The German '88

[rmgill]

Wrong. It was the case in the US Army but not the case with British field artillery, which used one man laying (the benefit of calibrating sights) which was faster than two man laying with a different elevation being ordered to each gun. The way the UK pams describe atk gunnery is the the No 1 (detachment commander, positioned to a flank in the case of field and anti-tank guns), ordered the single layer what to do. Perhaps the key role of the No 1 has led to incorrect assumptions. Not sure about atk drills for AA guns, but I don't recollect anything special in the atk pams.

 

For example...

 

Note the 25 pounder controls.

 

5.5" BL Gun...

[bojan]

...Note the Russians also used one-man laying...

 

Depends on what, speaking of WW2 stuff most was two gunners:

 

76mm m.1927 regimental - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

76mm m.1943 regimental - single gunner on the left

76mm m.1909 mountain - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

76mm m.1938 mountain - single gunner on the left

76mm F-22 m.1936 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

76mm F-22USV m.1939 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

76mm ZiS-3 - single gunner on left side

107mm m.1910/30 - single gunner on the left side

107mm M-60 m.1940 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

122mm m.1909/37 - single gunner on left side

122mm m.1910/30 - single gunner on left side

122mm M-30 m.1938 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

122mm A-19 m.1931 - single gunner on left side

122mm A-19 m.1931/37 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

152mm m.1909/30 - single gunne on left side

152mm m.1910/30 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

152mm M-10 m.1938 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

152mm D-1 m.1943 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

152mm m.1910/34 - single gunner on the left side

152mm ML-20 m.1937 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

152mm Br-2 m.1935 - single gunner on the left

203mm B-4 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

210mm Br-17 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

305mm Br-18 - two gunners, traverse left, elevation right

 

Post WW2 most used single gunner with exception of 130mm M46.

Edited January 2, 2012 by bojan

[cbo]

Most T-34s were KOd by 5cm guns in 1941. Of other, 7.5cm and 10.5cm both claimed larger % then 8.8cm.

As for KV, 8.8cm claimed more (by the fact it was largely immune to 5cm except PzGr.40 at sides at short range), but still more were KOd by 10.5cm and large caliber arty fire.

 

So, why is there no myth about deadly leFH18 and K18?

 

Perhaps because the 88-myth is english in origin, growing from the rough-handling of British armoured forces in the battle of Arras in 1940 and later in the desert. And perhaps the myth helped explain the failures of those forces against the Germans in 1940-41. Myth it was, at least regarding Arras in 1940, where the bulk of the British tanks destroyed did in fact fall victim to German field guns (10.5cm), not the line of 8,8cm guns that Rommel - or perhaps more correctly, his staff - set up as a backstop against the british attack.

The 8,8cm FlaK looked big and sinister, perhaps a better bogeyman than a lowly field-howitzer.

 

Aside from the few 8,8cm towed and SP guns modified for the ground role in the late 1930ies - IIRC mainly intended for bunkerbusting against the Maginot line? - the German use of the 8,8 cm FlaK in the ground role was really a sign of failure rather than succes. Just as with the use of the K18 and various field guns. Germany went to war with an inadequate anti-tank gun - the 3,7cm PaK - so they had to use FlaK and field guns to survive, particularily until the 5cm and 7,5cm anti-tank guns became available in large numbers, which wasn't until 1942.

 

One reason why other nations did not copy the 8,8cm FlaK or drew their heavy anti-tank guns far to the front to shoot at enemy tanks may have been that their anti-tank defenses were not quite as bad as those of the German army in 1939-1941. The big guns might have been nice to have had on some occasions, but the British, French and Soviets did not share the German experience of heavy enemy tanks driving unharmed towards your anti-tank guns, then running them over. So the need for big guns was perhaps not as pressing as it was for the Germans. Even if the odd shot from British or Soviet AT-guns pinged off the nose of a German tank with re-inforced armour, it was not a problem of the same magnitude as having an anti-tank defense consisting of thousand of guns that deservedly was called doorknockers by their crews.

Edited January 5, 2012 by cbo

[Colin]

Our C1,2,3 105mm howitzers have a spare elevation wheel on the left side (#2 position), so the #2 can traverse and elevate if needed.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Perhaps because the 88-myth is english in origin, growing from the rough-handling of British armoured forces in the battle of Arras in 1940 and later in the desert. And perhaps the myth helped explain the failures of those forces against the Germans in 1940-41. Myth it was, at least regarding Arras in 1940....

 

Aside from the few 8,8cm towed and SP guns modified for the ground role in the late 1930ies - IIRC mainly intended for bunkerbusting against the Maginot line? - the German use of the 8,8 cm FlaK in the ground role was really a sign of failure rather than succes.

IMHO that takes things a little too far in the other direction. In North Africa, 8.8cm Flak really did knock out a lot of British tanks (Italian manned 8.8 and their own 90mm too, as well as their 4" naval types). That was indeed partly because the available Axis AT guns were lacking against some tank types, especially in conditions often allowing long range fire. But that was often true of AT guns in various armies in WWII. And, AT guns which could meet any tank threat eventually also got big and unwieldy, or required extra resource and supply-consuming SP carriages. The tendency to try to hold onto the smallest handiest AT guns possible was not entirely a head-in-sand attitude of operators or the procurement system, but had real benefits if the gun could maintain a modicum of capability against tanks, and by same token a good performing intermediate caliber (between early war 25-47mm and late war >75mm) weapons like 5 or 7.5cm AT gun was definitely preferable if effective, depending on situation and enemy equipment. And even really big AT guns could still be better optimized in terms of height and silhouette than field or AA guns. But, one reason for the 8.8's success in North Africa was that typical desert mirage condition limited the problem of a high gun. It was still advisable to dig it in if possible, or else erect sandbag or rock breastworks, but the guns weren't as easy targets as they appear to be in close-up photo's.

 

Also, the 8.8's use in NA in close coordination with other forces typified German superiority in combined arms operations, which was the basic reason they overperformed compared to the quantity and quality of their equipment (tank, other vehicle, AT, arty) generally in North Africa. That also wasn't specific to the 8.8cm Flak, but the weapon tended to symbolize it.

 

As mentioned before, '88' as bogeyman to Western Allied tankers after the desert campaigns is more completely a myth, at least as far as the 8.8 Flak. 8.8cm caliber weapons encountered by Allied armor in the later campaigns was much more likely to be 8.8cm Pak or SP or tank guns of that caliber, with the 7.5cm Pak being a more common opponent still.

 

Joe

Edited January 2, 2012 by JOE BRENNAN

[scotsman]

There is no magic wand and no filtering. It becomes a matter of distinguishing vignettes from serious trends, having a certain grasp of proportionality in historical events, especially those the size of WWII. The historic record, as you call it, requires careful handling and interpretation, not skimming for favorite stories.

 

When you have read on the subject since the late 50s, performed academic studies since 1967, and studied at the graduate level in primary sources including interviews of participants since 1973, you may have a different sense of balance.

 

No different than conducting any serious documented studies for the active army at the general staff level when making acquisition or budget decisions.

 

Your proportionality ia defined by a specific historic flow of events...change the commanders and the intent at times and the flow changes...

 

No-one is skimming...I simply maintain that in the final examination its no different for any army. When there is a threat or gap whatever is handy is used to plug it. Material superiority tends to negate that need.

[scotsman]

You can imagine all you want, however, Larkhill was not responsible from training AA units or for developing AA equipment. What is the primary source for your assertion?

 

If you care to research the matter you'll find there were several ATk training pams, anti-tank gunnery was esentially the same whether in a tank, on an infantry or RA atk gun or on a field or AA gun. The correct training analogy would be small-arms training not the 'special to arm' arrangements for AA or field artillery. There were a reasonable number of full-calibre anti-tank ranges, including moving target arrangements, in UK as well as a lot of sub-calibre.

 

Having looked at the Tables of Content for all 14 RA Training Memos (1939-45) there is no explicit mention of HAA and atk, quite a lot on atk in general, often under the heading 'weaknesses', and specific mention of both 40mm and 25-pr atk.

 

However, RA Notes (monthly from Jan 43, Secret) does included some interesting items in their indexes (ignoring many general entries about Atk and non 3.7 eqpt specific atk):

'Use of Predictor No 3 v Tanks' (Feb 43), then 'Use of Predictor AA No 3 v Tanks' (Apr 43), 'German Use of AA Guns in Anti-Tank Role' (Jun 43), '3.7 AA Gun in Anti-Ship Role' (Jun 43),'Deployment of HAA agaisnt Ground and Sea Targets (Aug 43), 'AA Open sights for HAA Equipment' (Jul 43), 'Employment of 3.7" AA Guns in Field Artillery Role' (Sep 43) [this subject appears many times in the following months], finally, '3.7" AA Equipment - Deflection Gears for Anti-Tank Sighting Telescope' (Mar 44). There're no further mentions.

 

The significant point is mention of 'gears', this strongly suggests that the Atk telescope mount was quite sophisticated, as such in my view it would have been designed by Vickers or Woolwich. A School would not have had the technical capbility for such work.

 

The first ref, to Predictor No 3, is also interesting, it implies that if a HAA position came under tank attack then the predictor was used to aim the guns.

 

The source was direct consulation with larkhill over a period of months...an examination of their records (which are sparse on certain aspects) and 3.7" training conducted or authored by them...

 

Agree on the assessment of weakness in ATG gunnery training...thats confirmed by multiple sources...at least in terms of the result that it was producing initially...

 

I can see the use of the predictor in some instances as it certainly could get all the guns onto a target quickly...that would depend on battery layout and micro terrain I would imagine.

 

I have the predictor manuals, I'll have to go have a look see..

 

As for mention of gears....unsure....wouldnt have been the case for the intial tobruk sights as those were done in NA with no return of the guns to a depot. My understanding was that they simply adapted existing ATG gun telescopes to the mount...if I remember right the iron sights on one side and the tobruk sight on the other. Have to have a look see...

Edited January 2, 2012 by scotsman

[bojan]

...Germany went to war with an inadequate anti-tank gun - the 3,7cm PaK - so they had to use FlaK and field guns to survive, particularily until the 5cm and 7,5cm anti-tank guns became available in large numbers, which wasn't until 1942...

 

Soviets wee in not much better position, 45mm struggled with 30mm armor @500m and 50-60mm (stug/IIIh/IVe) was flat out of question... From unit reports those were "Heavily armored tanks immune to our AT fire. So they used field guns (76mm F-22 and F-22USV) which were not really good vs tanks due the need for two gunners. Older 76mm m.1902/30 guns were practically useless due the small traverse angle. 57mm ZiS-2 were very few (240something produced, 100 used for ZiS-30 SPG). Even older 76mm on tanks struggled vs thicker German tanks, 76mm L-11 and F-32 on early KV and early T-34 could not penetrate 60mm armor at more then 500m. there was also great deficit of 76mm AP rounds, average for arty there was 10 rounds/gun in mid-1941. dropping to ~ 5rounds/gun in September.

45mm started being reliable vs 30mm armor only in December 1941. when new redesigned ammo was introduced and vs frontal armor only when HVAP was introduced (which none agrees when it was, date varies from April 1942. to October 1943.).

 

One reason why other nations did not copy the 8,8cm FlaK or drew their heavy anti-tank guns far to the front to shoot at enemy tanks may have been that their anti-tank defenses were not quite as bad as those of the German army in 1939-1941. The big guns might have been nice to have had on some occasions, but the British, French and Soviets did not share the German experience of heavy enemy tanks driving unharmed towards your anti-tank guns, then running them over. So the need for big guns was perhaps not as pressing as it was for the Germans. Even if the odd shot from British or Soviet AT-guns pinged off the nose of a German tank with re-inforced armour, it was a problem of the same magnitude as having an anti-tank defense consisting of thousand of guns that deservedly was called doorknockers by their crews.

 

Well, at least Soviets actually had panic move in 1940. and declared 45mm obsolete (which it sort of was) stopping it's production (which hurt them a lot) and decided to have 57mm ZiS-2 as standard ATG (but production lagged) and 107mm M-60 at divisional level (and production lagged even more). No, I am not joking, they were convinced that Germans had tanks with 80-100mm front armor. 107mm M-60 was particularly interesting one as a lot of field gun functions were sacrificed for AT role, eg. elevation was limited to 45deg so that recoil mechanism could be made reliable on 0-15deg angles angles, while gun formally had two gunners there was also additional elevation wheel on left to enable AT use, shield was thicker then on 152mm M-10 howitzer (it used same carriage) etc.

There was also 85mm m.1941 ATG, which was 85mm AA-gun converted for use by single gunner and equipped with shield (which prevented elevation of more then 40deg making it useless in AA role.

They also enthusiastically used every single captured 88mm in AT role.

 

PS. here are percentages of T-34s knocked out:

 

Dangerous penetrations/damage:

Battle for Moscow, October 9th 1941. - March 15th 1942.:

Total examined/on T-34s and KVs - 230/83

150mm - 7/3

105mm - 9/5

88mm - 9/8

75mm - 18/13

45/47/50 - 69/42

37mm - 43/21

Small caliber (20mm, ATRs) - 19/5

HEAT (mostly 75mm) - 42/36

Unknown - 82/31

 

T-34s, April-September 1942:

20mm - 4.7%

37mm - 10%

50mm - 61.8%

75mm - 10.1%

88mm - 3.4%

105mm - 2.9%

128mm (12.8cm SfL I guess) - 4.7%

Unknown - 7.1%

 

T-34s, Stalingrad (fall/winter 1942/43):

50mm - 53%

75mm - 12.1%

88mm - 7.8%

Unknown - 28%

 

T-34s, Central front, Orel operation 1943:

50mm - 33.5%

75mm - 40.5%

88mm (now including Tigers)- 26%

[JOE BRENNAN]

Those numbers from Russia are interesting but not surprising in view of the figures from French campaign in which several 100 Flak 18 in Flak bns only even claimed 9 tanks. Many more claims were made by the only 33 modified (single gunner) Flak 18's issued to 3 AT bns, and there were also a handful of halftrack mounted SP guns (Flak 18 Sfl.). In that campaign, actual Flak to the front to defend against tanks wasn't so common.

 

In some of the early North Africa battles though, Flak 18's were a fairly significant % of German towed AT guns, if considered so, especially if discounting 3.7cm. For example the 5th Light Division had an establishment initially of only 9 Pak 38 5cm v 12 attached Flak 18, plus 36 Pak 35/36 3.7 cm (though there were also of course tank guns, 27 Czech vz.36 type 47mm AT on Pz.I chassis, and 12 10.5 cm howitzers). These were small battles by the standards of the French campaign, let alone Russia, but where much of the Flak 18's reputation as AT gun was gained, especially in the English speaking world.

 

Joe

Edited January 3, 2012 by JOE BRENNAN

[nigelfe]

The source was direct consulation with larkhill over a period of months...an examination of their records (which are sparse on certain aspects) and 3.7" training conducted or authored by them...

 

That doesn't compute. Larkhill didn't takeover AA until c. 1967, a decade after 3.7 left service. The Badley Library at Larkhill probably has various publications inherited from Manobier which was the AA School until transfered to Larkhill. Just because its in the library at Larkhill doesn't mean that the actions took place there or that they were written there.

[nigelfe]

A classic example of the one man laying the gun in British service were the Bohler 4.7cm guns captured by the British in the desert. 96 were adapted for one man laying from the original two man laying, a shoulder pad from the 6pdr was added as was a rifle telescope. These were then issued to airborne units as combined A-T and light field guns.

 

Not sure I'd call that 'classic', at best an interim arrangement before 6-pr on Mk 3 carriage (the problem was axle width and gliders).

[Ken Estes]

But, one reason for the 8.8's success in North Africa was that typical desert mirage condition limited the problem of a high gun. It was still advisable to dig it in if possible, or else erect sandbag or rock breastworks, but the guns weren't as easy targets as they appear to be in close-up photo's.

 

 

It is my understanding that the 88's were best dug in in N Afr, because of the desert mirage effect, which conceals objects no more than a meter high, but magnifies them above that meter. I originally read of this in Heinz Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, a good memoir by R's aide, who commanded an AT battery in the long retreat from Alamein, part of the rear guard and then Tunisia. I never read any material on desert fighting, including army manuals, that refuted his note and I often passed it to the arty as advice. Schmidt stated his 50mm guns dug in to near-muzzle level and remained unseen.

[DougRichards]

Not sure I'd call that 'classic', at best an interim arrangement before 6-pr on Mk 3 carriage (the problem was axle width and gliders).

 

It was a 'classic example' of how the Brits would even modify captured guns to one man loading. It was not a classic gun in the sense hat you are describing.

[DougRichards]

There simply was no need as there were lots of proper ATG to deal with the situation...but even in normandy...there are German documets that specifically called out the 3.7" as the #2 threat to German armor...specifically their heavies...

 

The use of 3.7" in a ground role in Normandy is pretty well documented...particualarly in counterfiring mortars with airburst...

 

Does anyone recall the instance of the German prisoner that asked to see 'the automatic 25pdr' after capture?

 

I have found a source, obviously third or fourth hand, (I have the book in book form)

 

http://books.google.com.au/books?id=MuGsf0psjvcC&pg=PA8&lpg=PA8&dq=encyclopedia+of+weapons+second+world+war&source=bl&ots=K5UBzjSFaI&sig=BnQrb5GUiaKQLR-AGZmVuPF6PoM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=cdgCT8iPNcOfiQfN3KHPAQ&ved=0CDoQ6AEwAzgK#v=onepage&q=encyclopedia%20of%20weapons%20second%20world%20war&f=false

 

that claims that the Germans used captured 3.7in guns in the coastal defence role, manufacturing specific ammunition for this role, and that at Walcheren these were responsible for sinking several landing craft.

[rmgill]

That doesn't compute. Larkhill didn't takeover AA until c. 1967, a decade after 3.7 left service. The Badley Library at Larkhill probably has various publications inherited from Manobier which was the AA School until transfered to Larkhill. Just because its in the library at Larkhill doesn't mean that the actions took place there or that they were written there.

 

It seems like he's citing their records. A great many things didn't happen at the tank museum at Bovington Camp but the records there are the best window into history as to what happened and why....

[Dave Clark]

I have found a source, obviously third or fourth hand, (I have the book in book form)that claims that the Germans used captured 3.7in guns in the coastal defence role, manufacturing specific ammunition for this role, and that at Walcheren these were responsible for sinking several landing craft.

 

I have also found a source which indicates the following:

 

In German service the gun was designated 9,4 cm Flak Vickers M 39 (e). In March 1944 there were 33 of these guns still operational, 14 of them (formed into 3 batteries) confirmed as being in Luftwaffe service according to an inventory produced by the Luftwaffe Generalquartiermeister on 1.3.1944. [COMMENT: The rest were presumably in naval service.] Most of the weapons were deployed on the Atlantic Wall, apart from several which were in use in Upper Silesia, manned in part by Luftwaffenhelfer. They were originally used with the ammunition that was captured with them. However, in 1942, as this ammunition was exhausted, a "Fuhrerbefehl" ordered the production of an additional 100 000 rounds. It was expected that after firing off this additional ammunition the barrels would be shot-out.

 

The 2 photos below show guns belonging to Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 260 located at Néville east of Cherbourg.

 

 

 

Source:

 

Müller, Werner. Beuteflak bei der Wehrmacht 1939-1945. Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Wölfersheim-Berstadt, 1995. ISBN 3-7909-0542-9-6. (Waffen-Arsenal Sonderband S-39)

 

Reason for edit: adding accent aigu

Edited January 4, 2012 by Dave Clark

[nigelfe]

It was a 'classic example' of how the Brits would even modify captured guns to one man loading. It was not a classic gun in the sense hat you are describing.

 

Having cast my eye over lots of pics of the 4.7 Boeler (both Dutch and Breda versions, and assuming that the ones captured by UK were Breda), then AFAICS this 4.7mm ATK was always one man laying. There's is no sign on any form of sight mount or traversing/elevating handwheel on the right side (and the position of the LBM would have made a sight mount on the right difficult), it's all on the left. It was a commendably light piece, but I can see that UK might well want to mount a guard on the left.

 

edit: LBM = Lever, Breech Mechanism

Edited January 4, 2012 by nigelfe

[nigelfe]

I have found a source, obviously third or fourth hand, (I have the book in book form)

 

http://books.google.com.au/books?id=MuGsf0psjvcC&pg=PA8&lpg=PA8&dq=encyclopedia+of+weapons+second+world+war&source=bl&ots=K5UBzjSFaI&sig=BnQrb5GUiaKQLR-AGZmVuPF6PoM&hl=en&sa=X&ei=cdgCT8iPNcOfiQfN3KHPAQ&ved=0CDoQ6AEwAzgK#v=onepage&q=encyclopedia%20of%20weapons%20second%20world%20war&f=false

 

that claims that the Germans used captured 3.7in guns in the coastal defence role, manufacturing specific ammunition for this role, and that at Walcheren these were responsible for sinking several landing craft.

 

Usual German practice was to use captured guns agaisnt the enemy that did not originally own them (ie captured western used on the East Front and vice versa).

[bojan]

Usual German practice was to use captured guns agaisnt the enemy that did not originally own them (ie captured western used on the East Front and vice versa).

Well, loads of ex-Soviets weapons were used on east...

[Chris Werb]

That doesn't compute. Larkhill didn't takeover AA until c. 1967, a decade after 3.7 left service.

 

57 Regt retired their 3.7s and disbanded in 1960 - not that that makes any difference. There's a picture of the disbandment parade on this site:

 

http://www.36regimentra.org.uk/id33.htm

[scotsman]

That doesn't compute. Larkhill didn't takeover AA until c. 1967, a decade after 3.7 left service. The Badley Library at Larkhill probably has various publications inherited from Manobier which was the AA School until transfered to Larkhill. Just because its in the library at Larkhill doesn't mean that the actions took place there or that they were written there.

 

All I can tell you is that as I ran the trail down thats where the trail lead to - I was doing it as a serving officer in the US Army at the time with the help and support of both active and retired British gunners to include a full colonel in the RA that served in WWII. I understand the comment but beyond what I've told you I can't help.

 

Addition: Found some of the original paperwork...The keeper at the Royal Artillery Museum (circa 2004) was one of those assisting in the hunt...specifically on the use of 3.7" AP shot...and the Royal Military college of Science at Shrivenham, that actually had a 3.7" and ammunition samples in their holdings. This is in addition to Larkhill and other artillery institutions. Found all this while doing some cleanup filing in my office,,,I'm sure theres more. I wouldnt have thrown it away...

 

The later was of no real use as I already had 3.7" HE and AP in my own collection...

Edited January 5, 2012 by scotsman

[Yama]

Usual German practice was to use captured guns agaisnt the enemy that did not originally own them (ie captured western used on the East Front and vice versa).

 

No, not really true, though such practise obviously would have lessened friendly-fire concern...captured T-34's were used mostly in Eastern Front, captured French tanks everywhere in secondary fronts (including Normandy...) etc.

[nigelfe]

All I can tell you is that as I ran the trail down thats where the trail lead to - I was doing it as a serving officer in the US Army at the time with the help and support of both active and retired British gunners to include a full colonel in the RA that served in WWII. I understand the comment but beyond what I've told you I can't help.

 

Then presumably you've read the relevant paragraphs I quoted in RA Notes. IIRC the Badley doesn't have them, but they are in the Clavell, not sure about Kew as I've never bothered to look for them there. It's useful to remember that the Badley was only established in the late 1960s (and yes I have donated a few items there).

[DougRichards]

I have also found a source which indicates the following:

 

In German service the gun was designated 9,4 cm Flak Vickers M 39 (e). In March 1944 there were 33 of these guns still operational, 14 of them (formed into 3 batteries) confirmed as being in Luftwaffe service according to an inventory produced by the Luftwaffe Generalquartiermeister on 1.3.1944. [COMMENT: The rest were presumably in naval service.] Most of the weapons were deployed on the Atlantic Wall, apart from several which were in use in Upper Silesia, manned in part by Luftwaffenhelfer. They were originally used with the ammunition that was captured with them. However, in 1942, as this ammunition was exhausted, a "Fuhrerbefehl" ordered the production of an additional 100 000 rounds. It was expected that after firing off this additional ammunition the barrels would be shot-out.

 

The 2 photos below show guns belonging to Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 260 located at Néville east of Cherbourg.

 

 

 

 

Source:

 

Müller, Werner. Beuteflak bei der Wehrmacht 1939-1945. Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Wölfersheim-Berstadt, 1995. ISBN 3-7909-0542-9-6. (Waffen-Arsenal Sonderband S-39)

 

Reason for edit: adding accent aigu

 

I wonder if they copied the ring sights from a Larkhill design?

[Ken Estes]

No different than conducting any serious documented studies for the active army at the general staff level when making acquisition or budget decisions.

 

Your proportionality ia defined by a specific historic flow of events...change the commanders and the intent at times and the flow changes...

 

No-one is skimming...I simply maintain that in the final examination its no different for any army. When there is a threat or gap whatever is handy is used to plug it. Material superiority tends to negate that need.

I finally read this one, what a laugh. One can only dream of any serious documented studies at a service headquarters. Spare me the general staff level term. Most issues don't afford the time; fast is more valued than good. The budget cycle hardly permits anything but the usual durges of agitprop calculated to make the wonderweapon or equipment shine to congressional and intraservice scrutiny. In my three years at my service HQ, I participated in no fewer than 5 'save the Osprey' and 3 'save the AAAV/AFV' campaigns, plus the usual DefBud and POM drills. Most real research is farmed out to the warfare labs or contractors. There is no sign of serious documented studies to be found. Gaming is usually substituted for fact.

 

Reminds me of what my mentor at Duke told the seminar upon his return from six months at Carlisle: "They showed me a paper, and told me, 'this is an outstanding study, forty colonels worked on it!'"

Edited January 5, 2012 by Ken Estes