Hypothetical War : Contest For The Spratleys

[Stuart Galbraith]

12 hours ago, TrustMe said:

 

In Argentina in 1982 the military moved all orders for the Falklands invasion by paper by motorcycle courier only. 

And even then, we knew it was on the way. We just failed to do anything about it.

[RETAC21]

13 hours ago, Josh said:

I assume China has been continuously updating its Taiwan invasion plans since 1949. I’m sure it wouldn’t require a lot of messaging or documentation. But physically mobilizing a landing force would almost impossible to mask. if nothing else, roughly a million tons of ferry and car carrier displacement would have to be taken out of service for the landing force.

The obvious solution is not to hide it, but put it on the open and rehearse time and again until lulling Taiwan into complacency, which is something the PRC is already doing with the intrusions on the ADIZ.

[Josh]

2 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

The obvious solution is not to hide it, but put it on the open and rehearse time and again until lulling Taiwan into complacency, which is something the PRC is already doing with the intrusions on the ADIZ.

A Normandy level training exercise is probably going to provoke a counter-Normandy level US response and alert level. China has to deliver and support hundreds of thousands of troops to Taiwan in an invasion scenario. Over a million tons of civilian shipping would need to be taken out of service. I just don't think that's a thing even they can repeat several times, and more over it probably would cost them a lot more than it costs the US to put additional bombers on alert and get some ships and submarines to the region.

I suspect China simply does something else more subtle and unexpected rather than take the most simple minded, head on approach that has a low chance of success. Perhaps they simply take the outlying islands of Taiwan as a challenge to the US, and if a war breaks out cast the US as the "aggressor". If they win the resulting naval battle, the region falls into their hands anyway without the risks of invasion.

[RETAC21]

34 minutes ago, Josh said:

A Normandy level training exercise is probably going to provoke a counter-Normandy level US response and alert level. China has to deliver and support hundreds of thousands of troops to Taiwan in an invasion scenario. Over a million tons of civilian shipping would need to be taken out of service. I just don't think that's a thing even they can repeat several times, and more over it probably would cost them a lot more than it costs the US to put additional bombers on alert and get some ships and submarines to the region.

I suspect China simply does something else more subtle and unexpected rather than take the most simple minded, head on approach that has a low chance of success. Perhaps they simply take the outlying islands of Taiwan as a challenge to the US, and if a war breaks out cast the US as the "aggressor". If they win the resulting naval battle, the region falls into their hands anyway without the risks of invasion.

No if they don't land on Taiwan.

The allies were able to run multiple rehearsals and the Germans were still clueless about the date of the landing. The Egyptians and the Syrians deployed their whole armies prior to the Yom Kippur War openly and the Israelis dismissed the indicators and warnings because they couldn't do it without air superiority.

All that shipping is not needed in the first wave and could be built up little by little or through flags of convenience ownership.

The thing with Taiwan for the PRC is not that they cannot do it, is that what they stand to gain is much less than the assured loss from commerce with the US and allies, a point that was lost for Putin...

 

[Josh]

54 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

No if they don't land on Taiwan.

The allies were able to run multiple rehearsals and the Germans were still clueless about the date of the landing. The Egyptians and the Syrians deployed their whole armies prior to the Yom Kippur War openly and the Israelis dismissed the indicators and warnings because they couldn't do it without air superiority.

All that shipping is not needed in the first wave and could be built up little by little or through flags of convenience ownership.

The thing with Taiwan for the PRC is not that they cannot do it, is that what they stand to gain is much less than the assured loss from commerce with the US and allies, a point that was lost for Putin...

 

The allies, Egyptians, and Syrians didn't have to deal with ubiquitous overhead imagery by commercial and military satellites. North Korea couldn't even move artillery shells to Russia without open source analysts figuring out the entire supply chain.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/report-orient-express-north-koreas-clandestine-supply-route-russia

China absolutely needs its ferry/RO-RO fleet for the first wave. Its military amphibious lift is only enough for a few brigades at most. The civilian ships are necessary for the first wave *and* for sustainment, until a major port is taken intact.

China's ability to successfully invade Taiwan while in an active war with the US is questionable at best. Most public war games have them lose, leave the situation in doubt, or have the win with extreme casualties. And those involve a lot of generous assumptions about defensive measures. Landing ship technology hasn't really changed much in most of a century. An LST is still ~15 knot target with no appreciable defense. Where as offensive firepower and ISR are radically different than Normandy or Inchon - supersonic missiles, target recognition seekers, persistent UAV and satellite ISR, remote acoustic detection, etc. Given that Ukraine has been able to hit Russian air bases in Crimea using NATO cast off ordnance hung on Soviet vintage planes, I would not take it for granted that a Taiwan beach head can be defended (or even the loading points for follow on waves and supplies for that matter).

As for China's motivation, I can't speak to that. It seems like an extreme risk that they are more likely to lose than win, and even if they win it results in a global depression. But I never thought Russia was had anything to gain by invading Ukraine, and they did anyway. Xi is giving me a similar vibe.

Edited October 26, 2023 by Josh

[TrustMe]

I've sometimes wonder if Xi wants to be the next Emperor of China. He's already got rid of the "no more than two terms" of leadership thing. So what's next ... 

[RETAC21]

34 minutes ago, Josh said:

The allies, Egyptians, and Syrians didn't have to deal with ubiquitous overhead imagery by commercial and military satellites. North Korea couldn't even move artillery shells to Russia without open source analysts figuring out the entire supply chain.

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/report-orient-express-north-koreas-clandestine-supply-route-russia

China absolutely needs its ferry/RO-RO fleet for the first wave. Its military amphibious lift is only enough for a few brigades at most. The civilian ships are necessary for the first wave *and* for sustainment, until a major port is taken intact.

China's ability to successfully invade Taiwan while in an active war with the US is questionable at best. Most public war games have them lose, leave the situation in doubt, or have the win with extreme casualties. And those involve a lot of generous assumptions about defensive measures. Landing ship technology hasn't really changed much in most of a century. An LST is still ~15 knot target with no appreciable defense. Where as offensive firepower and ISR are radically different than Normandy or Inchon - supersonic missiles, target recognition seekers, persistent UAV and satellite ISR, remote acoustic detection, etc. Given that Ukraine has been able to hit Russian air bases in Crimea using NATO cast off ordnance hung on Soviet vintage planes, I would not take it for granted that a Taiwan beach head can be defended (or even the loading points for follow on waves and supplies for that matter).

As for China's motivation, I can't speak to that. It seems like an extreme risk that they are more likely to lose than win, and even if they win it results in a global depression. But I never thought Russia was had anything to gain by invading Ukraine, and they did anyway. Xi is giving me a similar vibe.

They absolutely had to deal with that, and the best way of dealing with it was doing it all in the open (just like Hamas) multiple times until it became the new normal, and then, on a regular day, they just did it for real.

As for China capabilities, they aren't up against multiple armored divisions like the allies or lack the capability to assure air superiority like the arabs in time they would need to set up a bridgehead, much less to reinforce it, which would be easier with a port.

Just for comparison, "a few brigades" was/is enough lift for the USMC and was enough during the Pacific war, provided air and naval superiority (see the Guadalcanal campaign). Additional forces would be needed to take over all of Taiwan for sure, but not just to create a bridgehead and work from there.

Any US victory can only happen as the PRC needs to reinforce and sustain the force, and that is iffy, if the PRC is able to secure the sea lines, which they may be perfectly capable right now. Losses? sure, just like Russia and they are still in Ukraine, so, there's no way they can be enough to stop an invasion from a purely military point of view.

Motivation, risk, etc. I agree.

[RETAC21]

3 minutes ago, TrustMe said:

I've sometimes wonder if Xi wants to be the next Emperor of China. He's already got rid of the "no more than two terms" of leadership thing. So what's next ... 

And a bunch of the leadership...

[Josh]

1 hour ago, RETAC21 said:

They absolutely had to deal with that, and the best way of dealing with it was doing it all in the open (just like Hamas) multiple times until it became the new normal, and then, on a regular day, they just did it for real.

The allies did NOT have to deal with any overhead imagery. Similarly, I doubt the Israelis had direct access to anything like that either outside of what the US might give them. And the US at the time was just using a couple of satellites that still parachuted their film to the ground. KH-11/Kenon didn't exist until 1976. Compare that to a half dozen companies that maintain entire constellations now that download imagery in real time. Even ignoring US data collection, it is hard to fathom an invasion build up going unnoticed by commercial companies.

1 hour ago, RETAC21 said:

As for China capabilities, they aren't up against multiple armored divisions like the allies or lack the capability to assure air superiority like the arabs in time they would need to set up a bridgehead, much less to reinforce it, which would be easier with a port.

Have you ever looked at the TO&E of the Taiwanese army? It is a standing force of ~100,000. That would still require a Normandy like effort. While the PRC would have air superiority, it seems unlikely they could clear away all the mobile short and medium range SAM systems, so they likely wouldn't have total freedom of action. But the biggest problem would be the truck mounted AShMs shooting at the landing fleet. If the US is involved, you can add the USAF's bombers and anything able to fire a tomahawk within a thousand miles. It is a non trivial defensive problem for China.

1 hour ago, RETAC21 said:

Just for comparison, "a few brigades" was/is enough lift for the USMC and was enough during the Pacific war, provided air and naval superiority (see the Guadalcanal campaign). Additional forces would be needed to take over all of Taiwan for sure, but not just to create a bridgehead and work from there.

The larger objectives had a lot of US Army involvement. I'm sure "a few brigades" could take all of the outlying Taiwanese islands, just like the USMC. But who took the Philippines back? I don't think you are appreciating the scope of the problem. Could a few brigades have secured the Normandy beaches and then held out while the main force was readied?

1 hour ago, RETAC21 said:

Any US victory can only happen as the PRC needs to reinforce and sustain the force, and that is iffy, if the PRC is able to secure the sea lines, which they may be perfectly capable right now. Losses? sure, just like Russia and they are still in Ukraine, so, there's no way they can be enough to stop an invasion from a purely military point of view.

The US can threaten the sea lines of communication from hundreds of miles away. AGM-158B has a 600mi/1000km range and a B-52 carries twenty, a B-1 two dozen. It might not be able to track ships on the move like LRASM  (though the near future AGM-158D will have a two way datalink) but it can attack the loading sites on the mainland or the landing beaches and ports in Taiwan. There would also be a handful of B-2s occasionally dumping 80 JDAMs at a time, assuming they aren't equipped with an even larger number of small diameter bombs with much more stand off range. Keep in mine that the landing force is composed primarily of between fifty and eighty Ro/Ro vessels in the 30,000-40,000 ton range, tightly packed with vehicles bumper to bumper usually on two separate vehicle decks. They have a lot of capacity, but you lose a reinforced battalion of men and equipment every time one is hit at full load. And a single hit to a vehicle deck by 1000# class warhead sets a dozen vehicles on fire at once and probably makes the whole ship burn like magicians flash paper.

Assuming Taiwan's government and army are remotely committed to holding the island, it is a non trivial exercise to maintain a steady flow of forces and supplies even assuming the initial landings are successful.

Edited October 26, 2023 by Josh

[Tim the Tank Nut]

at various points it's been assumed that Taiwanese forces weren't sufficiently motivated.  I believe that Hong Kong and the Ukraine have reduced that concern a considerable amount.

[RETAC21]

1 hour ago, Josh said:

The allies did NOT have to deal with any overhead imagery. Similarly, I doubt the Israelis had direct access to anything like that either outside of what the US might give them. And the US at the time was just using a couple of satellites that still parachuted their film to the ground. KH-11/Kenon didn't exist until 1976. Compare that to a half dozen companies that maintain entire constellations now that download imagery in real time. Even ignoring US data collection, it is hard to fathom an invasion build up going unnoticed by commercial companies.

You have been debating with Glenn so long that you have decided that anything that doesn't fit into your ideas doesn't exist. Before satellites there was aerial reconnaissance: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/legendary-how-israel-used-its-super-fast-f-4e-phantoms-reconnaissance-66376

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/g/gaf-invasion-normandy.html#I

Aka overhead imagery. And it worked very well

Quote

Have you ever looked at the TO&E of the Taiwanese army? It is a standing force of ~100,000. That would still require a Normandy like effort. While the PRC would have air superiority, it seems unlikely they could clear away all the mobile short and medium range SAM systems, so they likely wouldn't have total freedom of action. But the biggest problem would be the truck mounted AShMs shooting at the landing fleet. If the US is involved, you can add the USAF's bombers and anything able to fire a tomahawk within a thousand miles. It is a non trivial defensive problem for China.

I have indeed, and I am quite conscious that it's not easy and they aren't going to roll over, but at the same time they need to defend all the island, terrain favors defense but hinders concentration, they lack enough aircraft and SAMs to defend possible landing beaches (they either cover the beach head or defend air bases, but lack enough to do both). You apparently believe the transparent battlefield only works one way, but it cuts both ways, the PRC is not lacking in drones and those truck mounted AShMs are not invisible, plus you are discounting the PRC air defence for some reason. 

Quote

The larger objectives had a lot of US Army involvement. I'm sure "a few brigades" could take all of the outlying Taiwanese islands, just like the USMC. But who took the Philippines back? I don't think you are appreciating the scope of the problem. Could a few brigades have secured the Normandy beaches and then held out while the main force was readied?

Sorry, we moved the goalpost to taking the Philippines all of the sudden? And why would the main force not be "readied" before the invasion? they don't need to be embarked but that doesn't mean they cannot embark as the landing force hits the beaches, not to speak about air transport.

Quote

The US can threaten the sea lines of communication from hundreds of miles away. AGM-158B has a 600mi/1000km range and a B-52 carries twenty, a B-1 two dozen. It might not be able to track ships on the move like LRASM  (though the near future AGM-158D will have a two way datalink) but it can attack the loading sites on the mainland or the landing beaches and ports in Taiwan. There would also be a handful of B-2s occasionally dumping 80 JDAMs at a time, assuming they aren't equipped with an even larger number of small diameter bombs with much more stand off range. Keep in mine that the landing force is composed primarily of between fifty and eighty Ro/Ro vessels in the 30,000-40,000 ton range, tightly packed with vehicles bumper to bumper usually on two separate vehicle decks. They have a lot of capacity, but you lose a reinforced battalion of men and equipment every time one is hit at full load. And a single hit to a vehicle deck by 1000# class warhead sets a dozen vehicles on fire at once and probably makes the whole ship burn like magicians flash paper.

Sure they can, but there are many available ports, ports are not particularly easy to put out of commission and they are defended. Of course, they can go with a few big ships or a lot more smaller ships, they can escort the convoys, or set up decoys, or use EW for the soft kill, ie, stuff that is being done for half a century already to decoy AShMs and work. Suddenly the US doesn't have enough AShMs.
 

Quote

Assuming Taiwan's government and army are remotely committed to holding the island, it is a non trivial exercise to maintain a steady flow of forces and supplies even assuming the initial landings are successful.

And I am not saying it's easy, but with proper preparation, it can be done with the forces the PRC has right now.

Edited October 26, 2023 by RETAC21

[Josh]

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

You have been debating with Glenn so long that you have decided that anything that doesn't fit into your ideas doesn't exist. Before satellites there was aerial reconnaissance: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/legendary-how-israel-used-its-super-fast-f-4e-phantoms-reconnaissance-66376

https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/g/gaf-invasion-normandy.html#I

Aka overhead imagery. And it worked very well

I'll grant you that there was probably some marginal overhead imagery in either case. I'll concede the point in terms of the absolute statements I made. I think you know that satellite reconnaissance with near real time downloads and potential AI analysis are to Luftwaffe/IAF photo recon what the telegraph is to cable modem. We talking about ISR capabilities that are orders of magnitude different and when I say that, I'm only talking about commercial satellites, not what the US is fully capable of. You could not mass a landing fleet without anyone noticing, probably even one of only a few brigades.

 

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

I have indeed, and I am quite conscious that it's not easy and they aren't going to roll over, but at the same time they need to defend all the island, terrain favors defense but hinders concentration, they lack enough aircraft and SAMs to defend possible landing beaches (they either cover the beach head or defend air bases, but lack enough to do both). You apparently believe the transparent battlefield only works one way, but it cuts both ways, the PRC is not lacking in drones and those truck mounted AShMs are not invisible, plus you are discounting the PRC air defence for some reason. 

There are probably only a dozen or so beaches appropriate to a landing, and they are clustered in the north near the capital and in the south across a wider arc but split up by rivers. The Taiwanese army doesn't have to be everywhere at once; it just has to be in the places it might reasonably expect landing ships to be able to navigate. There would probably be some air mobile operations and some hovercraft operations that attempted to outflank specific positions, but any heavy equipment landings are pretty much limited to a little over a dozen landing beaches with pre made obstacles and pre zero'd artillery.


 

Hunting mobile SAMs or AShM batteries doesn't seem to be going well in Ukraine from my perspective. Admittedly the PLAAF is probably much more capable of this in terms of numbers and equipment, but I'm not convinced it has an especially capable SEAD doctrine and capability.

I'm not discounting PRC air defense ships; I'm just pointing out that as the defense, they can't screw up or get surprised by anything. The same way a US CVBG can't allow even a couple missiles to reach the carrier, the PLAN can't allow even a dozen missiles inside their area defense of an active landing zone - the landing ships have no point defenses. If they were to drop the ball for even a single large scale attack, they might not just lose a task force, they might lose the entire war.

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Sorry, we moved the goalpost to taking the Philippines all of the sudden? And why would the main force not be "readied" before the invasion? they don't need to be embarked but that doesn't mean they cannot embark as the landing force hits the beaches, not to speak about air transport.

I think you under estimate the time involved in moving civilian ships out of their primary role and moving troops to the dozen or so known embarkation points off the Taiwanese coast (see above). Perhaps a few brigades could be landed on a beach or two with no other movement or deployment. How long do they last? Again, my question, could a few brigades have held the Normandy beaches for a few days without follow up? The landing ships are still limited to 15 knots and they are spread throughout the Chinese coast during peace time. A rather large percentage might have to come from Hong Kong, or else you have to pick the low end of the number of transports and tonnage that I have posted above.

What traditionally is done in an opposed amphibious assault is to throw as many ships and troops against it in as many places as you can support. Some kind of Diep type landing seems like a non starter to me. I don't think we're going to square that circle; you and I are of very different opinions.

 

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Sure they can, but there are many available ports, ports are not particularly easy to put out of commission and they are defended. Of course, they can go with a few big ships or a lot more smaller ships, they can escort the convoys, or set up decoys, or use EW for the soft kill, ie, stuff that is being done for half a century already to decoy AShMs and work. Suddenly the US doesn't have enough AShMs.

I would suggest looking at Taiwanese ports on google maps. Many of them have intentionally been designed with narrow channels such that they are easily blocked. I also don't think a modern port is particularly hard to put out of order in the context of missile strikes involving triple digits of cruise missiles. It might be mildly difficult to remove every pier that a Ro/Ro can unload on, but it is trivial to remove any ability to handle bulk petroleum or TEU containers. If the PRC is limited to just using Ro/Ros, we're back to the limitation of those ~60 or so vessels doing the landings and also the support of the entire invasion indefinitely.

 

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

And I am not saying it's easy, but with proper preparation, it can be done with the forces the PRC has right now.

I don't completely disagree. I'm saying the proper amount of preparation is impossible to conceal from orbit in this day and age. I'd also argue that the default outcome of amphibious warfare is failure for the landing party without overwhelming force, planning, and luck.

[futon]

The PRC has s growing capability in helicopter air lift. The Type 75  LDPs can serve as a transit point so heli-drops can insert into landing zone parameters, reducing the need of high concentration of an amphibious assault by creating another point of attack. So then once a beachhead is secured, then existing transports can make back abd fourth trips between the mainland and a secured beechhead, building up the force at the beechhead, and then start a ground campaign. 

[Josh]

1 hour ago, futon said:

The PRC has s growing capability in helicopter air lift. The Type 75  LDPs can serve as a transit point so heli-drops can insert into landing zone parameters, reducing the need of high concentration of an amphibious assault by creating another point of attack. So then once a beachhead is secured, then existing transports can make back abd fourth trips between the mainland and a secured beechhead, building up the force at the beechhead, and then start a ground campaign. 

I'm sure there will be no shortage of helicopter operations and hovercraft landings and I would expect them to be successful due to surprise. But those will not be major equipment drops; they will be moves to outflank the defenders with light infantry and block quick reinforcement, much like the airborne drops of Normandy (I personally doubt Y-20 type airborne drops are worth the risk though so old school An-2 commando landings seem likely). The bulk of any invasion will have to come from by sea over a beach or through a port. It is not completely unlikely the Chinese can secure a port on day 1 via some kind of air mobile or air borne operation, but I question how long they can keep it open or how successful unloading operations could be. The US will soon be in a position to hit such locations with aeroballistic missiles or hypersonics from allied territory or even Guam. If nothing else an SSGN likely would be available to hit such a target within a couple hours. Worst case (for the PLA) a HIMARS battery with PrSM in the Miyako islands, a Typhon battery with SM-6 on Okinawa, or an LRHW battery in Guam might hit it in under 30 minutes.

Edited October 27, 2023 by Josh

[futon]

56 minutes ago, Josh said:

I'm sure there will be no shortage of helicopter operations and hovercraft landings and I would expect them to be successful due to surprise. But those will not be major equipment drops; they will be moves to outflank the defenders with light infantry and block quick reinforcement, much like the airborne drops of Normandy (I personally doubt Y-20 type airborne drops are worth the risk though so old school An-2 commando landings seem likely). The bulk of any invasion will have to come from by sea over a beach or through a port. It is not completely unlikely the Chinese can secure a port on day 1 via some kind of air mobile or air borne operation, but I question how long they can keep it open or how successful unloading operations could be. The US will soon be in a position to hit such locations with aeroballistic missiles or hypersonics from allied territory or even Guam. If nothing else an SSGN likely would be available to hit such a target within a couple hours. Worst case (for the PLA) a HIMARS battery with PrSM in the Miyako islands, a Typhon battery with SM-6 on Okinawa, or an LRHW battery in Guam might hit it in under 30 minutes.

Air superiority is a big factor. The first is the BM so naturally, air defenses get smashed. The PRC is also a leader in drones. So there's the BM wave, then both aircraft and drone attacks. With skies secured, then anti-ship forces can be targeted from the air. A big factor in countering is if the US and Japanese aircraft are immediate available to contest the skies over Taiwan. Which then means that the PRC cannot ignore those US and Japanese bases in Sourhern Japan, which means that the PRC would have to target those with various missle attacks. Which means a reduced bombardment on Taiwan itself, which means Taiwan being on a better position to repel landing attempts.

How effective might HIMARS be against PLAN naval ship aur defenses? If those can be defeated at decent rate, then stocks or wave volume may not be enough.

[Josh]

I was speaking specifically to landing ship’s unloading, not naval ships. At some point, some kind of port needs to be taken or created (the Allie’s made an offshore port initially). That is a static target any long range weapon gets a crack at, and so is any ship that can’t quickly unload. Because any camera in a high rise apartment or inland mountain top can provide eyes on a port in good weather, even if we assume satellites and UAVs are somehow completely ineffective. And the US already has a subsonic toolbox for that (any Tomahawk platform within a thousand miles) and within a couple years a lot of fast reaction weapons.

[Nobu]

The risk at present, and for the forseeable future, is greater than the reward. There is no automatic victory button in Taipei for the PRC to press, except in wargames.

[Nobu]

13 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

And I am not saying it's easy, but with proper preparation, it can be done with the forces the PRC has right now.

If it is done, the PRC still loses the peace.

[RETAC21]

22 minutes ago, Nobu said:

If it is done, the PRC still loses the peace.

Yes, no argument about that. Invading Taiwan for the sake of having a military operation is a political and economic disaster for the PRC. But we are discussing whether they have that capability now, which they didn't have a few years ago.

[RETAC21]

8 hours ago, Josh said:

I'll grant you that there was probably some marginal overhead imagery in either case. I'll concede the point in terms of the absolute statements I made. I think you know that satellite reconnaissance with near real time downloads and potential AI analysis are to Luftwaffe/IAF photo recon what the telegraph is to cable modem. We talking about ISR capabilities that are orders of magnitude different and when I say that, I'm only talking about commercial satellites, not what the US is fully capable of. You could not mass a landing fleet without anyone noticing, probably even one of only a few brigades.

"Some marginal overhead imagery" no, read the links, both the Germans and the Israelis had accurate intelligence of the enemy preparations, and what you seem to miss time and again, for some reason, is that massing a landing fleet can be done in the open as neither the US nor Taiwan are going to execute a pre-emptive attack.

Further, it can be done several times to lull an opponent into complacency or they can use decoys to mislead an opponent, despite real time satellite imagery, because there's a big difference between seeing something and doing something about it.

[RETAC21]

8 hours ago, Josh said:

There are probably only a dozen or so beaches appropriate to a landing, and they are clustered in the north near the capital and in the south across a wider arc but split up by rivers. The Taiwanese army doesn't have to be everywhere at once; it just has to be in the places it might reasonably expect landing ships to be able to navigate. There would probably be some air mobile operations and some hovercraft operations that attempted to outflank specific positions, but any heavy equipment landings are pretty much limited to a little over a dozen landing beaches with pre made obstacles and pre zero'd artillery.

This map misrepresents the Taiwanese coast by a lot, that huge West coast is just about a continuous landing beach, with only 30 Km or so of mudflats. It also ignores the Penghu islands as staging zones or the capability developed by the PLA to now create off axis threats to Taiwan East coast. To believe that every single beach will be covered by artillery is delusional, mainly because Taiwanese artillery is hopelessly outdated:

"As of 2019, the ROC Army's current artillery in service consists of M109A2 and M109A5 systems, 8 inch M110A2 self-propelled howitzers and 155mm M114 towed howitzers. These systems have exceeded their service life with the oldest being the M114, which has been in service for 68 years, while the youngest artillery system, the M109A5, has been in service for 21 years. The last artillery system that entered service is the M109A5s, which are ordered in 1996 and taken delivery in 1998."

[RETAC21]

8 hours ago, Josh said:

Hunting mobile SAMs or AShM batteries doesn't seem to be going well in Ukraine from my perspective. Admittedly the PLAAF is probably much more capable of this in terms of numbers and equipment, but I'm not convinced it has an especially capable SEAD doctrine and capability.

I'm not discounting PRC air defense ships; I'm just pointing out that as the defense, they can't screw up or get surprised by anything. The same way a US CVBG can't allow even a couple missiles to reach the carrier, the PLAN can't allow even a dozen missiles inside their area defense of an active landing zone - the landing ships have no point defenses. If they were to drop the ball for even a single large scale attack, they might not just lose a task force, they might lose the entire war.

The PLA, on paper, is vastly superior to Russia in terms of ISR and has already exercised some of it over Taiwan: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/pla-army-deploys-new-armed-recon-drone-around-taiwan-island-report/

At the same time, Taiwan itself recognizes it lacks enough missiles: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2021/03/08/taiwan-aims-to-sink-half-of-a-chinese-invasion-fleet-it-could-take-years-to-buy-enough-missiles/?sh=387378fc1aa0

"it could be 2025 before Taiwan finally gets its new Harpoon trucks. And 2026 or later before it gets enough missiles fully to arm each truck.

The original plan for “Project Swiftness” was for Taiwan to acquire the launchers and missiles in 2023 and ‘24. But according to Up Media, delays on the American side and budget constraints on Taiwan’s part have combined to push back the full acquisition.

...

Despite recent Taiwanese purchases of American F-16 fighters and M-1 tanks and Taipei’s ambitious effort to develop a new submarine, today China has more and better conventional forces than Taiwan possesses. Taipei no longer can count on defeating an invasion fleet far from the island’s shores."

 

[RETAC21]

8 hours ago, Josh said:

I think you under estimate the time involved in moving civilian ships out of their primary role and moving troops to the dozen or so known embarkation points off the Taiwanese coast (see above). Perhaps a few brigades could be landed on a beach or two with no other movement or deployment. How long do they last? Again, my question, could a few brigades have held the Normandy beaches for a few days without follow up? The landing ships are still limited to 15 knots and they are spread throughout the Chinese coast during peace time. A rather large percentage might have to come from Hong Kong, or else you have to pick the low end of the number of transports and tonnage that I have posted above.

What traditionally is done in an opposed amphibious assault is to throw as many ships and troops against it in as many places as you can support. Some kind of Diep type landing seems like a non starter to me. I don't think we're going to square that circle; you and I are of very different opinions.

I don't, because I am saying that it doesn't need to be done covertly. It can be done openly, and increasingly, the PLA is doing just that, boiling the frog little by little.

If you want to look at history, I would point out that no invasion on this scale was ever repelled, and only 2 failed for lack of proper preparation, insufficient force, poorly chosen landing points and general incompetence: Gallipoli and Anzio (and note that in Anzio the landing force wasn't pushed back to the sea, and at Gallipoli it was a voluntary withdrawal).

The reason why is obvious, by picking up the landing point, the attacker will always be able to mass more forces than the defender, and the defender concentration will be hampered by aerial observation (since air superiority is a pre-requisite).

[RETAC21]

The frog is boiled slowly:

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5028001

[Josh]

On 10/27/2023 at 3:39 AM, Nobu said:

The risk at present, and for the forseeable future, is greater than the reward. There is no automatic victory button in Taipei for the PRC to press, except in wargames.

I don't think we (or at least I) am qualified to evaluate the risk-reward calculations in Beijing. I do not think Russian security has benefitted from its throw of the dice, and yet it seems to have no intention of stopping. Hamas also made a choice that seems almost existential in nature; it is hard to contemplate Israel not seeing that war through to a long and messy end. Economically a PRC-US war would be a catastrophe for everyone involved, on top of heavy casualties for everyone regardless of outcome. It certainly doesn't seem worth it to me, but every move Xi's China is making suggests they are angling to not only have the conventional capability to make the attempt but also are trying to get in front of the US ability to escalate strategically (eg, nuclear buildup and conventional ICBMs). I don't see how a military conflict with the US over Taiwan will ever help Chinese security and economics, but everything they are putting out says they intend to at least make it an option.