Pentagon's assessment of U.S. weapons late 1941

[RETAC21]

He's probably thinking along the lines of avoiding contact altogether by reducing footprint. Plausible in principle, but under the conditions actually obtaining in 1942, the Germans could put (just barely) enough subs into the operational area to patrol the most likely convoy routes, and had a communications system enabling a good chunk of the force to converge on a convoy any one boat had contacted.

 

Indeed, Paukenschlag forces were too few and too dispersed to concentrate against a given convoy, so just convoying would have emptied the sea of targets, but even if a convoy is detected, pursued and a wolfpack concentrated, it enables other convoys to go totally unhindered and undetected.

 

Moreover, a single big convoy is more difficult to detect, easier to defend with the available means and not as susceptible percentage-wise to suffer as much losses as many small convoys and definitely more than individual ships. Lessons NOT learned by King and/or the USN.

[irregularmedic]

<!--quoteo(post=768632:date=Fri 23 Apr 2010 0610:name=capt_starlight)--><div class='quotetop'>QUOTE(capt_starlight @ Fri 23 Apr 2010 0610) 768632[/snapback]</div><div class='quotemain'><!--quotec-->King and A/S warfare seem to have been strange bedfellows for a while.....

 

Damn typos and sticky keyboards (or that is my excuse - dyslexia rules KO!)<!--QuoteEnd--></div><!--QuoteEEnd-->

 

The problem in the Atlantic was that the pre-war planning for ASW was to activate and commission the laid up WWI four stacker destroyers. When these were "traded" to the Brits for island bases, this left a pretty big hole in ASW assets. Admiral King then made a decision that "people" were more important than "stuff" and concentrated his limited ASW assets on the protection of troop convoys at the expense of cargo convoys. Very few troopships were lost to submarine in either the Atlantic or Pacific. Until adequate ASW came out of the production pipeline, there was significant loss of merchant ships.

 

True, but the numbers of four stackers had already been depleted by the discovery of major problems with the boilers of a good percentage of them. Just a few years before there were a lot more of them available, I expect the pre-war planning was based on these numbers, and one wonders how much the perception that there were a lot of these DD's just laying around influenced the decision making process to release 50 of them to the UK/Commonwealth.

 

I'd argue that handing over the 50* DD's was the right decision anyway. At the very least you'd be stuck trying to come up with the personnel to man them just to protect the very same vessels that the Brits/Canadians ended up escorting with them. If they've got the crews for them ready to go might as well give them to them.

 

* Weren't a handful of the 50 not four stackers, but some sort of Coast Guard vessels?

[Shortround6]

[quote name='irregularmedic' date='28 April 2010 - 08:43 PM' timestamp='1272501794' post='770518'

 

* Weren't a handful of the 50 not four stackers, but some sort of Coast Guard vessels?

 

Perhaps some of the 4 stackers were "loaned" to the Coast Guard during prohibition?

[R011]

Lessons NOT learned by King and/or the USN.

King and the USN knew this, but they also knew that there were known choke points that made the theory less applicable. This meant that the targets might easily be found, resulting in at least as many losses of not more than free-running. Free0running also avoids virtual attrition.

 

They may have been wrong, but it's far from sure that they were. As soon as escorts became available, convoys were instituted. Things wren't helped by the fact that the USAAF tended to have its maritime patrol assets practice strategic bombing rather than ASW. Things improved once King got compete control of this task and a decent allocation of aircraft,

[irregularmedic]

Perhaps some of the 4 stackers were "loaned" to the Coast Guard during prohibition?

 

That sounds familiar, wiki has a list of the 50 vessels, and they are all DD's, but the first three listed are Caldwell class rather than Clemson or Dawes.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Destroyers_for_Bases_Agreement#The_ships

[irregularmedic]

Perhaps some of the 4 stackers were "loaned" to the Coast Guard during prohibition?

 

Found this:

 

By early 1924 a significant change occurred. Emphasis was placed on obtaining the vessels and personnel at all possible speed to meet the problem head-on. Therefore, the cruising cutters recommended by Commandant Reynolds were to be replaced by a similar number of laid-up Navy destroyers, which could be converted in a short time. Reynolds had earlier received a report from the service’s chief engineer describing Navy destroyers as "unsuitable" for Coast Guard work and excessively expensive. In any case, twenty destroyers were agreed upon, along with 203 cabin cruiser type and 100 smaller boats. With appropriate personnel, the cost was approximately $14 million. This was the largest single increase in the history of the Coast Guard.

 

The "new" destroyers were 750- and 1,000-tonners, built from 1910 to 1916. Several of the famous flush-deck four stackers were also obtained, all were capable of over 30 knots. Considerable renovation was required as at least one was described as an "appalling mass of junk" by her commanding officer. The first, Henley, went to sea in late summer, 1924. The majority of her enlisted men were new recruits, men who may well have been selling shoes one day and swabbing decks the next. The Coast Guard did not establish recruit training centers until the early 1940s. Destroyers that joined the force later had larger percentages of experienced manpower.

 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/dd-cg.htm

[capt_starlight]

How many U-boats were sunk/disabled/attacked during say the JAN to AUG42 (the "Second Happy Time") on the US East Coast ?

 

How many merchant men were sunk in the same period ?

 

I think you will find there was a certain amount of anti-RN sentiment around (and including) King. A combination of overweening pride and jealousy would colour his appreciation of RN experience and was shown by his apparent reluctance to accept RN/RCN escort vessels operating in 'his' sphere of operations. I think this also shown by the dismantling of the efficient RCN Operations Room for the Western Atlantic escorts to take that role upon the USN before they were ready for it.

 

Was his promotion to Fleet Admiral driven by a feeling of inferiority when dealing with Andrew Cunningham ?

[Richard Lindquist]

Perhaps some of the 4 stackers were "loaned" to the Coast Guard during prohibition?

 

No, the DDs loaned to the Coast Guard were the classes preceding the four stackers (some of which had four stacks). The classic four stackers had flush decks for ease of production while the preceding classes had high forecastles and were thus more suited to sea duty.

 

Four stacker flush decks:

 

272 completed out of the program:

 

12 lost prior to 12/07/41 (including Reuben james)

 

93 scrapped under 1930 London Treaty

 

46 converted to other duties (minelayer, minesweeper, high speed transport, seaplane tender)

 

50 to UK

 

71 remaining for US use.

[JOE BRENNAN]

No, the DDs loaned to the Coast Guard were the classes preceding the four stackers (some of which had four stacks). The classic four stackers had flush decks for ease of production while the preceding classes had high forecastles and were thus more suited to sea duty.

 

The USCG operated 6 flush deckers, Clemson class ships, near the tail end of Prohibition from 1930, to partly replace 13 worn out 'flivver' type DD's (742 ton) decommissioned around the same time, and supplement 12 1,000 tonners, ships they had acquired during the 1920's. They were returned to the USN in 1934. It so happens 4 of the 6 were later transferred to the RN, but not from the USCG.

 

The Coast Guard cutters transferred to RN at the same time and in addition to the 50 DD's were all 10 ships of the 250' or Lake class, 2,075 ton 17.5kt turbo-electric cruising cutters commissioned 1928-32, which became the Banff class sloops. HMS Walny (ex-Sebago) and Hartland (Pontchartrain) were perhaps most famous, lost carrying US rangers in the disastrous attempt to seize Oran harbor by coup de main during the Torch landings. Culver (Mendota) was sunk by U-105 31 Jan 1942. Six were returned, though only Cayuga and Saranac (renamed Tampa) saw significant postwar service in the USCG.

 

Welborn C Wood DD-195, as Wood CG-19, later HMS Chesterfield

 

250' Cutter Tahoe, later HMS Fishguard

 

Joe

Edited April 29, 2010 by JOE BRENNAN

[Argus]

AIUI unescorted convoys do improve the odds by reduced footprint, that was the key ASW lesson of WWI (pioneered in part by a USN Admiral no less), and the apparent argument against - that it actually increases target density for the 'lucky' sub that finds such a convoy didn't work out in practice. No matter how many ships might be in a convoy the sub can only fire so many torpedoes in an attack run, and provided the ships have a basic fit of defensive weapons to deter surface attacks, the sub generally only gets one bite at the cherry. So losing three ships from a 20 ship convoy is not nice, but much better odds than for those 20 ships meeting the submarine individually. The unescorted or minimally escorted convoy sees the same, or a slightly higher, loss per attack ratio, but lower net number of attacks. That's just the bare theory, yes the submarine can surface and run ahead outside gunnery range to make a second attack, just as the convoy is able to turn around the other way, duck into a coastal port or scream for help and receive assistance. It's all swings and roundabouts, but AIUI the real argument off the US coast during Drumbeat wasn't really about to convoy or not to convoy, but what constituted an 'escort'.

 

The RN position was that almost anything from a singled armed trawler or an unarmed CAP plane up was a worthwhile addition and counted as an escort, the USN disagreed and discounted anything less than a couple of destroyers or other suitable escort types and armed aircraft. The USN argument was nothing less had much hope of sinking a U-Boat, which is dead right. The RN perspective was that sinking subs was just cream, what counted was not losing merchant ships, and to a submarine that armed trawler was a threat to be taken seriously, which is was, and to a submarine all aircraft are armed unless proven otherwise, even then remaining a serious threat as spotters, again quite true. No one was 'wrong' in a technical sense they just had different appreciations of task at hand, the USN thought it was sinking submarines to protect merchant ships, the RN was about protecting merchant ships and sinking subs if possible. I'd say it almost comes down to national outlooks, America needed merchant shipping to project power, Britain needed them to survive as a power.

 

shane

[Richard Young]

Not setting up convoys in the East Coast was also a major blunder. Even unescorted convoys would have had cut losses.

 

It would have reduced loses, but also cut the number of trips each hull could make, as they would be waiting to form convoys....

[Colin]

As I recall, it is suspected that many of the Victory ship losses could be attributed to design faults and not just enemy action. This was not suspected till the 1950 thanks to a few spectacular salvages/near salvages postwar.

 

The M2 Combat car has always intrigued me and I wish the design had been sold to Canada in 1938, I realize it went into production later than this, but the design had likely been kicking around for a few years. They would have had more upgrade potential than the Vickers Light Tank and would have not required the investment in heavy industry that the Medium tanks like the Valentine, Ram and Grizzly did.

 

The US 90mm AA gun would have been useful on a Priest style mount in N. Africa

[Guest aevans]

AIUI unescorted convoys do improve the odds by reduced footprint, that was the key ASW lesson of WWI (pioneered in part by a USN Admiral no less)...

 

According to Gartner's Strategic Assessment in War, the key lesson learned from convoys was that they concentrated ASW assets where the enemy was likely to attack.

[binder001]

In late 1941, shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack, which U.S. weapons did American brass regard as obsolescent or inferior to foreign counterparts, and which weapons were regarded as entirely satisfactory and first-rate? This applies to all sizes of weapons, from battleships down to bayonets.

 

In 1941 the US Army was organizing and equipping its infant Armored Force. They realized that the many tank designs then in production were inadequate but the replacements were coming soon. The M3 "Stuart" light tank was soon to be superceded by the slightly better M5. The US still felt that the light tank had an important place on the battlefield and tank units still had a high proportion of light tanks. Army Ordnance knew that the M3 medium was not the right solution, but they were built to get "something" in the hands of the troops until the M4 could be produced. By late 1941 the basic design for the M4 was about ready with production to start at various plants in early 1942. When initially built and deployed the M4 was a world class medium tank. In 1941-42 the US was dabbling with the idea of the heavy tank, testing what would become the M6-series.

 

In 1941 there were still shortages of certain items. One sees light tanks used for training that didin't have their gun mounts fitted yet. Some light tanks show up in training scenes with an "M" on the turret, the underlined M meaning that the light tank was to count as a "medium" for maneuvers. There were still shortages of modern artillery. The 155mm Schneider design howitzer went to North Africa with US units because the new M1 series howitzers were not ready. THe M1 helmet was coming into production, with a lot of units still using the M1917A1 helmet well into 1942. When National Guard units were mobilized in 1940 they came into federal service wearing the WW1 pattern uniform. So the US Army was focused on quantity and concurrently was trying to improve quality across the board. This focus on qunatity for a rapidly expanding army would continue to affect US production decisions through most of the war.

[Ken Estes]

Thanks to Rich, we have this nugget, posted in '08 I think. It has always struck me as a feat that the Ord Dept was able to develop, test and have ready for use so many tank components for 1940s production, from such a desultory background in procurement of tanks:

 

In terms of standardized procurement the US Army since 1934 had completed by 1 September 1939:

 

19 Light Tanks M2A1

237 Light Tanks M2A2

73 Light Tanks M2A3

1 Light Tank M2A4

89 Combat Car M1

17 Combat Cars M1A1E1

7 Combat Car M1A1

 

No Medium Tanks had been standardized and the only prototypes completed in the same timeframe were:

 

16 Medium Tanks T4 (Ordnance design, Christie patents)

5 Medium Tanks T3E3 (rebuilt T3E2 - a 1932 design)

2 Medium Tanks T5 and T5E1 (the T5E1 was also rebuilt as the T5E2)

 

A total of 442 MG-armed light tanks, 1 37mm-armed light tank, 16 MG-armed medium tanks, and 7 37mm-armed medium tanks, a grand total of 466 tanks.

 

In roughly the same period the Germans had completed 1,800 Panzer I, 1,223 Panzer II, 176 Panzer III and 270 Panzer IV, and had built or aquired 368 Czech Panzer 35 and Panzer 38, as well as 245 command tanks and other specialty armored vehicles, a total of 4,082.

 

Then, from 1 September to 30 June 1940 standardized production consisted of:

 

18 Medium Tanks M2

45 Light Tanks M2A4

34 Combat Cars M2

 

While for the rest of the year production was:

 

6 Medium Tanks M2A1

280 Light Tanks M2A4

 

So 34 MG-armed light tanks, 325 37mm-armed light tanks, and 24 37mm-armed medium tanks, a grand total of 383 from the start of the war to the end of 1940.

 

Compared to German production of about 1,788 for 1940 alone (99 Panzer II, 367 Panzer 38 (t), 1,054 Panzer III, and 268 Panzer IV).

 

Basically, the comparison by the end of 1940 was roughly 357 "modern" cannon-armed US tanks versus at least 2,431 German ones. And 492 MG-armed US tanks versus 3,230 German ones. (Notice the proprtion of the MG to cannon-armed in the two tank fleets is roughly the same, about 72 percent for the US and about 75 percent for the German.

 

The first major contract for a modern tank was let in October 1939 after the German invasion of Poland, when American Car and Foundry Company of Berwick, Pennsylvania was granted an award to build 329 M2A4 Light Tanks, with first delivery in April 1940. Prior to that all major tank manufacture had been done at the Rock Island Arsenal since 1932, when the last of the Christie-patent tanks built by America LaFrance had been completed. The next key point was 30 June 1940 when the National Munitions Program was enacted, which among other authorizations approved the building of 1,741 M2A1 Medium Tanks, the project to be completed by 31 December 1941. Initial contracts were issued to American Locomotive Company and Baldwin Locomotive Company. However in June a member of the National Defense Advisory Commission, William S. Knudsen, President of General Motors, argued that the automobile manufacturers also had the capability of producing tanks (in Germany Daimler-Benz was already proving this was true). Between 17 June and 17 July 1940 negotiations went on that resulted in a contract to build a Chrysler Tank Arsenal at Detroit, Michigan for a projected cost of $21-million and an output of 10 tanks per day (roughly 220 per month based upon the then still standard five-day work week). The contract was signed on 15 August, with the intention of building 1,000 M2A1 Medium Tanks, the remaining 741 to be built by American and Baldwin.

 

Now the spur for that legislation was the fall of France, but assuming that the US enters the war in September 1939, there could be about a 10-month lead-time on that, which would imply that the contract of 15 August 1940 might be completed 15 November 1939 and the completion date would be set for 28 February 1941.

 

The USMC in the 1936-41 period managed to amass a total of 10 Marmon-Herrington CTL-3 and 36 M2A4 light tanks. The 8 M1917A1s of 1922-24 were surplused in 1936.