Battle of Britain

[Ken Estes]

Positioning is one thing, Rich, but I'd like to see the Op Orders for those ships, forces. It is my understanding that Home Fleet would have remained ready to intercept any move by the German heavy units into the channel from the north. Rosyth had served as such a base in War I.

The need to sacrifice Home Fleet in closed waters would have required an in extremis decision. There is still the Med and E. Asia to defend at sea.

Revenge is the only heavy unit you mention otherwise, apparently assigned anti-invasion duty in Aug40. She might have been designated as a floating battery or just part of the H&I force against the ports. She was least suited of all RN heavies to operate in the presence of enemy air. The Chief Constructor considered it criminal to place those R-class ships in combat action. Likely she was detached from convoy duty as a last gasp measure, typical of desperate days, but she soon reverted to escort duty, don't know the date of that.

 

Interesting that the RN did bombardments vs French coast. Were these during daylight?

Edited October 8, 2011 by Ken Estes

[Rich]

Positioning is one thing, Rich, but I'd like to see the Op Orders for those ships, forces. It is my understanding that Home Fleet would have remained ready to intercept any move by the German heavy units into the channel from the north. Rosyth had served as such a base in War I.

The need to sacrifice Home Fleet in closed waters would have required an in extremis decision. There is still the Med and E. Asia to defend at sea.

 

I haven't seen the OPORD for the Home Fleet, but what is implied by the movements is pretty clear...and I have seen the RAF OPORD, whose mission was to attack the invasion fleet and support the operations of the RN against said fleet. Nor do I really think they were all that much worried about the "threat" to the battleships...at least from the air. The 3-inch armor deck of Revenge was essentially impervious to penetration although not of course to blast damage, if hit by the common Luftwaffe SC (GP) or SD (SAP) bombs (as was later proven by the hits on Warspite and Valiant at Crete). The PC (AP) bombs are different but were just becoming available in late 1940. But each Ju-87-B2 could carry at most one PC-500 (500 kg) bomb. The Luftwaffe had virtually no torpedo capability and any U-Boote that ventured into the Channel was essentially dead meat.

 

In any case, there was virtually no German heavy units at this time for her to intercept, and the RN seemed to be pretty well aware of that. Bismarck was just entering sea trials in the Baltic, and G&S were both out of action until December. Scheer was also in sea trials after a major rebuild until 23 October, Lutzow was in repair for damage until June 1941, and only Hipper was considered a threat...but unknown to the RN on 30 September after a four-week stint in Wilhelmshaven for maintenance she suffered a major engine casualty that put her out of action until 28 October. So a BC, two BBs, and the rest at Rosyth were a bit of overkill to keep a single CA under wraps.

 

Revenge is the only heavy unit you mention otherwise, apparently assigned anti-invasion duty in Aug40. She might have been designated as a floating battery or just part of the H&I force against the ports. She was least suited of all RN heavies to operate in the presence of enemy air. The Chief Constructor considered it criminal to place those R-class ships in combat action. Likely she was detached from convoy duty as a last gasp measure, typical of desperate days, but she soon reverted to escort duty, don't know the date of that.

 

Revenge was never planned as a floating battery, unless you count bombarding France as making her a floating battery? However, those were not intended as H&I attacks, she was clearly intended to cause as much destruction as possible. She was also directed to intercept variouus minelaying and other German forces in the Channel in concert with her attached Cl and DD force a couple of times, but missed the small groups of German ships she was directed against, something that wasn't likely to happen with a slow procession of 2,000-odd tugs and barges in convoys. Oddly though, the attempts to direct her against the ship movements screwed each of the bombardment missions so they weren't as effective as they might otherwise have been.

 

Interesting that the RN did bombardments vs French coast. Were these during daylight?

 

Nope, she sortied at night and a couple of times was intended to work in concert with Bomber Command attacks, but coordination was poor overall.

 

Cheers!

[Archie Pellagio]

That noted, when it is fully loaded freeboard is awfully low and I wonder how they would handle any other then almost perfect weather...

 

 

Bear in mind this is the same body of water the Top Gear boys managed to cross in a Toyota Hilux fitted with an outboard motor...

[Rich]

The Germans recognized that they couldn't survive the RN, and so insisted on mine belts on each side of the invasion path. So, the battle would be fought when the mines were laid, and the RN came out to sink the minelayers, not when the German Army crossed the channel. The Germans only need to protect their minelayers and sink the mine clearance vessels, not sink the whole RN. In the near total absence of the RAF, that's at least arguably possible. By the time of the crossing the battle's largely over.

 

Oh yes, the German mine plan. The problem is, they had virtually no capacity to emplace the mines the plan required, in terms of either minelayers or the mines to be laid, while the RN had the most robust mineclearing capability, a legacy of their Great War experience, of any navy in the world.

 

The Mine Barrier (Minesperren) Plan

 

West Group –

From Cherbourg: Tannenberg (460 mines), Cobra (180 mines), Togo (225 mines?), Schwerin (280 mines), and Schiff 23 (later known as Stier, an auxiliary cruiser)

From Le Havre: Stralsund (World War I reparation to France, re-commissioned by the KM, 420 mines) and Skaggerak (180)

Total capacity was probably about 1,850 mines. They were responsible for laying 8 barriers of various lengths, two off Plymouth, two of Portsmouth, and 4 off Brighton.

 

East Group –

From Ostende: Grille (280 mines), Roland (400 mines), Preußen (a pre-World War I Baltic ferry and auxiliary minelayer, 400 mines), and Königin Luise (240 mines)

From Antwerp: Hansestadt Danzig (360 mines), Kaiser (World War I auxiliary minelayer, 200 mines), and Brummer (280 mines)

Total capacity was 2,160 mines and there were about 12,000 mines in KM inventory. They were responsible for laying 18 barriers of various lengths off Dover.

 

Evaluation of the Mine Barrier Plan by Jürgen Rohwer in “Chronik des Seekriegs”:

 

“The effect of this loss [of two British destroyers in a minefield on 31 August, a third was damaged] on the British side was hardly to be underestimated. However not just in terms of demoralization. The British units also had orders to place mines in order to disturb the approach of the invasion fleet. It may be assumed that with the beginning of Seelöwe operations the landing area would have been mined within the shortest time by English side, and that German mine search and clearing units would have been as helpless.

 

Contrary to the other armed services [i.e., OKH and OKL] the OKM evaluation of the value of the mine barriers was extremely critical. They objected that the barriers would only remain effective, if the British could be prevented from clearing them. To do that required the strengthening of the Kriegsmarine covering forces for a long period. In hindsight it has to be stated that they [i.e., OKH and OKL] did not make any allowance for the clearing of the mine barriers by the British as they did for the Germans.”

 

The actual barriers laid were:

 

SW 1, 2, 3, and 0 all laid in August and not really part of the Seelöwe plan, but usually counted as part of the plan. They were all laid parrallel to the French and Belgian coast running essentially from SW to NE, sequentially beginning with SW 3, mid-Channel, due east of the Thames estuary.

 

Planned barriers were:

A1 and A2, two short parallel lines southeast of the Isle of Wight, running SW to NNE, roughly 15 and 30 kilometers long.

 

B1, 2, 3, and S were to be laid as a nearly continuous but somewhat overlapping line from Beachy Head S and then running SSE towards the French coast near Fecamp, roughly 100 kilometers in length. As such it would have neatly cut off all vessels from Cherbourg and Le Havre that were engaged in landing ops west of Beachy Head from being supported by friendly forces east of the barrier and vice versa.

 

C1, 1a, 2, 3, and S filling the space between Dover-Calais and SW 3. C1 ran roughly WSW to ENE for about 25 kilometers, starting about 15 kilometers NE of Dover. C1a apparently was planned as three parallel rows between Dover and Calais from nearly shore to shore, roughly 40 kilometers. C2 ran the same direction and length as an extension of C1 starting a few kilometers N of the E end of C1. And C3 was a 15 kilometer link between the end of C2 and SW3. CS was two parallel rows running E from Ramsgate about 20 kilometers. There were also a series of four 'V' fields with each leg about 5 kilometers long running parallel to the coast between Dunkirk and Ostend, apparently designed to keep the British from approaching those ports to closely.

 

D1 and D2 which were similar to A1 and 2, but running NNW to SSE offshore from Dartmouth.

 

All told, roughly 450 kilometers of mines. Now, given that they could lay perhaps 4,000 at most at a time, then the density either would be a miniscule 11-12 per kilometer or it would require a long time run-up to lay them....and even with the 12,000-odd actually available, including air-dropped the density at best would be perhaps 26 per kilometer. That isn't insignificant, but it means that basically only the Dover-Calais field was really close to a 'barrier' - if it could be laid and maintained.

 

Presumably the British try to clear paths through the minefields on the invasion day, but presumably the Germans would move U-boats to the cleared paths. Also, the RN can't dodge the Stukas and Ju-88s and Me-110s while in the lanes through the minefield, so they are predictable targets.

 

It was well known to the KM by this time that placing a U-Boote in the Channel was the best way to get it sunk or put out of action for weeks...and aside from the totally ineffective ducks, at the beginning of August there were only 18 U-Boote available. Two new boats became operational during the month, but, two were lost and two old boats were retired as training vessels, leaving 16 available at the beginning of September. Another three became operational in September giving a maximum of 19 available (and the strength did not change in October, one joined but one was lost, leaving 19.

 

And yes, the British would have swept the minefields quite handily. There were six fleet minesweepers at Scapa, and literally dozens of MMS scattered around each of the British ports - they were extremely paranoid about ports being closed by mines.

 

The size of the minefields would have to be huge. Its not clear that its even sane to expect German industry to be able to produce the necessary number of mines.

 

Pretty much; IIRC the "plan" called for about five times the number of mines than the Germans actually had in inventory.

 

Cheers!

[DougRichards]

Bear in mind this is the same body of water the Top Gear boys managed to cross in a Toyota Hilux fitted with an outboard motor...

 

So the invasion forces could have driven across the Channel in Volkswaggons?

[Nobu]

Manned by a zombie crew, no doubt, since she was resting on the bottom at Ormoc bay...

Sent there by USN daylight airstrikes with no fighter opposition.

[Nobu]

What, pray tell, is an "air dominance situation"? How do you expect it to come into play over Britain?

Fulfillment of the air prerequisites for Sealion to the satisfaction of the Army, Navy and Hitler. There will be no invasion without Luftwaffe air dominance.

 

BTW, how do you expect your "fighters to be freed from the bomber escort"? Oh, and how many do you expect are "possibly bomb carrying" given that the bomb racks for the Bf 109 weren't generally available until winter 1940? Are you planning on invading England at Christmas?

Luftwaffe fighters freed from the bomber escort mission if the RAF does not provide nominal fighter cover will likely expend their ammunition on targets of opportunity versus returning to base with full armament loads. If unable to carry bombs, British targets both on the ground and in the water are not off the hook. They will be strafed. Without nominal British fighter interference, strafing damage will increase. Bf110s would seem particularly suited for this.

 

No, I did not. I have presented you with facts, to which you have replied with bogus, unsupported numbers that you insist on recasting as you see fit to support your assinine presumptions.

I have accepted most of your numbers in this discussion both immediately and without challenge. This includes your more accurate RAF sortie total of 2300 versus my incorrect total of 4500+. Taken directly from Wikipedia.

 

What I did challenge was your complete omission of the impact of the RAF, and especially Fighter Command, in a discussion of the damage inflicted on RN destroyers by the Luftwaffe in the context—which you provided—of Dunkirk.

 

I challenged your omission of critically important context in your claims of how much time and how much flying weather the Luftwaffe had to inflict that damage: partial days of flying weather on May 29 and 31. The RN decision to withdraw its most valuable destroyers from the evacuation effort after May 29. The RN decision that evacuation could only be continued at night after June 1.

 

Let there be no mistaking the relevance of this last element of context from your own perspective, for you begin your very next paragraph with the following words:

So for SEALION you have effectively one day, sorry, mostly night since the landing has to be at dawn

As far as your unwillingness to consider excluding Luftwaffe sorties not aimed at naval targets from your calculations of Luftwaffe sortie per sink and damage ratios, and your reasoning as to why, I cannot agree with them.

[Nobu]

By Mid 1940 the British had armed trawlers escorting convoys in the Channel. Many of those trawlers being crewed by 'British citizens' who were previously trawlermen. Many of the members of the RNR who crewed MGB and MTB were those whose love of the sea in more peaceful times lead them to sail yachts and pleasure craft. These men also knew the Channel well.

 

They were not superhuman, but Britain had a longer tradition of seafaring than those of the Kaiser. They may not have gone out to stab, club and shoot German soldiers, sailors and airmen in the water, BUT they were prepared to crew such vessels as the Fairmile B, some of which were the only 20kt MTBs, and a sign of what the British were prepared to put to sea in in 1940 in case of invasion, or the Harbour Defence Motor Launch, 12kt vessels with an armament out of WW1 (3pdr, 20mm and 2X .303 Lewis).

 

These were the boats, and the crews, that were prepared to put themselves in harms way.

To take nothing away from British seafaring tradition, if Sealion is on, the Luftwaffe is overhead in dangerous force, and seeking to cause destruction. The RAF is nowhere in sight. These boats and crews will be required to fly British colors as a means of identification I presume.

 

Those colors will be used to identify targets and as an aiming point for strafing Luftwaffe fighters, which feature the heavy punch of cannon. Harm will come as a result.

Edited October 8, 2011 by Nobu

[DougRichards]

To take nothing away from British seafaring tradition, if Sealion is on, the Luftwaffe is overhead in dangerous force, and seeking to cause destructon. The RAF is nowhere in sight. These boats and crews will be required to fly British colors as a means of identification I presume.

 

Those colors will be used to identify targets and as an aiming point for strafing Luftwaffe fighters, which feature the heavy punch of cannon. Harm will come as a result.

 

They would expect that, just like off Dunkirk. They would still venture out, and would also be able to increase the amount of metal going up, at the same time as meaning that those straffing fighters cannot be available to deal with the RAF aircarft that are also thrown into the battle. Even Bf109 cannot be dealing with two targets at once.

 

If Unternehmen Seelöwe was 'on' the British would operate in the same way that the Germans did when their territory was threatened. You would see everything from Hawker Hart trainers, Miles Masters, Westland Lysanders, Fairy Battles, Blenheins, Avro Ansons, Short Sunderlands, and every other type flown by Training Command and Coastal Command thrown in to the battle.

 

Losses would have been horrendous, admittedly,

 

But each one would still have had to be dealt with by German forces.

[Nobu]

However, the losses at Dunkirk and Crete did not have an effect on the British decsion to complete the operation. In both cases it was decided the risk was worth it. So, given that, does it make sense that they would make the decision not to defend the Channel approaches regardless of loss and abandon Britain to its fate?

Being in a situation where a position must be held regardless of losses is going to have repercussions if the enemy has a chance of making those losses real.

 

There has been mention of the theory that the British were willing to fight fanatically, perhaps even to the last man, against Sealion, in defense of the homeland. Was there a precedent or any sign for this in the fighting up to this point? I am not discounting the possibility, but not completely convinced of it either. The Channel Islands fell without incident.

[Ken Estes]

Well, Churchill for one did wish to defend the Channel Islands but was disuaded of this by the RN, pointing out the impossibility of maintaining communications in the face of ... German air power.

[MiloMorai]

Being in a situation where a position must be held regardless of losses is going to have repercussions if the enemy has a chance of making those losses real.

 

There has been mention of the theory that the British were willing to fight fanatically, perhaps even to the last man, against Sealion, in defense of the homeland. Was there a precedent or any sign for this in the fighting up to this point? I am not discounting the possibility, but not completely convinced of it either. The Channel Islands fell without incident.

Take a look at a map and it is obvious why the British didn't contest the occupation of the Channel Islands.

[Rich]

Fulfillment of the air prerequisites for Sealion to the satisfaction of the Army, Navy and Hitler. There will be no invasion without Luftwaffe air dominance.

 

Sorry, but that does not answer the question and is also incorrect. Hitler laid out five prerequisites. They were:

 

1. The English Air Force must be beaten physically and morally to a point that they cannot put up any show of attacking force worth mentioning.

2. Lanes will be swept through the mined waters.

3. The Straits of Dover must be cut off on both flanks by a thickly laid minefield and the Western entrance of the Channel in a line about from Alderney to Portland will be blocked as well.

4. The coastal area on the immediate front will be held under fire by strong coastal artillery to form an artillery screen.

5. It will be an advantage to pin down English Naval forces, shortly before the operation, in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean (by the Italians) and an attempt will now be made to cripple naval forces based in England by air and torpedo attacks.

 

Now, aside from the simple fact that the Germans were incapable of achieving any of those prerequisites, and never did in fact achieve them, the initial prerequisite does not describe a condition of dominance - dom•i•nate/ˈdäməˌnāt/Verb: 1.Have a commanding influence on; exercise control over

2.Be the most important or conspicuous person or thing in - but rather a condition of air superiority; "having sufficient control of the air to make air attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and, on the other hand, to be free from the danger of serious enemy air incursions." (Col John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign Planning for Combat, National Defense University Press Publication, 1988).

 

Also in any case, you are describing the prerequisite, but not how the Germans are supposed to get there - you are putting the cart before the horse.

 

I have accepted most of your numbers in this discussion both immediately and without challenge. This includes your more accurate RAF sortie total of 2300 versus my incorrect total of 4500+. Taken directly from Wikipedia.

 

You've "accepted" them? How nice. Why can't you get them right then? The figures are 2,307 and 3,835. Or, to put it in in wargaming terms, 1.66:1.

 

What I did challenge was your complete omission of the impact of the RAF, and especially Fighter Command, in a discussion of the damage inflicted on RN destroyers by the Luftwaffe in the context—which you provided—of Dunkirk.

 

"My complete omission"? I stated quite clearly the parameters I was using "In terms of Stuka effectiveness, at Dunkirk 806+ Stuka, 1,010 bomber, and 20 Hs-123 sorties resulted in the loss of 9 DD and damage to 19 of 56 employed. Over the course of nine days. During daylight. With decent weather on all but two days. In confined waters. With the DD often halted or barely moving. With probably close to 300 Stuka serviceable." You then replied with bogus sortie figures for the RAF and I in turn corrected them.

 

In the meantime, you still haven't explained how the Germans are supposed to achieve this so-called "air dominance"?

 

I challenged your omission of critically important context in your claims of how much time and how much flying weather the Luftwaffe had to inflict that damage: partial days of flying weather on May 29 and 31. The RN decision to withdraw its most valuable destroyers from the evacuation effort after May 29. The RN decision that evacuation could only be continued at night after June 1.

 

And I answered. To which you have still failed to explain how the Germans are supposed to achieve this so-called "air dominance"?

 

BTW, don’t think I didn’t notice your latest attempt to twist reality. There was never any “decision” by the RN to “withdraw its most valuable destroyers from the evacuation effort after May 29” and in fact they continued to participate in that effort to its very end.

 

“Sunday, 2 June, British Force K was formed for the final operations off Dunkirk. The destroyers were sent to Dunkirk to embark troops in pairs. Destroyer WINDSOR embarked 493 troops on her first trip and destroyer ICARUS embarked 677 troops… Destroyer CODRINGTON embarked 878 troops and destroyer SABRE embarked 756 troops. Destroyer SHIKARI embarked 470 troops. Destroyer ESK was to have accompanied her, but was unable to sail due to having been in continuous duty since 27 May.

 

The next pair was destroyers WINCHELSEA and WHITSHED. Destroyer WINDSOR on her second trip embarked 624 troops. French destroyers EPERVIER and LEOPARD operated on the patrol line, but withdrew when German bombing began at 1035.” http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4006-19JUN01.htm

 

Oh, excuse me, I thought that the “evacuation could only be continued at night after June 1”?

 

“Monday, 3 June, Destroyers ESK embarked 611 troops at Dunkirk, WHITSHED embarked 444, VENOMOUS embarked 1200, VANQUISHER embarked 414, MALCOLM embarked 736, SABRE embarked 592, SHIKARI embarked 383, minesweepers KELLET embarked 30, ALBURY embarked 400, HALCYON embarked 501, LEDA embarked 500, patrol sloop GUILLEMOT embarked 460, gunboat LOCUST embarked 196. “

 

Let there be no mistaking the relevance of this last element of context from your own perspective, for you begin your very next paragraph with the following words:

 

What, pray tell, does a German requirement for SEELÖWE have to do with a British decision for DYNAMO? The German requirement is actually a British advantage in the context of an invasion of Britain. And you have still failed to explain how the Germans are supposed to achieve this so-called "air dominance"?

 

As far as your unwillingness to consider excluding Luftwaffe sorties not aimed at naval targets from your calculations of Luftwaffe sortie per sink and damage ratios, and your reasoning as to why, I cannot agree with them.

 

Sigh, you cannot agree, but you also cannot contradict. Nor am I unwilling “to consider excluding Luftwaffe sorties not aimed at naval targets”, I simply cannot nor can anyone else. However, what I have done is show the various scenarios quite clearly, something you have failed to do entirely, and you have still failed to explain how the Germans are supposed to achieve this so-called "air dominance"?

[Assessor]

To take nothing away from British seafaring tradition, if Sealion is on, the Luftwaffe is overhead in dangerous force, and seeking to cause destruction. The RAF is nowhere in sight. These boats and crews will be required to fly British colors as a means of identification I presume.

 

Those colors will be used to identify targets and as an aiming point for strafing Luftwaffe fighters, which feature the heavy punch of cannon. Harm will come as a result.

Any ship would only have to show its true colours immediately before opening fire. Flying a false flag was an accepted ruse de guerre in naval warfare.

[Assessor]

Oh yes, the German mine plan. The problem is, they had virtually no capacity to emplace the mines the plan required, in terms of either minelayers or the mines to be laid, while the RN had the most robust mineclearing capability, a legacy of their Great War experience, of any navy in the world.

 

The Mine Barrier (Minesperren) Plan

 

West Group –

From Cherbourg: Tannenberg (460 mines), Cobra (180 mines), Togo (225 mines?), Schwerin (280 mines), and Schiff 23 (later known as Stier, an auxiliary cruiser)

From Le Havre: Stralsund (World War I reparation to France, re-commissioned by the KM, 420 mines) and Skaggerak (180)

Total capacity was probably about 1,850 mines. They were responsible for laying 8 barriers of various lengths, two off Plymouth, two of Portsmouth, and 4 off Brighton.

 

East Group –

From Ostende: Grille (280 mines), Roland (400 mines), Preußen (a pre-World War I Baltic ferry and auxiliary minelayer, 400 mines), and Königin Luise (240 mines)

From Antwerp: Hansestadt Danzig (360 mines), Kaiser (World War I auxiliary minelayer, 200 mines), and Brummer (280 mines)

Total capacity was 2,160 mines and there were about 12,000 mines in KM inventory. They were responsible for laying 18 barriers of various lengths off Dover.

 

Evaluation of the Mine Barrier Plan by Jürgen Rohwer in “Chronik des Seekriegs”:

 

Cheers!

 

Despite everything you've just said, I feel sure that someone is going to point out that these dozen or so old scows, some of which can make the collossal speed of twelve knots flat out with a following wind, are simply going to bimble back and forth a number of times, entirely unhindered, and the forty-odd submarines in UK waters aren't going to even bother any of them.

[Rich]

Being in a situation where a position must be held regardless of losses is going to have repercussions if the enemy has a chance of making those losses real.

 

This is getting more than a bit tiresome...yes, yes, yes, I know that you have a forte for stating the blindingly and fatuously obvious, but you still haven't explained how the Germans are supposed to achieve this so-called "air dominance"?

 

There has been mention of the theory that the British were willing to fight fanatically, perhaps even to the last man, against Sealion, in defense of the homeland. Was there a precedent or any sign for this in the fighting up to this point? I am not discounting the possibility, but not completely convinced of it either. The Channel Islands fell without incident.

 

I do have to admire your ability to turn virtually everything you post into a strawman. No one has argued that a fight to the "last man" was neccessary, except you, just now. Shep854 mentioned that "withdrawal was not an option" and made his "backs to the wall" comment as a response to your unsupported claims. Which you have still failed to support. Just how are the Germans supposed to achieve this so-called "air dominance"?

 

 

BTW, the "Channel Islands fell without incident" because they were undefended and indefensible not because they were "unwilling to fight fanatically". Britain on the other hand was both well defended and eminently defensible.

[Rich]

Despite everything you've just said, I feel sure that someone is going to point out that these dozen or so old scows, some of which can make the collossal speed of twelve knots flat out with a following wind, are simply going to bimble back and forth a number of times, entirely unhindered, and the forty-odd submarines in UK waters aren't going to even bother any of them.

 

Probably. Of course, they have to explain then how they are going to lay mines they don't have while "bimbling", how the mines they don't have are going to be laid at speeds and densitites the available ships can't achieve, and where forty-odd submarines that aren't there and don't exist in those numbers are going to effect anything? Oh, and it would be nice if they explained how the Luftwaffe is supposed to achieve "air dominance"?

 

Cheers!

[BillB]

Being in a situation where a position must be held regardless of losses is going to have repercussions if the enemy has a chance of making those losses real.

 

There has been mention of the theory that the British were willing to fight fanatically, perhaps even to the last man, against Sealion, in defense of the homeland. Was there a precedent or any sign for this in the fighting up to this point? I am not discounting the possibility, but not completely convinced of it either. The Channel Islands fell without incident.

Yes, Take a look at the fight to hold the Channel ports perimeter to cover the evacuation. There area also the preparations for carrying on the fight had the Germans gotten across the Channel; for an idea of how far they were willing to go look up stuff about the secret Auxiliary Units and what they were tasked to do.

 

BillB

Edited October 8, 2011 by BillB

[Rich]

They would expect that, just like off Dunkirk. They would still venture out, and would also be able to increase the amount of metal going up, at the same time as meaning that those straffing fighters cannot be available to deal with the RAF aircarft that are also thrown into the battle. Even Bf109 cannot be dealing with two targets at once.

 

Aside from the simple fact that straffing was ineffective. The Germans attempted to engage British MTB and MGB during the Channel battles numerous times and failed to sink or significantly damage a single one. Later, the British found that the 20mm Polsten and Oerlikon guns carried on fighters were essentially ineffective against standard steel-hull constructed vessels in terms of actually doing damage. Of course that means their plan to engage invasion barges with the few cannon armed fighters they could muster was futile as well, but then that was never an important factor.

 

If Unternehmen Seelöwe was 'on' the British would operate in the same way that the Germans did when their territory was threatened. You would see everything from Hawker Hart trainers, Miles Masters, Westland Lysanders, Fairy Battles, Blenheins, Avro Ansons, Short Sunderlands, and every other type flown by Training Command and Coastal Command thrown in to the battle.

 

Yep, BANQUET, including war gases.

 

Losses would have been horrendous, admittedly,

 

But each one would still have had to be dealt with by German forces.

 

Yep again.

 

Cheers!

[Chris Werb]

I have a few issues with the idea of moving u-boots to the swept lanes.

 

1) How would the swept lanes be identified in a meaningful way and it's location sent to a u-boot?

 

2) How long would it take RN combatants to go through the breaks in the minefield?

 

3) How many of those breaks would there be? (IIRC all RN destroyers, and possibly cruisers of that period carried paravanes - capital ships had done so in WW1 and perhaps still did)

 

4) How fast would the u-boat move?

 

5) How effective would u-boats have been, presumably submerged (RN ASW aircraft would be dropping flares) at night, vs high speed, manoeuvering targets laying down a smokescreen, given that they'd only get the one chance?

[mnm]

Bear in mind this is the same body of water the Top Gear boys managed to cross in a Toyota Hilux fitted with an outboard motor...

 

Too bad the Top Gear boys didn't work for Eisenhower. In the same body of water...

 

Only a few days in each month were suitable for launching the operation: a day near the full Moon was needed both for illumination during the hours of darkness and for the spring tide, the former to illuminate navigational landmarks for the crews of aircraft, gliders and landing craft, and the latter to provide the deepest possible water to help safe navigation over defensive obstacles placed by the Germans in the surf on the seaward approaches to the beaches. A full moon occurred on June 6. Allied Expeditionary Force Supreme Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower had tentatively selected 5 June as the date for the assault. The weather was fine during most of May, but deteriorated in early June. On 4 June, conditions were clearly unsuitable for a landing; wind and high seas would make it impossible to launch landing craft from larger ships at sea, and low clouds would prevent aircraft finding their targets. The Allied troop convoys already at sea were forced to take shelter in bays and inlets on the south coast of Britain for the night.

[Chris Werb]

Aside from the simple fact that straffing was ineffective. The Germans attempted to engage British MTB and MGB during the Channel battles numerous times and failed to sink or significantly damage a single one. Later, the British found that the 20mm Polsten and Oerlikon guns carried on fighters were essentially ineffective against standard steel-hull constructed vessels in terms of actually doing damage.

 

Not sure about this one. A lot of those barges (my wife grew up on one) were cast iron and quite brittle. They also had incredibly low freeboard and the troops and equipment inside them would often be vulnerable to strafing. In ETO Mustangs sank quite a few Rhine barges with 0.50 fire and batteries of 0.50s were effective against warships up to at least DD size in the PTO - particulary in the SW Pacific. Was POLSTEN ever used in an aircraft installation or available in mid `40? Are you sure you're not thinking Hispano? I'd have to defer to Tony, but a Hispano with Solid shot would surely be a serious proposition against shipping. I've just read 'Banff Strike Wing' and the 20mm Hispano was clearly thought an effective anti shipping weapon off Norway in the latter part of WW2.

[Marek Tucan]

Aside from the simple fact that straffing was ineffective. The Germans attempted to engage British MTB and MGB during the Channel battles numerous times and failed to sink or significantly damage a single one. Later, the British found that the 20mm Polsten and Oerlikon guns carried on fighters were essentially ineffective against standard steel-hull constructed vessels in terms of actually doing damage. Of course that means their plan to engage invasion barges with the few cannon armed fighters they could muster was futile as well, but then that was never an important factor.

 

Dunno 'bout that, one would think that strafing tightly packed barges would be somewhat effective - not necessarily by sinking them, true, but those on board won't like that I believe...

[Nobu]

This is getting more than a bit tiresome...yes, yes, yes, I know that you have a forte for stating the blindingly and fatuously obvious

I could be mistaken, but it rather sounds like you are enjoying yourself a bit. I and perhaps others get exposure to excellent data and sources from you in the process, as well as better understanding, as discussion continues. There is no downside to incorrect ideas getting debunked and even ridiculed.

 

I am willing to reconsider my assertions that the most valuable RN destroyers were not withdrawn after punishment dealt by the Luftwaffe to the evacuation effort on May 29. What I have read so far after you state: “There was never any “decision” by the RN to “withdraw its most valuable destroyers from the evacuation effort after May 29” is all over the place, including an order reversing(?) such a withdrawal order. Your breakdown of damage to RN destroyers on May 31 was also welcomed: “…and five were damaged by grounding in the shallow waters or striking debris, two were damaged by colliding with one another, and one was damaged by running into a quay.” I would point out, however, that British seamanship has been described to me in earlier this thread as being of superb quality. You yourself asserted that destroyers were "often halted or barely moving." But evidently colliding, grounding, striking debris, running into each other at a high enough speed to cause damage, and running into a quay. This sounds like panic-stricken maneuvering in the face of powerful and deadly danger. Apparently the Luftwaffe was raising serious hell down there.

 

My belief coming in that 5 cruise liners were sunk by Stuka attack on a single day of air operations over Dunkirk was clearly incorrect. 5 passenger ships of varying sizes were hit and sunk. My assertion of 4500+ RAF sorties over Dunkirk was clearly incorrect. I certainly don’t accept those assertions as accurate now, and have no plans to use them again.

 

Likewise, I doubt you will omit mention of the impact of the RAF in the context of the discussion you entered into ever again. At least not without considering the possibility of its omission being challenged before you immediately begin asking if I'd like to leave Dunkirk for a look at Crete or Norway.

 

Obvious? The tone of the discussion so far has been that a “Regardless of loss” stance would be a plus for British chances of successfully defending the homeland. Wasteful Japanese infantry assault tactics into the strength of devastating U.S. Marine firepower were so counterproductive that the practice was ordered stopped later due to bitter experience and a grudging realization that idiotic delusions both were no match for firepower and turned bad to worse. These idiotic delusions persisted, however, and such orders were at times disobeyed.

 

If the British end up learning such lessons the hard way, in a situation where British land and sea commanders with backs to the wall might even as Shep 854 also mentioned willfully disobey orders, if Training Command is thrown into the battle manning inferior airframes in a Luftwaffe air dominance situation as mentioned in the general discussion in another post, “regardless of loss” could lead to events that could end up being called turkey shoots. These would not help British prospects. Idiotic delusions will not save Britain. What will? Facts such as your description of Germany's minelaying capacity.

 

On a lighter note, you seemed to be somewhat in a hurry to leave Dunkirk and set up shop on Crete, both in your immediate reply and subsequent follow-up. Which would no doubt increase understanding of that battle and be welcomed by all. And where I presume the RAF contribution may accurately be described more to your liking (aka, completely ignored if you can get away with it).

Edited October 8, 2011 by Nobu

[Nobu]

Take a look at a map and it is obvious why the British didn't contest the occupation of the Channel Islands.

I did. It looks like an island accessible by a fast-moving RN destroyer in daylight without air cover.

 

Correction, a few islands. Similarly accessible.

Edited October 8, 2011 by Nobu