You're In Charge Of Imperial Germany's Naval Policy

[glenn239]

Now this would have been an interesting move ... not sure if either the US or UK would have played along though. Maybe involve the Japanese, too?

 

The Americans would instantly pirouette to the British to ensure trans-Atlantic harmony, but technically the deal I describe really doesn’t require British participation should the US be willing to use the RN as a benchmark between Germany and the US. Broaching the idea publically that the future US Navy should be equal to the British navy while the German navy would be 60% - this might catch American imagination, hence draw the British into talks that they don’t really want to be in. It may create an impression in all three countries that the US and the British are the building rivals, not the US and Germany or the British and Germany.

 

There is another advantage to drawing in Washington, perhaps even more important. Americans come pre-loaded to want to guarantee freedom of the seas, so in any political discussions that come along with naval talks the British might be outnumbered 2:1. The US will inevitably want to discuss the matter of this powerful future German fleet and the Western Hemisphere. One lovely aspect to an emerging German navy is being able to make “concessions”, such as hard-wired limitations in deployments to Central America, that aren’t really concessions at all. In terms of including other Powers like Japan. One question is whether more Powers in talks will increase or decrease the likelihood of an eventual deal. A Washington Treaty inclusive of all Powers would be the best case scenario perhaps, but better a more limited deal is better than no deal at all.

 

In any event, it seems certain that a mistake in the German historical strategy was to engage in bilateral talks with the British – making it pretty easy for the British to spin things along even if the Germans were eager to settle (which they were not since the Kaiser was a fool and deferred to Tirpitz, and Tirpitz went with the ‘deterrence’ strategy, which IMO was the worst choice of them all).

[BansheeOne]

A larger cruiser & colonial gunboat force can be easily afforded with the savings from a much smaller dreadnought fleet. Not too many cruisers, mind: not very many more can really be justified, & no point in provoking the RN unnecessarily, Enough to stand up to the French colonial fleet, is all. The planned for naval war would then be a brief & successful campaign against Russia for control of the Baltic, & battles against the French around Africa & in the Far East & Pacific in defence of the colonies. For this, a modest number of armoured cruisers is useful, to provide one for each major station.

 

Of which we can argue to have seven (Baltic and North Sea, Mediterranean, East and West Africa, China and New Guinea). Assume a rotation factor of three, so a total of 21 armored (later battle) cruisers, just five more than historically (and really the same number if we include the old protected cruisers; and yes, I forgot Blücher in my list). Let's say double that number of light cruisers, 42 vs. 35; and the same in "coastal battleships" again, four squadrons in the Baltic, two for defense of the North Sea coast. I could see that.

[rathi]

The Germany empire cannot simultaneously handle Britain, France and Russia. A diplomatic solution to avoid conflict with at least one of the other great powers is an absolute nessecity, to which sacrificing the size of the navy is a reasonable price to pay. The easier option would to reach an accord with Britain and limit the size of the fleet. More difficult but perhaps more rewarding would be to ally with Russia and try to use the larger German industrial base to outbuild Britain.

[Yama]

No no no. You're all thinking too nice. Take a page from Japanese playbook: surprise attack to Scapa Flow. Nighttime torpedo attack, then when daylight breaks, naval bombardment with Zeppelins scouting for targets. Fast minelayers to mine the outlets, more torpedo boats and maybe also subs to ambush when enemy tries to get out. Or something along those lines, whatever.

[BansheeOne]

Of which we can argue to have seven (Baltic and North Sea, Mediterranean, East and West Africa, China and New Guinea). Assume a rotation factor of three, so a total of 21 armored (later battle) cruisers, just five more than historically (and really the same number if we include the old protected cruisers; and yes, I forgot Blücher in my list). Let's say double that number of light cruisers, 42 vs. 35; and the same in "coastal battleships" again, four squadrons in the Baltic, two for defense of the North Sea coast. I could see that.

 

Pulling out my Weyer's 1900 reprint, I find there were of course also an Eastern and Western American station despite no German bases anywhere around. So make that 27 vs. 18 heavy (including the old large protected cruiser Kaiserin Augusta), and 54 vs. 51 light units (including small protected and unprotected cruisers plus gunboats remaining in 1914).

 

Obviously that's a rather static approach. The East Asia Squadron was supposed to always have two large and small cruisers each on station, and each battle squadron to work with two large and six small ones. Including single-ship requirements for the other stations, a fully mobilized fleet would thus require 20 of one sort, and 44 of the other.

[Argus]

 

AC’s served a purpose in scouting, but this role was better filled by BC’s and CL’s, leaving AC’s for backwater trade protection missions or the scrap yard.

 

The only purpose AC's serve in scouting is stiffening the screen to countering the other sides screen stiffening AC's, a pointless and distracting escalation that ends up with BC's equally miss applied and ultimately warped out of all sense to better fit this secondary mission (Lexington's).

 

Not sure if you mean lots of pre-dreadnoughts or lots of battlecruisers. In either case, the current proposal is to sacrifice the fleet engagement mission for sea control. Pre-dreadnoughts were good for fleet actions or coastal defense, two missions that Germany does not require in this strategy. Therefore, Germany should build as few pre-dreadnoughts as possible.

 

Neither, I actually meant lots of AC's, and how many PD's Germany builds comes down to exactly when we change their naval policy. I'm not sure I buy into the sea control mission either, I mean for that to work, or rather be worth the effort, you actually need some substantive reason to 'control' the sea, and so long as the UK's merchant fleet so trumps everyone else's Germany and German interests are still going to be playing second fiddle.

 

To my mind the best purpose the IGN can address itself too, is insuring the Army has the best possible conditions for doing its job - that is the functionary of secondary and supporting arms after all. Geography dictated Germany can, quite easily, be cut off form the worlds deep sea merchant trade, and there is nothing that can be done to change that, so why waste money trying?

 

The colonial gig is even more of a diversion down a dead end, first and foremost the whole business was a domestic and diplomatic expression of German nationalism/greatness/expansionism/ego <take your pick> it was not an economic gain for the country, for as much they got some profit out of parts of it, the rest were so heavily subsidised the total was a net loss as far as I can tell. Now presuming they pick up the same list of trifles under this alternative history not much is going to be different at least in economic terms - on that note I have to say most of the colonies simply didn't have a chance due to policy from Berlin. Forbidding external trade is not the way to make money in the age of steam. The German pacific is a perfect example, when absolutely everything has to be imported/exported through Germany ignoring closer, cost effective suppliers and markets in Asia, Australasia and America its pretty hard to be competitive. Historically a scattering of cruisers and gunboats around the place with single squadron with 1-2 AC's in China was perfectly adequate. Expanding that is not going to be ignored in London and will bring a response - as it did historically, Australia didn't buy a battlecruiser just for the fun of it

 

Battlecruisers is what Germany needs. Banshee proposes 340,000 tons of them at an average displacement of just over 24,000 tons each. I agree with this assessment, but would reduce the number of ships to about 10 while keeping the same tonnage, so that Germany has 34,000 ton battlecruisers. This will allow high speed, global endurance, and heavy armament.

 

Oh really, they need battlecruisers? Look if we take the primary responsibility of the navy (any navy) as ensuring the territorial integrity of the country, that means in this situation standing toe to toe with an enemy fleet threatening home coast port etc. Battleships are also the accepted 'tokens' on the international board. So I don't think we can get around building Dreadnoughts, and there's little point not building a sustainable number of them - so there is a big chunk of our capitol ship tonnage right there. Battlecruisers, ok so they're really good for killing AC's either at large on the oceans wide or in opposing cruiser screens..... these roles fit with our needs how? Seriously yes we need a couple, for keeping up appearances and for the odd jobs BC's are actually useful for, but to build a whole strategy around them is to go down the same path as historical only with a one trick pony that is even more one dimentional?

 

In terms of sea control, Battlecruisers, like AC's, are too much ship for raiding or for trade protection unless AC's are known to be at large, look at how the RN used them against von Spee in 1914. They're not general search and patrol platforms, but rather the killers you send out once the hunters (cruisers) and intelligence have localised the enemy. Or alternatively Queen you move about the chess board to push the enemy around and shut down his options. Worse they are greedy buggers that gobble coal and are quite fussy about quality if they're to retain speed. AC's were bad enough in this respect, but BC's were much worse, and without a decent network of coaling stations (or access to someone elses) supporting them in far distant waters is both expensive and difficult - more accuate to say it is always expensive and the difficulty is situational but generally high. This makes hunting them down quite easy too if they're not just playing tip and run from home base - you follow the coal trail.

 

So if we want to play fun and games with Franco-Russian trade globally we need lots of coal in place to do it. Being late to the game the trade routes were already established by the time Germany stated picking up bits of land and those scraps were generally those other people hadn't wanted ehough to grab for themselves. The German Concession in China being an exception. As a result of this, and the insularity of German colonial trade, the majority of traffic through German colonial coaling stations was German, so natural commercial demand was small and the cost of carrying larger stocks (say those requred to feed a fleet of large warship raiders) is going fall totaly on the German governemnt, as to will be the cost of defending those stocks with fortified ports and garrisions. Ahh but they can take it from the ships they capture.. to a pont. Emden was working hard to keep her (much smaller) bunkers filled while capturing ships hand over fist. Well at least defending the ports shouldn't be a problem, after all look at WWI and good old Lettow-Vorbeck 'the ghost of Africa' - who wasn't pinned down defeding tens of thousands of tons of coal in fixed locations. So this strategy would need colonial garrisions fit to stand siege by France's colonial army.

 

In the far East and Pacific it makes sense, if we're not planning on fighting the UK and Russia at the same time, its probably a safe bet the Rusisans and the Japanese are not going to gang up on us. So Tsing Tao has potential and should last a good while untill the Russians and French can get together and do somehting about it, so a good place for a small ecconomic fleet - just as they did historically. But do the same around Africa means a major investment in Tangynika and Nambibia (or Camaroon), and probably Rabaul too if we want a margin of operational flexiability without relaying too heavily on neutrals. Oh and the really critical trade for military operations in Europe is actually off South America - guano old boy, white gold, and the best sorce of nitrates before herr Haber comes along. Sea control or sea denial in this period needs coal before anyting else, but once you have the fuel (or even when you don't) the actual bar is quite low and any old warship will do, and any converted merchantman will generally do it even better.

 

As for building BC's 10k tons larger than contempoary BB"s... how exactly do we expect to hide this - or much of anything else for that matter? Oh sure you could keep a lid on technical detail, but anyone with a pair of binoculars can gather enough data to rough out a ships basic specifications by deduction. I mean IIRC the week leading up to the general mobalisation in 1914 was fleet regatta in Kiel with an RN sqn as guests. Again we're starting an arms race we're not going to win and won't find much profit in losing. That is not to say I'm against building BC's at all, its just again we need to cut out coat to suit our cloth.

 

shane

[glenn239]

The Germany empire cannot simultaneously handle Britain, France and Russia. A diplomatic solution to avoid conflict with at least one of the other great powers is an absolute nessecity, to which sacrificing the size of the navy is a reasonable price to pay. The easier option would to reach an accord with Britain and limit the size of the fleet. More difficult but perhaps more rewarding would be to ally with Russia and try to use the larger German industrial base to outbuild Britain.

 

Britain or Russia. One policy requires a small fleet, one requires a very large one. The British, as per historical, will always appear to be engaged, so that that the ‘or Russia’ policy will never get rolling. If allying with Russia, then unless Russian attention can be returned to a war of revenge on Japan, the price will (eventually) be the partition of Austria-Hungary and the elimination of the Ottomans by the Russians. So, if by way of Russia, there will be less room for retracing steps because the number of decisive decisions taken along the way (massive fleet, betrayal of Austria-Hungary). If by way of Britain, Germany will never be certain of the British, ever.

 

Frankly, neither choice looks that appealing.

Edited June 2, 2012 by glenn239

[glenn239]

Geography dictated Germany can, quite easily, be cut off form the worlds deep sea merchant trade, and there is nothing that can be done to change that, so why waste money trying?

 

For Germany to be totally cut off from the sea, the Powers France, Britain, Russia and the United States have to be at war with Germany. If any one of these is neutral, Germany is not totally cut off.

 

I'm not sure I buy into the sea control mission either, I mean for that to work, or rather be worth the effort, you actually need some substantive reason to 'control' the sea, and so long as the UK's merchant fleet so trumps everyone else's Germany and German interests are still going to be playing second fiddle.

 

Germany wants the Americans, the Japanese, everyone, to have large navies and plenty of rules about the freedom of trade. Britain wants everyone to have small navies and stay in their corner. Those are the two polarities. How is Germany going to move the global standard to the pole it wants without a navy on the table?

 

T

he colonial gig is even more of a diversion down a dead end,

 

Germany should have been looking to invest in the exploitation of existing empires rather trying to hack out an empire for itself. More of the Berlin to Baghdad railroad, less in the way of the Cameroons.

 

The German pacific is a perfect example...

 

The nicest map of the Pacific for Germany would be one where the Japanese flag flies over Rabaul and the US flag waves over all the islands of the Marianas and Marshalls. But that seems a stretch in the Imperial age.

[glenn239]

Not really. Britain had some pretty good feedback on German naval development via Hector Bywater

 

Germany cannot possibly outbuild Britain. But Germany can possibly mislead Britain. Best to concentrate on the possible and forget what is impossible, right? Sure, the British might see through the ruse, in which case, what has Germany lost in trying?

 

Oh really, they need battlecruisers? Look if we take the primary responsibility of the navy (any navy) as ensuring the territorial integrity of the country, that means in this situation standing toe to toe with an enemy fleet threatening home coast port etc.

 

The coastal defense mission for Germany was a minor consideration due to geography, and could be handled by submarines, minefields, torpedo boats and fortifications. A defending BC squadron that can make slashing ‘cavalry’ raids is a far better adjunct to that 'home' team than a ‘toe to toe’ slow force of dreadnoughts whose primary mission is to either sit in port or come out and die in great numbers in a decisive battle where they are outnumbered but cannot run away.

 

The British never, at no point in the war, refrained from coastal attacks for fear of German dreadnoughts. Had these been thought likely to come out, this would have been an incentive to attack. Rather, the British feared attrition via submarines, torpedo boats and mines. Therefore, dreadnoughts as the primary coastal defense doctrine is not only illogical, it would be counterproductive in that it would incentivize the British to make the attack that it is supposed to be deterred from. If the attack comes, the N-Squared Law states that a dreadnought defense will fail in spectacular fashion. We’re talking a new statute facing Lord Nelson in Trafalgar Square type fashion.

 

In terms of sea control, Battlecruisers, like AC's, are too much ship for raiding or for trade protection unless AC's are known to be at large, look at how the RN used them against von Spee in 1914. They're not general search and patrol platforms, but rather the killers you send out once the hunters (cruisers) and intelligence have localised the enemy.

 

There is no airpower or radar and most of the world’s ports are undefended, and you don’t need scouting to know where New York is or that there is a British AMC squadron there waiting to be obliterated. You just need a squadron that can get there.

 

Worse they are greedy buggers that gobble coal and are quite fussy about quality if they're to retain speed.

 

Can’t disagree, but that really was a function of the specifications to the ships they built, right? For Germany, the design requirement might be to be able to go to New York and back without refueling. That might require, say, 8,000 tons of coal, so you need to design a ship big enough that it can carry that amount of fuel. Hence, you’re already in the 35,000 ton displacement range, not the 25,000 ton range.

[swerve]

The colonial gig is even more of a diversion down a dead end, first and foremost the whole business was a domestic and diplomatic expression of German nationalism/greatness/expansionism/ego <take your="" pick=""> it was not an economic gain for the country, for as much they got some profit out of parts of it, the rest were so heavily subsidised the total was a net loss as far as I can tell. Now presuming they pick up the same list of trifles under this alternative history not much is going to be different at least in economic terms - on that note I have to say most of the colonies simply didn't have a chance due to policy from Berlin. Forbidding external trade is not the way to make money in the age of steam. The German pacific is a perfect example, when absolutely everything has to be imported/exported through Germany ignoring closer, cost effective suppliers and markets in Asia, Australasia and America its pretty hard to be competitive. Historically a scattering of cruisers and gunboats around the place with single squadron with 1-2 AC's in China was perfectly adequate. Expanding that is not going to be ignored in London and will bring a response - as it did historically, Australia didn't buy a battlecruiser just for the fun of it

 

shane

Indeed. But I'm the ruler of the Kaiser's navy, not able to make national policy in any area. I have to work with the hand I'm given, & that means the colonies, & a Kaiser who wants a big penis extension fleet. Maybe he could be bought off with a couple of super-dreadnoughts, instead of a large fleet of smaller ones - or maybe just a few impressive-looking fast battlecruisers. Whatever, I don't want a big enough fleet of modern capital ships to make the UK think I'm intent on going up against the RN. I want enough capital ships to beat the the Russians in the Baltic, & (in conjunction with my torpedo boats, minefields, & submarines) make attacks on the North Sea coast unwise. My old pre-dreadnoughts will help with those two jobs.

 

I need a colonial fleet, because the Kaiser insists on colonies. If I have to have it, I might as well make the best of it, & make it useful. It's also pleasant for cruises, & provides attractive billets for officers on the way up.

 

My marines are for both the Baltic (I want to get the credit for making it a German lake, & spearheading assaults on Russian-held islands will help with that) & colonial wars.

 

Commerce raiding is a minor task unless (heaven forbid!) I have to fight Britain, & I won't spend too much on it. If I can make the French use British ships by attacking their merchant fleet, well & good, but I'd rather block their ports with mines, if I can. More effective at cutting their imports, & the British can't complain if their colliers hit my mines in French waters.

 

I want to keep the North Sea open for trade, & that means peace with Britain. So internally, I'll do all I can to push the government away from conflict with the British Empire, including bluntly stating that while it'd be nice to have the government lavish money on the navy, it won't enable me to beat the RN, & I'd rather not do anything to provoke them into thinking I want to try it. I'll argue for a maritime policy of open seas, & good relations with as many maritime states as possible. I'd propose offering guarantees of Danish, Norwegian (from 1905) & Swedish neutrality (implying that Germany would defend them if they were attacked), & argue strongly against the Schlieffen Plan, on the grounds that it would provoke a potentially disastrous war with Britain.

 

I want a naval industrial policy, to build up shipbuilding for both merchant & naval fleets. When aircraft (heavier than air & Zeppelins) look practical, I'll be keen on their use for recce.

 

I'll try to cultivate good social relationships with the RN, & any other navy I think I can avoid fighting. I will direct my officers that foreign sailors may become our adversaries, but they are not to be treated as personal enemies. We must obey maritime law & custom, & behave honourably.

 

If I can get Scandinavian naval officers in their cups, I'll tell 'em that we have too much in common to be enemies, & if we ever have to fight each other, it'll be to my regret. I'll tell the Danes privately that I reckon they were hard done by back in 1864, & how much I respect the Schleswigers in my fleet.

 

My biggest colonial concern is the China station until 1905, because of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. After the Japanese deal with that for me, I can relax. Any colonial naval war will be a sideshow, but one in which I hope to force the French to divert resources from Europe, to the benefit of Germany. I can't do much about Togoland & Kamerun, but I hope to be able to disrupt any French attempts to land in S. W. Africa & Ost Afrika. I'd consider raids on French coaling stations.</take>

Edited June 2, 2012 by swerve

[Argus]

Germany cannot possibly outbuild Britain. But Germany can possibly mislead Britain. Best to concentrate on the possible and forget what is impossible, right? Sure, the British might see through the ruse, in which case, what has Germany lost in trying?

 

Oh absolutely nothing, and of course they would try to do it as they did historically and with as much success - in terms of details. But you simply can't hide a ten thousand ton difference in displacement, nor the infrastructure needed to support it.

 

The coastal defense mission for Germany was a minor consideration due to geography, and could be handled by submarines, minefields, torpedo boats and fortifications. A defending BC squadron that can make slashing ‘cavalry’ raids is a far better adjunct to that 'home' team than a ‘toe to toe’ slow force of dreadnoughts whose primary mission is to either sit in port or come out and die in great numbers in a decisive battle where they are outnumbered but cannot run away.

 

I'll get to the coastal defence side in a second, but first we need to talk about 'slashing cavalry' attacks.... no mate, shit just don't work that way when elephants clash. A speed advantage allows a BC force SOME advantage in manoeuvre, but it is no more an opened ended licence to run about the battle field than any cavalry commander ever has. There are three points that get in the way here, the enemy have their own light/fast forces, the Mk1 eyeball is still the principal recce and comms tool, and battleships are a lot tougher than BC's. Basically any BC force that gets into gun range of a superior BB fleet and hangs around for more than a couple of salvos is going to take more damage than it inflicts. From a gunnery perspective its the differential speed between the two ships that matters, so the fire control problem is more or less the same for both sides and BB's by there nature are better at taking punishment, also (depending on design) dishing it out. A BC force may be able to (slowly) run rings around a BB fleet with his 8-10 knot advantage is speed, but it can't engage seriously, is always at risk of being out manoeuvred or caught out by the enemy's dispositions and basically are best used as a matadors cape to play the bull onto the sword - as the HSF tried to do repeatedly. WIthout a 'sword' behind it the cape is pretty flimsy protection.

 

Fortifications with a field army working around them are 10 times more effective than fortifications on their own, and the same thing goes at sea too.

 

The British never, at no point in the war, refrained from coastal attacks for fear of German dreadnoughts. Had these been thought likely to come out, this would have been an incentive to attack. Rather, the British feared attrition via submarines, torpedo boats and mines.

 

No, they were absolutely certain the HSF would come out if the Grand Fleet went charging into the Heilogland bight. The minefields, submarines (and to a lesser extent fortifications) were all part of a defensive matrix WITH the HSF, so steaming into the middle of it and offering the Germans the battle they dreamed of was just common sense. Now without the HSF and with some reasonable motive for doing it (not that they had one while the distant blockade was effective enough and no one had a spare army), the RN might have gone inshore and worked their way through the minefields and submarines to reduce the batteries by gunfire and landing party etc, nothing impossible about it at all, just difficult and painful. Fortifications on their own arn't worth half as much as fortifications with a field force manoeuvring around them.

 

Therefore, dreadnoughts as the primary coastal defense doctrine is not only illogical, it would be counterproductive in that it would incentivize the British to make the attack that it is supposed to be deterred from. If the attack comes

 

No the British if anyone understood that a first rate coastal defensive array included a substantial naval component, and as a first rate power Germany could be expected to procure a first rate naval component without any raised eyeborws, and if dreadnoughts are the best then its only to be expected. The problem was the HSF challenging the RN for domination, not Germany having a reasonable navy.

 

If the attack comes, the N-Squared Law states that a dreadnought defense will fail in spectacular fashion. We’re talking a new statute facing Lord Nelson in Trafalgar Square type fashion.

 

Oh come one, yes if they steam straight down the channel fat dumb and stupid they will get slaughtered, but its rather presumptuous to assume they would and start erecting statuary in commemoration. The problems of reducing coastal defences were well understood. Certainly modern technology had some new tricks for people to learn about the hard way, as they did in the trenches. The historical Dardenelles attempt prooves this, yes it failed, but a/ it very nearly didn't, and b/ the naval planning did take all the facets of modern naval defence into account, just not as well as they thought or might have wanted too - the lack of fast minesweepers being a primary issue that was identified at the time.

 

There is nothing wrong and much that is valuable about 'fleet in being concept.' The problem was the Kaiser and his cronies tried to take it too far, but as part of a defensive matrix like this a decent fleet is not only perfectly valid, its damn nigh essential and no extraordinary threat.

 

Can’t disagree, but that really was a function of the specifications to the ships they built, right? For Germany, the design requirement might be to be able to go to New York and back without refueling. That might require, say, 8,000 tons of coal, so you need to design a ship big enough that it can carry that amount of fuel. Hence, you’re already in the 35,000 ton displacement range, not the 25,000 ton range.

 

And if you build SMS Humongous and her 5 sister ships, followed by the SMS Von der Flippinghuge and the rest of her class, the world might just make its responses no? You also have the little problem of getting back home again on your 8,000 tons of coal +/- the minor refit period such ships would need after a run like that even if they didn't fire a shot.

 

I'm not saying it is technically impossible, I'm just trying to see the point and why it is worth the effort - knocking off a few AMC's?

 

Using AC's as raiders wasn't cost effective, and employing jumbo BC's might expand your list of potential targets, but it hardly the cost benefit analysis. BC's with blue water range and a role to dash out to global trouble spots in defense of Germany's interests is one thing, but this...?

 

shane

[Argus]

The colonial gig is even more of a diversion down a dead end, first and foremost the whole business was a domestic and diplomatic expression of German nationalism/greatness/expansionism/ego it was not an economic gain for the country, for as much they got some profit out of parts of it, the rest were so heavily subsidised the total was a net loss as far as I can tell. Now presuming they pick up the same list of trifles under this alternative history not much is going to be different at least in economic terms - on that note I have to say most of the colonies simply didn't have a chance due to policy from Berlin. Forbidding external trade is not the way to make money in the age of steam. The German pacific is a perfect example, when absolutely everything has to be imported/exported through Germany ignoring closer, cost effective suppliers and markets in Asia, Australasia and America its pretty hard to be competitive. Historically a scattering of cruisers and gunboats around the place with single squadron with 1-2 AC's in China was perfectly adequate. Expanding that is not going to be ignored in London and will bring a response - as it did historically, Australia didn't buy a battlecruiser just for the fun of it shane

Indeed. But I'm the ruler of the Kaiser's navy, not able to make national policy in any area. I have to work with the hand I'm given, & that means the colonies, & a Kaiser who wants a big penis extension fleet. Maybe he could be bought off with a couple of super-dreadnoughts, instead of a large fleet of smaller ones - or maybe just a few impressive-looking fast battlecruisers. Whatever, I don't want a big enough fleet of modern capital ships to make the UK think I'm intent on going up against the RN. I want enough capital ships to beat the the Russians in the Baltic, & (in conjunction with my torpedo boats, minefields, & submarines) make attacks on the North Sea coast unwise. My old pre-dreadnoughts will help with those two jobs. I need a colonial fleet, because the Kaiser insists on colonies. If I have to have it, I might as well make the best of it, & make it useful. It's also pleasant for cruises, & provides attractive billets for officers on the way up. My marines are for both the Baltic (I want to get the credit for making it a German lake, & spearheading assaults on Russian-held islands will help with that) & colonial wars. Commerce raiding is a minor task unless (heaven forbid!) I have to fight Britain, & I won't spend too much on it. If I can make the French use British ships by attacking their merchant fleet, well & good, but I'd rather block their ports with mines, if I can. More effective at cutting their imports, & the British can't complain if their colliers hit my mines in French waters. I want to keep the North Sea open for trade, & that means peace with Britain. So internally, I'll do all I can to push the government away from conflict with the British Empire, including bluntly stating that while it'd be nice to have the government lavish money on the navy, it won't enable me to beat the RN, & I'd rather not do anything to provoke them into thinking I want to try it. I'll argue for a maritime policy of open seas, & good relations with as many maritime states as possible. I'd propose offering guarantees of Danish, Norwegian (from 1905) & Swedish neutrality (implying that Germany would defend them if they were attacked), & argue strongly against the Schlieffen Plan, on the grounds that it would provoke a potentially disastrous war with Britain. I want a naval industrial policy, to build up shipbuilding for both merchant & naval fleets. When aircraft (heavier than air & Zeppelins) look practical, I'll be keen on their use for recce. I'll try to cultivate good social relationships with the RN, & any other navy I think I can avoid fighting. I will direct my officers that foreign sailors may become our adversaries, but they are not to be treated as personal enemies. We must obey maritime law & custom, & behave honourably. If I can get Scandinavian naval officers in their cups, I'll tell 'em that we have too much in common to be enemies, & if we ever have to fight each other, it'll be to my regret. I'll tell the Danes privately that I reckon they were hard done by back in 1864, & how much I respect the Schleswigers in my fleet. My biggest colonial concern is the China station until 1905, because of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. After the Japanese deal with that for me, I can relax. Any colonial naval war will be a sideshow, but one in which I hope to force the French to divert resources from Europe, to the benefit of Germany. I can't do much about Togoland & Kamerun, but I hope to be able to disrupt any French attempts to land in S. W. Africa & Ost Afrika. I'd consider raids on French coaling stations.

 

And I'd cheer you on from the side lines, while eagerly seeing how the French and Russians respond. The Russians in particular havng been presented with a clean slate in 1905 were building some very nice ships in this period.

 

shane

[swerve]

Yeah, but the Russians had the problem of divided fleets. For example, I could counter the four Gangut class in the Baltic when they came on line, without having to worry much about the Imperatritsiya Maria class building at Nikolayev. The monster Borodino class battlecruisers would have worried me, but they do provide an excuse for building better capital ships, & perhaps I can find ways of causing problems with them. They depended on German components which Russian industry couldn't reproduce, didn't they? Of course, if WW1 breaks out on schedule I can forget them, since the essential German parts hadn't yet been delivered, & the Russians never found substitutes.

 

I'm pretty sure I could deal with the pre-dreadnoughts which escaped being sunk by the Japanese, & the cruisers.

[Argus]

Yeah, but the Russians had the problem of divided fleets. For example, I could counter the four Gangut class in the Baltic when they came on line, without having to worry much about the Imperatritsiya Maria class building at Nikolayev. The monster Borodino class battlecruisers would have worried me, but they do provide an excuse for building better capital ships, & perhaps I can find ways of causing problems with them. They depended on German components which Russian industry couldn't reproduce, didn't they? Of course, if WW1 breaks out on schedule I can forget them, since the essential German parts hadn't yet been delivered, & the Russians never found substitutes.

 

I'm pretty sure I could deal with the pre-dreadnoughts which escaped being sunk by the Japanese, & the cruisers.

 

 

Actually in retrospect... I think in your shoes I'd just divert one or two percent of the Naval funding, put half of it into R&D and building the Kaiser better yachts, then put the other half into bribing the yachties at Cowes Week to lose.

 

shane

[swerve]

_{An elegant solution. Then I can forget all the wang-measuring completely, & focus on building a sensible fleet.}

[Simon Tan]

Much better just to rent the RN as needed.

[Ken Estes]

Most true, as the German army will always have priority and preeminence. So, the army will have to carry the load in any continental decision, and the navy must contribute to the overall strategy, which, I repeat, ought to have been eliminating the Russian Empire for the future, while doing as little as possible to rile the western allies. A successful modernized Waldersee Plan would have support of the Hapsburg lands, the Turks and what diplomatic charm/ability extant ought to be used to keep the Italians neutral [for the time being] vice fantasies of dealing with the Anglos. Once a 1915 Brest-Litovsk Treaty is in place, the Turk-Austrian-[now]Italian branch of the Central Powers could be cajoled into a Mediterranean strategy of closing the Eastern Med, while the Kaiser's fleet in being screens the seizure of Norway/Denmark, presenting the UK with a modified Continental System [one that works], leading to a general peace. Colonies seized are returned and Germany basks in Mitteleuropa.

 

[Edit to add] There will in the aftermath be no Hitler, no Lenin/Bolshvism, no radicalized antisemitism, no Japanese militarism, and the Euro will be introduced by the Deutsche Bank c. 1950.

Edited June 4, 2012 by Ken Estes

[RETAC21]

Most true, as the German army will always have priority and preeminence. So, the army will have to carry the load in any continental decision, and the navy must contribute to the overall strategy, which, I repeat, ought to have been eliminating the Russian Empire for the future, while doing as little as possible to rile the western allies. A successful modernized Waldersee Plan would have support of the Hapsburg lands, the Turks and what diplomatic charm/ability extant ought to be used to keep the Italians neutral [for the time being] vice fantasies of dealing with the Anglos. Once a 1915 Brest-Litovsk Treaty is in place, the Turk-Austrian-[now]Italian branch of the Central Powers could be cajoled into a Mediterranean strategy of closing the Eastern Med, while the Kaiser's fleet in being screens the seizure of Norway/Denmark, presenting the UK with a modified Continental System [one that works], leading to a general peace. Colonies seized are returned and Germany basks in Mitteleuropa.

 

[Edit to add] There will in the aftermath be no Hitler, no Lenin/Bolshvism, no radicalized antisemitism, no Japanese militarism, and the Euro will be introduced by the Deutsche Bank c. 1950.

 

But then, continuing with that timeline, the Euro will collapse around 1960, and amid the chaos rises Rudolf Hitler (grandson of gefreiter Adolf Hitler) with a message of radical nationalism and antisemitism, promising a Neue Deutschland and therefore saving Tanknet's Clanturbation fantasies

 

And disaster is avoided...

[glenn239]

And if you build SMS Humongous and her 5 sister ships, followed by the SMS Von der Flippinghuge and the rest of her class, the world might just make its responses no? You also have the little problem of getting back home again on your 8,000 tons of coal +/- the minor refit period such ships would need after a run like that even if they didn't fire a shot.

It’s better to have a fleet that has the flexibility to operate under a variety of conditions. In the real war the surface fleet proved next to useless on account of lack of endurance, so having ships with greater speed and range seems the better option. After all, if it’s to be ‘fleet in being’, or coastal defense (against an assault that will never come), then whether your ships are long or short range really doesn’t make any difference to the strategy. But if the long range voyages are contemplated, then you have to have the material to undertake the mission or you can’t do it.

I'm not saying it is technically impossible, I'm just trying to see the point and why it is worth the effort - knocking off a few AMC's?

Germany had two strategies to pick from if building a large fleet; decisive battle or commerce raiding. Historically, decisive battle not only didn’t work, but ultimately proved a fiasco. So, that leaves either commerce raiding a hybrid strategy, or a small fleet intended to operate in the Baltic.

No the British if anyone understood that a first rate coastal defensive array included a substantial naval component,

I don’t think dreadnoughts contribute much to coastal defense. Given the proximity of enemy submarines they are probably a liability. If coastal or Baltic missions are all there is to be, then Germany should sound Britain with an offer not to build any dreadnoughts at all. Edited June 4, 2012 by glenn239

[swerve]

Most true, as the German army will always have priority and preeminence. So, the army will have to carry the load in any continental decision, and the navy must contribute to the overall strategy, which, I repeat, ought to have been eliminating the Russian Empire for the future, while doing as little as possible to rile the western allies. A successful modernized Waldersee Plan would have support of the Hapsburg lands, the Turks and what diplomatic charm/ability extant ought to be used to keep the Italians neutral [for the time being] vice fantasies of dealing with the Anglos. Once a 1915 Brest-Litovsk Treaty is in place, the Turk-Austrian-[now]Italian branch of the Central Powers could be cajoled into a Mediterranean strategy of closing the Eastern Med, while the Kaiser's fleet in being screens the seizure of Norway/Denmark, presenting the UK with a modified Continental System [one that works], leading to a general peace. Colonies seized are returned and Germany basks in Mitteleuropa.

 

[Edit to add] There will in the aftermath be no Hitler, no Lenin/Bolshvism, no radicalized antisemitism, no Japanese militarism, and the Euro will be introduced by the Deutsche Bank c. 1950.

 

But then, continuing with that timeline, the Euro will collapse around 1960, and amid the chaos rises Rudolf Hitler (grandson of gefreiter Adolf Hitler) with a message of radical nationalism and antisemitism, promising a Neue Deutschland and therefore saving Tanknet's Clanturbation fantasies

 

And disaster is avoided...

But no! Because in this case, the Euro (which would be called the Mark - or maybe Thaler, or Gulden, or Krone ) wouldn't be subject to the borrowing whims & statistical fakery of the Greeks & Spanish & Irish over-building, but be under the stern discipline of the Reichsbank, which will most definitely not underwrite anyone elses extravagance. There will be no negotiations with 'partners' about how many billions to give away: decisions will be made behind firmly closed doors in Berlin.

[Simon Tan]

So..it would have been what will be. Oh the upisde, Phil would be King of Greece and be horrid to them.

[swerve]

Phil? Nope. Still Constantine, unless someone knocked off King Pavlos before Constantine was conceived, & as long as someone (Germany?) propped Constantine up, as he was a lousy king. He laboured under the delusion that he had power.

 

Funnily enough, despite only being the son of the fourth son of Constantine's great-grandfather, Phil really would have been next in line until Constantine had children. All the other potential male heirs (& there were several) died without fathering sons except one, & he forfeited his rights to the succession by marrying a commoner.

[RETAC21]

Most true, as the German army will always have priority and preeminence. So, the army will have to carry the load in any continental decision, and the navy must contribute to the overall strategy, which, I repeat, ought to have been eliminating the Russian Empire for the future, while doing as little as possible to rile the western allies. A successful modernized Waldersee Plan would have support of the Hapsburg lands, the Turks and what diplomatic charm/ability extant ought to be used to keep the Italians neutral [for the time being] vice fantasies of dealing with the Anglos. Once a 1915 Brest-Litovsk Treaty is in place, the Turk-Austrian-[now]Italian branch of the Central Powers could be cajoled into a Mediterranean strategy of closing the Eastern Med, while the Kaiser's fleet in being screens the seizure of Norway/Denmark, presenting the UK with a modified Continental System [one that works], leading to a general peace. Colonies seized are returned and Germany basks in Mitteleuropa.

 

[Edit to add] There will in the aftermath be no Hitler, no Lenin/Bolshvism, no radicalized antisemitism, no Japanese militarism, and the Euro will be introduced by the Deutsche Bank c. 1950.

 

But then, continuing with that timeline, the Euro will collapse around 1960, and amid the chaos rises Rudolf Hitler (grandson of gefreiter Adolf Hitler) with a message of radical nationalism and antisemitism, promising a Neue Deutschland and therefore saving Tanknet's Clanturbation fantasies

 

And disaster is avoided...

But no! Because in this case, the Euro (which would be called the Mark - or maybe Thaler, or Gulden, or Krone ) wouldn't be subject to the borrowing whims & statistical fakery of the Greeks & Spanish & Irish over-building, but be under the stern discipline of the Reichsbank, which will most definitely not underwrite anyone elses extravagance. There will be no negotiations with 'partners' about how many billions to give away: decisions will be made behind firmly closed doors in Berlin.

 

You want a building bubble? I´ll give you a bubble building!:

 

[Argus]

It’s better to have a fleet that has the flexibility to operate under a variety of conditions.

 

True. Flexibility is always a good thing, but it hardly comes for free. In this case you are building very big very soft hulls. The idea that coal bunkers added to the protective scheme was one of the illusions quickly shattered by war, added to which the requirement for range and habitability is going to seriously chew into the historical German strength of extensive sub division. So while the historical German BC's topped the toughness scale, these behemoths are quite likely to be fragile. Added to which is they follow historical building practices, they're going to be 3 screw ships, which is not good news to system reliability, that centreline screw transmits vibration directly into the keel (can't help it) and so into the primary structure, which does nothing at all for keeping these like radios and range finders in adjustment over long cruisers. But that's just splitting hairs

 

In the real war the surface fleet proved next to useless on account of lack of endurance...

 

hang on did you really say that?

 

In the real war the surface fleet proved next to useless on account of lack of endurance...

 

Good god!

 

I'd dearly like to you provide one example of HSF being at a tactical disadvantage due to a lack of endurance.

 

Sorry but that is just wrong. The even the lack of endurance taken as historical gospel was no where near as bad people tend to think, we actually had a thread on that very point here some years back. They weren't the most suitable ships for a world cruise it is true, but they had plenty of legs for hat they were built to do.

 

...so having ships with greater speed and range seems the better option.

 

Yes if the cost in other areas is acceptable.

 

After all, if it’s to be ‘fleet in being’, or coastal defense (against an assault that will never come), then whether your ships are long or short range really doesn’t make any difference to the strategy. But if the long range voyages are contemplated, then you have to have the material to undertake the mission or you can’t do it.

 

Well it rather depends on having somewhere worth the effort to go to doesn't it?

 

Then there is the presumption that there is a job to be done somewhere else. I'll say again warships generally make poor raiders, and the bigger the warship the less efficient it is. So if raiding is out, what is the objective of this far ranging fleet?

 

Oh and on the subject of trade. You say Germany cannot be 'cut off' unless she is at war with basically everyone else, and so far as having access to markets that is correct. But we come back to geography and that awkward bloody archipelago between Norway and France. it wouldn't matter if Germany was only at war with Britain, all on its own the RN can/could/did block the channel with the greatest of ease, and impose a blockade across the North Sea. For that matter she could also blockade the Straits of Gibraltar and obviously Suez. Such a blockade would be/was permeable and far from absolute, but more than enough to seriously screw with the German economy let alone war effort. Remember such a blockade involves searching every merchant ship trying to pass, no matter whose flag it flies and confiscating any cargo on the contraband list consigned to/from the nation under blockade or their nominees in neutral countries, with the screws slowly tightening as loop holes are closed and ruses countered. Of course it pissed people off, but that's the joy of being the marine hegemon, folks might be pissed off at you ,but provided you play your diplomatic cards right you can get away with that sort of thing.

 

Germany had two strategies to pick from if building a large fleet; decisive battle or commerce raiding. Historically, decisive battle not only didn’t work, but ultimately proved a fiasco. So, that leaves either commerce raiding a hybrid strategy, or a small fleet intended to operate in the Baltic.

 

Umm wrong war, wrong navy, the Decisive Battle thingy was the IJN in WWII. The HSF in WWI was running a Risk Fleet off the back of a Fleet in Being. The big decisive battle was what the RN were looking for not the HSF, it was about the very last thing they wanted. Now I grant you that strategy isn't looking too good with our hindsight, but that's not to suggest the opposite in raiding is the automatic answer - because its not. As I've said time and time again, raiding by warships generally isn't very efficient, and the bigger the warship the less efficient it becomes. Look the ocean is a very very very big place, and ships are really tiny in comparison, 90% of the sea is empty 90% of the time. Its only along certain routes and around certain choke points and landfalls that the shipping density increases to the point of 'rich pickings'

 

All those concentrations are well known to everyone, and exactly the places 'cruisers' like to hang out. For the raider the challenge is not to get hit/ take damage or get pinned down. By definition it is a long way from home and on its own, it can't fix any but the most minor battle damage, replenish consumables, treat and replace causalities. So the last thing it wants to do is meet an enemy cruiser. The actual force level hardly matters, for a battle cruiser or a squadron of battle cruisers, meeting a 20 year old 3rd rate protected cruiser is a disaster, because even if the old tub never lays a glove on the raider she will have had a radio so the enemy now have a datum, and the raider will be down X rounds of irreplaceable ammo and YY tons of fuel from flashing up boilers to fight and then having to run long and hard to clear the datum. As a result raiders are most comfortable out in the never never, swinging into sweet spots occasionally to make a mess and then slipping off into the nothing for a while to reappear a long way away. Hang around the trade routes too long and you get found, and once found you get dead, its just a matter of time. That is where submarines were a game changer, they could loiter in the happy hunting grounds without getting localised and hunted to death. I suggest you have a look where the submarines did their killing in WWI - English channel, Irish Sea, Western Approaches, off the East Coast, and the Med of course - places were no surface raider would have lasted a day. Against the surface raiders who did their best work out in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, off the Capes etc. Its worth noting that even in these concentration areas, once convoy was introduced the U-Boat skippers suddenly found the seas 'became empty,' tere were just as many ships passing through, only the 'footprint' of 20 ships was now not much larger than the foot print of a single ship, and a drop in the bucket compared to the area involved.

 

I don’t think dreadnoughts contribute much to coastal defense. Given the proximity of enemy submarines they are probably a liability. If coastal or Baltic missions are all there is to be, then Germany should sound Britain with an offer not to build any dreadnoughts at all.

 

Then I'm sorry to say you are wrong. As I said before if a/the fleet isn't home (or doesn't exist) then you can't take the security of your coast for granted, as the fleet is an essential part of the coastal defence matrix. The fleet is the sword, the fixed/short range defences (forts mine fields, subs torpedo boats etc) are the shield. No fleet - what keeps the minesweepers from chewing their way in, and the mine layers from bottling up your submarines and torpedo boats while the enemy fleet walks up to your forts with a dozen dreadnoughts and pounds them in etc etc etc. The very essence of a successful defence is deterrence, a defence that never fires a shot has still done its job if without them the enemy would have struck there. I suggest you look at the American Civil War for an example of how good defences without a fleet works out.

 

I also don't see why the Baltic is so unworthy an objective, I mean if Russia is a potential enemy the Baltic is not just her front door to trade, but also a highway into her backyard. Germany did some good amphibious ops in the Baltic during WWI, and access to Swedish iron ore was no less valuable back then either.

 

shane

[glenn239]

Flexibility is always a good thing, but it hardly comes for free. In this case you are building very big very soft hulls

.

 

The idea is to increase endurance while maintaining the fighting power of 26,000 ton, 12” battlecruiser. I pictured doing it with larger ships since you need a longer, wider ship to accomodate the extra room for fuel.

 

They weren't the most suitable ships for a world cruise it is true, but they had plenty of legs for hat they were built to do.

 

Right, but what it turned out they were good at doing was sitting in port and not fighting. Occasionally, the fleet would dash out into the North Sea on some daring exercise with no clear target or objective, and as often as not, quickly dash back to port with the first stirring of opposition.

 

I'd dearly like to you provide one example of HSF being at a tactical disadvantage due to a lack of endurance.

 

A tactical disadvantage in a North Sea tussle? No, I was referring to a strategic disadvantage in that the HSF had no real way to wrest the initiative. The Germans are able to stalk prey in the North Sea. As soon as the RN tires of that game, there is no other game to be played.

 

But we come back to geography and that awkward bloody archipelago between Norway and France. it wouldn't matter if Germany was only at war with Britain, all on its own the RN can/could/did block the channel with the greatest of ease,

 

Britain certainly holds most of the aces in a naval war, but Germany’s maritime trade cannot be totally cut off without all of France, Russia and the USA participating in the war against Germany. Otherwise, Germany’s overseas trade continues, albeit at a significantly diminished rate.

 

I also don't see why the Baltic is so unworthy an objective

 

How does controlling the Baltic cause Great Britain to make peace?

Edited June 5, 2012 by glenn239