BansheeOne Posted October 7, 2013 Posted October 7, 2013 Junograd, 10 July 1945 The small islands forces encountered little opposition on Ekarma, Makanrushi and Kharimkotan, mainly some Japanese lookouts; they may not have found all yet as they have not covered all of the terrain so far. Our troops are certainly still digging out enemies on Onekotan and Shiashkotan despite all of them being now occupied. 2nd Kenai Cavalry was landed at Green Beach today to ensure the planned airfield site being secured quickly, and the engineers were already being brought ashore by nightfall. Since there has not been much enemy interference from Paramushiro and Shumshu the last two days, we hope to have the airfield up in three weeks with American assistance. The fleet has mostly taken to bombarding the northern islands in preparation for future landings there; there is return fire from Japanese positions at Shumshu's northern tip, but it is outranged by the US battleships while the cruisers are shelling other targets. Enemy air activitiy is limited to irregular sorties of not more than four planes which sometimes manage to zip in quickly and try kamikaze attacks; TGs 90.1 and 90.2 completely swatted such an attempt today off Shumshu even before friendly fighters showed up. At this rate, the Japanese will attrit their remaining aircraft in short order, though we keep watching out for reinforcements being brought up from the south. Our losses stand at 86 killed, 170 wounded and six missing so far.
Marek Tucan Posted October 7, 2013 Posted October 7, 2013 (edited) Any more signs of Bolshevist activity? Prague, July 10, 1945 It seems we are getting some leads from our POWs who were before the surrender stationed in SS training area off Prague - in the Soviet zone. They report there was some kind of operation carried on late in the war, witch a lot of crates being buried underground. Nobody seems to know what was in them - witnesses speak about anything they think we want to hear, from Wunderwaffen to gold. Paint me sceptical on this one, but more rational sources hint at lot of papers. Maybe some archive? Anyway Tanski's gentlemen will have full report and our full support if interested. Tuczek out Edited October 7, 2013 by Tuccy
swerve Posted October 7, 2013 Posted October 7, 2013 (edited) The USAAF will be the first occupants of the new airfield. A scratch P-40 squadron made up from the remaining P-40s of 343rd Fighter Group will be formed (the USAAF has a skeleton administration in place) & fly in. P-40s were selected because the USAAF wanted to get its fighters involved. Provisional plans are to fly in some of our P-51s next: 11th fighter. The first priority is guarding against incursions from the south, & lowering the pressure on the carrier fighters. Fighter-bombers & bombers will follow soon, when there's room. We'd be happy for the RCAF to deploy its Kittyhawks, but for the moment they're planned to remain in the Aleutians. From a command point of view, it would be preferable to deploy the Kittyhawks, & follow up with other units from 4ATAF, but politics, politics . . . I hope we can get all units in the Kuriles under 4ATAF as soon as possible. The fighting in the air is the easiest it's been, according to our de-briefings. The skilled IJAAF pilots encountered last year haven't shown up this time. There is a debate about whether the unskilled kamikazes (generally agreed to be mostly too inexperienced for anything else) are all they have left, or whether they're husbanding good pilots. We wonder if they transferred units south during winter to face the US. USAAF P-38s are now conducting all fighter patrols between the Komandorskis & Kamchatka, & along the edge of Bolshevist air space down to Shumshu. We agreed with the USAAF that it would reduce the risk of incidents. Edited October 7, 2013 by swerve
BansheeOne Posted October 7, 2013 Posted October 7, 2013 (edited) No overt action by the Bolshevists in the Kuriles so far. We believe that any Soviet move is likely to come from from Petropavlovsk on the east coast of Kamchatka. The following represents our best intelligence on forces in this Region: Defense Region Kamchatka (General-mayor Gnechko) - 198th Independent Rifle Regiment- 5th Independent Rifle Battalion- 7th Independent Rifle Battalion - 428th Independent Artillery Regiment (Howitzer)- 123rd Independent Artillery Battalion- 362nd Independent Artillery Battalion- 367th Independent Artillery Battalion- 726th Independent Anti-Aircraft Battalion (Motorized) 101st Rifle Division (General-mayor Ivanovich)- 138th Rifle Regiment- 302nd Rifle Regiment- 373rd Rifle Regiment- 279th Light Artillery Regiment- 169th Tank Destroyer Battalion- 119th Sapper Battalion- 103rd Signals Battalion- 131st Medical Battalion- unknown training battalion- unknown anti-aircraft company- 38th Chemical Company Petropavlovsk Naval Base Command (Kontr-admiral Fedorov) - Minelayer Okhotsk- Guard ships Dzerzhinski and Kirov- at least four subchasers of unknown type- ca. 12 minesweepers, possibly indigenious Fugas-class and Admirable-class lend-lease vessels- ca. 30 motor torpedo boats, possibly Type G-5- 2nd + 3rd Patrol Craft Division (unknown number of Type MO-4 small guard vessels)- 5th Submarine Division (estimated six submarines, Type ShCh medium patrol and at least one Type L-7 mine-laying submarine, tender Saratov) Petropavlovsk Naval Base Defense Command (unknown commander)- 50th Coastal Artillery Battalion (45, 100 and 130 mm batteries)- 169th Coastal Artillery Battalion (2 x 130 mm batteries, Chukchi Peninsula)- 180th Coastal Artillery Battalion (45 and 130 mm batteries)- 425th Coastal Artillery Battery (2 x 180 mm twin turrets)- 945th Coastal Artillery Battery (4 x 130 mm, Cape Lopatka)- at least one naval infantry battalion Petropavlovsk Naval Base Anti-Aircraft Command (unknown commander)- unknown units 2nd Mine-Torpedo Air Division (General-mayor Suchkov)- 4th Mine-Torpedo Regiment (Il-4, DB-3)- 49th Mine-Torpedo Regiment (Il-4, A-20G/H)- 52nd Mine-Torpedo Regiment (DB-3) 128th Air Division (Podpolkovnik Yeremin)- 410th Fighter-Bomber Regiment (P-63)- 888th Fighter Regiment (P-63)- 903rd Bomber Regiment (A-20, possibly Tupolev SB and interned allied aircraft) Since we blocked the handover of landing craft, patrol frigates and aditional minesweepers to the Bolshevists earlier this year, we assess that they could transport at best a brigade of troops with no heavy equipment with the locally available vessels, though obviously additional ships could be sent up from Vladivostok through the First Kurile Strait; the 130 mm battery at Cape Lopatka could also easily reach to Shumshu and cover most of it. However, then they might as well dispatch troops from the mainland. Here is the current intelligence on formations mentioned for possible invasion plans: 87th Rifle Corps (General-mayor Borisov)- 342nd + 345th Rifle Division- unknown artillery regiment- unknown artillery battalion (self-propelled)- unkown anti-aircraft battalion- 914th Signals Battalion- 967th Engineer Battalion 13th Naval Infantry Brigade (General-mayor Trushin)- 74th-78th Naval Infantry Battalion- 390th Naval Infantry Battalion- 502nd Mortar Battalion (Motorized)- 26th + 625th Sapper Company- 81st Anti-Aircraft Company (Motorized)- 138th Reconnaissance Company (Motorized)- 168th Anti-Tank Company (Motorized)- 223rd Signals Company- 341st Supply Company- 398th Medical Company 113th Independent Rifle Brigade (subordinated to Sixteenth Soviet Army; Polkovnik Zakharov)- unknown units Edited October 7, 2013 by BansheeOne
BansheeOne Posted October 8, 2013 Posted October 8, 2013 Junograd, 11 July 1945 There is still sporadic fighting with Japanese holdouts on the occupied islands, but FENCEGATE can be considered an overall success. Despite some hickups in execution, most of it went according to plans and the enemy was overwhelmed by our far superior number of forces at moderate cost of friendly losses; the Japanese obviously had no means to reinforce their battalions from Paramushiro and Shumsu, particularly with our air superiority. A flying boat was shot down today by Ki-45 fighters coming up from the Southern Kurils, but they ran into alerted American Hellcats when they approached Shiaskotan, which made rather short work of them. The Navy is looking for any survivors of either side. We are now in a position to block any potential Bolshevist advance down the Kurile Chain if they should try to land on Shumshu and Paramushiro, and conversely to go north ourselves. Contingency planning has now shifted to countering any Soviet operations against Shumshu across the First Kurile Strait by landing on Paramushiro, codenamed MAILBOX. However, the main intention is to wait for the Onekotan airfield - construction of which started today - to become operable, then land on Shumshu first to block the Bolshevists completely under codename DOORMAT. In any case however, the next step is not likely to be so easy. DOORMAT Shumshu presents an exceptionally hard target. It is strongly garrisoned for its size with an estimated 8,000-plus troops - including a tank regiment -, most terrain that isn't hilly is swamps, the Japanese have built extensive fortifications - most of which we suppose to be underground - and for good measure, we have mined most obvious landing sites to prevent the Bolshevists preempting us. Enemy centers of gravity are Kataoka Naval Base with Imaizaki Airfield on the western coast towards Paramushiro - only one nautical mile across the water -, Myoshino Army-Navy Airfield near the center, and the coastal batteries at Cape Kokutan on the northern tip, seven miles from Kamchatka. Our outer minefields extend from the Cape about two thirds down both sides of the islands, largely following the 300-feet line about three miles offshore but open to the south so that you can operate inside them. Additional fields in shallower water up to 50 feet are running to the same extent on the eastern coast but only halfway down the western where we intend to land. The port of Kataoka and strait towards Paramushiro are also heavily mined to preclude exchange of forces, though we have observed Japanese sweeping activity there. The concentration of troops on Shumshu rules out dividing our forces between both islands for simultaneous operations; a landing of two divisions from I Corps reinforced by Marine battalion landing teams is planned on the lower portion of the western coast (once more designated Blue and Red Beach) with the third held in reserve; a contingency is a landing at the southeast cape (designated Gold Beach) for a thrust towards Myoshino Airfield, to be secured in advance by an airdrop from 1st Commando Battalion, then to link up with the main effort and isolate Kataoka from the rest of the island. MAILBOX Paramushiro represents its own challenges with about the same estimated Japanese garrison strength, spread over a larger but also distinctly more mountainous island with similarly numerous coastal defense positions. The HQ of 91st Division and North Eastern Fleet are based at Kashibawara on the northeastern coast opposite Kataoka, which has both a port and army airfield. Kitanodai Airfield is a bit to the south on the same coast, Kakumabestu Airfield on the southwest coast, and Suribachi Auxiliary Airfield in the center of the south coast. Musashi Navy Airfield is located on the southermost tip, closest to Onekotan. We have thoroughly mined the coasts except for the southern part around Musashi and Suribashi which would be our landing sites. The plan would be essentially the same as for DOORMAT with two divisions landing and one in reserve, quickly securing the southern airfields to base our own aircraft on to support further operations - sure to be a slog along the length of the island similiar to operations on Beringa. If this happened as a contingency to Soviet landings on Shumshu, the Second Kurile Strait would act as a buffer, narrow as it is. The Yegers would stay to garrison Onekotan and Shirikotan in the way of the Beringa Brigade which was formed from battalions of the territorial regiments. The smaller islands of Atlasov and Antsiferov will probably be left alone until Shumshu and/or Paramushiro are fully secured, though Marines may be landed there if the situation allows.
BansheeOne Posted October 9, 2013 Posted October 9, 2013 Junograd, 12 July 1945 The Americans reported encountering some Soviet P-63s from Kamchatka in international airspace on their air patrols in the north of the current area of operations today, but after both sides identified each other, they disengaged without incident. We are not sure if this really indicates stepped-up activities by the Bolshevists; we have drastically more aircraft in the area now, including on the far side of the Kuriles where we have rarely strayed before, so we might just find more of their routine patrols. Obviously they may also be reacting to our increased presence though. I am adding our latest intelligence about their Pacific Fleet: Pacific Fleet (Vladivostok; Admiral Yumashev) - Minelayers Ayan, Okean, Teodor Nette and Tomsk- Net tenders Mezen, Mologa, Sukhona, Vychegda and Zyeya- at least 60 Type MO-4 anti-submarine motor boats- ca. 12 Type MO-211 anti-submarine motor boats Northern Pacific Flotilla (Sovetskaya Gavan; Vitse-admiral Andreyev)- 8th Torpedo Division (Type TK-7 motor torpedo boats)- 13th Minesweeper Division (unknown types)- possible additional units 3rd Submarine Brigade (Kapitan II Ranga Ivanov)- 8th Submarine Division (Type ShCh medium patrol submarines)- 10th Submarine Division (Type M small patrol submarines) Northern Pacific Flotilla Aviation Command (General-mayor Dzyuba)- 2nd NKVD Naval Border Guard Patrol Regiment (unknown types)- 48th Naval Patrol Regiment (MBR-2, PBN-1 and PBY-6)- possible additional units 15th Naval Air Division (Podpolkovnik Mikhaylov)- 42nd Naval Fighter Regiment (LaGG-3, Yak-9)- 55th Naval Bomber Regiment (Pe-2, Tu SB)- 59th Naval Fighter Regiment (Yak-9) 16th Naval Air Division (podpolkovnik Denisov)- 31st Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types)- 56th Naval Attack Regiment (Il-2)- 60th Naval Attack Regiment (unknown types)- 117th Naval Patrol Regiment (MBR-2, PBN-1 and possibly PBY-6) Northern Pacific Flotilla Coast Defense Command (unknown commander)- 54th Coastal Artillery Battalion (45, 130 and 180 mm batteries)- 216th Coastal Artillery Battalion (130 and 152 mm batteries)- 365th Naval Infantry Battalion- possible additional units attached from Pacific Fleet Land Defense Command Northern Pacific Flotilla Anti-Aircraft Command (unknown commander)- unknown units attached from Pacific Fleet Anti-Aircraft Command Vladivostok Naval Base (Kontr-admiral Fedorov)- Minelayers Argun, Astrakhan, Gizhiga and Woroshylovsk- eight Strela-class minesweepers- at least 40 additional minesweepers of unknown type- at least 40 motor torpedo boats of unknown type- possibly additional subchasers 2nd Submarine Brigade (Kapitan I Ranga Pavlov; guard ship Grom)- 6th Submarine Division (Type M small patrol submarines)- 7th Submarine Division (Type M small patrol submarines)- Submarine Training Division (unknown types) Vladivostok Naval Base Defense Command (unknown commander)- 689th Naval Infantry Battalion- possible additional units attached from Pacific Fleet Land Defense Command Coastal Artillery Sectors Artemovsky, Khasanski, Shkotovskiy, Suchansky and Vladivostok (unknown commanders)- reported to have one to four coastal artillery battalions each, some independent batteries and/or naval infantry battalions 12th Naval Railway Artillery Brigade (General-mayor Dmitiriyev)- 5th Coastal Railway Artillery Battalion (76, 130, 152 and 203 mm batteries)- 222nd Coastal Railway Artillery Battalion (three 130 mm batteries)- 6th Coastal Railway Artillery Battery (3 x 356 mm)- 7th Coastal Railway Artillery Battery (3 x 305 mm)- 8th Coastal Railway Artillery Battery (3 x 305 mm) Vladivostok Naval Base Anti-Aircraft Command (unknown commander)- unknown units attached from Pacific Fleet Anti-Aircraft Command Vladimiro-Olginskaya Naval Base (Kontr-admiral Tsipanovich)- various patrol boats, subchasers, minesweepers and motor torpedo boats- 4th Submarine Division (Type ShCh medium and Type M small patrol submarines) Vladimiro-Olginskaya Naval Base Defense Command (unknown commander)- reported to have four coastal artillery battalions and possible additional units attached from Pacific Fleet Land Defense Command Vladimiro-Olginskaya Naval Base Anti-Air Command (unknown commander)- unknown units attached from Pacific Fleet Anti-Aircraft Command De-Castrinsky Naval Base (Kapitan I Ranga Dobrovolksiy)- unknown base defense ships De-Castrinsky Naval Base Defense Command (unknown commander)- reported to have three coastal artillery battalions and possible additional units attached from Pacific Fleet Land Defense Command De-Castrinsky Naval Base Anti-Air Command (unknown commander)- unknown units attached from Pacific Fleet Anti-Aircraft Command Nikolayevsk Naval Base (Kapitan I Ranga Surabekov)- unknown base defense ships Nikolayevsk Naval Base Defense Command (unknown commander)- reported to have two coastal artillery battalions and possible additional units attached from Pacific Fleet Land Defense Command Nikolayevsk Naval Base Anti-Air Command (unknown commander)- unknown units attached from Pacific Fleet Anti-Aircraft Command Petropavlovsk Naval Base (see list of Petrovavlovsk forces) Nagayevo Harbor (unknown commander)- unknown base defense ships- one coastal artillery battalions and possible additional units attached from Pacific Fleet Land Defense Command- unknown units attached from Pacific Fleet Anti-Aircraft Command Light Detachment (Kontr-admiral Svyatov)- cruisers Kalinin and Kaganovich- destroyer leader Tblisi- ten Gnevnyy-class destroyers 1st Submarine Brigade (Kontr-admiral Chabanenko; destroyer Voykov)- 1st Submarine Division (Type S and ShCh medium patrol submarines)- 2nd Submarine Division (Type L mine-laying submarines)- 5th Submarine Division (Type L mine-laying submarines) 4th Submarine Brigade (Kapitan III Ranga Emelyanov; destroyer Stalin)- 11th Submarine Division (Type ShCh medium patrol submarines)- 12th Submarine Division (Type ShCh medium patrol submarines) Minesweeper Brigade (Kapitan I Ranga Kapadnaze; Fugas-class and unkown minesweeping motor boats)- unknown divisions 1st Torpedo Brigade (Kapitan II Ranga Kukhta; Type G-5 and possibly Sh-24 and Vosper A-1 motor torpedo boats)- 1st Torpedo Division- 2nd Torpedo Division- 3rd Torpedo Division 2nd Torpedo Brigade (Kapitan II Ranga Gvozdetskiy; likely same types as 1st Torpedo Brigade)- unknown divisions Patrol Brigade (Kapitan III Ranga Bespalov)- 1st Patrol Division (Uragan-class guard ships)- additional divisions with Type BO-1 subchasers Pacific Fleet Aviation Command (General-leytenant Lemeshko) - 16th Naval Long-Range Patrol Regiment (possibly PBN-1 and PBY-6)- 36th Mine-Torpedo Regiment (A-20, possibly Tu-2)- 43rd Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types)- 50th Guards Naval Long-Range Patrol Regiment (DB-3, A-20, Yak-9, Tu-2, possibly interned allied aircraft)- 115th Naval Patrol Regiment (possibly MBR-2)- possible additional units 2nd Mine-Torpedo Air Division (see list of Petropavlovsk forces) 7th Naval Fighter Air Division (Polkovnik Romanenko)- 6th Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types)- 12th Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types)- 27th Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types)- 39th Naval Fighter Regiment (possibly Yak-9)- 41st Naval Fighter Regiment (possibly LaGG-3) 10th Naval Air Division (Polkovnik Kovalenko)- 17th Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types)- 19th Naval Fighter Regiment (Yak-9)- 33rd Naval Bomber Regiment (Pe-2)- 34th Guards Naval Dive Bomber Regiment (Pe-2, Tu-2) 12th Naval Attack Air Division (Polkovnik Bartashov)- 14th Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types)- 22th Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types)- 26th Naval Attack Regiment (Il-10)- 37th Naval Attack Regiment (unknown types)- 38th Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types)- 61st Naval Fighter Regiment (unknown types) Pacific Fleet Land Defense Command (General-leytenant Kabanov) - 44th Security Regiment- 4th Independent Tank Battalion- nine independent machinegun battalions- at least two independent security battalions, likely one for each naval base under Pacific Fleet- Naval Artillery Battery 915 13th Naval Infantry Brigade (see list of possible invasion forces) Pacific Fleet Anti-Aircraft Command (General-mayor Dushnin) - 1st - 3rd, 7th, 10th and 14th Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Motorized)- 392nd Air Warning Regiment (Motorized)- 352nd, 362nd and 395th Searchlight Battalion (Motorized) 260th, 270th, 280th, 290th and 300th Anti-Aircraft Brigade (unknown commanders)- reported to have three to five anti-aircraft battalions each; some air warning, searchlight and/or radar batteries 72nd Barrage Balloon Brigade (unknown commander)- unknown units
Marek Tucan Posted October 10, 2013 Posted October 10, 2013 Prague, 13 July 1944 There was a bit of excitement in Pilsen last night. According to reports from Americans and from our troops at Pilsen airport, a Soviet M5 Halftrack, a truck and two cars slammed through a checkpoint at the demarcation line and before caught by US MPs who were occupied by an incident involving drunk RusAm and US troops, this column also slammed through the gate of airport. Vehicles were abandoned and after investigation will be returned to Soviets, but the passengers disappeared. Best guess is that they escaped approaching guards into the fields south of Pilsen, at least tracks seem to support this notion before they disappeared in the forest. Search still continues, it seems at least one of the group was injured. We have, of course, denied any involvement and upon my authority we went as far as to let Soviet liaison officers (invited to the investigation) to be witnesses to a thorough search of RusAm barracks in the area, roll cal and even checking the vehicle inventory - which was impeccable with RusAm troops, a bit messy in US and Czech case. They asked to be present for passenger check for any outbound flights or traffic in next days and they were promised a full cooperation (as well as cooperation in case the injured runaway shows somewhere in a hospital). From their activity it seems that the runaway may have been carrying some sensitive intel materials, though not probably on the top level. From other news, we managed to get our liaison officers to Allied comissions visiting various German production sites - lot of interesting stuff there, though some locations were collapsed and are thus inaccessible. Lot of information about jet engine production for example. Bulk of Czechoslovakian armored forces was redeployed to the East, after mid-June clash around Racibórz in the disputed territory around Těšín/Cieszyn. Likelihood of shooting war is low. However, the Czechoslovakian authorities asked if we would be willing to relinquish captured German tanks to them to build up reserve army. Since likelihood of war in Europe is low and these things would present transportation trouble, it might be good idea to get rid of them this way. Disbanding these ad hoc units will also provide us with opportunity to ship some ex-vlasov's troops home "fully legally". In return for the armor the Czechoslovakians offered us better access to weapons development during the war in Skoda and other factories. It seems there may be some interesting artillery pieces there at the least. I recommend we agree to this deal. Tuczek Out.
BansheeOne Posted October 10, 2013 Posted October 10, 2013 Junograd, 13 July 1945 The Bolshevists seem to get mighty pushy - or from their point of view probably pushing back - about our recruitment programs and the Kuriles. I just got a very short-fused order to fly out to Frankfurt, Germany tomorrow in the morning, there to get on a US aircraft to Berlin as head of a delegation consulting with the Americans and British during the Potsdam meeting that starts on the 17th - their request, not ours. The CoS is flabbergasted to let his plans chief wander into Soviet-surrounded territory while we're preparing our next steps in the Kuriles - and I agreed - but the order came from the minister himself who overrode any objections with "well, all plans are made, aren't they". I may have made myself too conspicious with my work. I think the chief believes I'm gunning for his post - he is past official retirement age now, but obviously was kept for the duration - and we have had a somewhat strained relationship ever since the affair over the establishment of II Corps. I would just happily keep doing my current job, but some higher levels seem to want me to move up, too ... if I don't crash and burn in Berlin, that is. Obviously I'm forbidden from leaving the western sectors of the city, much less come anywhere near the actual conference site in Potsdam. I'm going to take a couple of my girls anyway - they just got a batch of brand-new M2 carbines checked out. While I'm that side of the Atlantic, I might as well take a close-up look at VARYAG afterwards, and probably go to Czechoslovakia, too. Before I pack my bags, the latest on the Kurile situation. There was still some shooting with Japanese holdouts today, but the incidents become ever less. A number of the sealift ships is now headed for the mainland and planned to embark the Beringa Brigade at Stoyanka on the 21st - one battalion each from 2nd and 3rd Northern, 3rd Kenai and 3rd Krasivayaberga Infantry, 15th and 18th Mechanized Brigade - deliver them to their destination on the 24th, then take on 1st Division and the remaining I Corps troops for deployment to the Kuriles. Onekotan will become a rather heavily armed camp before the jumpoff to Shumshu and Paramushiro, at the earliest on the 29th, but depending upon progress in construction of the airfield. As I hear, work is going well though.
swerve Posted October 10, 2013 Posted October 10, 2013 We're a little concerned here about the contingency plans for the Bolshevists beating us to the punch & landing on Shumshu or Paramushiro first, or before we've pacified either island. As we understand it, the intention is not to fight them unless they attack us, but exactly how this is to be achieved seems to be hedged around with too many ifs & buts. I think it needs clarification. For what it's worth, we (after staff conferences) advocate abandoning our plans if they land before us, & instead moving south to pre-empt them there & secure everything down to Urup.
BansheeOne Posted October 11, 2013 Posted October 11, 2013 (edited) Keflavik, 14 July 1945 The Americans are having doubts about going hastily to Paramushiro if the Bolshevists land on Shumshu, too. They will support us if we go our intended regular route in the absence of Soviet interference - i.e. first taking Shumshu, then Paramushiro - since it doesn't really matter for the air and naval side with Japanese capabilities as reduced as they seem to be, but have pointed out to us that while it's our ground troops, going south and leaving the north to wither on the vine is likely to be easier on them as the Central and Southern Kuriles are reportedly less garrisoned and fortified. Obviously their main interest is in the Japanese Home Islands, too. However, our whole strategic (rather than nationalistic) reason for KEYCHAIN is keeping the Bolshevists barred into the Sea of Okhotsk post-war. Leaving Shumshu and particularly Paramushiro to them leaves the whole blocking chain dangling in the water, which means that if they ever try to attack us in force, we will have to fight them for control of the North Pacific rather than access to it. Our experience with the Japanese indicates that the latter is far preferrable to the former with our limited ressources. Having an incomplete chain would probably be the worst of both worlds to us as we would need both substantial ground forces to garrison the Kuriles and a substantial fleet in the North Pacific. Particularly as the Bolshevist are likely to concentrate their forces on going east before spreading them all over the Central Pacific, the opposite of what the Japanese did. Of course I'd like to think that we'll never be alone and have the US by our side in any case, but their politics under Roosevelt make you at least cautious. In fact I'm afraid the Kurile situation will be a major point we are expected to consult over with our allies in Berlin. At least from what I hear, Onekotan and Shiashkotan are now considered secured, as no new enemy hideouts were encountered for the first time today. Edited October 11, 2013 by BansheeOne
BansheeOne Posted October 12, 2013 Posted October 12, 2013 (edited) Frankfurt, 15 July 1945 Arrived at Frankfurt, waiting for the delegation to assemble for the flight to Berlin tomorrow. God gracious, but it's hot here; I have stuck around Junograd too long. Currently reviewing the plans for operations against Matua, Shimushiro and Urup, codenamed STAIRCASE, FIREPLACE and BASEMENT respectively, just to be prepared for everything. STAIRCASE Matua is currently planned to be taken by 1st Marine Division in mid- to late August after they have completely transferred from Europe. The main objective is of course the airfield used by the squadron of 553rd IJN Air Group reported there, though the unit may have ceased to exist as a fighting force after our initial bombing and some apparently remaining dive bombers being shot down over the last days in attempts to attack our FENCEGATE forces. The island is defended by the 41st Independent Mixed Regiment, reinforced by at least one tank company which made us make provisions for including an Army tank battalion or cavalry regiment in the assault plans. We do believe that as much as a battalion's worth of the Japanese troops may be spread over the neighboring islands of Raykoke, Rasshua, Ushishir and Ryponkicha, though the two latter may also be controlled by 42nd Division from Shimushir. All initial landings will be on Matua itself though. There is not much space for finesse there; two regiments will land either side of the southeast cape, with an additional battalion securing any enemy positions on the islet of Toporskovyy and the rest of the third regiment in reserve. The Japanese are certain to be prepared for that, maybe even reinforce before we get there, and we expect hard fighting though over a rather small area. FIREPLACE FIREPLACE is currently not thought likely to occur this year for several reasons. Shimushir is held by 42nd Division, about which we don't know an awful lot at this point - not even its commander and subordinated units. We believe that one brigade of the type reported on Shumshu and Paramushir is based in the north and another in the south, with possible detachments to neighboring Ketoy and maybe Ushishir and Ryponkicha as previously stated. This makes taking Shimushir an operation on the level of DOORMAT/MAILBOX with the requisite level of forces. However, it is uncertain whether the latter will be finished before the end of campaign season in October, as we expect that I Corps will be tied down at least as long as on Beringa to secure Shumshu and Paramushir; even if operations concluded there quickly, troops are sure to need some rest, and FIREPLACE would definitely extend into winter. Also, Shumshu and Paramushir would need to be garrisoned against the Bolshevist threat. The same would be true if we waited for the arrival of II Corps which is only planned to begin leaving Europe in early August and will not have completed transfer before late November. Obviously if DOORMAT/MAILBOX did not come about, the situation would change though. However, we would like to have better intelligence on Shimushir before we committed to FIREPLACE. The good news is that once Matua is secured, we could bomb that place all winter. BASEMENT BASEMENT is currently being treated as a contingency if a division became available before the end of campaign season - either because DOORMAT/MAILBOX concluded early but most of I Corps was needed to hold off the Bolshevists, or a partial transfer from II Corps that could be expected by mid-October - for use against Urup. The island is much larger than Shimushir, but also more lightly garrisoned due to its southern position, and we have a better handle on enemy units. Enemy strength is believed to be similiar to Matua, with 129th Independent Mixed Brigade also reported as reinforced by at least one tank company and anti-air battery each. We believe the local airfield is only for staging and supply purposes however, and not a permament base for combat aircraft - though that might change as our operations progress. Some of the forces may also be detached to neighboring Broutona and the Chyornie Islands. Plans are not finished yet, but we do believe that an Army division reinforced by 1st Airborne Brigade - available for operations again in September after their current reorganization - and one or two Marine regiments after conclusion of STAIRCASE will be a sufficient force to take Urup, unless the Japanese substantially reinforce in response to our operations. Land-based air support from Matua may be problematic with Shimushir in the way, but by the end of September Voyevodski will increase capabilities of Carrier Division 22 with 5th Naval Fighter and 6th Naval Attack Squadron, flying Hellcats and Avengers respectively rather than Wrangel's current single squadron of old Wildcats. Edited October 12, 2013 by BansheeOne
Marek Tucan Posted October 12, 2013 Posted October 12, 2013 Regarding Matua, since the enemy is prepared, would it not be beneficial to first capture o. Toporkovyy and use it to establish artillery positions to aid in supporting troops on Matua? The Yankees seem to have success with such actions on several places already.
swerve Posted October 12, 2013 Posted October 12, 2013 (edited) One thing to bear in mind is the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact. Would the Bolshevists simply ignore it, or formally revoke it before attacking? If they do revoke it, I think we may safely assume they will attack very soon. Air operations are currently rather routine. Japanese air activity out of Shumshu & Paramushir is now almost non-existent. The chief problem there is identifying targets. As usual, artillery & troop positions are well concealed. There have been a few recce flights up from the south (& some have been caught & shot down, though not, we think, before radioing reports), but attacks seem to have petered out. Edited October 12, 2013 by swerve
BansheeOne Posted October 13, 2013 Posted October 13, 2013 (edited) Berlin, 16 July 1945 What I have seen of Berlin is impressive in its utter destruction. I have seen some aerial image of the damage before, but you have to be driven through streets after streets of ruined buildings to really appreciate what it means for a city to be subjected to years of modern strategic bombing, then an assault by the Red Army. The latter is a particularly poignant point to us of course. We are quartered in a largely undamaged villa in the Lankwitz district in the American sector, apparently owned by a Siemens CEO before the war, then taken over by the state two years ago and amusingly housing the German Ibero-American Institute with their library of tens of thousands of volumes; also a monstrous four-manual Wurlitzer organ in a 400-seat musical chamber built by the Siemens guy. Extensive park outside, too; all around, skeletons of other villas which were not so lucky. I'm still a bit behind on local time, but we already had a meeting with British and American representatives in the afternoon. We covered a range of topics that will likely be covered by the Potsdam conference and got a rough impression where we stand vis-a-vis the Bolshevists. At times it felt like being subjected to a stern parental talk to their bickering kids ... Pacific: The Bolshevists are displeased with allied operations in the Kuriles and claim this as their natural sphere of interest, but I got an overall feeling the British and Americans will support us here, since for once the others have been late in coming to the table while we have been spending our blood against the Japanese. In fact we indicated we might contribute a corps for the planned second round of landings in the Japanese Home Islands under CORONET, but met with no more than friendly interest. Reportedly MacArthur is up to his old ways again and argueing against any non-American participation; even the British are scaling down their plans for a Commonwealth corps to take part. However, the Americans have also long rejected the idea of a Soviet occupation zone in Japan; again by current plans, even the Commonwealth will only have a minor presence under overall American command, mostly reoccupying British possessions outside Japan itself. Similiarly, the Bolshevists are expected to get the southern part of Sakhalin, occupy the northern part of Korea and get their wish of Mongolia being recognized as an independent state by China. As far as the Americans are concerned, that should be ample reward if Stalin should make good on his promise at Yalta to finally go to war with Japan three months after the German defeat. The Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact is an interesting point; the Bolshevists formally announced to not extend it in April, a year ahead of its expiration as stipulated in the text, but it will still be in force until 13 April next year - which would be even after the planned second round of landings in the Home Islands under CORONET in March, amounting to joining a fight by kicking a man on the ground. The question is whether the Bolshevists will break their pledge to their allies or the Japanese. Among ourselves, we believe it will be the latter as they stand to gain more from it, though we preferred to leave it at voicing our doubts to our allies, pointing to the obvious disregard the Bolshevists are exhibiting for previous allied agreements in Eastern Europe. However, we are not sure what allied position would be if the Bolshevists tried to encroach upon the Kuriles by force. We broached this point irrespective of the time at which it might occur, but our partners were rather dismissive about it. Obviously they know as well as we do that the Bolshevists do not currently have sufficient means in theater for a substantial effort, though we warned that might change and the current alliances were not likely to survive the war for long - certainly not when it comes to our relationship with the Soviets. The British conceded that, but the Americans seem to put a certain trust in a stable global post-war order. President Truman, while more distrustful of the Bolshevists, appears still committed to Roosevelt's project of a United Nations Organization and hopes to get them in on it at Potsdam after talks broke down at Yalta due to Stalin's demand for sole recognition of the USSR. Working-level negotiations seem to indicate a mounting, though conditional Soviet willingness to participate on the basis of equal recognition with Russian America; they might feel they stand to gain more than to lose from it with developments in the Pacific working against them, though they are still making demands for an elevated position vis-a-vis ours. This includes them being a permanent member in the proposed security council but not us, and each of their republics having a seat in the general assembly versus our one. Obviously we are not enthusiast about that and frankly would prefer them to stay out of the UNO and not be officially recognized at all, but I fear the train has left on the latter part due to the developments of the war. With their gains in real-world power, it may be better to have them tied into an international organization, though we are of course opposed to them being given any preferential treatment over us. At any rate, our allies assured us of their continued commitment to our support even against the Bolshevists, for whatever that's worth in the face of everybody hoping for peace after nearly four to six years of global war with millions of dead and vast amounts of treasure expended - the USSR is not Yugoslavia which was pushed out of Austria by a late show of resolve. Europe: The mood was not so helpful on our ongoing recruitment program in Europe. Our allies are under pressure to come to a repatriation agreement with the Bolshevists as the latter have predictably started holding back on British and American POWs they "liberated" in Eastern Europe and Germany, and families are beginning to ask why their boys who were reported alive in captivity are not home two months after cessation of hostilities. They have been proposing joint commissions to determine the wishes of each POW and DP where he or she wants to go, similiar to what the British put forth in Austria, to accomodate both our interests and their qualms of delivering Soviet personnel to the tender mercy of the Bolshevists who are on the record as stating that the great Soviet forces have only fighting or dead troops. The Bolshevists are aware of their strong position though and strictly demand that every Soviet national under the power of western allied forces be returned to them. Our partners said they were working on definitions what constituted a Soviet national, and the commission approach might still work for coherent groups in the public light like the Domanov Cossacks who are still encamped in Austria, but a blanket agreement was likely to come about at Potsdam. Their best advise was to get out whoever we can, because they might soon be forced to turn over any Soviet national in the occupied areas, even if they were in the care of our troops. We didn't press the point of non-occupied areas like Czechoslovakia and France as we are reasonably sure of support by the respective national government; neither did we elaborate about formerly Soviet troops in II Corps, as from our point of view it is rather clear that they are our soldiers like all others and undistinguishable from "native" Russian Americans in that respect, but the warning was understood. Our main worry is Italy where 4th European Theater Support Brigade has only arrived yesterday to tend to ex-Soviet POWs there. This is not officially an occupied country due to their government's late change of sides in the war, but their situation is somewhat ambivalent and they have not a lot of room to stand up to allied policy. We also talked about continued participation in the occupation, and there was no mention of distinction between groups of Russian American troops on that point. We still think that the bulk of II Corps should be moved into France as soon as possible, a process already begun. 1st Guards Brigade is still in the US zone of Austria to care for the Domanov Cossacks, but are unproblematic as they are largely "native" troops. We are definitely seeing our future engagement in the South with either the Americans or French, likely brigade-sized. If the establishment of 6th Division isn't completed due to the aforementioned shortage of personnel if we don't get much of the POWs in Italy, we would certainly have a brigade to go around, though in that case we would prefer 1st Guards to stay due to their uncritical makeup. 4th and 5th Division would redeploy to the Pacific to be filled up with the two mechanized brigades already stood up at home; the third division in II Corps might then be 1st Marine Division, unless the Navy returns to their antics regarding Army command of their forces; they have been rather tame in the planning for KEYCHAIN though, possibly because they feel adequately recognized in the new allied framework. I talked with some officers from II Corps staff on the flight to Berlin (also met my European-deployed brother at Frankfurt), and the problem of reequipping the new formations seems largely solved as allied troops are leaving behind vast amounts of materiel as they return home or transfer to the Pacific Theater. We have already struck an agreement with the Canadians who don't intend to pay for shipping their vehicles back and are handing over lots to us without too many questions. We can therefore also fulfill the Czech request to give them our booty tanks. Small arms are likely to stay German issue to some extent before the return to Russian America, but troops really like the machineguns and automatic rifles anyway. Edited October 13, 2013 by BansheeOne
BansheeOne Posted October 17, 2013 Posted October 17, 2013 Berlin, 20 July 1945 We have not heard much out of the Potsdam negotiations so far, other than a request to put off operations against Shumshu and Paramushir to allow a negotiated settlement of the issue with the Bolshevists. Given that we are highly dependent upon allied assets, this is obviously more of a rather strong suggestion, accompanied by hints that the situation may soon develop in our favor. One interesting though quite sensible tidbit is that British opposition leader Clement Attlee is participating alongside Churchill in case he wins the recent national elections; results are expected within the next week after the votes of troops deployed overseas have been transported home. Churchill is widely expected to prevail with his record as an iconic wartime leader, but since there has been little urgency to deal with actual conference issues in the last days, our delegation is spending part of its time on getting a feel on Attlee just in case. This is helped by the fact that we're getting a bit of a tourist program to keep us entertained, and since the western part of central Berlin which holds the former Nazi power center is in the British zone, there is ample opportunity to exchange with our British escort. Somewhat to my surprise I have found there is actually a lot of support for Attlee among the troops, particularly the lower ranks who are fearing to return home to unemployment and social decline like many did after the last Great War. One sergeant told me that the Labour Party's promise to "win the peace" resonated with many soldiers who remember the economic downturn and Great Depression of the 20s; even though the Tories are obviously not to blame for the latter, they presided over much of the interwar period and are identified with the negatives, including the appeasement policy towards Hitler in the 1930s. This has caused me to review our diplomatic evaluations of Attlee. As deputy prime minister of the wartime coalition government, obviously he has supported British policy over the last years, so not too much should change in the international field if he should win; the main differences with Churchill are of course in domestic politics. However, he is a socialist in the end and seems to harbor greater sympathies for the Bolshevists, more in the mold of Roosevelt. We would definitely be better off with Churchill remaining in office. Apropos of our tourist program: We have visited the Reichstag building and Brandenburg Gate, carefully staying on the western side; unfortunately the Reichskanzlei and the bunker where Hitler is supposed to have holed up at the end are beyond the line. Other allied visitors are going there all the time, but we were in agreement with the Brits that it wouldn't be very wise for us. I should note that there is still no proof that Hitler is really dead; the Bolshevists maintain that no body has been found and he may have escaped. Personally I'm predisposed to think that they are lying as usual. In fact you aren't even left alone by the Bolshevists on this side; we were appalled to find they had begun building a war memorial just west of the Brandenburg Gate even before the other occupation forces arrived in the city. Our companions didn't seem to think it a big deal as Berlin is under joint allied control, but it's just the kind of flagrant encroachment the Bolshevists will run in your face to friendly applause of the naive. It didn't make us feel very confident about post-war world order.
BansheeOne Posted October 23, 2013 Posted October 23, 2013 (edited) Berlin, 26 July 1945 Two major events today. First, the Big Three issued a joint declaration defining the terms for Japanese surrender. Those are not unlike the terms for Germany, including occupation, disarmament and prosecution of war criminals. However, they imply a perspective for a future undivided sovereign Japanese nation under democratic auspices; there is no specific mention of the post-war role of the emperor, for example. The document largerly reiterates the Cairo Declaration of two years ago which stated that Japan will be expelled from all territories "she has taken by violence and greed", particularly all islands occupied since 1914, with specific mention of a free Korea and the return of all territories taken from China. It also stated that the Allies are not fighting Japan for their own territorial expansion; however, today's communiqué clarifies that Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the Home Islands "and such minor islands as we determine". We have been privately signalled by the Americans and British that the islands north of the 1855 line should return to us, with the Southern Kuriles possibly also becoming our responsibility during a post-war occupation period. The 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg would thus be rescinded since the Japanese breached it by taking southern Sakhalin in 1904. Since the latter is foreseen to be given to the Soviets, the Northern Kuriles would be our compensation. Inter-allied negotiations with the Bolshevists about this issue are still going on, however. It strikes us that the urgency to get them in against the Japanese is no longer the same as under Roosevelt, probably since the momentum is now clearly against the enemy. Soviet landings in the Home Islands have been strictly ruled out at this point because everybody quite openly wants to avoid them getting a foothold there; moreover as stated before, the Americans seem decided to take and occupy those largely by themselves. MacArthur insists that even the planned Commonwealth Corps should include no more than three divisions, among them no Indian units "due to linguistic and logistical complications", that they should be American-equipped and -trained, be under command of a US army and only be in reserve during the initial landings. Our delegation is currently deliberating a new pitch to the British to form a joint allied army - possibly including the French - for an invasion of Hokkaido next year, either concurrent or subsequently to CORONET in Honshu. However, it doesn't seem a very promising proposition given the American stance, though that might change if DOWNFALL as a whole ran into difficulties. The other big issue today was of course announcement of the British election results. Attlee actually won in a landslide, much to everbody's surprise, promptly taking over for the British at Potsdam. It seems a bit thankless by the British towards Churchill given his wartime record, but obviously the reasons mentioned earlier held sway. It's not so fortunate for us given Attlee's previously stated disposition towards the Bolshevists, but the Americans remain much more important to us. Edited October 23, 2013 by BansheeOne
swerve Posted October 23, 2013 Posted October 23, 2013 I suspect Macarthur's objection to Indian troops is racial in nature, & that the logistical complications are caused by a self-imposed insistence on segregation. The Americans are extraordinarily wasteful in their unwillingness to use their Africans fully in the war, & I think they view the Indians similarly.
BansheeOne Posted October 24, 2013 Posted October 24, 2013 Berlin, 29 July 1945 Today would have been the first date envisioned to move against Shumshu or Paramushir, which would have involved 1st Division landing directly from Beringa. Instead, they are now being set up on Onekotan, pending results of the Potsdam negotiations with the Bolshevists. This makes the island a bit crowded and puts additional stress on our log chain, but improves reaction time in case of a Soviet move. If the Bolshevists stick to their commitment of opening hostilities with Japan three months after German defeat, we now have a ten-day window until 8 August, but are holding off for the time being. From my reports, there has however been less air activity from Kamchatka recently, though several minesweeping trawlers were spotted off Cape Lopatka - but not straying into Japanese waters where our mines are. Allied naval forces also chased several submarine contacts to inconclusive results; the Bolshevists were warned to stay away from our area of operations to avoid inter-allied incidents, but Admiral Fletcher has still ordered not to engage unidentified submarines north of our minefields with weapons if they are not headed towards major fleet units. We are hearing from Potsdam that the POW question is treated with more urgency than the Kuriles though, as the British and Americans are under domestic pressure to bring their boys home from Eastern Europe. Incidentally, the latest report on VARYAG arrived today. 4th European Theater Support Brigade in Italy has worked quickly, and overall the backlog in processing registered personnel seems to have vanished due to the greater proportion of already-serving troops. 1st Marine Division has by now completely left Europe, and along with the Iceland Regiment and Osttruppen replacements in 1st Airborne Brigade we are beginning to see European recruits coming to Russian America with regular units. It now looks like we will narrowly reach planned manning levels for II Corps including 6th Division, though we are still short on cadres. - Total ex-Soviet military personnel registered: 233,000 (including 77,000 Osttruppen; rest POWs held in German camps). - Expressed wish to become Russian Americans: 125,000 (including 63,000 Osttruppen). - Turned over to Allied authorities due to war crime investigations: 9,000 (all Osttruppen). - Judged unfit for service due to wounds, health and nutrition issues and transferred to LONGBOAT: 46,000 (including 10,000 Osttruppen). - Eligible for service in Russian American Armed Forces: 70,000 (including 44,000 Osttruppen), of which - transferred to Signals: 4,000 - processed for service: 66,000 (including 43,000 Osttruppen), of which - repatriated to Russian America: 16,000 (including 14,000 Osttruppen) - serving in European Theater: 50,000 (including 29,000 Osttruppen). Under LONGBOAT, we have accessed about 1.8 million Soviet forced laborers at this point, of which about 700,000 are expected to be willing to become Russian Americans. 100,000 are in the French transit camps, plus the 27,000 Domanov Cossacks in Austria and 23,000 in the informal transit camps in North Africa. 25,000 are on the Australian link with another 30,000 already arrived; 5,000 are on the Canadian link. That are 210,000 we hope to be safe even if we were told to hand over all Soviet citizens in occupied Germany tomorrow, though the case of the Domanov Cossacks is not really clear. Each week next month will get us another 8,000 as spaces free up in the transit camps, plus the 70,000 troops. However, it is unlikely that we will manage to bring home all of the projected 700,000 DPs.
BansheeOne Posted October 25, 2013 Posted October 25, 2013 (edited) Berlin, 1 August 1945 We are getting some interesting background information on the Yalta negotiations which are informing the current talks at Potsdam now, not heard in the same detail before. First, it may be worth to recall the Yalta Agreement as signed by the Big Three in its entirety: PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions: I. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE The following declaration has been approved: The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems. The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter - the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live - the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations. To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require, ( a ) to establish conditions of internal peace; ( b ) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples; ( c ) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and ( d ) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration. When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration. By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind. In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested. II. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows: "The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security." The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative. III. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY. It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government. It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany. IV. REPARATION The following protocol has been approved:Protocol On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind 1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy. 2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms: ( a ) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. ( b ) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed. ( c ) Use of German labor. 3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America. 4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows: "The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points ( a ) and ( b ) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned. The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission. V. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference. VI. POLAND The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference: "A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. "M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. "When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland. "The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference." VII. YUGOSLAVIA It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch: ( a ) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement. ( b ) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare: ( I ) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and ( II ) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference. VII. ITALO-YOGOSLAV FRONTIER - ITALO-AUSTRIAN FRONTIER Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later. IX. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius. X. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects: ( a ) The Control Commission in Bulgaria. ( b ) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations. ( c) Oil equipment in Rumania. XI. IRAN Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel. XII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London. XIII. THE MONTREAUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment. The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference Feb. 11, 1945. E. R. Stettinius Jr.M. MolotovAnthony Eden AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that: 1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved. 2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, concerning ( a ) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it; ( b ) The commercial port of Dairen and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base; ( c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen. It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It is further understood that the agreement concerning the former rights of Russia referred to above will require concurrence of Marshal Arkhangelski. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin. Notes on these subjects were put in by the Soviet delegation and the American and British delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later. For its part, the Soviet Union expresses it readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke. Joseph StalinFranklin D. RooseveltWinston S. Churchill February 11, 1945. It will be recalled that Roosevelt had wanted to head the agreement with a decision on his pet United Nations Organization, intending to hold a founding conference in April. Of course that ran into Stalin's junctim with the Bolshevists being recognized as the sole legitimate successor government of the Russian Empire, demanding the return of all Soviet POWs and DPs at the same time. We knew before that Stalin was on the verge of withdrawing his commitment to enter the war against Japan when the other parties balked, largely due to Churchill creating a stir. In the end the UNO part was left out but the agreement on Japan put in because obviously the Bolshevists saw it in their interest to stay in on the game there. What we did not know so far was the content of their notes on the subject, which was rather detailed demands they had wanted to enter in the agreement. Those obviously included southern Sakhalin and restoration of the lease on Port Arthur, but also all of the Kuriles; the internationalization of Dairen to safeguard their pre-eminent interest, plus operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and Manchurian Railroad to Dairen by a joint Soviet-Chinese company. Roosevelt had been expected to grant them all that with no objections from Churchill, but apparently tried to save his UNO project by pointing out that there were after all two governments who could lay claim to the former rights of Russia, and wouldn't this world organization be a great venue to sort those out. However, Stalin apparently felt he could play for time with the allied POW issue sure to put pressure onto the British and Americans after defeat of Germany, and let the UNO talks deadlock even though Roosevelt was prepared to give him additional seats for the individual Soviet republics in the assembly. Roosevelt probably intended to force us into giving up all former Russian claims while Truman conversely supported our plans for the Kuriles to put the screws on Stalin; that would explain why the Americans were stalling on the joint allied command organization for the North Pacific before Roosevelt's death, then suddenly went ahead with it after Truman came in. Anyway, the whole issue is now back on the table at Potsdam. Edited October 25, 2013 by BansheeOne
swerve Posted October 25, 2013 Posted October 25, 2013 (edited) The defenders of Paramushir & Shumshu are now almost completely passive. They don't even shoot at our recce aircraft. Could be conserving ammunition, could be avoiding giving away their positions. The USAAF is now providing air cover with P-40s from Onekotan. 11th Fighter flew in two days ago (P-51s). The airfield is almost ready for another squadron (the space for parking aircraft is the current limit), allowing us to fly in Mosquito bombers, currently scheduled for the 5th. Matua has been revisited, & is completely inactive at present. We observed repair work after the first raids, but no sign of any since the last bombing raid. There's some speculation here as to whether this is because they can't (I doubt that: they must have men & shovels), they've given up trying, or they fear us invading & don't want to hand us an intact runway. Edited October 25, 2013 by swerve
BansheeOne Posted October 26, 2013 Posted October 26, 2013 Berlin, 4 August 1945 We have curiously been asked about our population numbers and what we know of the individual Soviet Republics'. Apparently this is for the UNO negotiations and the Bolshevist demands to get more than one seat; the Western position seems to be that the republics ought to be at least our size to make the cut. At our current recorded population of 3.3 million (not including VARYAG), this would mean Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Usbekistan. We think there may actually be something positive about this as we are housing some Ukrainian, Georgian and other nationalist groups on the promise of actual self-administration in a post-Bolshevist Russia (whenever that should come about) which present no problems in Russian America - being on the other side of the world - but have been useful in political attacks on the Bolshevists and might get a whole new venue for that in the UNO. I should note that 1st Ukrainian (ex 14th SS) Division is still languishing in Northern Italy and not included in VARYAG, though there have been contacts; but neither do they seem to be under threat of repatriation to USSR as the allies appear to honor the agreement under which they changed sides. This makes us somewhat hopeful for the Domanov Cossacks whose fate is still up in the air. I'm also being informed that the number of leadership cadre taken over under BATTLEAXE stands at 5,000. By March next year, another 3,200 should have made it through our reserve cadre program, plus a regular domestic increase of 3,000. This should allow us to raise overall troop strength by 51,000 over the 1945 OOB, though it still leaves us short 10,500 by current planning - so the final fate of 6th Division is still undecided, too. It may well turn out that 1st Marine Division will take its place under II Corps, with 1st Guards Brigade remaining in Germany as an occupation force and an additional territorial regiment under Central Command, restoring previous replacement capacities; probably not a bad thing considering possible losses in the Kuriles and, eventually, the Japanese Home Islands. Prompted by the information about Bolshevist claims in China, we have made contact with the Chinese delegation following the Potsdam meeting (I see that I erroneously attributed the 26 July declaration to the Big Three when it was in fact made by the Americans, British and Chinese - the Soviets not currently being at war with Japan, they could hardly call for her surrender). Near as I can tell, they're equally distrustful of the Bolshevists and us, though they are acting very much the inscrutable orientals; I wish Tanski was here. It seems pretty clear to us that the Bolshevist will get southern Kamchatka since they already own the northern part and we don't really have a quick way of getting there, so we have not put up much objection. However, they still demand all of the Kuriles too, including those south of the 1855 line, to which we have been objecting very much. Unfortunately their designs on Port Arthur would largely invalidate the purpose of locking them into the Sea of Okhotsk behind the Kuriles. Obviously the Chinese don't like the restoring of imperial Russian rights very much, but are being armwrestled to accept this by the Americans as per the Yalta Agreement; the British don't seem to make much of a difference as Attlee, lacking Churchill's experience, is apparently pretty much going along with Truman - which at least means we are not seeing much of his feared greater sympathy with the Bolshevists so far. We are currently trying to decide on a course taking into account the complete package of Bolshevist demands. Our preferred outcome would naturally be for them getting neither the Kuriles nor Port Arthur. This would mean supporting the Chinese, but in view of the relative weight we're bringing to the table, we consider this result unlikely and counter-productive to pursue; if we unilaterally renounced claims to Port Arthur, appealing to the grand principle of national self-determination on behalf of China, it is almost certain the Bolshevist would gladly take the basing rights all by their own, making us look weak. If we insisted on being given equal consideration for the old rights, we might succeed despite the Yalta clause having been negotiated with the Bolshevists; the wording correctly refers to former Russian rights after all, and their own notes called for an internationalization of Dairen. Basing rights there would give us the warm water port the Navy has been dreaming of, and allow us to stay on their toes - though it would be a mighty tense situation sitting practically side-by-side. As mentioned, it would also invalidate possession of the Kuriles, and in fact it would be better for us to spend as little ressources as possible on garrisoning those. We are therefore wondering if our approach shouldn't be the following: - reneging on claims in the Kuriles south of the current position of our troops, but naturally maintaining those to Shumshu and Paramushir to keep watch on Petropavlovsk; - support internationalization of Dairen in exchange for basing rights in the area, but not joint control of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and Manchurian Railroad; if we have to sail into port there, so can the Bolshevists. Nobody in the delegation is really enthusiast about this; it would mean surrendering more historical Russian territory to the Bolshevists, and Dairen is vulnerable to be taken by a Soviet offensive if they should enter hostilities with Japan as promised; the example of Danzig is not exactly encouraging for the Free Port model. In fact the Bolshevists are trying to get their handover of the latter to Poland retroactively legalized in Potsdam right now, though the German annexation in 1939 didn't improve things either. The Americans will probably like it if their UNO gets to administrate the area and we make the Kurile question easier for them though, and basing troops there as part of a Potsdam agreement would establish our status as an equal power; it might be the way to go despite the drawbacks.
swerve Posted October 26, 2013 Posted October 26, 2013 I am wary of this. China is weak at present, but has great potential. What if she revives, & seeks to re-establish her borders? We'd find it hard to argue against self-determination, backed by a powerful army. And if push comes to shove, the Kuriles would be easier to hold than anywhere on the Asian mainland.
BansheeOne Posted October 27, 2013 Posted October 27, 2013 (edited) Those concerns are echoed within the delegation. We are trying to evaluate the positives and negatives of various possible end states to determine what would have the most gains at the least cost while appreciating the risks and likelihoods involved. We have a pretty clear picture about what would be involved in holding the Kuriles, since that is what we have been planning for so far. We assess that we would have to garrison them against the Bolshevists at least to the same level as the Japanese do now, which would mean two fully active divisions north of the 1855 line. The southern Kuriles would add another division for a full corps, which we have so far thought might be necessary only for a period of occupation until they returned to a future peaceful Japan. Conversely, holding on just to our current conquests plus Shumshu and Paramushir would require only one division, which corresponds to our pre-war active Army forces. We have of course grown a bit since then and hope to continue this trend with VARYAG and future population development, but don't think it possible to keep up the current war footing indeterminately without serious economic repercussions. It looks like we will end this war with a total ground force of two corps plus a division's worth of regular army combat troops (one mechanized brigade in Germany, one airborne brigade, one Yeger, heavy artillery and heavy engineer regiment each) and five or six territorial regiments. Our pre-war ratio of active to inactive troops was 1:2.6, though as we all know mobilization proved difficult due to the overaged reserve cadre structure. Our wartime cadres will keep us afloat for all contingencies for some time to come, but letting that potential wither away was what caused our troubles in 1942. We should also be aware that we gained disproportionally more troops than overall population through VARYAG, which will be compounded if the program is cut short through agreements between the Big Three at Potsdam. Total mobilized strength will grow to 288,000-299,000 in 1946 from 190,000 in 1942 - so about 50 percent - but population only to 3.6-4.0 million from three, only by a fifth to a third. With all the new technology we see coming in, from radar to jet engines, it is also likely that training requirements will rise. There will have to be some reorganization in the mid-term which may include shorter average terms of service for leadership cadres to provide more mobilization potential for reservists, a decision on what roles women will continue to play after the war and possibly a change in the term of conscription. However, I'm pretty certain about two things: we will not be able to field more troops within the coming decade, and we cannot keep them all active all the time anyway, because we need to keep building up the country - particularly with the new arrivals. A 1:2 ratio for the Army which is most mobilization-dependent sounds healthy. Counting the territorial forces as two inactive divisions, this would certainly allow us to keep two divisions active for the Kuriles, plus one brigade for Germany and a third of each of the army troops formations. There could also be an active Marine brigade which might be based in Dairen if it came to that, and otherwise be our main contingency force. It would be a model of almost pure forward defense against the Bolshevists, with the only active ground combat troops on the mainland maybe a battalion of Guards, Yegers, paratroops, heavy artillery and engineers each, plus a battalion of marines at each of the three Navy ports. Conscripts would largely serve their term in the Kuriles, probably not a very popular thing. Limiting ourselves to a single division in the northernmost Kuriles would allow us to base another on the mainland to improve the organization of defense if the Bolshevists sailed an invasion fleet around the South of Japan. Alternately, we could invest more personnel in the Navy and Air Force to better prevent them from landing here in the first place. This would probably warrant some basic reorganization of those services as they don't lend themselves as readily to rapid mobilization with conscripted personnel; I would like to hear some thoughts from them on this. What I do think events of the last years have shown is that we should probably bury all dreams of landing in the old motherland for the foreseeable future, moving from an expeditionary to a largely defensive posture. A 1:1 ratio in active vs. reserve ground forces would of course give us more ready strength and better flexibility in post-war basing, plus cut down on the reserve cadre problem - though we would need to have the active cadres in the first place, and this will need more military expense at the cost of civilian economic gains. I think this is probably the upper limit which we could afford at all in the long run; we have been planning on this base for the occupation period in Japan with the southern Kuriles under our responsibility, as it would allow basing of a full corps there. If it could be kept up indefinitely, I'm not sure, but I'm starting to understand why I of all people was sent to Berlin ... All of the above is based upon the assumption that we will have to defend our interests largely on our own. If there were guarantees and substantial commitments by our allies to safeguard them, things may look different; but everybody has zigzagged on commitments to allies so much since 1939 (including ourselves if we are honest) that it might be hard to sell it at home even if we got it. We are probing the Americans and British anyway, while separately talking with the Australians and Canadians on the side. Edited October 27, 2013 by BansheeOne
Marek Tucan Posted October 27, 2013 Posted October 27, 2013 One solution may be interesting US in helping with garrisoning the area. Maybe at least in longer run, but the strategic value of the islands must be clear to them. Maybe we could offer them basing rights in exchange for them actually exercising them? More importantly if we want to hold on the islands we shall think about colonising them. This would be probably expensive, but they better have some population. Is there anything of value at all? Any minerals? There is a lot of fish, but the Japanese did not do much with the islands. We have to, and quickly. Part of displaced persons from Europe can be given an incentive to settle there. Prague, 5 August 1945 Our troops got involved in several incidents in the borderlands, when they interfered with excesses aimed at German inhabitants of Czechoslovakia. We are led to believe that the Powers already decided that their fate is deportation from Czechoslovakia, but in some places there are already wild pogroms going on, accompanied by murders and other excesses. These are usually done with approval from local authorities - though higher instances sometimes do step in. In few instances our soldiers had to threaten to fire at local civillians or even police in order to stop the atrocities - while this has no de facto legal grounds, a group of soldiers with fixed bayonets and armored vehicle behind them seems to have a great effect on the hotheads. However we are sure more atrocities happen outside of our sight. The Czechoslovakian authorities are, in the meantime, arranging an organised deportation along with Allies - mostly US, Brits and Soviet though. In the meantime, we were informally approached by one Czechoslovakian officer. He inquired about our stashes of captured small arms and possibility to sell some. Sounds very shady and all, he insisted that it is strictly unofficial request. He also insisted that the British must not know - he did not mention anyone else specifically. We guess this may refer to the trouble Brits are reportedly having in Palestine. The situation alongside borders with Poland settles down. Seems the post-war borders will be same as pre-Munich. Nothing much new to report here. Тучек out.
BansheeOne Posted October 28, 2013 Posted October 28, 2013 Berlin, 6 August 1945 After initial slow proceedings from our point of view, things seem to be moving quickly towards the finish line at Potsdam now, apparently linked closely to events in Asia. Yesterday, the Bolshevists unilaterally abrogated their neutrality pact with the Japanese. The talk of the town today is the American statement on the dropping of an "atomic bomb" onto the city of Hiroshima, which appears to be the means of "prompt and utter destruction" threatened in the declaration of 26 July. The description of its power sound utterly impressive, though we have seen nothing in the way of a damage assessment. I suppose it was delivered from the US bases in the Marianas or Ryukyus, not through our front. There is some hope this new weapon will speed up the course of the war, though preparations for DOWNFALL are continueing as before from what I gather. By the same token, decisions about the Kuriles can be excepected quickly now that the Bolshevists seem intent on making good on their promise to engage Japan. We have talked to the Americans and British plus Canadian representatives about solid guarantees for our post-war interests and found credible will to accommodate us, probably because everybody wants to bring negotiations to a close without endangering what was already achieved. As one of our US contacts told us, "if it wasn't for you guys, we'd have been out of here three days ago". In fact delegations seem to prepare for leaving within the week, and we have been advised to expect a final agreement between the Big Three in the next days. The UNO part is reportedly done, with all current members of the United Nations invited to a founding conference scheduled in San Francisco for 17 October; the formula for recognition of governments within the former Russian Empire will be that the USSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia and Russian America will be admitted as members without any prejudice as to de-facto rule. The Bolshevists wanted seats for the other Caucasian and Central Asian republics too, but were rejected with arguments amounting to "come on, those were never real nations, just old Mongol fiefdoms". Even Georgia was contentious, but eventually included to woo Stalin into agreement. In return they didn't press the point of the Baltic states too much, where they were on very thin ice. However, the USSR will be the only one to sit permanently on the planned security council; the difference in real-world power worked against us there again, but unfortunately we were expecting this all along. The question of Russian possessions in East Asia is still under negotiation. It looks like the Bolshevists will get their wishes regarding Kamchatka, Port Arthur and Dairen, including the joint Chinese-Soviet railroad companies; after talking with Junograd, we have decided not to push for rights of our own in China due to the precarious position of the area now that the Bolshevists seem set on attacking the Japanese, but rather negotiate separately with the Chinese depending upon how the situation develops. We assess that the wartime alliance between Chiang Kai-shek and the communists in China is likely to not survive peace for long, which may make them succeptible for an alliance with us in return for being a thorn in the North Pacific side of the communists' Soviet sponsors. The internationalization of Dairen may give us some opportunities anyway, so we recommend reaching out to the Chinese without mentioning Russian rights prior to the end of the war. We will not do this here in Berlin though so as not to interfere with our negotiations in the Kurile question. Regarding that, we are currently working on a memorandum of understanding about post-war cooperation with the Americans and Canadians. We agreed quite quickly that it would be for the benefit of all if we became full members of the Permanent Joint Board of Defense for North America, where we have already discussed most cooperative measures anyway despite having only observer status so far. We hope to hammer down various other things in time to accompany the Potsdam Agreement within the next days, serving as a base for an eventual formal treaty. There is considerable American interest in bases along the great circle route to Japan which happens to run largely by the Aleutians and Kuriles, so our positions are really not too diverse. Our intention is of course for them to commit actual troops as far forward as possible, in the Komandorskis and the Kuriles themselves - not necessarily for first-line defense, but to assure their support if those should get attacked by the Bolshevists. The Canadians are maintaining their limitation to defense of the North American continent for domestic reasons, but seem open to keep some troops at least in mainland Russian America post-war, which ultimately serves the same purpose and frees up our own forces for forward defense. As for the rest of the emerging Potsdam Agreement, most of it deals with administration of Germany and rearrangements in Eastern Europe, unsurprisingly including substantial Soviet annexations. Somehow the piece of Poland the Bolshevists invaded while the Nazis came the other way will remain Soviet, Poland to be given a chunk of eastern Germany in compensation. Somebody has referred to this marshalling operations as "nations on wheels" ... There will also be provisions for peace treaties with those nations who switched sides to the Allied camp when they saw the jig was up, namely Italy, Finland, Romania and Bulgaria. The POW/DP issue will be dealt with in a separate agreement but done concurrently. We have been warned again this would take effect quite quickly, including the French zones of occupation. All allied military personnel will be repatriated as soon as possible without prejudice, with which we are largely okay since BATTLEAXE has grassed off about any wiling recruit; relocation of relevant II Corps troops into France is in the final lap except for the recent additions in Italy, which are not even fully formed yet. Needless to say, we're pursueing this bit with utmost urgency. We have also agreed in principle to keep a combat and a support brigade in the American zone as our contribution to the occupation of Germany. LONGBOAT looks less satisfactory. Apparently there will not even be consideration of the wishes of individual DPs, but every Soviet citizen found in the occupied areas after the agreement takes effect is to be summarily handed over to the Bolshevists. Of course they also laid claim to those in France, but the French basically said "Hey, we weren't invited to Potsdam, and you didn't even want to give us our own zone of occupation. You're welcome to enter into separate negotiations with us, of course." I'm afraid even the Domanov Cossacks may become victims of the repatriations, though we are trying to get the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency to take responsibility for this. One thing we have been assured of though is that "Soviet citizens" will only refer to those having lived within the pre-1939 borders of the USSR. I believe there have been a lot of Balts, Finnish, Poles and Romanians emerging among those currently waiting for transport to France in our German transit camps recently ...
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