Pentagon's assessment of U.S. weapons late 1941

[Jerry W. Loper]

In late 1941, shortly before the Pearl Harbor attack, which U.S. weapons did American brass regard as obsolescent or inferior to foreign counterparts, and which weapons were regarded as entirely satisfactory and first-rate? This applies to all sizes of weapons, from battleships down to bayonets.

[Guest aevans]

<MrPicky>

The Pentagon was barely under construction late 1941.

</MrPicky>

 

Even within the Departments of the Army and Navy you could get ten different opinions on anything.

[Josh]

It is a hopeless question. Every service would have a different opion even of US weapons. And more over, given all the theaters and situations the various services operated in, they might be perfectly right.

[Doug Kibbey]

I doubt the USAAF had any illusions of supremacy with regard to fighter aircraft development given some of the practical displays that had already taken place in Europe before we were combatants. And they had feedback from Lindberghs' inspection of the German aircraft industry. Brits and French had practical experience that could not have been encouraging either.

Navy might have had some reservations, but these certainly would have crystalized after Dec. 7 and engagements shortly after that. I suspect, but cannot support, that they were more blindsided by the gap in aviation ability since they were primarily focused on what was happening with Japanese developments that might not have seems all that impressive until you were actually facing them in the air.

[capt_starlight]

I doubt the USAAF had any illusions of supremacy with regard to fighter aircraft development given some of the practical displays that had already taken place in Europe before we were combatants. And they had feedback from Lindberghs' inspection of the German aircraft industry. Brits and French had practical experience that could not have been encouraging either.

Navy might have had some reservations, but these certainly would have crystalized after Dec. 7 and engagements shortly after that. I suspect, but cannot support, that they were more blindsided by the gap in aviation ability since they were primarily focused on what was happening with Japanese developments that might not have seems all that impressive until you were actually facing them in the air.

 

 

King and A/S warfare seem to have been strange bedfellows for a while.....

 

Damn typos and sticky keyboards (or that is my excuse - dyslexia rules KO!)

Edited April 28, 2010 by capt_starlight

[DKTanker]

I doubt the USAAF had any illusions of supremacy with regard to fighter aircraft development given some of the practical displays that had already taken place in Europe before we were combatants. And they had feedback from Lindberghs' inspection of the German aircraft industry. Brits and French had practical experience that could not have been encouraging either.

Navy might have had some reservations, but these certainly would have crystalized after Dec. 7 and engagements shortly after that. I suspect, but cannot support, that they were more blindsided by the gap in aviation ability since they were primarily focused on what was happening with Japanese developments that might not have seems all that impressive until you were actually facing them in the air.

Supremacy perhaps not, but every US pursuit aircraft, navy and USAAF, used during WW2 was in development and or being fielded by 1941. The last of the WW2 group to see combat, the F6F, was contracted June of 1941.

[Doug Kibbey]

Supremacy perhaps not, but every US pursuit aircraft, navy and USAAF, used during WW2 was in development and or being fielded by 1941. The last of the WW2 group to see combat, the F6F, was contracted June of 1941.

 

Small role and small numbers, but when was the P-61 Black Widow contracted for?

[Hittite Under The Bridge]

According to wiki, 5 November 1940.

[Ken Estes]

According to wiki, 5 November 1940.

A good illustration of how lucky we were to have a 27-month advance notice of WWII, more in the case of the Japanese, but alone they could not threaten much.

 

Thanks to the shock of the fall of France, we went into war emergency mode with still 18 months to go, ordering the Victory Fleet, contracting for most aircraft designs and at least beginning to build the army from its No. 18 standing in the world.

 

Strategy in many respects is the application of force in time and space; we had much of each stored in our favor.

[Doug Kibbey]

According to wiki, 5 November 1940.

 

 

Yep, I wondered what foresight gave U.S. planners the incentive to undertake this design, then found it wasn't really domestic needs:

 

"It originated in the Battle of Britain, when the British urgently needed a night fighter. Because early radars were so heavy and because the british requirement called for a nightfighter that could stay airborne for a long time, only a twin-engined aircraft would work. Northrop began working on the project in late 1940."

[cptcav]

I don't recall my source, but I seem to recall that the M-2 .50 cal heavy machine gun was a secret weapon prior to WWII. When German observers came to the US the M-2's were removed from vehicles (i.e. the M-3 White Scout Car), so that they would not see one up close.

 

Regards,

Mark

[bojan]

I don't recall my source, but I seem to recall that the M-2 .50 cal heavy machine gun was a secret weapon prior to WWII...

 

I see no reason why when FN did aircraft version and exported it.

'

[Josh]

Off the top of my head, Navally didn't the Wildcats give as good as they got despite having a lot of performance inferiorities? By the time the Hellcats came around I think the comparison is unfair.

[Jabberwocky]

I don't recall my source, but I seem to recall that the M-2 .50 cal heavy machine gun was a secret weapon prior to WWII. When German observers came to the US the M-2's were removed from vehicles (i.e. the M-3 White Scout Car), so that they would not see one up close.

 

Regards,

Mark

 

The Browning M2 design had been around for 20 + years by the start of the war, so they were hardly a “secret weapon”. Besides, it was essentially just a scaled up M1919 Browning,

 

Belgium armed their Hurricanes with FN Browning 13.2 mm HMGs, which were the same as the M2, just sped up to 1,000 rpm.

 

I don’t think that the US was particularly unrealistic about their own equipment, but I do tend to think that there was a trend to underestimate the effectiveness of enemy equipment before US divisions got into combat (particularly strongly in the case of Japanese equipment) and then overestimate the effectiveness of enemy equipment after initial engagements (particularly in the case of German equipment).

[Guest AlaskanWarrior]

Let me add a few items to the mix:

 

Army

75mm gun, the famous French 75 of WWI, being replaced with the 105mm How M1

M1903 Springfield, being replaced with the M1 Garand

All its armored vehicles prior to the M2

75mm M2 and M3 AA guns, being replaced with 90mm and 120mm

 

Navy

TBF Devastator

Brewster Buffalo

 

Airforce

P-36

B-10

[Richard Lindquist]

King and A/S warfare seem to have been strange bedfellows for a while.....

 

Damn typos and sticky keyboards (or that is my excuse - dyslexia rules KO!)

 

The problem in the Atlantic was that the pre-war planning for ASW was to activate and commission the laid up WWI four stacker destroyers. When these were "traded" to the Brits for island bases, this left a pretty big hole in ASW assets. Admiral King then made a decision that "people" were more important than "stuff" and concentrated his limited ASW assets on the protection of troop convoys at the expense of cargo convoys. Very few troopships were lost to submarine in either the Atlantic or Pacific. Until adequate ASW came out of the production pipeline, there was significant loss of merchant ships.

[RETAC21]

The problem in the Atlantic was that the pre-war planning for ASW was to activate and commission the laid up WWI four stacker destroyers. When these were "traded" to the Brits for island bases, this left a pretty big hole in ASW assets. Admiral King then made a decision that "people" were more important than "stuff" and concentrated his limited ASW assets on the protection of troop convoys at the expense of cargo convoys. Very few troopships were lost to submarine in either the Atlantic or Pacific. Until adequate ASW came out of the production pipeline, there was significant loss of merchant ships.

 

Not setting up convoys in the East Coast was also a major blunder. Even unescorted convoys would have had cut losses.

[shep854]

"TBF Devastator"--AlaskanWarrior Welcome to TankNet!

 

That should have been a "TBD Devastator"; a Douglas product.

 

The TBF was the Grumman Avenger

Edited April 28, 2010 by shep854

[binder001]

I agree with the statement that you would get different answers from each office you visited. At the beginning of WW2 the US Army (and the other services) were in transition, not only from peace to war, but in expansion and in replacing a lot of older design equipment with newer. Most officers felt that the US equipment was first rate, especially the new designs just coming into production. Most of the disappointment came later after first exposure to combat. The real or imagined deficiencies were reported after the troops got their first tastes of combat. Generally the US went into WW2 with a "can do" attitude.

[Richard Lindquist]

Not setting up convoys in the East Coast was also a major blunder. Even unescorted convoys would have had cut losses.

 

How is an unescorted convoy going to cut losses? It just concentrates the targets for the subs. An escorted convoy concentrates the targets, but also lures the subs to the ASW assets. When you are unescorted, travel alone and as fast as you can zig-zagging frequently.

[Guest aevans]

How is an unescorted convoy going to cut losses? It just concentrates the targets for the subs. An escorted convoy concentrates the targets, but also lures the subs to the ASW assets. When you are unescorted, travel alone and as fast as you can zig-zagging frequently.

 

He's probably thinking along the lines of avoiding contact altogether by reducing footprint. Plausible in principle, but under the conditions actually obtaining in 1942, the Germans could put (just barely) enough subs into the operational area to patrol the most likely convoy routes, and had a communications system enabling a good chunk of the force to converge on a convoy any one boat had contacted.

[Richard Lindquist]

From a land warfare point of view, things weren't too bad:

 

Small Arms: M1 Garand coming on line to replace the M1903 Springfield (which certainly was competitive with the bolt actions the rest of the world were using). M1911A1 pistol was competitive with the rest of the world (the M1/M2 carbine came along later, but was not an absolute necessity).

 

Crew Served: M1918A2/M1919A4/M1917A1 combo was adequate compared to most of the world. The German MG34/MG42 progression was better. 60mm and 81mm were certainly competitive.

 

AT: 37mm turned out to be inadequate, but the US was in no worse shape than the rest of the world in this department. The 25mm/37mm/2pdr/45mm was the world standard for AT in 1940.

 

Light Arty: US 105mm howitzer ready for production to replace the French 75. 75mm pack howitzer ready for production.

 

Medium Artillery: US 155mm howitzer/4.5in gun ready for production to replace the Schneider 155mm how.

 

Heavy Artillery: US 155mm gun/8in howitzer ready for production to replace 155mm GPF.

 

Trucks: world's best truck fleet ready for production.

 

Scout Cars and Halftracks ready for production.

 

Tanks: Not too shabby compared to what the rest of the world had fielded. World class tank production facility coming on line north of Detroit.

[Guest aevans]

From a land warfare point of view, things weren't too bad...

 

One could argue that with our later start and minimal prior investment, we avoided a lot of blind alleys and legacy commitments.

[Assessor]

One could argue that with our later start and minimal prior investment, we avoided a lot of blind alleys and legacy commitments.

 

I think there's considerable mileage in that arguement - the US had had ample opportunity to see what had worked, what hadn't and I think (generally) employed this knowledge well. By not having to change horses mid-race, the production volumes were able to make a difference early on.

 

I'll probably get shot for this, but I can't see that there's a credible arguement against Adm King concentrating on protecting troop convoys. The US could probably replace materiel vastly more easily than trained men.

[Guest aevans]

I'll probably get shot for this, but I can't see that there's a credible arguement against Adm King concentrating on protecting troop convoys. The US could probably replace materiel vastly more easily than trained men.

 

I don't think you'll get an argument from any thoughtful person around here, provided it is accepted that that was King's reasoning (and it probably was, at least to some degree).