German Armed Forces reduced to 150 000?

[Chris Werb]

Wouldn't the rotating crews for frigates get terribly seasick?

[BansheeOne]

Maybe they are finally going to open service to EU citizens, or else are expecting a surge in patriotism ...

 

Interestingly the forthcoming new white book of the Bundeswehr is indeed reported to include the suggestion that EU citizens could serve in the Bundeswehr.

[Simon Tan]

Stop ripping off RusAm.

[lastdingo]

 

 

Still, aren't 20,000 medical personnel too many in proportion to the total size of the force?

Not if you are planning to get your ass whipped.

 

ROTFLMFAO

 

It could be that the medical personnel are career soldiers on long contracts. While on top of that 150,000 figure you have the reservists, people whom have served their 2 yr conscription but could be called up in war time to swell the ranks to twice that number.

 

West Germany never had 2 yr basic military service (conscription) post-1945. I don't know about East germany, but that ceased to exist in 1990, so their conscripts wouldn't be of military age for anything but support services any more.

[BansheeOne]

Markets | Wed Jul 6, 2016 11:07am EDT Related: STOCKS, MARKETS, INDUSTRIALS

German defence needs to spend billions to rebuild munition stocks -source

BERLIN, JULY 6 | BY SABINE SIEBOLD

Germany needs to spend 14 billion euros ($15.48 billion) on replenishing its badly depleted stockpile of munitions as part of a broader plan up to 2030 to upgrade military equipment after years of decline, a German military source said.

Government sources said earlier this year that Germany sought to invest about 130 billion euros ($143.74 billion) over the next 15 years on modernising equipment to enable the army to better fulfill its missions abroad.

Military sources said that a vital part of that upgrade would be to restore stocks of munitions to acceptable levels.

Hans-Peter Bartels, military ombudsman in the German parliament, said current stocks had fallen to a two-day supply, far below NATO's old Cold War requirement of 30 days.

Bartels, a member of the Social Democrats who are the junior partner in the right-left coalition, said Russia's 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimea had put a new focus on NATO's collective defence responsibilities.

"And having adequate supplies on hand, from munitions to fuel to logistics, is a big part of that capability," he said.

Henning Otte, a defence expert in Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats, acknowledged that current German munition supplies were not good. "Personal equipment, weapons and munitions are the life insurance of our soldiers," he said.

A defence ministry spokesman would not comment on the state of the military's munitions supplies on the grounds that the data was classified.

However a confidential ministry report seen by Reuters acknowledged that the stockpile had shrivelled and would limit any deployment by Germany to aid NATO allies in eastern Europe.

The report prepared by the ministry in March concluded that additional spending was needed to beef up supplies of equipment and munitions.

Barring additional funding, "it would not be possible to execute national and allied defence with larger, rapidly deployable forces", the report said.

"Negative consequences for allied commitments and structures would be inevitable, and it would be possible to maintain capabilities only at a low qualitative and quantitative level."

Critics say they are uncertain whether Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen will succeed in securing the full 130 billion euros in funding she hopes to spend to rebuild capacity through 2030.

Current budget plans for 2017 include just 359 million euros in funding for new munitions, only 30 million more than in 2016. ($1 = 0.9044 euros)

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/germany-munitions-idUSL1N19S0EU

[sunday]

 

Maybe they are finally going to open service to EU citizens, or else are expecting a surge in patriotism ...

 

Interestingly the forthcoming new white book of the Bundeswehr is indeed reported to include the suggestion that EU citizens could serve in the Bundeswehr.

 

 

In separate units? Could be somewhat curious to see again a unit of Spanish Volunteers.

[Panzermann]

 

 

 

 

Maybe they are finally going to open service to EU citizens, or else are expecting a surge in patriotism ...

Interestingly the forthcoming new white book of the Bundeswehr is indeed reported to include the suggestion that EU citizens could serve in the Bundeswehr.

In separate units? Could be somewhat curious to see again a unit of Spanish Volunteers.

And dutch, belgian, french, kroat... Ukrainian of course

 

Sorry, no segregation of Austrians.

Edited July 7, 2016 by Panzermann

[Simon Tan]

Worked so good last time round.

[Panzermann]

Worked so good last time round.

Exactly.

[BansheeOne]

The new white book was published today. There's even an English version, which saves me a lot of my usual translation work. Of course there is the usual share of bureaucratese, bullshit and squishy feelgood lingo, but I can find little fault with the analytical part.

 

[...]

 

1.2 Germany’s Values and Security Interests

The commitment and aims of German governance are to ensure freedom, security and prosperity for our citizens, to promote peace, and to strengthen the rule of law.

German security policy is tied to values and guided by interests. The guiding principles for the formulation of our national interests are

- the values of our constitution, in particular human dignity and other basic rights, democracy, and the rule of law as well as

- European law and international law, particularly the protection of universal human rights and the maintenance of peace.

Our security policy interests are moreover decisively determined by our geographical position at the heart of Europe and our membership in the EU, our economic strength and dependency on trade, our commitment to responsible engagement, as well as the imperative to preserve peace according to Article 26 of the German constitution.

In summary, the security interests of Germany are as follows:

- protecting our citizens as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country;

- protecting the territorial integrity, the sovereignty and the citizens of our allies;

- maintaining the rules-based international order on the basis of international law;

- ensuring prosperity for our citizens through a strong German economy as well as free and unimpeded world trade;

- promoting the responsible use of limited goods and scarce resources throughout the world;

- deepening European integration and

- consolidating the transatlantic partnership.

Our interests remain closely interwoven with those of our allies and partners. Germany values reliability and loyalty to its allies. It is only in cooperation with others that Germany can protect its territory and open society, make effective use of its profound but limited resources, and unfold its innovative and productive potential. Pursuing German interests therefore always means taking into account the interests of our allies and those of other friendly nations.

At the same time, our ability to respond in an international – and particularly European and transatlantic – context is based on a clear national position.

2 Germany’s Security Environment

2.1 The International Order in Transition 28

Drivers of Change 28

Multipolarity and the Diffusion of Power 30

Rules-Based Euro-Atlantic Order of Peace and Stability Called into Question 31

European Project Under Pressure 33

2.2 Challenges for German Security Policy 34

Transnational Terrorism 34

Challenges from the Cyber and Information Domain 36

Interstate Conflict 38

Fragile States and Poor Governance 39

Global Arms Build-Up and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 40

Threats to Information and Communication Systems, Supply Lines, Transportation and Trade Routes as well as to the Secure Supply of Raw Materials and Energy 41

Climate Change 42

Uncontrolled and Irregular Migration 42

Epidemics and Pandemics 44

In the past years, Germany’s security environment has become even more complex, volatile and dynamic and is therefore increasingly unpredictable.

Only by being fully aware of current trends and processes as well as the direct and indirect challenges we are facing can our security policy accurately target the causes, utilise existing scope for action, and anticipate future developments.

2.1 The International Order in Transition

The international order, which was established after World War II and whose organisations and institutions still provide a framework for international politics, is undergoing profound changes. The drivers and effects of these changes are varied and numerous.

Drivers of Change

The globalisation and digitalisation of recent decades have resulted in an interconnected world and interconnected societies. More and more people are gaining better access to information and technology.

These political, economic and technological networks are the cause of far-reaching social transformation processes. The cyber and information domain, which has increasingly come to dominate our activities and communication, is a manifestation of this global interconnectivity.

At the same time, globalisation is also promoting the interconnection and spread of risks as well as their repercussions. These include epidemics, the possibility of cyber attacks and information operations, and transnational terrorism.

Anti-globalisation movements are also on the rise: introverted and often radical nationalism, violent extremism as well as religious fanaticism, which results from identity and legitimacy deficits and often from a decline in norms and values. These forces can intensify the disintegration of state orders.

Demographic transformations and urbanisation are further drivers of change. The growing world population is increasingly concentrated in urban coastal regions. As a result, these regions are gaining significance as the starting and focal point of conflicts.

In addition, some societies are growing older, while others have a large proportion of young people. In order to remain globally competitive, ageing societies must find new ways of receiving sufficient qualified immigrants, retaining skilled workers, and adapting production conditions to older workforces. Younger societies, on the other hand, are facing the fundamental challenge of providing prospects for young people and creating the necessary training programmes and jobs.

In many parts of the world, the state, as the central element of order, also faces other challenges to its legitimacy and competency: Poor governance and informal economies, which are characterised by widespread nepotism and corruption and are frequently associated with organised crime, are contributing to innerstate conflicts as well as regional and international crises.

Multipolarity and the Diffusion of Power

Politically, economically and militarily, the international system is moving towards a multipolar order. The global distribution of power is changing – power is shifting within the international community but also between states and non-state actors. As a result of technological advances, transnational non-state networks are becoming particularly important, and they are increasingly exerting influence in international security policy.

The growing economic, political and military influence of key states, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, will lead to increasing multipolarity and shifts in geopolitical power. Dynamically growing societies are connecting their increasing wealth and participation in the global economy to an aspiration to extend their influence in regional and global affairs. They are underlining this with a significant increase in defence spending and through an intensified coordination of their interests in new organisations and groups of states.

It is estimated that China, for example, could account for one fifth of the global economic output by 2030, while India will account for approximately one sixth. It is likely that these two countries together will have an economy equal in size to that of the entire OECD area by the middle of the current century. When it comes to defence, China already spends approximately as much as all EU states combined. The international influence of other key states will also continue to increase.

This means that organisations and forums consisting mainly of members of this group of states will become more important. The BRICS group is one example, as are ASEAN and a number of increasingly influential Latin American and African regional and sub-regional organisations. The increasing significance of the G20, which has established itself as an important forum for global economic and financial cooperation, is also mainly due to the growing influence of such key states.

As a result of these global shifts, the regional dimension of security is becoming ever more important. This entails the risk that competing paradigms in international politics may develop. Fragmentation with different and potentially competing regional systems would weaken the universally binding nature of the foundations and institutions of our current global order. This development would have far-reaching implications for Germany as a globally networked country that depends on free access to global routes of information, communication, supply, transport and trade.

In order to effectively counter these risks of fragmentation at a global level, multipolarity must be appropriately reflected in the United Nations System.

In this multipolar world, the United States will continue to have a profound influence on international security policy. In past years, the United States has increasingly called on its partners, including in Europe, to take on more responsibility. This trend is likely to continue in view of economic and political developments in the United States. Its European partners will likely be expected to show more commitment in pursuing common objectives and strategies.

The United States of America has guaranteed security and stability in Europe since 1945. Germany has a long-standing partnership with the United States which is deeply rooted in our society and is reflected by a broad spectrum of common security policy interests.

The transatlantic security partnership will grow closer and become more productive the more we Europeans are prepared to shoulder a larger share of the common burden, and the more our American partners engage in shared decision-making. Germany embraces the joint responsibility that arises from the common Euro-Atlantic system of values.

Rules-Based Euro-Atlantic Order of Peace and Stability Called into Question

Since the end of the Cold War, European countries – together with the United States of America – have established a unique peace order on the European continent to which all participating states in the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have committed themselves. This order is based on the idea that European security is indivisible. Its institutional backbone is a tight network of multilateral regional and pan-European organisations and institutions which is characterised by cooperation among themselves as well as with third parties on the basis of common values and rules for their implementation.

Although this peace order has never been able to completely prevent the outbreak of local violent conflicts in Europe, it has provided a basis for their resolution and thus for far-reaching stability.

Russia is openly calling the European peace order into question with its willingness to use force to advance its own interests and to unilaterally redraw borders guaranteed under international law, as it has done in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This has far-reaching implications for security in Europe and thus for the security of Germany. The crisis in and surrounding Ukraine is the concrete manifestation of long-term internal and external developments. Russia is rejecting a close partnership with the West and placing emphasis on strategic rivalry. Internationally, Russia is presenting itself as an independent power centre with global ambitions.

This is reflected, for example, by an increase in Russia’s military activities along its borders with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO). In the course of extensively modernising its armed forces, Russia appears to be prepared to test the limits of existing international agreements. By increasingly using hybrid instruments to purposefully blur the borders between war and peace, Russia is creating uncertainty about the nature of its intentions. This calls for responses from the affected states, but also from

the EU and NATO.

Without a fundamental change in policy, Russia will constitute a challenge to the security of our continent in the foreseeable future. At the same time, however, Europe and Russia remain linked by a broad range of common interests and relations. As the EU’s largest neighbour and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia has a special regional and global responsibility when it comes to meeting common challenges and managing international crises. Sustainable security and prosperity in and for Europe cannot therefore be ensured without strong cooperation with Russia. It is therefore all the more important that, in our relations with Russia, we find the right balance between collective defence and increased resilience on the one hand, and approaches to cooperative security and sectoral cooperation on the other.

What is important for the common security space of our continent is thus not the development of a new security architecture, but rather respect for and consistent adherence to existing and proven common rules and principles.

European Project Under Pressure

The EU is much in demand as a major international player and partner owing to its economic strength, its global alliances, and its commitment to the rule of law. At the same time, it is confronted by the challenge of maintaining and cultivating internal cohesion and solidarity among its member states.

The EU and its member states are facing a special challenge on account of the simultaneity and consequences of the economic and financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and the instabilities on its external borders. The situation has been further exacerbated because a number of member states are placing an increased emphasis on their own national interests. The success of the European project and the further deepening of the integration process therefore require the continued commitment of all member states and their citizens as well as an awareness of the fact that losses and gains in security and prosperity will affect us all.

Europe’s internal challenges also affect the domain of security and defence. Here, armed forces, which are still organised on a national basis, have been significantly reduced in recent years under the pressure of the debt crisis and in view of the allegedly peaceful environment. Meanwhile, other states outside the EU have invested heavily in their armed forces, and they will continue to do so in the future.

The EU will have to make a substantial effort to stay in the lead economically and technologically and to remain a role model for other societies around the world. It will continue to have a stabilising effect on its neighbours only if it overcomes internal fault lines, successfully counteracts centrifugal forces, resolutely continues on the path of modernisation and innovation, and thereby strengthens its internal cohesion and unity. It is therefore necessary to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by the Treaty of Lisbon.

[...]

Edited July 13, 2016 by BansheeOne

[Simon Tan]

How many new Panzer Divisions???

[Simon Tan]

I note the somewhat amusing rule of law assertions from those supporting revolution.

[BansheeOne]

The currently 14 Tornados based at Holloman AFB, NM, will be relocated to Jagel, Schleswig-Holstein by the end of 2019 and the Luftwaffe training center at Holloman disbanded. The Luftwaffe states that the introduction of guided bombs has allowed to train "synthetically" and independently from air-to-ground ranges, and requirements have reduced overall with the downsizing of the Tornado fleet. Also, operating aircraft and basing personnel in the US causes disproportionally higher cost than training in Germany.

 

Luftwaffe Wing 71 "Richthofen" in Wittmund was re-established on 4 July after having previously been reduced to a group subordinated to Fighter Wing 31 "Boelcke" in 2013. The reorganization includes an increase from four to six squadrons total, 730 to ca. 900 personnel and ten to an initial 21 Eurofighters which will further grow to 35 since aircraft will not be deployed to Holloman for training as originally planned.

[lastdingo]

Worked so good last time round.

 

Another unnecessary reply from "Mr. useless one-liner".

 

Look up Hilfswillige and how integral and indispensable these were during 1942-1945. They were Soviet prisoners of war. Not volunteer citizens of allied countries - prisoners of war. The HiWi concept was no doubt among the success stories of the Wehrmacht. A typical division of 1944 had in excess of 5% HiWi personnel.

 

A few per cent such foreign volunteers aren't harmful for cohesion or performance. It becomes most troublesome with multinational brigades such as the Franco-German Brigade or even mixed battalions as planned for the tripwire force in the Baltic countries and Poland.

[Simon Tan]

HiWi and national legions are quite different. That the latter were later transferred to the SS is irrelevant. But perhaps in the spirit of the season we shall gloss that over.

[BansheeOne]

As the sixth Class 212A submarine was commissioned today, the MoD announced plans for two additional boats until 2030, acknowledging that the current number is below operational requirements of the Bundeswehr, and in the past sometimes only two had been available for deployment at a time; though that shouldn't surprise given the conventional wisdom that only one out of any three warships is ever available. Of course I've heard that part of the problem is a lack of crews, which would obviously not be solved by more hulls; but that is probably intended to be addressed by the planned increase of seagoing Marine personnel mentioned earlier on this thread.

 

The most interesting part of the announcement to me was that the additional boats should "orientate on the Class 212A regarding capabilities and size", which implies they will be similar, but not the same type. Of course the second batch of two already had some modifications over the first four, like a new flank sonar array, satcom and combat information system, an optronic persiscope, a four-man diver lockout chamber and tropic-capable airconditioning.*

 

Meanwhile I don't find an open source for the planned details of the Leopard 2 A7 (V) upgrade, but it has been reported for some time that there will be a total of 104, including the existing 20 A7 and another 84 from the additional 100 Leopards being bought back from industry (and 16 transfered from the Netherlands as part of the deal to stand up joint GER/NL Panzerbataillon 414). Part of the upgrades will also be implemented in the A6, A6M and Bergepanzer 3 Büffel variants in Bundeswehr service.

 

* ETA: It was also mentioned that cooperation with Norway or others was being investigated in the submarine plans, so it's possible there would be joint procurement of a new type; this is in fact not entirely new.

 

Germany, Norway Eye Joint Submarine Procurement

By: Lars Hoffmann, March 11, 2016

GÖTTINGEN, Germany — Norway plans to complete the definition phase for the procurement of new submarines in the first half of this year and may consider a joint purchase with another country.

The Norwegian Ministry of Defense is negotiating ​with several different shipyards but has not yet chosen a supplier for new submarines, ​it stated in a press release. ​

Norway ​has to replace its six Ula-class submarines, which ​will gradually reach their end of life in the 2020s. According to the release, Norway is also in discussions with several nations ​to establish the basis for ​submarine cooperation. ​

Last year, ​Norwegian Defense Minister ​Ine Eriksen Søreide suggested a joint procurement with Poland during her visit to the MSPO exhibition ​in Kielce. Another potential partner is Germany.

According to sources familiar with the subject, beside Germany, South Korea, Italy, Sweden, France and Spain qualify as supplier countries. ​Germany has had ​traditionally close military links with Norway and a ​track record of decades-long cooperation in naval construction. Norway's ​Ula submarines go back to a German design, while the first four German class-212 A submarines were equipped with a Norwegian battle management system.

​Germany is also home to ThyssenKrupp Marine systems, ​which is considered a global leader in building non-nuclear submarines.

“Germany is therefore a nation which it is natural for Norway to discuss a potential future submarine cooperation with,” the Norwegian MoD writes. ​Industry also will play an important part in ​future submarine cooperation, the ministry stressed.

These topics were discussed in early February with German partners in Berlin during a visit of a Norwegian delegation led by Defense State Secretary Øystein Bø and ​National Armaments Director Morten Tiller.

​The German MoD is interested ​in cooperating with the Nordic country because ​the German Navy plans to purchase two to four ​submarines in the second half of the 2020s. ​Since ​the ministry has classified submarine construction as a key technology, which is to be kept in Germany, shipyard capacity utilization is a necessity. Therefore, the proposal is on the table to combine the ​Norwegian and ​German procurement projects.

To save costs, the German MoD wants to employ a single design for both nation's boats. ​The Norwegian side ​submitted a draft with its ​submarine specifications for review to Germany last year.

In case of a joint procurement, Germany wants to function ​as ​lead nation and ​assume project responsibility, stated the German MoD. To reduce the life-cycle costs, ​maintenance and operation also should be managed in cooperation.

And as Gundbert Scherf, responsible for armaments cooperation with foreign countries in the MoD, said several months ago, the German Navy ​could imagine a common military submarine command with the Norwegians.

One major hurdle remains: ​The Norwegians want to open ​the German defense procurement market to ​companies from the Scandinavian country. According to Torbjørn Svensgård, the president of the Norwegian Defence and Security Industry Association, ​it is easier for its member companies to have success in the US market than in the closed European armament markets.

"Norway wants market access in the country, from which we obtain the submarines," he stressed.

Svensgård advised the competing yards not to rely solely on their technical expertise and thus to feel too safe. He pointed to the procurement of the Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates several years ago. While German and British shipyards would have expected to get a contract, the order was finally given to Spain.

“If the prospective suppliers don't listen carefully to the customer and provide a comprehensive response to all requirements, including those related to industrial cooperation, it could end similar when it comes to submarines,” he warned.

​Katrin Suder, German secretary of state for armament, ​said that a procurement of the naval strike missile and the battle management system, ​both produced by ​Norway's ​Kongsberg, is "conceivable." The condition for such a deal, however, is a previous tender process. ​In case of a jointly developed product between Norway and Germany, this could be obtained without competition, the secretary of state said. It remains to be seen whether this German approach fits the requirements of the Norwegians.

In terms of shaping ​industrial cooperation, the Norwegian state has ​better options than does the German Defense Ministry, ​as Norway holds a majority stake in ​the publicly listed technology and armaments group Kongsberg, Norway's defense industry leader. ​

In contrast, the entire German armaments industry is privately organized, which leaves the German MoD with little direct influence.

Although Norway plans to procure more boats than Germany, the position of Germany as a lead nation in this program seems to be acceptable. ​Svensgård said he sees no fundamental problems.

“With such arrangements​, we've had good experiences at US-led projects,” he said. Norway participates in the construction and development program for the American F-35 fighter aircraft.

“In the past, it had rather been a problem with European armaments projects, that no one was taking the leadership role,” Svensgård said. However, it is important for a lead nation that it is prepared to listen to and accept suggestions, he says. “And of course, the long-term obligations have to be met.”

 

DCNS, ThyssenKrupp To Face Off in Norwegian Submarines Bid

By: Pierre Tran, July 11, 2016

PARIS — The French naval defense and energy specialist DCNS expects to submit early next year an offer in Norway’s potential tender for attack submarines — a competition that pits the state-controlled naval shipbuilder against German archrival ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), the newspaper Journal du Dimanche reported.

The Norwegian technical requirements landed three weeks ago, and DCNS aims to respond “early in 2017,” the newspaper reported. “We are once again in competition with TKMS of Germany, which needs this contract to ensure its survival,” DCNS Chairman Hervé Guillou said.

Work on the subs will be “100 percent French,” without a technology transfer, the paper reported.

Oslo, however, has made offset requirements, with the prospective order intended to help continue development of a competent and competitive local defense industry.

“The Norwegian Parliament expects that a potential future procurement will ensure contracts for the Norwegian defense industry equal to the procurement cost, and that these contracts will provide access to the home market of the chosen supplier,” the Defence Ministry said in April, when DCNS and TKMS were announced as the short-listed bidders.

The Norwegian parliament is expected to decide later this year whether to approve a procurement program, the ministry said.

DCNS would pitch its diesel-electric Scorpene attack sub, modified to meet the specific Norwegian requirements. Norway operates six Ula-class boats, and a decision has yet to be made whether or not the whole fleet will be replaced.

 

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2016/07/11/dcns-thyssenkrupp-submarine-norway/86948750/

Edited October 10, 2016 by BansheeOne

[Gregory]

Meanwhile I don't find an open source for the planned details of the Leopard 2 A7 (V) upgrade, but it has been reported for some time that there will be a total of 104, including the existing 20 A7 and another 84 from the additional 100 Leopards being bought back from industry (and 16 transfered from the Netherlands as part of the deal to stand up joint GER/NL Panzerbataillon 414). Part of the upgrades will also be implemented in the A6, A6M and Bergepanzer 3 Büffel variants in Bundeswehr service.

The "buy back" Leopards are the ones that were slated for scrapping, correct? Any word on what the price on those is and how many more are left?

Edited October 10, 2016 by Gregory

[Panzermann]

I am not aware that any Leopard 2 have been slated for scrapping. They sold then to KMW so that they are off the MoD books and KMW was supposed to sell them to foreign customers.

[BansheeOne]

Can we have local ze Germans say anything about that? Is of legit or just Spiegel can into sensationalism?

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11057330/German-fighter-jets-unable-to-fly-and-mechanics-forced-to-borrow-spare-parts-claims-magazine.html

 

There has been a report on mission-readiness of the Bundeswehr's main weapon systems every year since that one from 2014; the current one came out recently and again generated some press. While things have improved over the last two years, they remain far from optimal. The report judges the individual systems either mature for deployment or not (except strangely for Luftrwaffe systems), gives total numbers on the books (including those in depots, industrial overhaul or seconded for trials outside the forces), numbers available in the forces and actually deployable on average this year, as well as reasons for a lack of availability/deployability.

 

Leopard 2 - mature system

On the books: 244 (+ 84 to be bought back from industry)

Available: 167

Deployable: 132

Problems: None reported.

 

Marder - mature system

On the books: 388

Available: 321

Deployable: 222

Problems: None reported (vehicles serving longer under the new plans for more equipment will get Eurospike to replace Milan as well as some other minor updates).

 

Puma - not yet a mature system

On the books: 89

Available: 48

Deployable: 32

Problems: Delivery rates have not yet regularized, though quality has improved. Repair capabilities, particularly availability of spares, must be improved in 2017. Quick improvement of C² equipment, hull vision systems and adaption of Eurospike and turret-independent secondary weapon necessary to reach planned standard. FOC not expected before 2024.

 

Boxer - not yet a mature system

On the books: 201

Available: 142

Deployable: 102

Problems: Acceptance of electronic technical documentation not yet completed, also necessary for further qualification of military maintenance personnel; deployablity currently ensured by partnership with industry.

 

Fuchs - mature system

On the books: 898

Available: 668

Deployable: 532

Problems: None reported.

 

Fennek - mature system

On the books: 220

Available: 182

Deployable: 146

Problems: None reported.

 

Panzerhaubitze 2000 - mature system

On the books: 123

Available: 61

Deployable: 41

Problems: Intensive use of low available numbers leads to higher inspection and maintenance rates; delay of technical solutions for age-related technical failures.

 

MARS II - mature system

On the books: 41

Available: 16

Deployable: 11

Problems: 18 to be updated from 2018 to achieve higher availablity.

 

Tiger - not yet a mature system

On the books: 42

Available: 27

Deployable: 12

Problems: 62 recommendations of Task Force Rotary Wing Aircraft to be implemented before FOC, including establishment of a third maintenance squadron in each attack helicopter regiment and relief of available capacities through more industry support next year, concentration of command and technical expertise in army aviation to increase capabilities in the mid-term.

 

NH90 - not yet a mature system

On the books: 48

Available: 29

Deployable: 9

Problems: High proportion of pre-series aircraft, lack of spares and particularly lack of capacities for inspections and maintenance. 85 recommendations of Task Force Rotary Wing Aircraft to be implemented, including additional maintenance docks in industry, speedier supply with spares, increase of maintenance capacities, streamlining and defragmentation of inspection system which can currently be "hardly handled".

 

UH-1D - mature system

On the books: 41

Available: 33

Deployable: 23

Problems: Original end of service this year extended until availability of H145 for domestic SAR mission in July 2019 at the latest.

 

H145M LUH SOF

On the books: 8

Available: 4

Deployable: 4

Problems: None reported.

 

CH-53

On the books: 72 (to be reduced to 66)

Available: ca. 45

Deployable: ca. 20

Problems: Deployability impacted by age of system, including some spares no longer being available on the market.

 

Sea Lynx Mk 88A - mature system

On the books: 22

Available: 18

Deployable: 5

Problems: Operative minimum requirement for six deployable aircraft could still not be reached in 2016.

 

Sea King Mk 41 - mature system

On the books: 21

Available: 14

Deployable: 4

Problems: Operative minimum requirement for six deployable aircraft could still not be reached in 2016, particularly due to high age and spares being hard to get. Very limited possibility for missions beyond SAR. Priority on measures to ensure continued operations until 2013 and Sea Lion (MH90) take over from 2019 without interruption.

P-3C Orion - mature system

On the books: 8

Available: 5

Deployable: 2

Problems: Three aircraft currently getting new wings and avionics.

Eurofighter

On the books: 123

Available: ca. 80

Deployable: ca. 45

Problems: Lack of spares and long maintenance cycles. Procurement measures implemented upon recommendation by Task Force Fixed Wing Aircraft will only become effective in the mid-term.

Tornado

On the books: 93

Available: ca. 65

Deployable: ca. 30

Problems: Lack of availability of spares.

Transall

On the books: 41

Available: ca. 30

Deployable: ca. 18

Problems: Deployability impacted by high age and attendant supply bottlenecks, delays in aircraft being returned from industrial overhaul. Due to delays in A400M deliveries, the aircraft will stay in service until 2021.

A400M

On the books: 5

Available: 3

Deployable: 1

Problems: High inspection and maintenance rates as well as industrial overhaul due to the well-publicized technical problems with engines etc.; FOC not before 2023.

Airbus 310

On the books: 5 (4 MRTT)

Available: 4

Deployable: 4

Problems: Increasing industrial overhaul times reduce availability. Investigation of a successor system within the scope of a multinational MRTT fleet has begun.

Patriot

On the books: 14 batteries

Available: 10 batteries

Deployable: 6 batteries

Problems: Continuous deployment to Turkey last year reduced spare stocks severely; condition will only improve within the next years again.

Ozelot

On the books: 3 batteries

Available: 2 batteries

Deployable: 2 batteries

Problems: One battery used for training only. Deployability currently ensured, but high age and planned use might lead to failures and supply problems at short notice.

Mantis

On the books: 2 batteries

Available: 1 battery

Deployable: 1 battery

Problems: One battery in industrial update; unexpectedly low reliability, particularly of the guns, long industrial maintenance cycles, lack of spares. Improvement expected in late 2017 after conclusion of ongoing updates and improvenment of supplies.

Frigates - mature systems (not yet including F 125)

On the books: 14 (four F 122 already decommissioned)

Available: 7

Deployable: 5

Problems: Necessary technical updates on F 123 and F 124 were concluded this year, improving deployability to 6-7 from August.

K 130 - mature system

On the books: 5

Available: 4

Deployable: 3

Problems: Intensive use and long deployments reduced deployability from June.

U 212A - mature system

On the books: 6 (one commissioned in October)

Available: 4

Deployable: 2

Problems: Complex and time-consuming overhaul phases, acceptance trials of the two boats of the second lot in 2016.

Minesweepers - mature systems

On the books: 19 (including seven already decommissioned)

Available: 8

Deployable: 5

Problems: Aging, but reliable systems; most tied up in SNMCGs, preparing for same or standing down from deployment. Deployability impacted by short-term technical failures, preparation fot yard periods and decommissioning early in the year.

[Gregory]

Am I correct in assuming that the difference between "On the Books" and "Available" reflects units which require extensive repair/spare parts to be moved into "Available" category?

[BansheeOne]

Not necessarily; as noted, some of those are borrowed to some Wehrtechnische Dienststelle or other for trials, some are undergoing regularly scheduled updates or overhauls in industry - though of course overhauls will often involve swapping out parts. But I think the spares problem is much more relevant in the difference between the "available" and "deployable" categories, i.e. vehicles in the motorpool/hangar/port and those actually combat-ready.

[Panzermann]

often the vehicles are standing around with the industry as

well, because some spare parts are hard to come by or have to made new. Which takes time and makes the systems unavailable for longer than scheduled. Also the geniusses in their reforms find now that outsourcing and cutting organic maintenance capabilities is not as good as they thought.

 

The situation in the line units is worse of course and for a company to roll to an exercise or deploy requires borrowing parts and vehicles from everywhere. Really, with the Bundeswehr as is, nobody has to fear an assault on Moscow. Not even "bedingt verteidigungsbereit" anymore.

[Special-K]

So I guess this as good a place as any to post this:

 

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/germany-beefs-up-tank-fleet-with-832m-acquisition

From the above link:

 

COLOGNE, Germany — The German Army is in line for an upgrade of its tanks, based on the expectation that future conflicts will rely heavily on ground warfare with armored vehicles.

All told, the Bundeswehr stands to get 104 used Leopard 2 battle tanks out of storage that manufacturer Krauss-Maffei Wegmann will upgrade under a contract with the German Defence Ministry from the A4 configuration to the newest A7V standard. The latest package includes improvements in the areas of information technology, armaments and armor.

.....SNIP.....

Also part of the €760 million (U.S. $832.7 million) contract with KMW is the delivery of 32 tank chassis frames that can later be turned into additional vehicles of the Leopard 2 series, such as variants capable of launching bridges across rivers and other chokepoints.

The German Army is slated to receive the upgraded tanks beginning in 2019, with deliveries finished by 2023. The new tank deal will bring the number of German tanks to 328, in line with a goal set by Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen.

 

 

Thoughts on the -A7V model?

 

How many more are there that would be available to upgrades and a return to service before they would have to produce new vehicles?

 

 

 

-K

[Dark_Falcon]

So I guess this as good a place as any to post this:

 

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/germany-beefs-up-tank-fleet-with-832m-acquisition

From the above link:

 

COLOGNE, Germany — The German Army is in line for an upgrade of its tanks, based on the expectation that future conflicts will rely heavily on ground warfare with armored vehicles.

All told, the Bundeswehr stands to get 104 used Leopard 2 battle tanks out of storage that manufacturer Krauss-Maffei Wegmann will upgrade under a contract with the German Defence Ministry from the A4 configuration to the newest A7V standard. The latest package includes improvements in the areas of information technology, armaments and armor.

.....SNIP.....

Also part of the €760 million (U.S. $832.7 million) contract with KMW is the delivery of 32 tank chassis frames that can later be turned into additional vehicles of the Leopard 2 series, such as variants capable of launching bridges across rivers and other chokepoints.

The German Army is slated to receive the upgraded tanks beginning in 2019, with deliveries finished by 2023. The new tank deal will bring the number of German tanks to 328, in line with a goal set by Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen.

 

 

Thoughts on the -A7V model?

 

How many more are there that would be available to upgrades and a return to service before they would have to produce new vehicles?

 

 

-K

 

Is it coincidence that the newest Leopard model has a sub-model designation that echos Germany's first tank, or is it a deliberate homage?

[Panzermann]

the V stands for verbessert (improved) similar to Pentagon "PIP" and similar suffixes. It is planned to bring all Leo 2 A7 up tp the new standard and then the V will be dropped, because all cats are on the same revision level then.

 

But yes the incidental similarity has been widely noted. Well maybe some clerk in the BAAinBw has had some humour.