This ought to be good for a nice, long thread...

[RETAC21]

As has been noted a number of times the problem is in defining the parameters properly. If "Soviets alone" means that as of 22 June 1941 Germany is at peace with the Western Allies and that Japan does not attack American and Commonwealth interests in the Pacific, then the Soviet Union would probably have fallen in short order. Yes, the accession to the Ostheer in terms of combat-ready offensive formations would have been perhaps two Panzer and 15 infantry divisions from Africa and Ob. West, so perhaps a 10% increase in offensive Panzer strength and slightly more in offensive infantry strength, but it also frees up at least 24 occupation-capable divisions to help secure the German rear areas and improve logistics capabilities. Add in the 25% or so increase in Luftwaffe capabilities and the lack of naval requirements and that means that a large increment of Wehrmacht strength is available either as military manpower or production manpower, which is their major shortfall.

 

But the 24 occupation capable divisions would still be needed to keep France et al occupied, wouldn't they? if sent to the East, they would add up to the logistical burden in 1941, when partisan activity was still small.

 

Which was a logistics issue and not a production issue.

 

Not saying otherwise, but it points to poor German planning.

 

Maybe so, but he never got it. Essentially the entire German civilian motor vehicle industry got turned to component production for war industry in 1939 as did the rest of the civilian economy. About the lone exception to that I have ever been able to find is production of "white goods" - major household appliances like refrigerators and stoves - which are difficult to do without and which also have "military" applications.

 

Rationalization had little to do with the German production miracle, instead it was ruthless manpower and resource allocations. Quite a few make a big deal about the "failure" of the German economy to go to multi-shift work at factories, but are apparently unaware that was due to a simple dearth of manpower. That is also the reason for the fall 1940 reductions in the Heer strength; it was critical manpower released to war work. Slave labor - oops, sorry "Gastarbeiter" - helped, but really only became a factor after 1942.

 

On the other side the Soviets were able to prioritize military neccessity because of Lend-Lease replacing "niche" items in the economy.

 

Cheers!

 

I bow to your superior knowledge, but I also ask, this "niche" items, when did they become available? is there an schedule of what was delivered when? all I have seen are totals for the war which make LL very significant, but I suspect its impact was only felt at a time the war had already turned against the Germans.

[Rich]

But the 24 occupation capable divisions would still be needed to keep France et al occupied, wouldn't they? if sent to the East, they would add up to the logistical burden in 1941, when partisan activity was still small.

 

 

 

Not saying otherwise, but it points to poor German planning.

 

 

 

I bow to your superior knowledge, but I also ask, this "niche" items, when did they become available? is there an schedule of what was delivered when? all I have seen are totals for the war which make LL very significant, but I suspect its impact was only felt at a time the war had already turned against the Germans.

 

Okay, for some reson my replies are disappearing instead of posting, so rather than wasting my time I'm simply gonna say sayonara.

 

Cheers!

[RETAC21]

Okay, for some reson my replies are disappearing instead of posting, so rather than wasting my time I'm simply gonna say sayonara.

 

Cheers!

 

Don't do this to us!!! I am eagerly awaiting your answer.

[Rich]

Don't do this to us!!! I am eagerly awaiting your answer.

 

I tried to reply twice, but both disappeared. That's a fifteen minutes or so of my life down the drain.

 

Cheers!

[alejandro_]

There is a point I would like to make.

 

Without the Western allies in the war, would the Germans be able to carry out a surprise attack as in 22/6/1941? if Germany was in an advantageous position in 1942 was because of the inmense losses sustained by the Soviets in Barbarossa. Stalin did receive many warnings from serveral intelligence sources but he did not believe them. The UK was far from finished and the US was getting more and more involved. Other intelligence sources pointed out that production for Wehrmacht had not increase much, and there was no winter equipment. Stalin did not want to play the role the Tsar did in WWI, and would wait until the right moment (like with Japan).

 

If Barbarossa would not caused so much surprise German advance would have been less dramatic, and losses higher. Would it be similar to Kursk How would this leave them for the 1942 campaign? its not such an impossible scenario, officers like Rokossovsky suggested that Soviet troops should be deployed along pre-1939 borders as defensive positions were better and they would be less vulnerable to an attack.

 

Okay, for some reson my replies are disappearing instead of posting, so rather than wasting my time I'm simply gonna say sayonara.

 

When writing long messages I tend to use Word/Wordpad to avoid these surprises.

[RETAC21]

There is a point I would like to make.

 

Without the Western allies in the war, would the Germans be able to carry out a surprise attack as in 22/6/1941? if Germany was in an advantageous position in 1942 was because of the inmense losses sustained by the Soviets in Barbarossa. Stalin did receive many warnings from serveral intelligence sources but he did not believe them. The UK was far from finished and the US was getting more and more involved. Other intelligence sources pointed out that production for Wehrmacht had not increase much, and there was no winter equipment. Stalin did not want to play the role the Tsar did in WWI, and would wait until the right moment (like with Japan).

 

If Barbarossa would not caused so much surprise German advance would have been less dramatic, and losses higher. Would it be similar to Kursk How would this leave them for the 1942 campaign? its not such an impossible scenario, officers like Rokossovsky suggested that Soviet troops should be deployed along pre-1939 borders as defensive positions were better and they would be less vulnerable to an attack.

 

But that not only depends on awareness but on the ability of the army to cope with the Germans, the French were not surprised and lost all the same. The Red Army in 1941 was just as bad and the Germans are going to be able to operate within their OODA loop -specially Stalin's - as demostrated by the Kiev debacle.

[R011]

If it was not engaged in WWII, the USA would not have had the Manhatten Project, and there would have been no plans to steal

Both the US and the British did had nuclear weapons programs before December 1941 which were combined and ramped up to form the Manhattan project. The British one. at least, was penetrated by the Soviets. Even at that low rate of effort, they were still miles ahead of Heisenberg and the Germans. This doesn't give the Soviets a Bomb, to be sure, but does give their project something of a boost. I suspect that even without espionage, Soviet scientists would have done reasonably well in developing nuclear weapons - though obviously not as well as historically.

As the materials for a nuclear device were "requisitioned" by the Soviets from the USA, without the Lend Lease program there would have been no materials.

Thanks. I certainly looks then, that the Soviets would not get a device before the 1950's, well after the issue between them and the Nazis would have been decided. Mind you, neither would the Germans so that's this Wunderwaffe not in play.

[R011]

IIRC, not that much. Western Allies were very secretive about breaking the Enigma etc.

The Soviets had a very active and successful HUMINT operation going in Germany, as well as in the West. This probably helped them as much as ENIGMA - except before BARBAROSSA when Stalin didn't want to hear what they were telling him.

[Ken Estes]

But that not only depends on awareness but on the ability of the army to cope with the Germans, the French were not surprised and lost all the same. The Red Army in 1941 was just as bad and the Germans are going to be able to operate within their OODA loop -specially Stalin's - as demostrated by the Kiev debacle.

Precisely. Nobody does very well against the German Army until end/41, and there is still a lot left to handle in 42-43 before the turning moment on all engaged fronts. The surrender of two German field armies in first half of 1943 decides the issue, but much fighting remains ahead. Between the wars, the Brit refrain is, 'one has not seen modern war until fighting the German Army' or words to that effect.

[Doug Kibbey]

I tried to reply twice, but both disappeared. That's a fifteen minutes or so of my life down the drain.

 

Cheers!

 

Some websites will "time out" after a finite period between beginning a reply and posting it. I don't know what the mechanism is here, but as has been suggested, create lengthy replies in notepad or something so they can be copied and pasted and your worthy efforts won't be lost to untimely disconnects and other disturbances in the force.

[Detonable]

Peace with Britain would probably lead to or require a steady pullout of German occupation troops in Norway, France, Greece, Libya, etc. Both sides would want it, and the British would probably insist on it. So the British can argue they brought freedom to all these countries, as well as preserving the empire.

 

Germany imported guest workers from France and other countries but the Allied (probably mostly British) bombing made Germany an undesirable place to work. Perhaps more could be enticed to work in the war industries. I think the Germans could have been considerably more productive if they didn't have to rebuild their cities and factories, and could obtain imports.

 

As it becomes obvious the war won't be over as quickly as historically, the Soviets may push development projects hard. Perhaps we see the T-44 and T-54 fielded before the end.

[ickysdad]

I just don't see the Soviets winning minus other Allies fighting the Germans in some sort of way, minus LL and all it's trappings which included huge amounts of raw materials, and also what about political consequences??? Would Germany's historical erstwhile allies,ala Hungary/Romania/Bulgaria maybe a bit more enthusiastic in this scenario? With the UK & US out of the war You think Turkey might just see a chance to get at the Soviets?? Could it be possible for the Germans to be able to recruit more non-Germans to fight the communists? We had a great debate over on JP's Panzers on a subject like this about 3 years ago.

 

 

 

http://panzercentral.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=93&t=41158&hilit=allies+defeating+germany

Edited May 18, 2011 by ickysdad

[Colin Williams]

Precisely. Nobody does very well against the German Army until end/41, and there is still a lot left to handle in 42-43 before the turning moment on all engaged fronts. The surrender of two German field armies in first half of 1943 decides the issue, but much fighting remains ahead. Between the wars, the Brit refrain is, 'one has not seen modern war until fighting the German Army' or words to that effect.

 

Wait Ken, just a while ago you were on the "Red Army conquers all page"! Have you "reveled too much" in Trevor Dupuy's efforts? (just kidding)

 

Besides, the German Army of WW2 is overrated, and don't get me started on the German Army of WW1!

[Heirophant]

I think the Soviet Union could have had a fair chance of bleeding Germany dry, prolonging the war, and ultimately surviving as a coherent powerful nation, all without Western help. Surviving, certainly, but maybe not actually running rampant across Europe like they did. Forcing a stalemate was very possible.

 

After all, the USSR had industrialized at a tremendous pace from 1920 to 1941, and by that latter time probably had the 3rd largest industrial base in the world (after the U.S. and Germany). Manufacturing is one of 2 physical pillars of warmaking power, alongside manpower (another area of Soviet strength).

 

Russia and later the Soviet Union had started their industrial revolutions decades behind Western Europe, and this disadvantage could not be made up overnight.

 

OTOH, the Germans could have done 3 key things, which would have made crucial differences in their over-all war effort:

 

1) Rationalize the models and makes of all weapons systems. Ruthlessly pare it all down to a few key systems, everything from small arms to tanks and planes. Producing Mark III at the same time as Mark IV, or Mark IV at the same time as Panther, for example, was madness.

 

2) Full industrial mobilization of machine tools and factories for war production. 24/7 factory operation. Build as much machine tooling as rapidly as possible - possible because of the very large German machine tool sector.

 

As late as Jan. 1943, Germany was still only devoting ~20% of its economy to war, versus ~50% for say the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth. They were even making such things as grand pianos and civilian motor cars at that late date! By the time full mobilization was ordered in early '43, it was too little, too late.

 

3) Throw the women into the factories. This gives a further pool of educated workers ready to be trained in modern production processes, increasing production or freeing men for front-line service.

 

 

The Allies did all 3 of the above, and it would have worked for Germany as well. The full-mobilized German economy would have been more than half as large as the full-mobilized American economy, but would not have to have much of a Navy, nor a very long trans-oceanic logistics tail.

 

That would have made the USSR beating Germany less likely, IMHO.

[Nobu]

How about proper winter fighting equipment? S/F...Ken M

 

Winter may not be as much of an issue assuming a Barbarossa launch date of April 15, 1941. The Kiev pocket is closed in mid-July. Japan enters the war that same week to eject Russia from its holdings on the Sea of Japan.

 

Germany gets two extra months of campaigning when the discrepancy between Russian and German capability is never greater. No reinforcements from the Pacific are available to counter Typhoon, which begins August 14, 1941.

 

As a branch scenerio of this what-if, what odds do you give the RN vs. the IJN in 1941? Kido Butai vs. Ark Royal, and Illustrious class CVs?

Poor if the RN decides to launch a sortie to punish the Japanese underneath Japanese air.

Edited May 19, 2011 by Nobu

[Meyer]

 

- Since the LW devoted little resources in 1941/42 for home defence, there would be relatively few impacts in the East by the addition of this planes, as the war wears on, sure, they would be wellcome, but the Germans were already behind the curve in aircraft production so they would only delay the eventual result.

 

"The percentage of total funding from the entire armed forces weapons budget devoted to the flak arm rose continually throughout 1941, from 15 percent in the first quarter, to 17 percent in the second quarter, 19 percent in the third quarter, and finally 24 percent in the fourth quarter. Likewise, expenditures for flak ammunition jumped from 18 percent in the first quarter to 27 percent in the second quarter and to 34 and 35 percent in the last two quarters of 1941, respectively."

 

from "Flak: German Anti-aircraft Defenses 1914-45", Edward B. Westermann. Numbers for 1942 were even higher. Plus, 30-50% of the single engine fighters of the Lw were operating in other fronts than the East. I think that hardly qualifies as "little resources".

[IronsightSniper]

Come on guys, you can do better than that. Instead of dismissing the man himself, dismiss his arguments. Attacking him and his tone are just logical low blows that make you, make us look bad.

 

In any case, my personal opinion on it is that with Industrial support from the West (and perhaps morale support from GB), the SU could of blitzkrieged to Paris in a matter of years. Millions more would of died but that's not relevant to Nazi killing is it? Besides, the majority of the Allied campaign in Europe took place on the high seas and several thousand feet above sea level. The allied landings in Sicily and Normandy were pathetic compared to the epic battles of the Eastern Front, I'm sorry to say. The last hoorah of the Wehrmacht, the Ardennes Offensive, was indeed the only struggle that could compare to the Epics of the Eastern Front. That is not Stalinhugging that is simple logic.

[RETAC21]

"The percentage of total funding from the entire armed forces weapons budget devoted to the flak arm rose continually throughout 1941, from 15 percent in the first quarter, to 17 percent in the second quarter, 19 percent in the third quarter, and finally 24 percent in the fourth quarter. Likewise, expenditures for flak ammunition jumped from 18 percent in the first quarter to 27 percent in the second quarter and to 34 and 35 percent in the last two quarters of 1941, respectively."

 

from "Flak: German Anti-aircraft Defenses 1914-45", Edward B. Westermann. Numbers for 1942 were even higher. Plus, 30-50% of the single engine fighters of the Lw were operating in other fronts than the East. I think that hardly qualifies as "little resources".

 

Interesting but not necessarily conclusive since that expenditure was needed in any case to cover the increased coastal area gained defeating France, Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece, and equipping new units. From the same source: "Despite the significant expansion of the flak arm in the first years of the war, the Wehrmacht was in fact spending a modest amount of its budget on anti-aircraft defenses at this point in time."

Can be found here: http://www.nazi.org....914-1945%20.pdf

 

Further, production of heavy flak guns was still moderate in relation to the number of tubes produced, from Jason Long's site:

 

 

Uploaded with ImageShack.us

 

Most of which went to units in the field, although more would be freed if the skies over the Reich were empty of enemy bombers.

 

As for fighters and bombers, indeed there would be a substantial increase, but would it be enough?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited May 19, 2011 by RETAC21

[RETAC21]

Winter may not be as much of an issue assuming a Barbarossa launch date of April 15, 1941. The Kiev pocket is closed in mid-July. Japan enters the war that same week to eject Russia from its holdings on the Sea of Japan.

 

Germany gets two extra months of campaigning when the discrepancy between Russian and German capability is never greater. No reinforcements from the Pacific are available to counter Typhoon, which begins August 14, 1941.

 

Except they would have found muddy roads in Russia:

 

"The transition between summer and winter within Russia is characterised by rapid changes in temperature. This results in two distinct periods known locally as rasputitsa, (quagmire season). The spring thaw during March and April sees the snow melt to be replaced by slush and mud by day and ice during the night. The autumn freeze in late October sees very similar conditions brought about by the frequent rainy weather at this time of year. It is often recommended to avoid travel during these months."

 

http://www.adventurebimbling.com/russia/russia_weather.html

 

There's evidence that this period in 1941 lasted longer than usual, into early June.

[RETAC21]

Peace with Britain would probably lead to or require a steady pullout of German occupation troops in Norway, France, Greece, Libya, etc. Both sides would want it, and the British would probably insist on it. So the British can argue they brought freedom to all these countries, as well as preserving the empire.

 

Germany imported guest workers from France and other countries but the Allied (probably mostly British) bombing made Germany an undesirable place to work. Perhaps more could be enticed to work in the war industries. I think the Germans could have been considerably more productive if they didn't have to rebuild their cities and factories, and could obtain imports.

 

As it becomes obvious the war won't be over as quickly as historically, the Soviets may push development projects hard. Perhaps we see the T-44 and T-54 fielded before the end.

 

Why would the Germans give up France or Norway? I can see Denmark, maybe the Neterhlands, but they need French industry and would like the payback of WW1 and Norway was a Nordic nation with a common border with the USSR which protected their iron supply from Sweden.

 

As for the Med, in what condition does Italy pull out of the war? in June 1940 they have won nothing of note. What does Mussolini do now, attack Greece? a settlement between the UK and Germany may mean the UK has more forces available to support the Greeks and Mussolini gets a real defeat rather than a stalemate.

[alejandro_]

But that not only depends on awareness but on the ability of the army to cope with the Germans, the French were not surprised and lost all the same. The Red Army in 1941 was just as bad and the Germans are going to be able to operate within their OODA loop -specially Stalin's - as demostrated by the Kiev debacle.

 

The French did not have any reserves once the Germans broke through ("Aucune" as Gamelin said). Also, the USSR was a much larger country than France, and they could have used the territorial gains in Poland as a buffer zone. I am not saying they would defeat the German army but could have stopped their advance before and cause them more casualties.

Edited May 19, 2011 by alejandro_

[RETAC21]

The French did not have any reserves once the Germans broke through ("Aucune" as Gamelin said). Also, the USSR was a much larger country than France, and they could have used the territorial gains in Poland as a buffer zone. I am not saying they would defeat the German army but could have stopped their advance before and cause them more casualties.

 

Well, they did stop them, at Yelnia. Before that, I doubt the Red Army had the ability to outmaneuver the Germans.

[Colin Williams]

 

1) Rationalize the models and makes of all weapons systems. Ruthlessly pare it all down to a few key systems, everything from small arms to tanks and planes. Producing Mark III at the same time as Mark IV, or Mark IV at the same time as Panther, for example, was madness.

 

 

 

I don't see the Germans as egregiously bad in this way, at least not with respect to tanks. Aside from a questionable investment in heavy tanks late in the war, German tank production was relatively focused and producing more than one model at a time gave them flexibility the Soviets lacked. Producing just the PzIII and not the PzIV would have limited the Germans to the 50mm L60 gun as their most powerful tank gun in the critical period of 1942-43. By maintaining production of the PzIV with the Panther, they were able to rely on the PzIV while working out the various teething problems with the Panther. The early success of the German invasion, as much as any other factor, forced the Soviets to rely more on the T34 than they originally planned. In this they were fortunate, as the T34 was an excellent tank, but if it had proven seriously deficient in combat there weren't a lot of other options.

 

Now, if you want lack of rationalization in tank production, look at the British. I believe that in 1943 they still produced the Matilda, Valentine, Churchill, Covenanter and Crusader, alongside newer tanks like the Cavalier, Centaur, and Cromwell. Probably a few Tetrachs in there also.

[Meyer]

Interesting but not necessarily conclusive since that expenditure was needed in any case to cover the increased coastal area gained defeating France, Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece, and equipping new units.

Most flak and searchlight batteries were actually in Germany (we're talking about more than 70% here), and the batteries located in Western Europe are also in the "home defence" mission.

From the same source: "Despite the significant expansion of the flak arm in the first years of the war, the Wehrmacht was in fact spending a modest amount of its budget on anti-aircraft defenses at this point in time."

Well, what constitutes as a "modest" amount for the Wehrmacht (20-30% of budget, hardly a little), is a lot more for the Luftwaffe (40, 50, 60%?).

 

Can be found here: http://www.nazi.org....914-1945%20.pdf

Damn, I had to pay for it...

[Meyer]

 

 

 

That¡s BS since 1943 - they had a last blip over Kursk but from then on, Soviet air power overpowered them, initially with numbers, but increasingly with quality. Certainly, in the last 2.5 years of the war, the combined bomber offensive wore off the LW and forced it to cut back its bomber, transport and training force, but before that, the LW at its height was unable to bring the 1941 campaign to a victorious conclusion or to supply Stalingrad. I don't see how loosing air superiority later rather than sooner is going to turn the tables.

Oh, but it was by numbers: their own numbers, and the number of Allied aircraft that forced the Luftwaffe to focus in the home defence. Even so, the few Luftwaffe fighters that remained in the East continued to manage higly favorable kill ratios, and the bomber and ground attack aircraft were able to continue operating without prohibitive losses. The Soviets, OTOH, did not take full advantage of their superiority, partly because they were focus almost exclusively in the less rewarding tactical approach, neglecting the strategic and interdition kind of missions.

Throw a full Lw from the beggining, and things would be VERY different in the air war.

 

So, let's be generous and add 2-3 divisions (infantry) to the OOB, how much of difference does that make? let's look at some numbers to get perspective, from Glantz:

 

Comparative manpower:

 

22-6-41: 5.5 million Soviet vs 3.050 million German + 650 thousand allies

1st dec 41: 7.4 Mio vs 3.38 Mio German + 650k allies

1st Nov 42: 9.3 Mio vs 2.5 Mio German + 1 Mio allies

14th Oct 43: 10.2 Mio vs 2.56 Mio German + 500k allies

 

Hardware on 22-6-41: 22.600 tanks, 76.500 guns and mortars, 20.000 combat aircraft

same for 1st Jan 42: 7.700 tanks, 48.600 guns and mortars, 12.000 combat aircraft

same for 1st jan 43: 20.600 tanks, 161.600 guns, 21.900 combat aircraft

same for 1st jan 44: 24.400 tanks, 244.400 guns, 32.500 combat aircraft

 

If instead of being sent to NA, the DAK is sent to the East it adds 2 divisions, 155 tanks, at Tobruk axis strength was 35.000, at Gazala 80k and 560 tanks, 116k and 540 tanks at 2nd Alamein, etc. substantial reinforcements were only sent in time to be lost at Tunis, but again, total strength of German troops was about 130k men.

That's not really generous (actually very cheap). Germany could throw a lot more than 2-3 divisions if wasn't at war with anybody else.

And about those manpower numbers, it looks like an apples-oranges conparison (as all Soviet military men against Axis men in the theather).

 

Definitely, but don't forget that Germany needs all those French trucks, and tanks to equip the additional 10 Panzer divisions.

 

French tanks?