Hypothetical War : Contest For The Spratleys

[Josh]

On 10/27/2023 at 4:23 AM, RETAC21 said:

"Some marginal overhead imagery" no, read the links, both the Germans and the Israelis had accurate intelligence of the enemy preparations, and what you seem to miss time and again, for some reason, is that massing a landing fleet can be done in the open as neither the US nor Taiwan are going to execute a pre-emptive attack.

I don't think the Germans were unaware there was a landing attempt. I think they were unaware of when and where that attempt would occur. I don't think they needed a lot of photo recon to figure out one was coming. As for Israelis, it is a lot easier to stage a ground assault with little warning than a landing. Realtime satellite intelligence is a thing now; I'm confident the Germans could have identified Normandy as the target and I bet the Yom Kippur war wouldn't have acheived tactical or operational surprise if you tried it now.

I'm sure the PRC could easily stage a surprise attack against everyone in the region with basically no warning. I think they would not be able to follow that up with a landing for many days or more likely weeks. Though I as I noted, they might well opt for something less than a full invasion and adopt some kind of military operation that simply made Taiwan's position untannable - bombardment followed by blockade and seizure of the outlying islands, perhaps the Batanes as well. There would be a lot of options well short of full invasion that would have less severe failure modes for the PRC. For the PRC to win, the US either doesn't get involved or does get involved and suffers a military defeat. China doesn't need to be in possession of Taiwan to be able to ultimately absorb it; if either of the above two criteria are met then it likely is matter of negotiating the annexation regardless of whether there are any Chinese troops on the island itself.
 

On 10/27/2023 at 4:23 AM, RETAC21 said:

Further, it can be done several times to lull an opponent into complacency or they can use decoys to mislead an opponent, despite real time satellite imagery, because there's a big difference between seeing something and doing something about it.

Well I'll worry about that when I see China actually mobilize its commercial shipping on an army corps level. Their training cycles to date are far short of that, and I think they would struggle to hold such an exercise without a lot off economic pain and US/Taiwan/Japan mobilizations.

[Josh]

On 10/27/2023 at 4:46 AM, RETAC21 said:

This map misrepresents the Taiwanese coast by a lot, that huge West coast is just about a continuous landing beach, with only 30 Km or so of mudflats. It also ignores the Penghu islands as staging zones or the capability developed by the PLA to now create off axis threats to Taiwan East coast. To believe that every single beach will be covered by artillery is delusional, mainly because Taiwanese artillery is hopelessly outdated:

"As of 2019, the ROC Army's current artillery in service consists of M109A2 and M109A5 systems, 8 inch M110A2 self-propelled howitzers and 155mm M114 towed howitzers. These systems have exceeded their service life with the oldest being the M114, which has been in service for 68 years, while the youngest artillery system, the M109A5, has been in service for 21 years. The last artillery system that entered service is the M109A5s, which are ordered in 1996 and taken delivery in 1998."

The map might over simplify, but it isn't just mudflats that aren't accessible: there's plenty of coastal terrain that is also sufficiently rocky that landing ships couldn't beach. That wouldn't preclude tracked amphibious vehicles from rolling into the coast and hovercraft would have even more access, especially on the mudflats and river deltas. But without LST beaching or Ro/Ros dropping ramps onto a pier, that isn't going to sustain an axis of advance.

You don't really need very modern artillery if you know exactly where you want to shoot at, though I agree it is shocking that it is a travesty Taiwan hasn't adopted more modern systems.

[RETAC21]

2 minutes ago, Josh said:

1) I don't think the Germans were unaware there was a landing attempt. I think they were unaware of when and where that attempt would occur. I don't think they needed a lot of photo recon to figure out one was coming. As for Israelis, it is a lot easier to stage a ground assault with little warning than a landing. Realtime satellite intelligence is a thing now; I'm confident the Germans could have identified Normandy as the target and I bet the Yom Kippur war wouldn't have acheived tactical or operational surprise if you tried it now.

2) I'm sure the PRC could easily stage a surprise attack against everyone in the region with basically no warning. I think they would not be able to follow that up with a landing for many days or more likely weeks. ...

Well I'll worry about that when I see China actually mobilize its commercial shipping on an army corps level. Their training cycles to date are far short of that, and I think they would struggle to hold such an exercise without a lot off economic pain and US/Taiwan/Japan mobilizations.

1) You mean, just like the most modern surveillance systems in the World warned and stopped the attack by Hamas on Oct 7th? 

2) Yes, but they can do it (days, maybe, weeks, no way), and the same "pain" would be felt most of all, by Taiwan, which would need to bring its economy to a standstill to mobilize its army (its 25 infantry brigades are all mobilization units) - this in itself would be a PRC victory if a US response could be avoided. 

Neither is likely IMO, because it amounts to the military adventurism that Putin has thoroughly discredited.

[RETAC21]

2 minutes ago, Josh said:

The map might over simplify, but it isn't just mudflats that aren't accessible: there's plenty of coastal terrain that is also sufficiently rocky that landing ships couldn't beach. That wouldn't preclude tracked amphibious vehicles from rolling into the coast and hovercraft would have even more access, especially on the mudflats and river deltas. But without LST beaching or Ro/Ros dropping ramps onto a pier, that isn't going to sustain an axis of advance.

You don't really need very modern artillery if you know exactly where you want to shoot at, though I agree it is shocking that it is a travesty Taiwan hasn't adopted more modern systems.

Look at sat imagery, you will see most of the coast is in fact quite accesible to landing boats, ships and vehicles, if there's an obstacle it would be the rice paddies. Re. zeroed artillery, transparent battlefield. It doesn't work in Ukraine and it wouldn't work in Taiwan.

[Josh]

On 10/27/2023 at 4:52 AM, RETAC21 said:

The PLA, on paper, is vastly superior to Russia in terms of ISR and has already exercised some of it over Taiwan: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/pla-army-deploys-new-armed-recon-drone-around-taiwan-island-report/

At the same time, Taiwan itself recognizes it lacks enough missiles: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/03/08/taiwan-aims-to-sink-half-of-a-chinese-invasion-fleet-it-could-take-years-to-buy-enough-missiles/?sh=387378fc1aa0

"it could be 2025 before Taiwan finally gets its new Harpoon trucks. And 2026 or later before it gets enough missiles fully to arm each truck.

The original plan for “Project Swiftness” was for Taiwan to acquire the launchers and missiles in 2023 and ‘24. But according to Up Media, delays on the American side and budget constraints on Taiwan’s part have combined to push back the full acquisition.

...

Despite recent Taiwanese purchases of American F-16 fighters and M-1 tanks and Taipei’s ambitious effort to develop a new submarine, today China has more and better conventional forces than Taiwan possesses. Taipei no longer can count on defeating an invasion fleet far from the island’s shores."

 

I fully expect China's suppression efforts to be successful than Russia's, even only given the weight of mass. But at the same time, I doubt either one of us expected Ukraine to still have anything like an intact air defense or have any planes flying at all, and that points to the problems of "on paper" vs real life. Even the US efforts at suppression have often been rather disappointing in practice; see the Scud Hunt or Serbia. Taiwan has its own surface launched anti shipping missiles, including dual mode subsonic ones and supersonic examples. And if the US is involved, thousands of a cruise missiles and soon other more exotic weapons. The Chinese defense/suppression effort really has to be on its game on day 1; it won't be able to adjust for failure later.

[Josh]

On 10/27/2023 at 4:58 AM, RETAC21 said:

I don't, because I am saying that it doesn't need to be done covertly. It can be done openly, and increasingly, the PLA is doing just that, boiling the frog little by little.

If you want to look at history, I would point out that no invasion on this scale was ever repelled, and only 2 failed for lack of proper preparation, insufficient force, poorly chosen landing points and general incompetence: Gallipoli and Anzio (and note that in Anzio the landing force wasn't pushed back to the sea, and at Gallipoli it was a voluntary withdrawal).

The reason why is obvious, by picking up the landing point, the attacker will always be able to mass more forces than the defender, and the defender concentration will be hampered by aerial observation (since air superiority is a pre-requisite).

Fair enough, but I just don't think historical comparisons apply with modern ISR. Tactical surprise might still be accomplished temporarily, but achieving operational, let alone strategic surprise don't seem like achievable goals at this level.

[Josh]

5 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

1) You mean, just like the most modern surveillance systems in the World warned and stopped the attack by Hamas on Oct 7th? 

Hamas's effort involved the mobilization of thousands of  individuals and a few piece of heavy equipment across a few dozen kilometers of front. A Chinese invasion would involve crossing >100km of water with tens of thousands of troops in the first wave. If Taiwan shared a border with China I would agree there is no way they would know what was coming. For another analogy I doubt South Korea would have any indications it was under attack until practically after its first defense line had been overwhelmed. The water obstacle adds a lot of complexity though.

 

5 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

2) Yes, but they can do it (days, maybe, weeks, no way), and the same "pain" would be felt most of all, by Taiwan, which would need to bring its economy to a standstill to mobilize its army (its 25 infantry brigades are all mobilization units) - this in itself would be a PRC victory if a US response could be avoided. 

Neither is likely IMO, because it amounts to the military adventurism that Putin has thoroughly discredited.

I'm not sure China is in a place economically where it has the clear upper hand in that case, and I'm not sure Taiwan would take the risk of not mobilizing regardless. But I also am definitely not assuming that China won't ultimately go this route anyway.

Perhaps we can agree that without a lot of shaping and preparation exercises, China can not currently hope to achieve surprise?

[Josh]

9 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

Look at sat imagery, you will see most of the coast is in fact quite accesible to landing boats, ships and vehicles, if there's an obstacle it would be the rice paddies. Re. zeroed artillery, transparent battlefield. It doesn't work in Ukraine and it wouldn't work in Taiwan.

The mechanics a beach landing are bit different than the Ukraine invasion. I would presume that much like Normandy, every beach has a pre-existing fire plan and that all units need to be told is the number/name of said fire plan. The coastal interface is a fixed transition point that the Russians didn't have to deal with in their invasion.

[X-Files]

This 12+ year old thread is based on OSINT, which if we're creating a wargame some speculation is required about 'what we don't know we don't know'. 

 

That said is why we broach rumors (aka RUMINT or Rumor Intelligence).  If Beijing has anti-submarine traps in the Taiwan Strait and has actually been 'hoisted on their own Petard',  ONI/Pentagon certainly isn't going to let on that they know or HOW they know what happened. 

So consider that an [? OBSTACLE ?] counter when you're running up your OOB for HARPOON 2024.

 

Edited October 30, 2023 by X-Files

[futon]

On 10/27/2023 at 8:58 PM, RETAC21 said:

The frog is boiled slowly:

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5028001

There are some reports about observations of carrier Shandong by JMSDF vesssels in the waters south and/or east of Taiwan.

From April 7th to April 9th, Carrier Shandong was with a Type 52D, two Type 54A, and a replenisher, and conducted about 80 takeoffs with fighter aircraft and about 40 with helicopters.

https://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2023/p20230410_01.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjVnaXpwJ2CAxWysFYBHdh4DOMQFnoECCMQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2jD9wGQ51ExY-FU616-0Oa

The carrier group was later joined by a Type 55 destroyer and went further into the Pacific somewhat towards the Mariana Islands. Finishing up by April 24th, carrying out a total of about 620 takeoffs by fighters/helicopters. The carrier group was observed by JS Akebono.

https://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2023/p20230425_01.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjVnaXpwJ2CAxWysFYBHdh4DOMQFnoECCQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1ntmodJML17WmBqPJkQZOt

 

 

On September 13th and 14th, Carrier Shandong along with two Type 52Ds, two Type 54As, and a replenisher, carried out about 40 fighter rakeoffs and 20 helicopter take offs. It was observed by JS Ariake. On September 15th it headed to the South China Sea.

https://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2023/p20230915_05.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjorL_e4p2CAxVLaPUHHeiTDDMQFnoECA4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2k4xP5xU9ivhlVxxpMMBgX

 

So then movement by the carrier since from your article, carrier Shandong with two Type 52Ds and two Type 54As practicing takeoffs on October 28th. Observed by JS Sazanami.

https://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2023/p20231028_01.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwi5y8yP5J2CAxVGMN4KHTKuAP8QFnoECAwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Kb1GOajQk6kXPCshsWIXF

 

[Josh]

5 hours ago, X-Files said:

This 12+ year old thread is based on OSINT, which if we're creating a wargame some speculation is required about 'what we don't know we don't know'. 

 

That said is why we broach rumors (aka RUMINT or Rumor Intelligence).  If Beijing has anti-submarine traps in the Taiwan Strait and has actually been 'hoisted on their own Petard',  ONI/Pentagon certainly isn't going to let on that they know or HOW they know what happened. 

So consider that an [? OBSTACLE ?] counter when you're running up your OOB for HARPOON 2024.

 

I just don't find the report of the submarine casualties that credible. IMO, it would be rather suicidal for the USN to let its boats operate in the straight in wartime even without any kind of ASW obstacles outside the more typical bottom mines.

[RETAC21]

22 hours ago, Josh said:

Perhaps we can agree that without a lot of shaping and preparation exercises, China can not currently hope to achieve surprise?

Yep, definitely

[RETAC21]

6 hours ago, futon said:

There are some reports about observations of carrier Shandong by JMSDF vesssels in the waters south and/or east of Taiwan.

From April 7th to April 9th, Carrier Shandong was with a Type 52D, two Type 54A, and a replenisher, and conducted about 80 takeoffs with fighter aircraft and about 40 with helicopters.

https://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2023/p20230410_01.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjVnaXpwJ2CAxWysFYBHdh4DOMQFnoECCMQAQ&usg=AOvVaw2jD9wGQ51ExY-FU616-0Oa

The carrier group was later joined by a Type 55 destroyer and went further into the Pacific somewhat towards the Mariana Islands. Finishing up by April 24th, carrying out a total of about 620 takeoffs by fighters/helicopters. The carrier group was observed by JS Akebono.

https://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2023/p20230425_01.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjVnaXpwJ2CAxWysFYBHdh4DOMQFnoECCQQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1ntmodJML17WmBqPJkQZOt

 

 

On September 13th and 14th, Carrier Shandong along with two Type 52Ds, two Type 54As, and a replenisher, carried out about 40 fighter rakeoffs and 20 helicopter take offs. It was observed by JS Ariake. On September 15th it headed to the South China Sea.

https://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2023/p20230915_05.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjorL_e4p2CAxVLaPUHHeiTDDMQFnoECA4QAQ&usg=AOvVaw2k4xP5xU9ivhlVxxpMMBgX

 

So then movement by the carrier since from your article, carrier Shandong with two Type 52Ds and two Type 54As practicing takeoffs on October 28th. Observed by JS Sazanami.

https://www.google.co.jp/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://www.mod.go.jp/js/pdf/2023/p20231028_01.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwi5y8yP5J2CAxVGMN4KHTKuAP8QFnoECAwQAQ&usg=AOvVaw3Kb1GOajQk6kXPCshsWIXF

 

Thanks, that's pretty intensive given that Liaoning is being refitted, so it seems that the PLAN is not letting up on the pilot qualifications. Of course, they need a lot of pilots with 3 carriers coming up...

[RETAC21]

Just dropping this here: https://www.aerosociety.com/news/red-dragon-flankers/

[Nobu]

On 10/29/2023 at 5:14 PM, Josh said:

Perhaps we can agree that without a lot of shaping and preparation exercises, China can not currently hope to achieve surprise?

What is puzzling/interesting is that they don't seem to be interested in it.

This makes some sense if their primary goal is in fact not military (OVERLORD 2023), but political (preventing a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence).

[futon]

They can practice in a decentralized way an inversion of Taiwan, for example the Taipei capital building neighborhood mock up. It's been made no later than 2015. They also already have practiced using civilian ferries to load up military vehicles. 

At some point, they may very well start practicing force buildups. In which case, the example of the Russian buildup of forces "just for training" in December 2021 through to January and February 2022 that came before Russia's invasion in February 2022 will be hardly remembered. 

On the economic side, while de-risking/decoupling does make sense to do sinse without it, the PRC is continually fed towards to being more of a better shape faster a domanant role in the region and globally. And given the statements and attitude the PRC has had thus far, its not logically that losing deep and wide global economic links would deter it from engaging in "unification rejuvenation". But what derisking/decoupling also does is reduce the consequential impact the PRC would face. So de-risking/decoupling only slows the inevitable. It's probably not enough to put a cap on rising PRC power to cross a threshold of attempting the seizing of Taiwan. A very, very tense standoff seems inevitable. 

[Josh]

23 minutes ago, Nobu said:

What is puzzling/interesting is that they don't seem to be interested in it.

This makes some sense if their primary goal is in fact not military (OVERLORD 2023), but political (preventing a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence).

Actually this one area where I agree with Glenn…if China was truly serious about an invasion, it would start mass producing landing ships that were point to point capable on top of the civilian fleet it keeps in being. IMO China wants a hypothetical capability to invade but isn’t willing to spend the effort on a truly uncompromising invasion posture. I think they are looking/hoping for a window in which the US isn’t involved or else is first defeated regionally, and then Taiwan is simply coerced into annexation as the only alternative outside destruction and if necessary, invasion.

[Josh]

5 minutes ago, futon said:

 

At some point, they may very well start practicing force buildups. In which case, the example of the Russian buildup of forces "just for training" in December 2021 through to January and February 2022 that came before Russia's invasion in February 2022 will be hardly remembered. 

 

It’s notable that the U.S. was very convinced of a Russian invasion across multiple fronts well before it happened.

[futon]

18 minutes ago, Josh said:

It’s notable that the U.S. was very convinced of a Russian invasion across multiple fronts well before it happened.

And we should assume the PRC will reherse it and to it in same fashion instead of waiting for it to then be convinced because the time of their buildup up to launch is too short to prepare countermeasures that can respond sufficiently to it. Logically speaking, they give no reason to give others that pay attention to think that they won't try. Economic links are not enough to dissuade. 

Edited October 30, 2023 by futon

[Josh]

22 minutes ago, futon said:

And we should assume the PRC will reherse it and to it in same fashion instead of waiting for it to then be convinced because the time of their buildup up to launch is too short to prepare countermeasures that can respond sufficiently to it. Logically speaking, they give no reason to give others that pay attention to think that they won't try. Economic links are not enough to dissuade. 

I’m pointing out that repeated preparation might build up proficiency but also might remove surprise, nothing more. Russia seemed to attempt to bluff its way into a better position in ‘21 with its initial military build up, then later decided the bluff didn’t achieve its goals in the additional build leading into the actual 2022 invasion. The US correctly interpreted the first build up as bluff and the second as a multi front invasion.

 

There are economic, political, and military costs with any major build up or exercise. China’s current level of amphibious training is nothing like full scale invasion, yet. It might attempt to make large exercises more routine, but if a U.S. opposed invasion was a medium term goal I suspect they would also mass produce more appropriate shipping.

Edited October 30, 2023 by Josh

[futon]

3 hours ago, Josh said:

I’m pointing out that repeated preparation might build up proficiency but also might remove surprise, nothing more. Russia seemed to attempt to bluff its way into a better position in ‘21 with its initial military build up, then later decided the bluff didn’t achieve its goals in the additional build leading into the actual 2022 invasion. The US correctly interpreted the first build up as bluff and the second as a multi front invasion.

 

There are economic, political, and military costs with any major build up or exercise. China’s current level of amphibious training is nothing like full scale invasion, yet. It might attempt to make large exercises more routine, but if a U.S. opposed invasion was a medium term goal I suspect they would also mass produce more appropriate shipping.

Well yeah, but it's already the case that we should just expect them to build up one day anyway. It's already the case that there should be no surprise, even without one happening yet. If they haven't done one yet, that only means deterrance is working. 

[Nobu]

18 hours ago, Josh said:

Actually this one area where I agree with Glenn…if China was truly serious about an invasion, it would start mass producing landing ships that were point to point capable on top of the civilian fleet it keeps in being. IMO China wants a hypothetical capability to invade but isn’t willing to spend the effort on a truly uncompromising invasion posture. I think they are looking/hoping for a window in which the US isn’t involved or else is first defeated regionally, and then Taiwan is simply coerced into annexation as the only alternative outside destruction and if necessary, invasion.

Generally agree with you on what they want and what they hope for, which would indicate a long-term PRC strategy that is, sadly, rational.

What isn't mentioned and must be, is what they fear. A Taiwanese Declaration of Independence that compels them to invade and lose militarily, or not and lose politically.

[TrustMe]

When Ukraine was invaded I thought the UKies would last about a month, six weeks tops. But now, regarding a Taiwan-China conflict I think that if the Taiwanese can stop them at the beaches - or heloborne infantry landing zones - I think Taiwan could win. 

[Josh]

21 hours ago, Nobu said:

Generally agree with you on what they want and what they hope for, which would indicate a long-term PRC strategy that is, sadly, rational.

What isn't mentioned and must be, is what they fear. A Taiwanese Declaration of Independence that compels them to invade and lose militarily, or not and lose politically.

I can’t imagine that’s a big concern for them. If Taiwan didn’t declare independence in the 90s when it was in a much better position to do so I can’t imagine it is on the table now, under any government.

I think the much bigger fear would be direct US involvement - either an Ukraine style lend/lease of equipment or worse, a sudden fair accompli of US troops being permanently based in Taiwan.

[X-Files]

China said Thursday its troops were “on constant high alert” after US and Canadian warships passed through the Taiwan Strait, their second joint passage in two months.

China on 'Alert' After US, Canadian Ships Cross Taiwan Strait (thedefensepost.com)