Battle of Britain

[RETAC21]

Nobu is right: we could argue about what were the objectives of the RN considering the situation that it faced, and to what extent those were determined by the LW control of the air, but what is clear is that:

 

-The RN could not totally prevent the naval landings of Axis reinforcements.

-The RN could only reinforce the garrison, and deliver supplies to the Island in a very limited matter

-The RN could not prevent the deliver of supplies by sea (and that was the way that the majority of supplies reached Crete)

-The LW control of the air greatly limited the number of troops that could be evacuated, and then some were lost on the way to Egypt.

 

That is so, but the battle was won/lost on the ground. If the battleground was Britain:

 

- The RN could prevent the initial landings due to the huge disparity of forces (the LW could attack or support the ground troops but not both simultaneously)

- The RN wouldn't need to reinforce anything - all their forces could be devoted to anti-invasion work

- The RN wouldn't need to secure supply lines more than they were.

- The LW control of the air would only be relevant to stopping the RN or supporting the paratroopers/survivors of the Channel crossing, it could do one, not both.

[Marek Tucan]

Plus when trying to protect the invasion force, LW would have to get vwry good in target recognition, as no matter how ould they start to be miraculously good at hitting fast moving destroyers, they won't stop RN from getting some of them in the invasion area.

[Nobu]

Plus when trying to protect the invasion force, LW would have to get vwry good in target recognition, as no matter how ould they start to be miraculously good at hitting fast moving destroyers, they won't stop RN from getting some of them in the invasion area.

The idea that RN miracle class destroyers will be invulnerable to air attack in a confined sea under Luftwaffe air dominance sounds like a corollary to its concept of fighting planes with ships.

[Mk 1]

The idea that RN miracle class destroyers will be invulnerable to air attack ...

I'm not sure where this idea that the RN would have to be "invulnerable" comes from, other than as a straw-man construction.

 

The RN doesn't have to be invulnerable. It only has to get a small portion of its available warships through to ruin the invasion or re-supply effort.

 

Let us look at the Luftwaffe's history. By mid-1940, how many occasions can we find where they destroyed more than 40 destroyers and a dozen cruisers in one day?

 

And how many times had they done that in one night?

 

Oh, that's right, they never had. Nor had any other air arm, of any nation.

 

So why all this chest-beating about the mighty mighty Luftwaffe? The task was impossible for them to perform, even IF they were at their anti-shipping warfare peak, which they most certainly were not in 1940.

 

-Mark 1

[Rich]

The idea that RN miracle class destroyers will be invulnerable to air attack in a confined sea under Luftwaffe air dominance sounds like a corollary to its concept of fighting planes with ships.

 

Hmm, given that it didn't require miracles for destroyers to survive air attacks in confined waters, whether under Luftwaffe attack or someone else, but that it did require a miracle for a Stuka command decimated in combat to be operational in the timeframe for SEALION, I think I may have to ask you for your evidence supporting your miraculous requirement?

 

Between 13 August and 7 September the strength of the Stukageschwadern shrank from 365 on hand and 286 serviceable (78.4%) to 174 on hand and 133 serviceable (76.4%). On 13 August the three Stukageschwadern and nine Gruppen were operational in the West:

 

Stab, I, II, III/StG 1

Stab, I, II/StG2

Stab, I, II, III/StG 77

IV (St.)/LG 1

 

On 7 September three Geschwardern, but only four Gruppen ,were active:

 

Stab, II/StG 1

Stab, II/StG2

Stab, I/StG 3

IV (St.)/LG 1

 

By 26 October I/StG 1 was operational again, but that is too late for SEALION.

 

In terms of Stuka effectiveness, at Dunkirk 806+ Stuka, 1,010 bomber, and 20 Hs-123 sorties resulted in the loss of 9 DD and damage to 19 of 56 employed. Over the course of nine days. During daylight. With decent weather on all but two days. In confined waters. With the DD often halted or barely moving. With probably close to 300 Stuka serviceable.

 

So for SEALION you have effectively one day, sorry, mostly night since the landing has to be at dawn, to stop nearly the same number of destroyers that are free to maneuver at speed (the waters are "confined" for the Germans, not for the RN in this case), with less than half the force that has lost many of its most capable crews.

 

Doesn't require miracle class destroyers...sorry.

 

Do you want to look at Norway or Crete?

 

Cheers!

[Nobu]

Hmm, given that it didn't require miracles for destroyers to survive air attacks in confined waters

It would take rather less than a miracle for them to be harmed by air attack in a confined sea under Luftwaffe air dominance.

 

In terms of Stuka effectiveness, at Dunkirk 806+ Stuka, 1,010 bomber, and 20 Hs-123 sorties resulted in the loss of 9 DD and damage to 19 of 56 employed.

This ignores that the Luftwaffe was operating not in a condition of air dominance, but against a first-class outfit called the RAF over Dunkirk, whose efforts likely had more to do with the hit rate of 28 RN miracle class DDs out of 56 than you give it credit for.

 

Over the course of nine days. During daylight. With decent weather on all but two days. In confined waters. With the DD often halted or barely moving. With probably close to 300 Stuka serviceable.

Against 4500+ sorties flown by the RAF over the same timespan of flying weather.

 

Weather report:

 

May 27: Fine weather

May 28: Poor flying weather

May 29: Poor flying weather until 2 p.m.

 

RN loses 3 miracle class DDs sunk and 7 more damaged in a single afternoon after 2 p.m. 5 cruise liners and many other smaller ships hit and sunk. The most modern and valuable RN DDs are withdrawn from the battle by British Admiralty due to excessive losses this afternoon. Possibly stemming from trying to fight planes with ships.

 

May 30: Poor flying weather

May 31: Poor flying weather until the afternoon. Total Stuka sorties for the entire day: zero.

June 1: Fine weather.

 

4 more RN DDs and many other evacuation vessels sunk despite the presence of RAF Fighter Command in strength. Admiralty forbids daylight evacuation efforts after this experience. Possibly stemming from trying to fight planes with ships.

 

June 2: Night evacuation

June 3: Night evacuation

June 4: Night evacuation

[Marek Tucan]

The idea that RN miracle class destroyers will be invulnerable to air attack in a confined sea under Luftwaffe air dominance sounds like a corollary to its concept of fighting planes with ships.

 

Erm... Invulnerable? Why?

 

Besides maybe you missed what I was hinting at, so read again. Target. Recognition. Y'know, the confined waters would be full of targets... Most of them Germans. JW didn't have that great track record wrt own ship, and here in situation when everyone and their dog are maneuvering like mad, with all the smoke and excitement... True, after few hours they may be sure that the only DDs operating in Channel are Royal Navy.

 

Besides, if Seelöwe begins, LW has to switch from neutralising airfields, so RAF fighters come back from the North.

 

Besides your magical Stukas took severe beating already, and if they try to catch RN DDs, they cannot support troops. So invasion force's screwed once again.

[shep854]

Nobu, while RN warships would definitely be "harmed" and in numbers, keep in mind that this would have been a classic "back to wall" event, and damaged British ships would stay in the fray, fighting until the last gun was underwater. If this sounds grandiose, remember that those Brit crews would be defending their very homes and families. Withdrawal would not have been an option.

[DougRichards]

Nobu, while RN warships would definitely be "harmed" and in numbers, keep in mind that this would have been a classic "back to wall" event, and damaged British ships would stay in the fray, fighting until the last gun was underwater. If this sounds grandiose, remember that those Brit crews would be defending their very homes and families. Withdrawal would not have been an option.

 

Think of the example, and google if you don't know the name of : "HMS Jervis Bay", on a scale beggaring modern understanding as to being what RN crews would do in the Channel in case of invasion.

 

If the Royal Navy, and a whole of of fishermen, yachtsmen, pleasure craft owners and the like risked everything for the evacuation at Dunkirk then imagine what this lot would do if they saw the Hun crossing the water. I would not put it past over-the-hill Home Guard units with nothing more than rifles and Northover Projectors to commandeer 'pleasure craft' and venture out just to see what they could do to hurt the Bosch.

[shep854]

Think of the example, and google if you don't know the name of : "HMS Jervis Bay", on a scale beggaring modern understanding as to being what RN crews would do in the Channel in case of invasion.

 

If the Royal Navy, and a whole of of fishermen, yachtsmen, pleasure craft owners and the like risked everything for the evacuation at Dunkirk then imagine what this lot would do if they saw the Hun crossing the water. I would not put it past over-the-hill Home Guard units with nothing more than rifles and Northover Projectors to commandeer 'pleasure craft' and venture out just to see what they could do to hurt the Bosch.

There's also the "Small Boys" off Samar, and they were "just" protecting other warships.

 

When protecting one's own, the Japanese had no corner on ferocity.

[swerve]

Nobu, while RN warships would definitely be "harmed" and in numbers, keep in mind that this would have been a classic "back to wall" event, and damaged British ships would stay in the fray, fighting until the last gun was underwater. If this sounds grandiose, remember that those Brit crews would be defending their very homes and families. Withdrawal would not have been an option.

Not so. There was an option, in the last resort, to abandon the UK & withdraw what could be saved to Canada. The core of "what could be saved" would have been the Royal Navy (carrying the contents of the Bank of England & the royal family), plus, of course, every merchant ship that could put to sea, & every aircraft with the range to hop via the northern islands across the Atlantic.

 

That would have been an extremely interesting situation. I think the dominions & empire had the industrial resources to maintain the navy, but probably not to expand it, & they certainly couldn't fight Germany unaided. There would also have been the question of how many of the colonies the Germans & Italians could have been kept out of, & what India would have done. Holding it if it rebelled would not have been an option: an accommodation would have to be made with Congress, hopefully dominion status, or at least full independence with a commitment to some degree of mutual defence. The threats were enough for it to be sensible for India's leaders to sign up to that, though they wouldn't necessarily have seen it like that.

Edited October 5, 2011 by swerve

[shep854]

Not so. There was an option, in the last resort, to abandon the UK & withdraw what could be saved to Canada. The core of "what could be saved" would have been the Royal Navy (carrying the contents of the Bank of England & the royal family), plus, of course, every merchant ship that could put to sea, & every aircraft with the range to hop via the northern islands across the Atlantic.

 

That would have been an extremely interesting situation. I think the dominions & empire had the industrial resources to maintain the navy, but probably not to expand it, & they certainly couldn't fight Germany unaided. There would also have been the question of how many of the colonies the Germans & Italians could have been kept out of, & what India would have done. Holding it if it rebelled would not have been an option: an accommodation would have to be made with Congress, hopefully dominion status, or at least full independence with a commitment to some degree of mutual defence. The threats were enough for it to be sensible for India's leaders to sign up to that, though they wouldn't necessarily have seen it like that.

I see your point that contingency plans were in place, but the engaged units would likely have been considered a "forlorn hope" and fought on to buy time for the evacuation you mention, and exact as high a price as possible. In any withdrawal under fire, somebody has to stay behind and hold as long as possible.

[swerve]

True, but in this case evacuation would not have been ordered until it was clear the invasion had succeeded, & the Wehrmacht was storming across England.

 

I'm not at all sure that capital ships would have been thrown in to battle in the straits en masse. Too vulnerable to e-boats & bombs there, & if lost, we'd be done for anyway.

[RETAC21]

True, but in this case evacuation would not have been ordered until it was clear the invasion had succeeded, & the Wehrmacht was storming across England.

 

I'm not at all sure that capital ships would have been thrown in to battle in the straits en masse. Too vulnerable to e-boats & bombs there, & if lost, we'd be done for anyway.

 

 

Some were clearly of the "expendable" type, namely, the Revenges:

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Catherine

 

Same goes for cruisers of WW1 vintage. This is a bit later (being Jan 1941) but it shows the dispositions around the Channel:

 

http://www.naval-history.net/xDKWW2-4101-26RNHome.htm

 

And we have not mentioned the MTB flotillas.

 

 

 

 

 

[Rich]

This ignores that the Luftwaffe was operating not in a condition of air dominance, but against a first-class outfit called the RAF over Dunkirk, whose efforts likely had more to do with the hit rate of 28 RN miracle class DDs out of 56 than you give it credit for.

 

Oh dear me, but you seem to have confused me with someone who doesn't know WTF they're talking about.

 

Against 4500+ sorties flown by the RAF over the same timespan of flying weather.

 

Like this bit of silliness, probably cribbed from any one of a half-dozen Wiki-linked pages. Those figures, well, actually 4,822 which is the correct figure, are for all RAF sorties over France for the period 26 May-4 June The German figures are for 27 May through 2 June, for sorties over Dunkirk, so not the "same timespan" - or area - at all. In the same timespan RAF sorties totaled 2,307 over Dunkirk. Although mind you I'm not sure just how productive the sorties by No. 2 Group (388) and Bomber Command (155) were at intercepting Luftwaffe attack sorties.

 

Furthermore, you seem to have missed that I was accounting only for Luftwaffe strike sorties. During the same period, the Jagdwaffe flew 1,595 sorties and the Zerstörerwaffe flew 405. In terms of gaining "air dominance" the score was RAF 746 Spitfire, 906 Hurricane, and 112 "other" (mostly Defiant) sorties from 11 Group, a total of 1,764, versus 1,595 Bf 109 and 405 Bf 110 sorties, a total of 2,000.

 

Weather report:

 

May 27: Fine weather

May 28: Poor flying weather

May 29: Poor flying weather until 2 p.m.

 

How odd, I think I just said the same thing? Of course, it hardly explains why on 27 May, with fine weather the Luftwaffe flew 545 sorties while on 29 May, with most of the day gone due to poor flying weather , they managed 760. And 455 during the poor flying weather of 31 May.

 

RN loses 3 miracle class DDs sunk and 7 more damaged in a single afternoon after 2 p.m. 5 cruise liners and many other smaller ships hit and sunk. The most modern and valuable RN DDs are withdrawn from the battle by British Admiralty due to excessive losses this afternoon. Possibly stemming from trying to fight planes with ships.

 

"Cruise liners"? Are you serious?

 

Yes, the RN lost three destroyers on the 29th. Mind you, the first, WAKEFUL, with 600 troops on board, was torpedoed and sunk at 0136 by S-30 a Schnellboote close to North Kwinte Buoy and the second, GRAFTON, was torpedoed and badly damaged by U-62 a U-Boote, while halted and rescuing WAKEFULs survivors, and was later scuttled. The third, GRENADE, was sunk at 1602 by German bombing (hurrah!) while along the east mole at Dunkirk…in other words, she wasnt moving.

 

May 30: Poor flying weather

May 31: Poor flying weather until the afternoon. Total Stuka sorties for the entire day: zero.

 

Why yes, but 195 bomber sorties, which did manage to hit 12 vessels, sinking seven. Included were five destroyers damaged (one was French) by German bombing, but another was damaged by German artillery, and five were damaged by grounding in the shallow waters or striking debris, two were damaged by colliding with one another, and one was damaged by running into a quay.

 

June 1: Fine weather.

 

4 more RN DDs and many other evacuation vessels sunk despite the presence of RAF Fighter Command in strength. Admiralty forbids daylight evacuation efforts after this experience. Possibly stemming from trying to fight planes with ships.

 

Sure… Destroyer KEITH (already damaged the previous day) was damaged by the near miss of a bomb and then was finished off at 0915 by a third attack. Mind you, she was stationary for both of those. HAVANT was badly damaged at 0905 in German bombing off Dunkirk and sank under tow five miles from West Buoy. BASILISK was immobilized by near misses from German bombing at 0800, was badly damaged again by German bombing at Dunkirk at 1258 and was later scuttled. French destroyer FOUDROYANT was sunk in German air bombing off Dunkirk. Oh, wait, she was French, so that should be three RN.

 

June 2: Night evacuation

June 3: Night evacuation

June 4: Night evacuation

 

Uh, yeah, night…mind you, 305 sorties on 2 June did manage to hit seven vessels, sinking one, and an unknown number of sorties hit two on 3 June, but sinking none.

 

Unfortunately though, the effectiveness of the Luftwaffe against mostly stationary or slow moving vessels wasnt all that great. A total of 94 vessels of significant size were lost or sunk and 77 were damaged. In addition, 5 blockships were deliberately sunk.

 

Of those lost:

 

51 were primarily due to bombing/air attack;

11 were abandoned;

9 were to unknown causes

8 were to mines;

7 were to collisions;

4 were to S-Boote;

3 were to shore guns;

1 was to U-Boote; and

1 was to mine or torpedo.

 

Of those damaged:

 

46 were primarily due to bombing/air attack;

19 were to collisions;

7 were to fouling;

3 were to shore guns;

1 was to mines; and

1 was to S-Boote.

 

Those sunk by type and/or tonnage included 37 Naval and Naval Auxiliary Vessels (approx. 22,833 tons total: 617 tons average):

 

9 DD (13,244 tons total: 1,472 tons average)

1 gunboat (585 tons)

1 Armed Boarding Vessel (1,877 tons)

1 Auxiliary AA Vessel (1,110 tons)

14 minesweepers (4,271 tons total: average 305 tons approx.)

3 ASW trawlers (1,584 tons total: average 526 tons)

3 LCM (approx. 102 tons total: 30-37 tons each, average 34 tons)

5 LCA (approx. 60 tons total: 11-13.5 tons each, average 12 tons)

 

And 57 Merchant Vessels (approx. 57,369 tons: 1,006 tons average):

18 steamers (48,851 tons total: 2,714 average tons)

7 tugs (1,876 tons)

4 fishing trawlers (1,304 tons total: 326 average tons)

2 miscellaneous vessels (1,463 tons total: 731 average tons)

4 fishing boats (139 tons total: 35 average tons)

18 drifters and sailing barges (1,736 tons total: 96 tons average approx.)

4 canal motor boats (est. 2,000 tons total: 500 tons average)

 

On 27 May it took 100 German bombing sorties to inflict one loss sunk or damaged, on 28 May it took 9.375, on 29 May 13.871, on 30 May 7.5, on 31 May 16.25, on 1 June 17.321, and on 2 June 43.571. Or 11.5 sorties per loss or damaged. That at least was a better performance than the anti-shipping campaign from 3 September to 9 April 1940, which netted 15 merchantmen (31,663 GRT), 17 trawlers, and 5 minesweepers for 820 sorties (and 39 aircraft lost) or 22.16 per sortie. Mind you, it didnt get any better later either, from August 1940 through June 1941 the Luftwaffe flew 1,530 dedicated anti-ship and 3,236 minelaying sorties against the British merchant marine, mostly when they were in harbor in east coast ports, but sank only 20 ships of 71,566 GRT, while damaging 148 of 693,446 GRT. Yes, one hit per 28.4 sorties.

 

So anyway, would you care to actually address the other points I made regarding the attrition of the Stukas, or are you only interested in silly buggers bullshit?

 

Cheers!

Edited October 5, 2011 by Rich

[Nobu]

It was not? did you told the German mountain troops that drowned when the RN intercepted their convoys? You realise no significant German force made it to Crete by sea, so you?

"The operations of the last 4 days have been nothing short of a trial of strength between the Mediterranean Fleet and the German Air Force...I am afraid that in the coastal area we have to admit defeat and accept the fact that losses are too great to justify us in trying to prevent seaborne attacks on Crete. This is a melancholy conclusion, but it must be faced. As I have always feared, enemy command of the air, unchallenged by our own air force, and in these restricted waters, with Mediterranean weather, is too great odds for us to take on except by seizing opportunities of surprise and using the utmost circumspection."

 

Admiral Andrew Cunningham

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet

May 24, 1941

 

(Clark A. The Fall of Crete. Page 119)

 

Edited for date

Edited October 6, 2011 by Nobu

[Nobu]

I'm not sure where this idea that the RN would have to be "invulnerable" comes from, other than as a straw-man construction.

 

From the following statement.

Plus when trying to protect the invasion force, LW would have to get vwry good in target recognition, as no matter how ould they start to be miraculously good at hitting fast moving destroyers

 

I would agree that the chances of a successful Sealion are low to almost non-existent, and that the Royal Navy would be a dire threat to seaborne landing and resupply attempts.

 

I would argue that if the Luftwaffe has achieved air dominance, it will make the Royal Navy pay dearly for daylight naval operations in confined waters, and that achievement of Royal Navy missions under such conditions is not guaranteed.

[Nobu]

Erm... Invulnerable? Why?

Because of your assertion that fast-moving destroyers could only be harmed by the Luftwaffe by miracles.

 

I would agree that if significant German casualties and targets are in the water in close proximity to RN ships, the Luftwaffe will hesitate to press home attacks.

 

The Luftwaffe will do its utmost to exact its toll beforehand and afterward in daylight without British air interference. Expect harm to come the Royal Navy's way as a result.

[Archie Pellagio]

Does nobody think it would occur to the Germans that they too would realise the threat posed by the Royal Navy and perhaps switch the bombing campaign towards them also as the D-Day for Seelowe approched?

Surely the idea of bombing ships in port can't have been that alien to the LW...

[Nobu]

Nobu, while RN warships would definitely be "harmed" and in numbers, keep in mind that this would have been a classic "back to wall" event, and damaged British ships would stay in the fray, fighting until the last gun was underwater. If this sounds grandiose, remember that those Brit crews would be defending their very homes and families. Withdrawal would not have been an option.

No argument from me on your first point, and I see where you are coming from on your second.

 

I must add, however, that taking away options to withdraw, no matter the reason or how rational the benefit, sounds like a prescription for a pyrrhic victory, and even disaster.

[RETAC21]

Does nobody think it would occur to the Germans that they too would realise the threat posed by the Royal Navy and perhaps switch the bombing campaign towards them also as the D-Day for Seelowe approched?

Surely the idea of bombing ships in port can't have been that alien to the LW...

 

See Rich's post above, they did:

 

from August 1940 through June 1941 the Luftwaffe flew 1,530 dedicated anti-ship and 3,236 minelaying sorties against the British merchant marine, mostly when they were in harbor in east coast ports, but sank only 20 ships of 71,566 GRT, while damaging 148 of 693,446 GRT. Yes, one hit per 28.4 sorties.

 

It's just that they weren't too good at it.

[DougRichards]

Does nobody think it would occur to the Germans that they too would realise the threat posed by the Royal Navy and perhaps switch the bombing campaign towards them also as the D-Day for Seelowe approched?

Surely the idea of bombing ships in port can't have been that alien to the LW...

 

Ports, and particularly RN bases, were probably protected by the heaviest ack ack defences of any British targets.

 

Overall, the British coast wasn't too badly protected by a range of coastal artillery, and anti-invasion artillery.

 

Numerous US 75mm guns of various marks were received and emplaced as anti-invasion weapons to cover beaches and approaches. These guns could not be described as 'coastal artillery' as they had no fire control that could be used against shipping, but would have been very useful against barges and armoured vehicles on the beaches.

[Nobu]

Think of the example, and google if you don't know the name of : "HMS Jervis Bay", on a scale beggaring modern understanding as to being what RN crews would do in the Channel in case of invasion.

By this standard, an example of valor from the Luftwaffe, just as incomprehensible to modern understanding, would be a good indicator of what unchallenged air power would do to these RN supermen crews in the Channel in daylight.

 

If the Royal Navy, and a whole of of fishermen, yachtsmen, pleasure craft owners and the like risked everything for the evacuation at Dunkirk then imagine what this lot would do if they saw the Hun crossing the water.

The fishermen, yachtsmen, and pleasure craft owners of the Channel Islands saw the Germans crossing the water. They did not do anything to interfere with the German troop landing that I know of.

 

I would not put it past over-the-hill Home Guard units with nothing more than rifles and Northover Projectors to commandeer 'pleasure craft' and venture out just to see what they could do to hurt the Bosch.

I cannot envision private British citizens sailing out on their own to shoot, club, and stab shipwrecked German sailors, soldiers, and airmen en masse as they cling to wreckage and lifebelts the water. This should be taken as a compliment.

 

There are plenty of rational reasons why Sealion will likely fail. Delusions of superhuman British fighting ability are not one of them.

Edited October 6, 2011 by Nobu

[shep854]

No argument from me on your first point, and I see where you are coming from on your second.

 

I must add, however, that taking away options to withdraw, no matter the reason or how rational the benefit, sounds like a prescription for a pyrrhic victory, and even disaster.

By "withdrawal not an option", I was referring to personal decisions to fight to the death, defending home & hearth. Orders for engaged units to break contact and withdraw would likely have stretched even the legendary RN discipline. At the very least, there likely would have been sudden "communications failures", if not direct disobedience. Remember, the British sailors would have been fighting for home & hearth. I agree with you that had landings been successful, the RN would not continue to throw ships (and crews) away.

 

Had HM government been forced to evacuate, though, I seriously doubt that the King and Crown Prince would have left; noblesse oblige would have demanded they stay (and die fighting).

Edited October 6, 2011 by shep854

[Assessor]

Ports, and particularly RN bases, were probably protected by the heaviest ack ack defences of any British targets.

 

Overall, the British coast wasn't too badly protected by a range of coastal artillery, and anti-invasion artillery.

 

Numerous US 75mm guns of various marks were received and emplaced as anti-invasion weapons to cover beaches and approaches. These guns could not be described as 'coastal artillery' as they had no fire control that could be used against shipping, but would have been very useful against barges and armoured vehicles on the beaches.

 

 

There were about forty RN, Norwegian, Dutch and Polish submarines in UK waters. Even a quarter of them getting into contact with the invasion fleet would wreak havoc.