Hornet mishandled at Midway?

[Cinaruco]

This the kind of debate that makes me miss King Sargent.

 

 

Mk 1,

 

I have trouble seeing this as a key "mistake". Closer to either a "lucky ommission" or a "surprisingly well reasoned strategy".

 

Semantics. I added the quotation marks precisely to avoid infering any real mistakes = negligence. Yes, it was a well reasoned strategy, at Midway.

 

More mind-food, I think if Yamamoto had launched the Center Force (name was used during the OOB at Midway?) he would not only taken the Attol, but sent the USN to its grave then and there. Not because I am a Yamato awesomeness fanboi, but the fact that if Yamato had any chance of succeeding at what it was intended to do (sink the enmy big ships and lure attention) it was then and there. The decisive battle doctrine and all, but then again, its a what if. Joe I would be interested in your opinion on this.

 

Joe B

I agree. It was seen many times also later in the war that Japanese airfields on atolls were untenable in the face of serious carrier air power. An airfield on a significant landmass, ie with space to disperse the a/c farther from the field and/or under trees, was much more difficult to neutralize, especially if out of range of naval gunfire, IOW less vulnerable than Henderson Field. And a large landmass could just hold more a/c, once both sides had expanded their air arms later in the war.

 

Two question regarding this my friend, first is if the first strike on Midway had been hammered, wouldn't this affect the ensuing carnage? And wasn't Midway capable as holding as many fighters, fighter sized divers and torpedoes as the Yorktown class?

 

Then I end, of course with the third question that originally wasn't intended. The USN had five carriers in the pacific? Enterprise, Hornet, Yorktown, Saratoga and Long Island at the time of Midway.

 

As I understood this, the latter only arrived after the battle to the PTO.

[shep854]

"The ineffectiveness of B-17's against maneuvering ships was barely realized at that time."--JOE BRENNAN

Actually, the anti-shipping mission was the early rationale for the B-17. It was pitched as a winged coast-defense fortress (hence the name, Flying Fortress), capable of bombarding invading fleets hundreds of miles at sea. Early WWII engagements were a rude shock to the AAF.

 

While unsuccessful at actually damaging the Japanese fleet, Midway air strikes were wildly successful at disrupting Japanese plans and timing. The whole Midway op was to get the US carriers. Actually taking the atoll would have been a nice bonus. I don't think anyone would give the USN much of a chance against the Japanese carrier strike that was waiting to launch upon location of the American ships.

Edited May 12, 2011 by shep854

[Marek Tucan]

Also re. B-17, they proven to be great for long-range patrol duty, and again, ineffective as it was, their raid on Nagumo's forces helped to disorganize Japanese defences.

[JOE BRENNAN]

"The ineffectiveness of B-17's against maneuvering ships was barely realized at that time."--JOE BRENNAN

Actually, the anti-shipping mission was the early rationale for the B-17. It was pitched as a winged coast-defense fortress (hence the name, Flying Fortress), capable of bombarding invading fleets hundreds of miles at sea. Early WWII engagements were a rude shock to the AAF.

Yes, antishipping was the rationale of USAAC heavy bombers in pre-WWII defensive oriented US strategy. But the early WWII engagements were a shock, or fully realized shock, as of *after* the war when it became apparent almost no Japanese ships were hit by medium/high level B-17 attacks (there were some exceptions, though very few if restricted to *moving* ships). The USAAC/F realized the obvious fact that early Japanese invasions, of PI and DEI, hadn't been stopped by B-17's. But there weren't a lot of B-17's available (to begin with and especially after losses on the ground in the initial Japanese attacks), and they believed pretty many hits, and some important sinkings, had been achieved. Then at Midway again the USAAF believed hits had been achieved. It was a controversy between Army and Navy at the time as to who was responsible for the victory. The USAAF gradually realized over 1942 that B-17 antishipping tactics were not effective, no sudden shock.

 

So my point was that, as in many what if/alt history cases, it's easy to confuse what was realized at the time v what was realized later. Real histories often give facts that were only know later without identifying them as such. It would be clumsy to constantly refer to when a fact was known, and not using later facts gives a less complete picture. But over time the actual state of knowledge of the participants can become obscured. Another simple example of this is reference to the Japanese a/c types at Midway by their later (1943) nicknames (Kate, Val, etc) which tends to obscure the actually still quite fuzzy knowledge by the US of Japanese a/c types as of June 1942.

 

As far as B-17's as scouts, they were used effectively that way in the Solomons, and that was a reason the USN was so anxious to get its own PB4Y/B-24's operational in the Pacific. But that was also a learning process in terms of inter-service coordination. At Coral Sea, Crace's US/RAN cruiser/DD force was subjected to an almost simultaneous level bombing attack by B-17's and JNAF Type 96 Rikko's (identified as Japanese Army Fiat BR-20's) .

 

Joe

Edited May 12, 2011 by JOE BRENNAN

[rmgill]

-The ineffectiveness of B-17's against maneuvering ships was barely realized at that time. Many hits had been claimed prior to Midway, and many were claimed at Midway and given credence at least by the USAAF; not firmly disproven until Japanese accounts were available postwar, though there was a general recognition that medium/high altitude attack didn't work well by late 1942.

 

Until the advent of radio guided (and better) bombs. Then it became more Rock Scissors Paper with measures and counter measures between the sparkys and weapons geeks.

Edited May 12, 2011 by rmgill

[glenn239]

While unsuccessful at actually damaging the Japanese fleet, Midway air strikes were wildly successful at disrupting Japanese plans and timing.

 

If, for example, Lexington’s dive bomber aviators had made the Henderson strike from Midway, Hiryu would have died long before the 10:20 strike. That would be a considerably better result for Fletcher than mere disruption, (unless, that is, the destruction of a carrier motivated Nagumo out of his lethargic state of mind).

 

Actually, the anti-shipping mission was the early rationale for the B-17. It was pitched as a winged coast-defense fortress (hence the name, Flying Fortress), capable of bombarding invading fleets hundreds of miles at sea. Early WWII engagements were a rude shock to the AAF.

 

The United States Navy fought the Battle of Midway and chose the OOB for Midway Air Station. While the USAAF was high on high-level bombing techniques, the USN does not appear to have been so.

 

Just one example: where are all those F4Fs gonna come from? How're they gonna get there? Who's gonna fly 'em?

 

Yorktown’s air group at Coral Sea consisted of VF-42, VB-5, VS-5 and VT-5. At Midway it looks to have been VF-3, VB-3, VS-5, VT-3. This means (presumably) that VF-42, and VB-5 rotated off upon return to Hawaii. Lexington’s air group at Coral Sea was VF-2, VB-2, VS-2, VT-2. Most of these pilots survived the battle. They too, presumably, will have rotated out at Hawaii.

[JOE BRENNAN]

The United States Navy fought the Battle of Midway and chose the OOB for Midway Air Station. While the USAAF was high on high-level bombing techniques, the USN does not appear to have been so.

As you state it those two sentences are somewhat contradictory: Navy completely free to determine OOB, didn't believe in B-17 antishipping effectiveness, but stationed B-17's at Midway anyway. I think the historical reality (as opposed to 'what if's' that change participant's opinions to reflect later facts) is that Navy was not as a practical matter free to exclude the Army from an operation like the defense of Midway without a big political rigamarole going all the way up to FDR to sort out, and therefore a damn good reason. And, while it had less confidence in B-17 antishipping capability than the Army did (but what else would one expect?), it wasn't in possession of conclusive evidence that early-mid 1942 B-17 tactics were ineffective against ships.

 

Another aspect to consider is the Navy had had its own ships hit by Japanese level bombing, (hit on the USS Houston and sinking of the Langley in DEI, as well as hits/sinkings of other Allied ships by JNAF level bombing in early months of the war). And the USN included level bombing as a alternative tactic for torpedo planes where target was uncertain or water depth might preclude torpedo use, as in the hit TBD's scored on the auxiliary seaplane tender Kiokawa Maru in the Lae/Salamaua raid in March 1942, from around 13k ft. This was before any actual torpedo unreliability problems surfaced. In those cases the bombing was from lower than B-17's typically bombed in the first part of 1942, but again the conclusion that medium altitide level bombing against ships was unprofitable, and outright high altitude bombing useless, was arrived at gradually. It wasn't something the USN let alone USAAF was certain of as of June 1942.

 

BTW, didn't you use to argue, at length on multiple forums, about how formations of B-17's from Hawaii would surely score hits on moving warship formations? (if I'm mistaken, then it was your colleague on Hawaii what if's, Robdab). I think the idea added the concept of bigger formations because there were more B-17's available, which might have merit in theory though practically speaking is not how they operated. Might your new position on B-17's be the result of the first time in history somebody with a strong opinion has changed it based on other people's arguments on internet boards?

 

Joe

[glenn239]

Navy completely free to determine OOB, didn't believe in B-17 antishipping effectiveness, but stationed B-17's at Midway anyway

 

I can’t recall ever reading why B-17’s were sent instead of more fighters and dive bombers, but since long range was their advantage I would assume they were included for both the distant strike mission and supplemental scouting.

 

BTW, didn't you use to argue, at length on multiple forums, about how formations of B-17's from Hawaii would surely score hits on moving warship formations?

 

No – I may have argued that mass B-17 raids would deter Nagumo from closing on Oahu, but deterred by being unnerved by near misses or the occassional lucky hit. In puttering around with probabilities a bit back at the time it seemed the chances of hitting a maneuvering carrier-sized target from 20,000 feet should be quite poor, from 30,000 feet even worse. Looks to me like one would need about 40 bombers or so.

 

(if I'm mistaken, then it was your colleague on Hawaii what if's, Robdab)

 

Colleague? More like a boat anchor. I took a warning on this site (the only one) thanks to being in a thread where his antics were on full display.

 

And the USN included level bombing as a alternative tactic for torpedo planes where target was uncertain or water depth might preclude torpedo use.

 

The point at hand is whether the USN considered dive or level bombing to be the superior method of attack against ships in May/June 1942. The USAAF might have been unpleasantly surprised that its preferred method of attack was ineffective. But I don’t think the US Navy will have shared the Army’s illusions about level bombing, that’s all.

[shep854]

With hindsight, there is likely some overanalysis of a desperate scramble to get anything that could shoot or drop in a position to confront the Japanese. If they were available, I wouldn't be surprised if CAP Stinsons had been sent up.

[glenn239]

With the Japanese, the failures of command that lead to defeat were of the highest order - the diversion of carrier forces to secondary objectives, lack of coordination to solving the identified tactical problem of carrier flank attack, the sloppy execution of the submarine picket line, etc.

 

With the USN, most of the things we're discussing here are 'tweaking' - issues of less importance where doing something else might have been better. More single engined and less B-17's. Hornet with Fletcher instead of Spruaunce. Minor improvements perhaps, but not in any way of decisive importance. At the highest level, Nimitz got it right and Yamamoto got it wrong.

[Ken Estes]

Whether Spruance or Halsey commanded the TF, we forget that the aviation expertise came from the staff, including the Chief of Staff, Capt Miles Browning, who traditionally has received much credit for the tactical planning and decisive launch decision at Midway. Halsey was hardly more an aviator than Spruance, having been ordered by King to Pensacola in his fifties in order to qualify for command of Lexington. The oldest naval aviator then, he was truthfully a battleship and torpedo expert.

[John Dudek]

Whether Spruance or Halsey commanded the TF, we forget that the aviation expertise came from the staff, including the Chief of Staff, Capt Miles Browning, who traditionally has received much credit for the tactical planning and decisive launch decision at Midway. Halsey was hardly more an aviator than Spruance, having been ordered by King to Pensacola in his fifties in order to qualify for command of Lexington. The oldest naval aviator then, he was truthfully a battleship and torpedo expert.

 

Before he was a battleship expert, Halsey commanded a division of destroyers. During a wargame in the early 20's, Halsey used the unorthodox tactic of sailing his destroyers between two columns of "enemy" battleships, firing his practice torpedoes to both port and starboard. Umpires ruled that all of Halsey's destroyers had been sunk, but not before his torpedoes badly damaged several enemy BB's. In fact, so many practice torpedoes hit the battleships, that a number of them suffered major water leaks from sprung plates and were laid up under repairs in drydock for quite some time.

[JOE BRENNAN]

The point at hand is whether the USN considered dive or level bombing to be the superior method of attack against ships in May/June 1942.

No it's not. It's whether the Navy felt strongly enough and had enough evidence of the uselessness of level bombing (from typical B-17 altitudes of that time) to make the extraordinary military/interservice political effort to try to exclude the Army from the defense of Midway. In non-alternative real history, obviously they didn't try to do that.

 

The point at hand, as with most what ifs, particularly yours and Robdabs (if youve changed your mind about him good for you, but you used to team up with him on web boards to push far fetched ideas; you damage your credibility further to do an alternate history about that ) is whether they are plausible without supernaturally giving the decision makers later information. This is one like most is not. The USN viewed its capabilities in overlapping areas as superior to other services as always and vice versa, and in this case with good reason based on all later information, but had no clear proof just how ineffective B-17s had been against Japanese ships up to that time, nor *during* the Midway battle for that matter. And OTOH USN had direct experience that JNAF level bombers were *not* a trivial threat to moving ships. By the same token, the idea of stripping carriers (like Saratoga) of a/c to put them on islands conflicted with basic doctrine of what carrier a/c units were for, which the USN had no reason to change based on its limited combat experience up to Midway. Even putting carrier units ashore at Gcanal was an expedient after their carriers were disabled or sunk. Saratoga was nearly ready for Midway (after repair of January sub torpedo damage), and nobody knew how long the Midway operation would last or where it might proceed out of range of Midway island.

 

Your proposed alternative is perhaps a tweaks with full hindsight, but isn't a plausible alternative for a decision made at that time. To me the a key for a non-BS 'what if' alternative tactic or strategy is to present evidence the alternate idea was at least considered at the time.

 

Joe

Edited May 14, 2011 by JOE BRENNAN

[swerve]

With a line of enemy destroyers between two lines of battleships, I reckon there could have been a lot of damage from 'friendly' fire. What did the umpires rule on that?

[John Dudek]

With a line of enemy destroyers between two lines of battleships, I reckon there could have been a lot of damage from 'friendly' fire. What did the umpires rule on that?

 

The Author, Robert Leckie didn't say what the umpire's ruled, regarding friendly fire damage. However, Halsey's unorthodox and suicidal torpedo attack turned the wargames upside down, while putting a number of BB's into drydock for repairs.

[Ken Estes]

Can this tale be found anywhere besides Leckie, such as in E.B. Potter's biography?

[John Dudek]

Can this tale be found anywhere besides Leckie, such as in E.B. Potter's biography?

 

I believe I read the account in Leckie's book "Delivered from Evil." I'll see if I can dig up the book and give you the story in its entirety.

[John Dudek]

Okay. Here's the story right from the book. "Commander Halsey stayed in destroyers following the war and in 1921, he won the most resounding simulated naval battle in history. He was in temporary command of a squadron of 18 destroyers during manuevers against four battleships off Long Beach, California, and if he'd busted a rule or two before, this time he splintered the set. He bracketed the battlewagons between his two columns of destroyers and let go with 36 practice torpedoes. Twenty two connected and even though fitted with soft noses, to prevent harm to the target ships, they were fired so close in and so accurately, they did $1.5 million in damage. Halsey not only enraged the battleship skippers, but he infuriated the pinch penny Congress of that era.."

[shep854]

John, there's a slight contradiction here. In Post #37, you wrote that the cans went between two BB columns. In your last post, your quotation states that the battleships were in the middle, between two destroyer columns.

----

How times have changed...Nowadays, $1.5 mil will just about cover scratched paint.

Edited May 16, 2011 by shep854

[John Dudek]

John, there's a slight contradiction here. In Post #37, you wrote that the cans went between two BB columns. In your last post, your quotation states that the battleships were in the middle, between two destroyer columns.

----

How times have changed...Nowadays, $1.5 mil will just about cover scratched paint.

 

You are absolutely correct. I hadn't read that historical account in well over ten years and relied on my failing memory, so I blame advancing senility and too many fried brain synapses as being the culprit.

[Kentucky-roughrider]

Wheren't the battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor send to the West Coast in case the Japanese headed there instead of Midway? If that is correct it might have been the Admiral covering his bets, in case the Japanese were running a false flag operation or was he sending units that couldn't be useful in the battle out of the area?

[Kentucky-roughrider]

oopps double post.

Edited May 16, 2011 by Kentucky-roughrider

[John Dudek]

Wheren't the battleships stationed at Pearl Harbor send to the West Coast in case the Japanese headed there instead of Midway? If that is correct it might have been the Admiral covering his bets, in case the Japanese were running a false flag operation or was he sending units that couldn't be useful in the battle out of the area?

Admiral Pye sortied from San Francisco in Task Force 1 on June 5. His force consisted of a combination of 6 repaired and other old US battleships plus the light carrier, USS Long Island. Together, they made a lengthy patrol off the western US coast for several weeks duration. Pye did so because of the possibility of the Japanese mounting carrier air raids on key US aircraft factories and other defense plants along the US west coast.

Edited May 16, 2011 by John Dudek

[glenn239]

Lundstrom records, interestingly enough, that Nimitz was annoyed with Pye's dramatics, such that his relief from combat command would follow.

[John Dudek]

Lundstrom records, interestingly enough, that Nimitz was annoyed with Pye's dramatics, such that his relief from combat command would follow.

 

For all the good that Pye's Task Force One did, considering the overall waste of bunker fuel, he would have been much better off keeping his battleships at San Francisco or San Pedro California.