Littoral Combat Ship News

[Ivanhoe]

It needs to be armed like a sloop or corvette from WWII.

In today's navy, we can't design small ships with big complements. IMHO, fewer weapons, bigger weapons, and self-loading weapons are the key. I'm thinking two big (relatively) multipurpose guns, 4 gyro-ed autocannon, maybe a small set of AShMs. Ships smaller than a DDG I just don't see operating without DDGs protecting their backsides, and at least some air cover from a regional CVBG.

 

What is the mission of the LCS?

 

Is it supposed to be a patrol boat, or frigate?

Well, that's the problem. When we've already got the Burkes and LA class subs handling blue water, and CVBGs and ARGs handling force projection onshore, a shoal-water frigate sounds like a 20 pound flyswatter. Operating two light helos sounds great and enables the ship to do lots more things, at much longer distances, but that then boxes you in w.r.t. size and cost of the hull and size of the complement. And if you're going to do most things via helo, why screw around with a shoal draft hull? Just park 20-30 miles offshore and fly in. And if you're gonna do that, then just fly them off a converted freighter or similar "milk cow".

[JWB]

Drone carrier.

[RETAC21]

What is the mission of the LCS?

 

Is it supposed to be a patrol boat, or frigate?

 

It's supposed to be a platform to support a weapon system in the same sense that a planes drops a bomb.

 

The mission defined has been: ASW, littoral anti-surface warfare, mine warfare and Special forces support IIRC, each of which would have specific packages built around remotely controlled sensors and weapon vectors (air and submarine drones and helos), manned by permanently assigned crews that would be "independent" of the ship crew.

 

Problems started cropping when the bleeding edge sensors and weapons started not being ready and with the notion of hundreds of squids lying around doing training in the states in the non-deployed modules.

[swerve]

The problem I see in government is "groupthink". If you disagree and voice your opinion that is contrary you are told "get with the program" or "You are being negative"

I've seen plenty of that in private industry. Senior management tells us workers the plan. Gasps of disbelief. Brave person asks the question we're all thinking, but slightly re-phrased, i.e. "What do we do if the project is late?", when we're all thinking "What will they do when it's late?". He's slapped down: "It will not be late. Failure is not an option. Everything has been meticulously planned. All eventualities have been taken into account."

 

A little later, I smile at a representative of the outside contractors (one of the biggest in the business) whose very expensive analysis of our systems is the basis of the plan, & ask "Where does so-and-so fit into this diagram? I can't see it." Looks of bafflement. I continue: "You know, it feeds into invoicing. It has links to the provisioning database. All our billing goes through it.". Consternation ensues. Colleagues who are also examining the diagram grin, & one of them asks a question about another hole. And so on . . . .

 

But still, nobody was allowed to question the plan.

 

When it had overrun the schedule by 100% & completion was nowhere in sight it was re-scoped. A lot of it was abandoned. Parts of the old system were still running several years after their scheduled close down date under the plan.

 

BTW, that was in a successful, very profitable firm, which is still paying fat dividends on the shares it gave me while I was working for it. I've seen worse elsewhere.

Edited April 25, 2013 by swerve

[RETAC21]

Meh, Too-big-to-fail Bank invested 5 years developing The System that was supposed to unify and simplify all front to back processes, save untold millions and enable the lay-off of thousands of highly paid useless mouths with implementation date 2010, 2011, 2012, forget about it, we will now develop "the system" which will integrate all front to back processes, save untold millions, enable the... improve efficiency! and make use of the hugely expensive data center that sits underutilized...

[RETAC21]

Pertinent, meet CDR Scott Chisholm USN (Ret.), posted 2012

 

http://forums.navalwarfare.net/showthread.php?2604-LCS-quot-Quick-Swap-Concept-Dead-quot&highlight=Scott+Chisholm

 

"For those who don't know me, I am a retired USN Commander (O-5). One of my last assignments was as the Officer-in-Charge of the Commander, Mine Warfare Command Operations Detachment (CMWC OPDET). One of the missions of that detachment was to perform proof of concept trials of the LCS Mine Warfare package, specifically the UUVs.

The original concept of the LCS was to build something like 60 ships and ~100 modules. Following Iraqi Freedom, in the early 2004 timeframe, we had numerous design/CONOPS discussions for the vessel. Being a CRUDES/CVN/Amphib officer on a Mine Warfare staff staffed by pure blood Mine Warfare bubbas gave me a different perspective on what the LCS should look like. For instance, she was originally envisioned to have only a 29kt top speed. I argued that such a speed limitation would prevent the LCS from running with the CVNs which can boogie considerably faster than that.

I also argued against their limited self-defense capabilities, the cost of maintaining the personnel and equipment of the ~40 idle mission modules (figure a cost of $40k/sailor with 15-25 sailors per module for starters), and the trouble of maintaining the motivation and training of Sea Duty designated sailors who had absolutely nothing to do. You can only train on simulators so much before you go stir crazy. That was an issue I had initially experienced with my OPDET.

Then budget cuts in the 2004 timerframe led to the decision to limit the number of modules to the number of hulls. That's when I asked my Admiral the question "Why bother?" I suggested we scrap the entire LCS concept and build a multipurpose FFG-7 replacement with an oversized helo hanger that could function as a Mission Module Bay and deploy UAVs/UUVs/USVs. That's when my Admiral told me to sit down and shut up.

That was eight years ago."

 

"The thing to remember about the LSC is that it's nothing more than an overgrown ocean-going pickup truck intended to provide direct support to fleet assest. Want to hunt mines? Toss all of your mine countermeasures gear in the back and have at it. Tired of mines? Perhaps interested in a little ASW? Dump all of the mine countermeasures gear and replace it with ASW gear....

It was a sexy way to do more with less.

Because they were intended to provide direct support to the CSGs, they had to be able to keep up with the carriers. Twenty-nine knots was about the top speed of an FFG-7 (originally intended as convoy escorts in support of REFORGER operations as you stated), and they frequently had trouble keeping up with the CVNs when they had to lift their skirts and get somewhere in a hurry. Bad form to leave your ASW escorts behind, but you'd be surprised how often we did it....

In any event, the LSCs needed to run fast in order to keep up with the Big Dogs, especially if you intended for them to race ahead and do some mine countermeasures/ASW sweeps prior to the carrier's arrival. I'm pretty sure that's where the ~40kt speed came from.

As for the utility of the UUVs, they are much farther along than one would think. When I was involved in the projects, the Navy was shotgunning a bunch of different UUV concepts, some really big, while others were nearly man-portable. There were also UAVs, helicopters mostly, that could perform MCM, ASW and ASuW operations.

Part of the reason for the lack of self-defense capability of the LSC most likely stems from the fact one does not engage in MCM operations unless one has local air and sea superiority. Once an MCM starts dancing in a mine field, that's all they can focus on; they count on other surface and air assets to handle any nearby threats. I've never really had an issue with the self-defense aspects of LCS as the Navy had walked into that with their eyes open. If it's becoming an issue now, it's because we've deviated from the initial CONOPS, which is what I think Tom Rowden said in the article.

In any event, I hope Momma Navy figures out what she wants to do with the LCS program before she sinks too much more taxpayer money into it."

 

"The modules are, well, modular. Each module is comprised of equipment and the people necessary to operate and maintain that equipment. A module would usually have several (2-6) "containers" (they resemble the standard 20 foot shipping container) which include all of the work spaces, equipment, and storage, and the crew to man it all. In some instances, manned and unmanned aviation and surface assets are part of the package. Most of the packages extensively utilize unmanned assets.

If your are configured for a specific mission, that is all you can do outside of the ship's inherent capabilities. Ship's company was not intended to support module activities that did not involve ships equipment. For instance, Ship's company provides the flight deck crew, and operates winches and cranes. They would not be expected to operate specialized module equipment such as UVs.

Conversely, the module's crew is not expected to assist in routine ship's work (line handling, etc. - Ship's company has to be able to operate the ship when there are no modules embarked). In the case of emergencies, all personnel embarked would bear a hand to help.

All grousing aside, the module concept is pretty cool. The ship has a large "Mission Bay", sort of like a extra-large hanger or small tank deck, where the containers are placed. You then literally plug them into the ship's power grid and LAN and they become, in come cases, air conditioned work spaces. The ship is equipped with berthing facilities for the module personnel, in a manner similar how amphibs are configured. Each module has an Officer-in-Charge who is integrated into the ship's command structure. Originally, the turn around time to swap modules was 3-4 days, provided everything was waiting for you on the pier when you started the swap.

But, the module concept is very, very expensive. I mentioned earlier an average cost of $40k/sailor; that was the figure we used back in 2004 to ballpark costs associated with Navy payroll. The cost for officers is slightly higher, but in the case of the modules there were so few officers involved that the $40k number worked fine. In any event, a module of 20 sailors yields an annual payroll cost (actually, pay and benefits) of around $800k. Times the original 100 modules, and you've got a cool $80 million/year before you even start talking about equipment.

Original numbers called for about 60 hulls and 100 modules. That meant the Navy would be spending closed to $30 million/year on sailors who weren't actually doing their assigned mission. I realize in the grand scheme of things, that's pretty much chump change, but the military is where federal fiscal cuts almost always seem to start. In fact, during the 2004-2005 time frame my command - the one responsible for the proof of concept testing of the MIW modules - suffered a nearly 30% reduction of our OPTAR (operating funds). The funds weren't lost to the military; instead, they went to pay the bills we were incurring in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Back on point, it was very hard to justify all those idle sailors back then. I'm only surprised it took so long for the Navy to realize it.

But, this begs the point I asked back in 2004: if the ships are going to be equipped with dedicated modules, why bother? If you suddenly find yourself needing 5 MIW modules and all you have in theater are ASW ans SUW modules, you have to pull five ships into port, debark their modules, then pack them up and ship them to a port near where you need them, then embark them on the ships where they are needed. AFTER you debark their modules.

I just don't see a happy ending here."

[Steven P Allen]

"Part of the reason for the lack of self-defense capability of the LSC most likely stems from the fact one does not engage in MCM operations unless one has local air and sea superiority. Once an MCM starts dancing in a mine field, that's all they can focus on; they count on other surface and air assets to handle any nearby threats. I've never really had an issue with the self-defense aspects of LCS as the Navy had walked into that with their eyes open."

 

 

Tell that to the boys who hunted mines around Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

[ScottBrim]

Bryan McGrath has a thread on Galrahn's ID forum concerning the FY 2014 budget and the latest 30 year shipbuilding plan.

 

On the FY 14 Shipbuilding Plan

Criticism of the LCS consumes about half of the 50 replies posted so far, including my own explanation of how it was I came to make my Summer 2008 prediction that the Navy would fall to 200 ships by 2020 or thereabouts.

 

Some number of the LCS critics over there seem resigned to the probability that the LCS won't be abandoned any time soon.

 

But, miracles do happen .... sometimes.

[tankerwanabe]

I think that the majority of the criticism is that the LCS is unable to perform Frigate duties, but it cost more than a Frigate right?

 

But I've read reports stating that the LCS is generally successful thus far in sea trials. Thus it appears that the LCS have been successfully tested as a Patrol Boat.

 

Have there been any testing of the LCS as a Frigate yet? The same stuff that the Perry class used to do - light anti-air, anti-sub etc.

[CaptLuke]

The mission defined has been: ASW, littoral anti-surface warfare, mine warfare and Special forces support IIRC, each of which would have specific packages built around remotely controlled sensors and weapon vectors (air and submarine drones and helos), manned by permanently assigned crews that would be "independent" of the ship crew.

 

This is a pretty good mission description but what's equally important is how the LCS got there.

 

Not unlike the F-35 program, the primary goal of the LCS was just to get ships built, regardless of all other considerations. Thus the LCS team began promising that it could do everything everyone wanted and nothing they didn't want it to do regardless of whether or not the resulting package made any sense, had any doctrine to back it up, or would be cost-effective for any of its tasks.

 

The tasks no one wanted were littoral support tasks, which is how we got the brilliant concept of a 40 knot minesweeper and a ship with no on-ship (as opposed to ship's aircraft mounted) ASW weapons fighting submarines and so on.

 

For the tasks others wanted, it was vitally important that the ship have no capability for two reasons:

1. Avoiding disruption of the status quo, i.e eliminating any tactical innovation and
2. Making damn sure that no dumbass congressman would start to see them as alternatives to buying real ships

Sinking other ships was a job for Naval air, submarines and maybe the real ships, so the LCS was designed from the start with no real capability in this area. Similarly, AAW was the province of airplanes and real ships so the LCS was to have no capability there either. The only "combat" no one wanted, because it wasn't worth their time, was shooting up speed boats.

 

Not only was the LCS designed with no capabilities in these "No Go" areas, it was designed to make upgrades in these areas difficult. Has it ever struck you as odd that modular weapons fit was a major design goal but there is no real provision for 'topside' gun or missile launching modules along the stanflex lines? Now you know why. It's also why the topside 'modules' are much smaller and non-standard, specifically to keep them from being useful for larger weapons. This is also why there is a 57mm gun: defensive use only!

 

A lot of the criticism of the LCS is "it does a bad job at this . . " or "It's overpriced for that . . " and the criticism is all correct but you have to remember that it was never intended to be a Littoral Combat Ship (that, like the speedboat bugaboo, was purely marketing all along) and the only inflexible program goal was to build ships.

 

By that standard the program is a wild success: they have two separate designs in full production with no working modules, no doctrine,

huge cost over-runs and schedule delays, and a litany of design flaws. Long term the LCS will serve the same important purpose for the Navy as the F-35 did for the USAF: it shows how to get mindbogglingly poorly conceived and executed procurement programs into full production, thus avoiding any need for innovation, tough decisions or especially procurement reform, We will see all the procurement practices that led to the LCS again, in spades and that will be its real legacy.

[Sardaukar]

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/navy-secretary-singles-out-littoral-combat-ship-as-one-of-our-very-best-programs?a=1&c=1171

 

You could not come up with this easily...

[Ivanhoe]

Another peculiar thing about LCS is that there's (TMK) never mention of how either LCS design factors in to peacekeeping and disaster recovery missions. The USN is spending more and more time on those two missions, and with a little forethought they could have critiqued the two LCS designs against lessons learned from situations like the 2004 tsunami.

[shep854]

You have to wonder about Thompson's mental state as he composed that.

----

From the 'Laugh or you pound head' department:

LCS Is Hacked

 

"Last year it was decided to put the ship into mass production. But it was recently revealed that last year the navy discovered that the computerized combat systems of the LCS were vulnerable to hacking."

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/20130429.aspx

Edited April 29, 2013 by shep854

[Tony Williams]

Another peculiar thing about LCS is that there's (TMK) never mention of how either LCS design factors in to peacekeeping and disaster recovery missions. The USN is spending more and more time on those two missions, and with a little forethought they could have critiqued the two LCS designs against lessons learned from situations like the 2004 tsunami.

 

I rather like the Danish Absalon class: http://www.navalhistory.dk/English/NavyNews/2006/0622_PatrolShips.htm . Exceptionally versatile ships, just what is needed in present circumstances. They're slow, but with room for two big choppers, who cares? Note the budgeted cost... US$ 800 million - for three of them!

[Guest Jason L]

 

Another peculiar thing about LCS is that there's (TMK) never mention of how either LCS design factors in to peacekeeping and disaster recovery missions. The USN is spending more and more time on those two missions, and with a little forethought they could have critiqued the two LCS designs against lessons learned from situations like the 2004 tsunami.

 

I rather like the Danish Absalon class: http://www.navalhistory.dk/English/NavyNews/2006/0622_PatrolShips.htm . Exceptionally versatile ships, just what is needed in present circumstances. They're slow, but with room for two big choppers, who cares? Note the budgeted cost... US$ 800 million - for three of them!

 

It's even got Ro-Ro capability for heavy vehicles! Cool. Never know when you need a Leopard in your pocket.

 

Edited April 29, 2013 by Jason L

[Ivanhoe]

... US$ 800 million - for three of them!

 

There's your problem right there.

[BP]

 

 

Another peculiar thing about LCS is that there's (TMK) never mention of how either LCS design factors in to peacekeeping and disaster recovery missions. The USN is spending more and more time on those two missions, and with a little forethought they could have critiqued the two LCS designs against lessons learned from situations like the 2004 tsunami.

 

I rather like the Danish Absalon class: http://www.navalhistory.dk/English/NavyNews/2006/0622_PatrolShips.htm . Exceptionally versatile ships, just what is needed in present circumstances. They're slow, but with room for two big choppers, who cares? Note the budgeted cost... US$ 800 million - for three of them!

 

It's even got Ro-Ro capability for heavy vehicles! Cool. Never know when you need a Leopard in your pocket.

 

 

OUTSTANDING! I have never seen that.

 

Talk about the ultimate mission module. You just got upgunned to 120mm.

[rmgill]

Hoist to the Helo Deck and strap two of them down?

[RETAC21]

But it only makes around 24 knots and lacks the Kewlness module to awe potential enemies.

[Colin]

Now just add firing ports out the side and the leopards can join the fun....

[Ivanhoe]

A recessed tub topsides would allow R2D2 mode.

[BP]

Now just add firing ports out the side and the leopards can join the fun....

 

In this case the guns could run themselves out!

 

[tankerwanabe]

The USN was saying that the LCS was supposed to be revolutionary. What was revolutionary? Was it supposed to the the stealth?

[Ivanhoe]

 

Now just add firing ports out the side and the leopards can join the fun....

 

In this case the guns could run themselves out!

 

 

Its about time the USN took another look at chain shot. Sweep the antennae off OPFOR's boat, cut off satellite TV and Internet, white flag follows soon thereafter.

[Max H]

Some kind of range-improved M1028?