of strategic doctrine, as proved by J.Corum's books or Luftwaffe's manuals. Agree with the problems with the Navy, which had as much fault here as the Lw.

Edited June 22, 2013 by Meyer