MARINES(!) in Normandy?

[Corinthian]

AFAIK, there were no US Marines in Overlord, right?

 

That said, what if Marines were involved in the landings at Omaha and Utah, would they have made a difference? Or just the same?

[Jim Martin]

Likely just the same. Amphibious equipment and doctrine were largely being shared between services and across theaters. I do recall some lamentation that an Army division commander who'd just been transferred from the PTO to the ETO, who had wide experience in PhibOps, had made recommendations to change the operation, but he arrived in Jan 1944 and it was too late to implement his suggestions by then.

Edited May 27, 2010 by Jim Martin

[Corinthian]

I just did a search and found this: http://www.shsu.edu/~his_ncp/USMCETO.html Didn't know that they were there. But were there any USMC that did land in the beaches, along with the first or so assault waves?

 

Also, who was that Army commander and what were his recommendations?

[Jim Martin]

I don't know of any individual Marines who landed on D-Day. Certainly no organizations did. I don't remember the name of the Army general, nor his recommendations. The discussion was years ago and my aging brain fails me.

[binder001]

1) Wasn't the general in question J.Lawton Collins? He had commanded the 25th Infantry Div on Guadalcanal and came to the ETO to command a Corps.

 

2) In Jonathan Gawne's "Spearheading DDay", the issue of Marines in Overlord was addressed. The Marine detachment on USS Texas was alerted to possibly go ashore to reinforce the Rangers at Pont du Huc but they were cancelled. The Army was sensitive to the good PR gain that the Marines got from providing a brigade to the 2nd Infantry Division in France in WW1 and they were going to be darned if any Marines were going to France again!

 

3) End result = similar to actual events. Take the Marines and scatter them along the beach area with leaders dead and units lost and/or intermingled and you would have another Tarawa scenario for the USMC. Both on Betio and on Omaha Beach the assault troops finally got things sorted out and accomplished their mission but at a terrible price.

Edited May 27, 2010 by binder001

[Jim Martin]

1) Wasn't the general in question J.Lawton Collins? He had commanded the 25th Infantry Div on Guadalcanal and came to the ETO to command a Corps.

 

 

Rings a bell. ISTR he'd also done other PhipOps besides Guadalcanal, being part of Mac's Army in the SWPO. I still don't remember the revisions to the plan he'd recommended when he arrived in ETO.

 

I reckon if any Marine units might have caused things to go differently on the beaches, it might have been Marine air providing CAS. Army units in the PI who received Marine air CAS had stellar things to say about them. Compared to the USAAF's lip service to CAS, Marine flyers would have been scraping the beaches with their props suppressing German defenses.

[BillB]

Mebbe the same for OMAHA, as the Army got off the beach pretty quick there despite all the horror hype, and the subsequent tardiness was a lot to do with the restricted terrain inland. I suspect Marines would have done a better job at UTAH instead of landing and then stopping for the night leaving the Airborne dangling. Collins came ashore on the night of 6-7 June to kick arse in that regard but without much success.

 

BillB

[Ken Estes]

The US Army commander was MG Charles Corlett, who had commanded the 7th ID at Kwajalein, then led XIX Corps under Bradley. He advocated using amtracs and a few other ideas. While there were barely enough landing ships and landing craft to execute both Normandy and the Marianas a half-world apart, there would not have been amtrqcs in sufficient quantity for Normandy.

 

I don't think any US Marines came ashore at Normandy, or the Altantic coast. Apart from those seconded to OSS, there were only the ships' detachments on cruisers and BBs, and some of these pulled off some raids etc. in the Med.

[Rich]

The US Army commander was MG Charles Corlett, who had commanded the 7th ID at Kwajalein, then led XIX Corps under Bradley. He advocated using amtracs and a few other ideas. While there were barely enough landing ships and landing craft to execute both Normandy and the Marianas a half-world apart, there would not have been amtrqcs in sufficient quantity for Normandy.

 

From a series of my posts at AHF:

 

"Perhaps we could look at what the leadership knew of Corlett.

 

For one, he wasn't considered a genius in the Army, or even close to it. He was 81st of 93 in USA 1913 and 100th of 151 in CGSS 1923. He never attended any of the advanced leadership courses in the Army, and had a single tour of instruction at CGSS (1927-1931). He was consdiered solid and reliable.

 

For another, he was sick following his Pacific service. Assigned to command of XIX Corps 10 March he didn't arrive in England until mid-April and was apparently not fully recovered. Note that he was assigned to a follow-on corps, rather than an assault corps - again I ask, why do you think that his arrival scant weeks before the original planned invasion date would have allowed for a complete change in plans? He got sicker in Normandy and by the time he was relieved without prejudice in October he had lost most of the drive he displayed in June-September.

 

For another, I have yet to find where Marshall sent him to First Army as an "amphibious expert"? He sent him as a competent, combat-experienced major general, which were sorely lacking throughout the Army. But he did not insist on him being assigned V Corps or that he be used to draft a last-minute revision of a plan that had already been heavily revised a number of times and the V Corps initial plan had been completed 26 March (BTW, all changes were "locked out" as of 20 May).

 

For another, all the major amphib "skull sessions" had already occurred long before Corlett had arrived so he never had a real chance to contribute. The major doctrinal discussion at the unit leve had been completed the previous year at the Amphbious Assault Center in a series of conferences (24 May-23 June 1943) and at the command level in December 1943 and January 1944. For better or worse, that was the assault doctrine employed.

 

For another, the changes that were made to doctrine regarding the LVT were made as a result of incremental learning gained at Guadalcanal, then Bougainville, then Tarawa, and then Kwajalein. But in the three-plus months from Tarawa to Kwajalein no major operational change were made implying that the results of lessons learned took somewhat longer to inculcate, both institutionally and industrially. Many of those changes did occur at Saipan, so might have been employed in Normandy if those assets had been transferred in situ from the Central Pacific to England...a prospect that is "unlikely" shall we say?

 

I tracked down Weigley who gives the story on pp. 68-69 of Eisenhower's Lieutenants. It is the standard "Marshall sent Corlett to England to show those guys how it was done in the Pacific and they ignored him". Unfortunately though Weigley references his long, nearly two-page screed to a single source - Corlett's unpublished memoir manuscript held at USAMHI, Carlisle Barracks, PA. No corroboration from Marshall's extensively published papers or from those of Eisenhower. When next I get a chance I'm going to check Marshall since ISTR I looked into this subject in Ike's papers a number of years back without finding any mention that would support the story.

 

Interestingly enough, Williamson Murray makes the same claim in an article for the Joint Forces Quarterly using the same language as Weigley, but referencing the source to...himself , Williamson Murray in A War to be Won (which, BTW, is very good, but rife with errors in detail). And Weigley - or is it Corlett? - is again parrotted, but at least referenced, in the opther major work that gives this account, a CGSC Masters thesis by Major Michael J. Daniels, Innovation in the Face of Adversity: Major-General Sir Percy Hobart and the 79th Armoured Division (British).

 

So far this appears to be the epitome of scholarly circular reasoning...

 

BTW, to be clear, none of this is a reflection upon General Corlett's competence - he was a very competent and skilled commander - or his honesty. However, I always find it odd that there are two schools of thought, one that believes that all reports, documents, and memoirs by senior leaders are written solely to enhance their careers and make themselves look good, and one that believes that everything written by any senior leader is gospel and requires no fact checking and that their meory is never subject to the distortion of time or prejudices. Oddly enough, both schools also appear devoted to the most heinous distortions of fact.

 

Getting back to the LVT, the American Amphibious Truck Companies apparently had one LVT-2 assigned, definetely in the companies assigned to the assault echelon, and possibly to all 19 ATC in England. So possibly 19 in American hands, with a half-dozen replacements, in the ETO, which would explain why so few were seen. The rest of the operationally critical types, the LVT-2, LVT(A)-2, and the few LVT-4 were all going to the Marine and Army Amtrac battalions in the Pacific, and the even fewer LVT(A)-1 and LVT(A)-4 were going to the Amphibious Tank Battalions that were being formed.

 

There were also apparently 100 LVT-2 in British hands that arrived possibly early enough to be used, but the 203 LVT-4 that arrived were probably too late, since that type began production in December 1943 and was priority for equipping the forces for Saipan. The 200 LVT-1 in British hands that arrived in 1943 were only used for training. Both the LVT-1 and LVT-2 were unarmored and were easily punctured, even those LVT-2 at Tarawa that had been "armored". The major problem was that cumulative punctures could overwhelm the bilge pump and, worse, the bilge pump ran off the engine drivetrain...many losses at Tarawa were when engines stalled, failed, or the overworked LVT (normal situation in a critical assault) simply ran out of fuel. The simple expedient of providing wooden bullet-sized dowel plugs and a mallet was first employed at Saipan, so it is possible that it may have trickled east as well.

 

Saipan was the example that we should look at to compare to Normandy. That landing involved two assault divisions with 600 LVT (mostly LVT-4) and 136 amphibious tanks. They were embarked on 47 LST and four LSD, so roughly 17 each. The assault troops were embarked on the LST at Eniewetok so the tedious transfer from AP to LCVP to LST or LST was avoided, but that meant each LST/LCD carried roughly two companies.

 

Just as a note, the figures [for LVT production] as given in the WW 2 Vehicle Database are slightly scrambled. All those are based upon figures given by Colonel Robert Icks, originally widely published in his Profile on the LVT in the late 1960s. Unfortunately he double-counted the LVT-2 and LVT(A)-2 and undercounted the LVT(A)-4, which can be confirmed by comparing the totals to the monthly figures for the LVT and LVT(A) as given by the War Production Board. The production by type and year (LVT-1/LVT-2/LVT(A)-2/LVT-3/LVT-4/Total LVT/LVT(A)-1/LVT(A)-4/LVT(A)-5/Total LVT(A)) were:

 

LVT........1.......2.....A-2...3.....4......Total.......(A)1..(A)4..(A)5...Total

1941....72........0......0.....0......0........72...........0.....0......0.......0

1942..851.........0......0.....0.....0.......851...........3.....0.......0......3

1943.302...1340...200.....1....11.....1854.......288...200......0....488

1944 ...0...1172...250..733..4980....7135.......219..1739......0..1958

1945 ....0.......0......0..2230..3360....5590..........0....401...269....670

 

Two LVT-3 and two LVT-4 chassis were built as "lightweight" versions and were not used in combat. The initial LVT-3 was axctually completed in April 1943, but teething problems delayed serial production until late in 1944 and it was only used on Okinawa. The LVT(A)-5 was also not used in combat until the Korean War."

 

Hopefully that sums it up.

 

BTW, Bill, now you are claiming that the 4th ID and attached sat on UTAH until nightfall? Are you drinking from the same well as 67 1/2 Tiggers by any chance?

[binder001]

I think it was in Rich's book also that the point was made that the bluffs at Omaha would have worked against using LVTs as well as some other "funnies". The Germans made use of those bluffs as a natural obstacle and were well supplied with artillery and AT weapons. Quite a few M4A1 DD tanks actually landed (contrary to legend that all were lost) and have their mobility contrained until the infantry could clear the strongpoints at the draws leading inland. A number of the realively well protected tanks were KO'd on the beach, so the taller, thinner-skinned LVTs would likely have been shot to pieces.

[BP]

Thankfully the Gyrenes didn't go up Pointe du Hoc, or the headline narrative would be "Berlin falls to Marine Corps; Army, Russians support".

[Jim Martin]

Thankfully the Gyrenes didn't go up Pointe du Hoc, or the headline narrative would be "Berlin falls to Marine Corps; Army, Russians support".

 

 

That attitude was already held by 1st ID under Terry de la Mesa Allen and Teddy Roosevelt, Jr. I believe it was in Sicily when another divisional commander accused them of having the attitude that the US Army consisted of 1st ID and 250,000 replacements, and they asked him what his point was?

[BP]

That attitude was already held by 1st ID under Terry de la Mesa Allen and Teddy Roosevelt, Jr. I believe it was in Sicily when another divisional commander accused them of having the attitude that the US Army consisted of 1st ID and 250,000 replacements, and they asked him what his point was?

 

Other than you had a very good chance of getting your ass shot off, that would have been ONE HELL of a duo to serve under. To be a nice, safe LTC fly on the wall of that HQ. . .

Edited May 27, 2010 by BP

[Jim Martin]

Other than you had a very good chance of getting your ass shot off, that would have been ONE HELL of a duo to serve under. To be a nice, safe LTC fly on the wall of that HQ. . .

 

 

Read about a firefight in Tunisia where Roosevelt and a Regimental Cmdr sat in a dugout playing mumblepeg while German tanks advanced on them....

[BillB]

BTW, Bill, now you are claiming that the 4th ID and attached sat on UTAH until nightfall? Are you drinking from the same well as 67 1/2 Tiggers by any chance?

Er, no. Are you suffering from the same lack of reading comprehension capabilities you claim Tigger is prone to? I'm saying the same as I said in my book. Thanks to the Airborne the 4th ID et al got off the beach and over the causeways with light to no resistance, some via a needless long-range wading exercise, which took them all day. They then hunkered down for the night as soon as it looked like getting dark and sat on their hands until first light despite pleas for support from Ridgeway, and despite Collins coming ashore to chivvy them into acting with the urgency the situation demanded.

 

Said hunkering took place well before they had attained their D-Day objectives, which were only a handful of miles from the beach and ought to have been attainable with a little more push, even allowing for traffic flow problems across the causeways due to landing awry. They were lucky that i. the Airborne were so aggressive and effective despite their own problems, and ii. that the German presence in the Cotentin was relatively thin number and armour wise and not especially high calibre, or the 4th ID et al might well have ended up taking swimming lessons. If they weren't pinned against the inundated areas.

 

BillB

[Ken Estes]

Just to amend Rich's excellent summary, the LVT(A)-2 was an armored version of the LVT2 cargo/pers variant and was produced only far the army. The Armored Amphibian was the term applied to the turreted LVT(A)4 and 5. The USMC LVT-1 and-2 at Tarawa all had improvised armor scrounged up by the 2d Amtrac Bn.

 

There were many salient evolutions and new items in amphib doctrine and equipt between Tarawa and Roi-Namur/Kwajalein, in the form of the first armored amphibian units [amphib tank bn in army parlance], improvements to comm, naval gunfire, obstacle clearance [uDT], introducing the medium tank to the divisional battalions, more and new flame weapons and so forth. By the Marianas it is all in place except for final refinements in close air support, dedicated CVEs. As with otehr thigns, these are all on the drawing board or in production at the time of Tarawa.

 

There was no shortage of amphibious 'experts' in the ETO and Med by mid-1944. Corlett went to the ETO, as noted, because he was a well-regarded MG. Quite a varied career: signal, arty and infantry.

[BillB]

I think it was in Rich's book also that the point was made that the bluffs at Omaha would have worked against using LVTs as well as some other "funnies". The Germans made use of those bluffs as a natural obstacle and were well supplied with artillery and AT weapons. Quite a few M4A1 DD tanks actually landed (contrary to legend that all were lost) and have their mobility contrained until the infantry could clear the strongpoints at the draws leading inland. A number of the realively well protected tanks were KO'd on the beach, so the taller, thinner-skinned LVTs would likely have been shot to pieces.

Mebbe. OTOH LVTs could have carried their passengers across the beach to the dead ground at the base of the bluffs. The Germans didn't have that many AT guns, as IIRC the tanks that made it ashore did some useful suppressive work. The bulk of the casualties were down to small arms fire between the troops leaving their landing craft and reaching the top of the beach; being carried in LVTs could have mitigated that. Dunno how dense the beach obstacles were though as it's a while since I looked at it, so they might have put the mockers on them though.

 

Edited to add: as the LVTs were open topped they might not have afforded much protection to fire from above too.

 

BillB

Edited May 27, 2010 by BillB
afterthought

[Ken Estes]

Although the amtrac is preferable to the LVTP in the assault waves, it remains an open-topped vehicle and I fear the resistence nests on the military crest of the bluffs at Omaha would have hammered the occupants badly, although there was some armor and the ramp was at the rear [LVT4]. Amtracs also hold up less well for repeat trips, in the case any survice the assault.

[BillB]

Although the amtrac is preferable to the LVTP in the assault waves, it remains an open-topped vehicle and I fear the resistence nests on the military crest of the bluffs at Omaha would have hammered the occupants badly, although there was some armor and the ramp was at the rear [LVT4]. Amtracs also hold up less well for repeat trips, in the case any survice the assault.

See my aftethought above.

 

BillB

[Hittite Under The Bridge]

That attitude was already held by 1st ID under Terry de la Mesa Allen and Teddy Roosevelt, Jr. I believe it was in Sicily when another divisional commander accused them of having the attitude that the US Army consisted of 1st ID and 250,000 replacements, and they asked him what his point was?

 

And it got them both relieved.

[Jim Martin]

And it got them both relieved.

 

 

Without prejudice. Allen got a new division, Roosevelt became ADC of 4th ID and of course, got his MH leading them ashore on D Day.

[Hittite Under The Bridge]

Without prejudice. Allen got a new division, Roosevelt became ADC of 4th ID and of course, got his MH leading them ashore on D Day.

 

Of course. Roosevelt's MOH and Allen's command were deserved, but the relief sent a message.

[Delta tank 6]

That attitude was already held by 1st ID under Terry de la Mesa Allen and Teddy Roosevelt, Jr. I believe it was in Sicily when another divisional commander accused them of having the attitude that the US Army consisted of 1st ID and 250,000 replacements, and they asked him what his point was?

 

I spent 15 days or so at Normandy on "Uncle Sugar's" dime back in May- June 1993. The leader of this group of 12 US Army Officers and one French Army Captain (we needed an interpreter)was Major General Albert H. Smith Jr, (ret) (now deceased) 16th Infantry Regt. 1st Infantry Division (landed as the Bn XO of 1st Bn. 16th Inf. Captain at the time of landing on Easy Red at 0830). We were standing down on the 29th Division side of the beach and the General was beating up the 29th Division over their plan for assault, and I personally thought for a unit that was in combat for the first time, and under the circumstances of their first experience in combat, I thought they did a pretty good, so I objected to his characterization of the 29th ID. The General looked at me and continued to talk and another officer grab me, pulled me aside and said; "Mike as soon as you understand that the US Army in World War II consisted of the 1st Infantry Division and 89 other divisions in support. . .what the General says will all make sense to you! And he was right!!

 

Mike

 

to correct a huge spelling error!!

Edited May 29, 2010 by Delta tank 6

[BP]

I spent 15 days or so at Normandy on "Uncle Sugar's" dime back in May- June 1993. The leader of this group of 12 US Army Officers and one French Army Captain (we needed an interrupter)was Major General Albert H. Smith Jr, (ret) (now deceased) 16th Infantry Regt. 1st Infantry Division (landed as the Bn XO of 1st Bn. 16th Inf. Captain at the time of landing on Easy Red at 0830). We were standing down on the 29th Division side of the beach and the General was beating up the 29th Division over their plan for assault, and I personally thought for a unit that was in combat for the first time, and under the circumstances of their first experience in combat, I thought they did a pretty good, so I objected to his characterization of the 29th ID. The General looked at me and continued to talk and another officer grab me, pulled me aside and said; "Mike as soon as you understand that the US Army in World War II consisted of the 1st Infantry Division and 89 other divisions in support. . .what the General says will all make sense to you! And he was right!!

 

Mike

 

Great story!

 

Interestingly enough, one of Allen's (and Roosevlet's) proteges, Dutch Cota, took the 29th across the beach at Normandy. He wasn't the biggest fan of the D-Day amphibious plan.

[Delta tank 6]

Great story!

 

Interestingly enough, one of Allen's (and Roosevlet's) proteges, Dutch Cota, took the 29th across the beach at Normandy. He wasn't the biggest fan of the D-Day amphibious plan.

 

Dutch Cota I believe was the Chief or Staff of the 1st Infantry Division when they invaded North Africa. Later Asst. Division Commander 29th ID, later Commander of the 28th ID "Bloody Bucket" Pennsylvania Army National Guard, which my two grandfathers (World War I) and both my brother and I served in during our military careers.

 

Mike