75-mm M3 v. Mk IV armor

[Jonathan Chin]

Mark 1 is not talking about literature on the small unit level, even though reports compiled at the division level usually correctly identified German tank types encountered and there were numerous records of tank to tank fighting between Shermans and Mark IVs; I, like him, did not find a single one in which Mark IV was protrayed as invulnerable or even well-protected. He is talking about well-researched official histories written post-war, reports compiled by Armies and Army Groups during the war, as well as tests performed under controlled conditions on specimen of captured German tanks. No one was interested in Mark IVs in 44.

[Mobius]

How is it possible that no one in the combat zone noticed that the most numerous German tank was highly resistant, or even impervious, to US tank gunfire?

 

-Mark 1

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence

 

I have a ballistic test of Allied shot vs the front drivers plate of a PZIII that had 30mm +32mm FH armor. The M72 penetrated from 500yds and a M61 penetrated from 1000yds.

[Mk 1]

Fear o' the Panther/Tiger?

 

And maybe because they didn't recognize the enemy AFV for what it was until after they had sufficiently ventilated it?

I don't quite get this.

 

The Pz IVG was in service by the time the US M4 was fighting in Tunisia. It was downright common (as far as Panzers went) by the time the US was fighting in Sicily and/or Italy.

 

Why would you yell TIGER every time you see a tank, if the Pz IV was a danger to you, and impervious to your fire?

 

If I can't kill a Pz IV, well yeah a Tiger might be even more scary, but I'll still be shouting my brains out that I CAN'T EVEN KILL A PZ IV!!! to anyone and everyone who will listen (or can't get away fast enough).

 

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence

Yes and no.

 

Absence of evidence, where there has been no search for and no expectation of evidence, in ideed not evidence of absence.

 

But when you search in an area where you expect to find both A and B, and you find ample evidence only of B, then the absence of evidence of A is noteworthy and is evidentiary. It may not be conclusive evidence, but it is indicative that there are factors against evidence of A. It does not tell you what those factors are, but it tells you there are factors at play.

 

Given that the US Army, US front line commanders, British front line commanders, and even some German commanders considered the Sherman to be a better tank than the Pz IV, up to the point of describing the Sherman as the best tank in service in any army in early 1943, I find it hard to believe that Pz IVs had overwhelming advantages and could dominate Shermans on the battlefield.

 

As a correlary I also find it hard to believe that Pz IVs had an overwhelming ability to dominate T-34s on the battlefield as well.

 

Somehow, somewhere, after the first 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers had accumulated direct experience with on the battlefield with these vehicles, I think someone would have noticed and mentioned it.

 

The absence of evidence, in this case, is indeed evidence.

 

-Mark 1

[bad-dice]

The British routinely used M72 in Combat during their various North Africa Campaigns. Grants at Gazala and Grants and Shermans during the various Alamein Battles. I don’t recall if they were still using it by the time of the Tunisian battles or if M61 had begun to replace M72.

 

Not so sure this gives the whole picture. There was a thread quite a while back about Grant tanks, and one of the interesting facts that came out was that the British were disatisfied with the performance of the anti-tank rounds for the Grant. To solve this they set up an ammunition manufacturing operation using converting and substituting ex-French 75mm ammo which worked very well. The dumps for this ammo were overun following Gazala so the battles of Alam el Halfa and Alamein were fought with the original US ammo.

 

This always struck me as explaining why there were glowing accounts of the Grant at Gazala but non at the later battles.

[Mobius]

Not so sure this gives the whole picture. There was a thread quite a while back about Grant tanks, and one of the interesting facts that came out was that the British were disatisfied with the performance of the anti-tank rounds for the Grant. To solve this they set up an ammunition manufacturing operation using converting and substituting ex-French 75mm ammo which worked very well. The dumps for this ammo were overun following Gazala so the battles of Alam el Halfa and Alamein were fought with the original US ammo.

On the page of test results there were a number of test shots at the PZ III that I didn't mention. 2 pdr, 57mm and German 75mm. The German 75mm was noted as penetrating the front of the PZIII at 1000yd and causing a "disasterous burst effect inside" while the penetration of the US 75mm had little remaing energy and small damaging effect at 1000yds. Edited May 30, 2009 by Mobius

[Paul Lakowski]

I don't quite get this.

 

Given that the US Army, US front line commanders, British front line commanders, and even some German commanders considered the Sherman to be a better tank than the Pz IV, up to the point of describing the Sherman as the best tank in service in any army in early 1943, I find it hard to believe that Pz IVs had overwhelming advantages and could dominate Shermans on the battlefield.

 

As a correlary I also find it hard to believe that Pz IVs had an overwhelming ability to dominate T-34s on the battlefield as well.

 

-Mark 1

 

Most countries believe their tank is the best, that doesn't mean a whole lot. The best could mean most reliable , the fastest , the longest time between fuel or overhaul. Hard to know without more info. In the east as far as I know the Panzer IV was able to out shoot the T-34, 3:1 and its long gun could penetrate the T-34 frontal armor at 1-2km range.... so I can see how Panzer IV dominated if deployed in sufficent numbers and if handled properly. I recall some figures from engadgements at Kursk 1943 being around 7:1 in their favor.

Edited May 30, 2009 by Paul Lakowski

[DougRichards]

Emerging from the Captured Weapons' thread in Military History is the memory that the Germans used what was effectively the same gun as that mounted in the M3 Grant as an anti-tank gun as one of the first answers to the T-34.

 

That is, the 7.5cm Panzerabwehrkanone 97/38, which used the French 75mm 1897 gun on a PAK 38 carriage.

 

It was not considered to be especially successful, as apart from the light carriage trying to deal with the recoil the low muzzle velocity in comparison with 'real' anti tank guns, even when using the Polish pirecing shell. A hollow charge shell was developed for anti-tank use.

 

So it cannot really be considered that the 75mm gun of the Grant or Sherman would have been particularly effective against German medium tanks, when the Germans themselves didn't continue using it on a regular basis against Soviet mediums with a stardard piercing projectile.

[Buq-Buq]

Not so sure this gives the whole picture. There was a thread quite a while back about Grant tanks, and one of the interesting facts that came out was that the British were disatisfied with the performance of the anti-tank rounds for the Grant. To solve this they set up an ammunition manufacturing operation using converting and substituting ex-French 75mm ammo which worked very well. The dumps for this ammo were overun following Gazala so the battles of Alam el Halfa and Alamein were fought with the original US ammo.

 

This always struck me as explaining why there were glowing accounts of the Grant at Gazala but non at the later battles.

 

 

bad-dice:

 

A couple clarifications, and then an opinion or two:

 

The anti-tank ammunition that you refer to was actually converted from German 75mm APCBC ammo. The Brits had substantial stocks of this explosive-loaded ammunition (from the L/24 7.5cm gun of the Pz IV) captured during the relief of Tobruk in late 1941. The resulting 75mm AP-Composite ammunition was apparently very effective against Pz III and Pz IV targets, as Mobius notes. The penetration was on par with the new U.S. M61 75mm APCBC ammunition, which, apparently, was not available for use by the time of the Gazala battles.

 

From Hunnicutt's Sherman, page 90:

 

Some of the converted ammunition was test fired against a Panzer III hull in comparison with a few of the new U.S. APC M61s which had been flown out to Ciaro. Like the German round, the M61 was fitted with an armor piercing cap, but it was inert loaded since the development of a suitable base detonating fuse was not yet complete. The tests showed the penetration performance of the two rounds was identical, but the damage resulting from the German projectile was much greater. Both penetrated the front of the Panzer III at a 1000 yards [sic], but the German round exploded inside the tank. In combat such an explosion would almost always set off the stowed ammunition.

 

Apparently this 75mm AP-Composite ammunition was available for use by the British units equipped with the Grant before the Gazala battles took place. I have not been able to find any information on how that ammunition might have been distributed or used. According to Hunnicutt "About 6000 rounds were captured by the Germans in the dumps at Capuzzo during the retreat to Alamein." That leaves some 9000 75mm AP-Composite rounds unaccounted for, out of the original 15,000 that were converted.

 

[Just a side note: that would make an availability of 89 75mm AP-Composite rounds per M3 Grant tank at the beginning of the Gazala battle . . . 15,000 AP-Composite rounds, divided by 167 Grants available to the British at the beginning of the battle. That is not to say that each Grant received that allotment, or that any rounds were even issued . . . just that that would be the numeric availability of the ammunition.]

 

There was a program to use the fuses from French 75mm ammunition in the American M48 HE ammunition. The French fuse used a creep element, which allowed for more reliable effects when firing the ammunition at a flatter trajectory (which would normally be found when firing from a tank gun, as opposed to an artillery piece).

 

My opinion: I think that the reason that the Grant is spoken so highly of during the Gazala fighting is simply due to the shock that it put to the Germans. It certainly was cut from a different cloth than the tanks the Germans had been used to facing, and I think that the Germans were absolutely stunned by its presence . . . and ultimately thankful that British generalship didn't live up to the opportunity that presented itself due to that shock (and capability). You can see it in Rommel's writings about the battle.

 

Regarding your comment on the lack of praise for the Grant in later battles, I think that if you look carefully, you will find 'glowing accounts' of Grants in the battles throughout the summer of 1942. It was, after all, after the defeat at Gazala that the Grant came to be nicknamed 'Egypt's Last Hope'. Again, looking at the historical accounts, you will see that the British armor handlers husbanded the Grants throughout the summer, continually resisting allowing them to be frittered away in hopeless tactical situations. They knew that the Grant's capabilities far outstripped anything else that the British armory had to offer, and they strove to ensure that those capabilities were employed at decisive points.

 

 

 

 

Mark

[Buq-Buq]

So it cannot really be considered that the 75mm gun of the Grant or Sherman would have been particularly effective against German medium tanks, when the Germans themselves didn't continue using it on a regular basis against Soviet mediums with a stardard piercing projectile.

 

 

Doug:

 

That looks like quite the leap of logic to presume that the American gun & ammunition must not have been effective against German medium tanks based on the fact that the Germans decided to discontinue use of a similar gun & ammunition against Soviet medium tanks.

 

This statement supposes that the German and Soviet medium tanks are equivalent in their resistance to armor-piercing ammunition. It also completely ignores minor issues such as availability, standardization, training, the need to plan and develop to meet future threats, etc. . . .

 

Unless you were being facetious, in which case I missed your emoticon.

 

 

 

 

Mark

[jwduquette1]

I have a ballistic test of Allied shot vs the front drivers plate of a PZIII that had 30mm +32mm FH armor. The M72 penetrated from 500yds and a M61 penetrated from 1000yds.

 

Hey Steve:

 

Regarding the Cairo Tests, while the location of the penetration for 75mm M72 is specific for the 500-yards range -- "drivers plate", the hit location\s for M72 600 yard range shot\shots isn't indicated. Are we seeing the M72 break-up on the higher obliquity portions on the front of the hull; or do we assume the break-up\s at 600yards occured on the driver plate as well?

 

The target aspect description at the top of the page only says:

 

"Front

32mm. Face Hard, bolted over

30mm, Basic Homo welded"

 

which seems like it could describe 3 possible locations on the front of a PzKwIIIh

 

 

32mm+30mm at 9-degrees

32mm + 300mm at 52-degrees

32mm + 30mm at 21-degrees

 

 

The 75mm M61 and 75mm Composite projectiles are indicated as being able to penetrate "all portions" of the frontal armor from 1000-yards. Which would seem to imply even the higher obliquity 32mm+30mm portions of the hull could be penetrated at ranges of at least 1000-yards. I also would say that the 1000-yard figure can't be taken as any sort of immunity range. The "little remaining energy" energy comment could be significant in the case of the M61, but without something a bit more specific about which 32mm+30mm set of plates is being disscussed it is not possible to get any sort of sense of the armors immunity range against M61 -- unless of course we take the worst case scenario leap and assume the little remaining energy comment refers to the hardest target to perforate -- the 32mm+30mm at 52-degrees. All that I take away from the results table was that penetrations by 75mm M61 and 75mm Composite projectiles occured at 1000-yards, but that it is likely the immunity range is somewhere beyond -- possibly well beyond -- 1000-yards depending upon which 32mm+30mm target aspect is being attacked.

 

Best Rgrds

JD

Edited May 30, 2009 by jwduquette1

[jwduquette1]

The other interesting bit in the Cairo Test result page is that it indicates the drivers plate is inclined at 10-degrees and the lower front plate is inclined at 20-degrees. The design inclination -- see the Jentz\Doyle image I posted above -- indicates the design inclination for the drivers plate and lower hull plate should be respectively 9-degrees and 21-degrees. Could just be measurement error, but the fact the error for both plates is in the exact same direction makes me think the vehicle has a little upward cant -- ~1-degrees -- like the target vehicle was sitting on slightly sloping ground or whatever.

 

Here is a combat account of Grants vs. Afrika Korps MkIIIs and MkIVs at Gazala:

 

 

I suppose one would have to check the Panzer Regiments accounts to see if they match-up with the "heavy losses" bit. But the waiting till' the range closed to 1000-yards thing sounds like maybe the Cairo Test report may have made the rounds to tank units equipped with Grants -- or could be the range is simply coincidental.

Edited May 30, 2009 by jwduquette1

[Jonathan Chin]

Most countries believe their tank is the best, that doesn't mean a whole lot. The best could mean most reliable , the fastest , the longest time between fuel or overhaul. Hard to know without more info. In the east as far as I know the Panzer IV was able to out shoot the T-34, 3:1 and its long gun could penetrate the T-34 frontal armor at 1-2km range.... so I can see how Panzer IV dominated if deployed in sufficent numbers and if handled properly. I recall some figures from engadgements at Kursk 1943 being around 7:1 in their favor.

 

Mr. Lakowski,

 

A comment and a question.

 

The L/48 could penetrate T-34 or M4 armor at exceedingly long ranges (2,000m kills of early M4 recorded) so I suppose if a force of Pz IVs had a long field of fire they could dominate Allied and Russian mediums at standoff range, in Caen as well as in Kursk. However, like Mk 1, I am not finding any literature from the American side that would indicate the Pz IV to be invulnerable or even markedly superior to the Shermans under the conditions of their front with the concomitant factors of terrain and German tactics. Not in one battle between M4 Shermans and German tanks identified as "Mark IVs" did I find the Americans bemoan the superiority of the German machines, at least no complaints about the inability of their weapons to knock out a Pz IV. Pz IV attacks was not met with the same alarm or urgency as reports of othery heavier types of German tanks; from what I can see dealing with Pz IVs was expected to be a pretty normal engagement with even odds.

 

Question: I have been told by several printed books and websites that Russian 76-mm AP ammo, while being able to knock out mid service life Pz III/IV, was extremely poor performing against Pz IV H frontal armor and for that purpose a limited number of APCR rounds were issued to tank units expected to make the critical effort. Was there really a shatter problem with Russian ammunition against face-hardened armor?

Edited May 31, 2009 by Jonathan Chin

[DougRichards]

Doug:

 

That looks like quite the leap of logic to presume that the American gun & ammunition must not have been effective against German medium tanks based on the fact that the Germans decided to discontinue use of a similar gun & ammunition against Soviet medium tanks.

 

This statement supposes that the German and Soviet medium tanks are equivalent in their resistance to armor-piercing ammunition. It also completely ignores minor issues such as availability, standardization, training, the need to plan and develop to meet future threats, etc. . . .

 

Unless you were being facetious, in which case I missed your emoticon.

Mark

 

Actually I wasn't being facetious, I am also not showing hubris, like others who may consider that a 45 year old field gun (in 1942) that was mainly intended for firing HE at around 2000ft/sec was perfectly adequate for anti-tank combat in 1944 and 1945. It should also be remembered that US tanks were not intended to go head to head against German tanks: that is what tank destroyers with 76mm guns were meant to do.

 

I wonder if much of the argument here here Grants vs PzIV armour are leaning on examples of Shermans with 76mm guns against Pz IV and not of Grants, many of which had a shorter barrel than that even of the 75mm Shermans (Grants had a L28.5 barrel in comparison with the L37.5 barrel of the Sherman, that is the Grant weapon was comparable in armour penetration to the L60 50mm of late PZ III.) To compare Shermans against PZ IV is quite a bit different than comparing Grants against PZ IV,

 

It could be argued that, in terms of tank killing, the British 2pdr was as good as the 75mm in Grant or Sherman, and the 6pdr better than the 75mm. The 2pdr having comparable armour piercing ability whilst the 6pdr exceeded the AP capabilities of the 75mm gun by a handsome amount. The advantage of the 75mm in the Grant was in its ability to throw HE, which British tanks lacked, meaning that German AT guns in the desert could be attacked from outside their own effective range.

 

The German PAK 97/38 fired a piercing shell at 1870ft/sec. The Grant fired a shell at 1,860ft/sec. If the Germans considered a 75mm projectile at less than 2000ft/sec to be insufficient against medium tanks it is only sheer hubris to think that an American shell at the same velocity will do any better against medium tanks. The Germans upgunned first to a L43 gun then to L46 and to L48. They skipped the idea of going to anything between 30 and 40 calibres (like the 75mm Shermans L37.5) completely. So, I wasn't being facetious.

[DougRichards]

I am not very sure if this is the right forum. Mods, if inappropriate, please move it.

 

I am a fed up by wiki's refusal to change their class A article on how Panzer Mark IV was invulnerable to M3 fire to regular ranges. So I have a couple of rudimentry questions. Now the folowing is what my research indicates:

 

Panzer Mark IV H had 80mm of armor on mantlet that covers most of the turret front, superstructure front as well as brow. On the H model the 80mm mantlet was FH plate, the rest was RHA. Mk IV J changed the entire frontal armor to RHA to save manufacturing costs.

 

If my sources are right, then the American M72 one-piece AP round have more than enough penetration at least on paper to penetrate the 80mm armor of the ausf. H. But FH plate was designed specifically to shatter one-piece AP shots and I have read of the poor performance of American and Russian solid shots against FH armor.

 

The M61 APCBC on the other hand could penetrate 3-in. of FH plate at 1,000 yards. That should give it the ability to kill a Mark IV H at long range by mantlet hit. But hits elsewhere might not be effective. Against Mark IV J however it had insufficent performace to penetrate the RHA armor.

 

So, my question is, in ETO, what was the typical AP round loaded on a Sherman tank, the M61 or M72? And how successful was the FH was at shattering one-piece AP shots? This conerns me because if the M72 was reasonably effective, then a Sherman crew should load mostly M72s, because it could deal with all threats effectively. But if the FH plate was effective, then the Sherman crew would need to carry M61s to defeat the Mark IV H at the expense of greatly deduced performance against Mark IV Js.

 

What do you guys think? Was killing Mark IV mostly about trying hit it in the sweet spot with M61? Or just shooting M72 at it until the Mark IV was dead?

 

I just realised that your question comes from an incorrect premise, and that is the the gun on the M3 Medium was the same as that on the M4. It wasn't, it was 9 calibres shorter and had armour penetration of 60mm at 500 metres. The M61APCBC would have been introduced late in the desert campaign.

 

Meanwhile, the armour figures for the Panzer IV are off, when taken in relation to the Grant. The PZIV H didn't go into production untilk 1943, and the PZ IV J didn't enter production until June 1944, so there is no point in quoting it against the Grant. In the desert (the latest model being the PZ IV F) the PZ IV tanks in use had a maximum hull and turret thickness of 50mm at around 10 or 11 degrees. Some earlier PZ IV had 30mm & 30mm supertructure armour.

 

If you are going to argue about a particular gun versus a particular tank you shoudl at least get the weaponry and the mark of tank correct for the dates being discussed.

 

No gun armed Grant faced a PZ IV with 80mm armour.

[Mobius]

Hey Steve:

 

Regarding the Cairo Tests, while the location of the penetration for 75mm M72 is specific for the 500-yards range -- "drivers plate", the hit location\s for M72 600 yard range shot\shots isn't indicated. Are we seeing the M72 break-up on the higher obliquity portions on the front of the hull; or do we assume the break-up\s at 600yards occured on the driver plate as well?

I believe I got my copy of the Cairo Test from you, Jeff. However, I didn't know that the German round was infact a composite round. I thought they just shot a German 75mm at the target.

[Buq-Buq]

I just realised that your question comes from an incorrect premise . . . If you are going to argue about a particular gun versus a particular tank you shoudl at least get the weaponry and the mark of tank correct for the dates being discussed.

 

No gun armed Grant faced a PZ IV with 80mm armour.

 

 

Doug:

 

Actually, re-reading Jonathan's post that you quoted, there is no incorrect premise at all: Jonathan never once mentioned the M3 Medium in his original post. In fact, in the sixth paragraph, he uses the term "ETO" which effectively removes the M3 Medium from consideration. Jonathan re-states his original query in Post #9:

 

Does anyone here, btw, believe in the wiki theory the Pzkw IV ausf. H was invulnerable to 75mm M3 at regular battle range?

Lieste first mentions the M2 75mm gun in Post #6, and supertsar and Kip Swanson bring the M3 Medium up again in Posts # 23 & 24 . . . but again, I think that you're putting words in Jonathan's mouth that don't belong there.

 

 

 

My point about your statement

 

So it cannot really be considered that the 75mm gun of the Grant or Sherman would have been particularly effective against German medium tanks, when the Germans themselves didn't continue using it on a regular basis against Soviet mediums with a stardard piercing projectile.

 

is that you are comparing apples to oranges. A Soviet medium tank in May of 1942 on the Eastern Front was not a German medium tank in May of 1942 in the Western Desert.

 

If you are going to argue about a particular gun versus a particular tank you shoudl at least get the weaponry and the mark of tank correct for the dates being discussed.

 

[sic]

 

To say that just because the Germans rejected a similar gun and ammunition combination due to their experience against Soviet medium tanks does not automatically mean that Western Allied use of that gun in a different theatre became obsolete overnight. The experiences of the participants were different.

 

 

 

 

Mark

[jwduquette1]

I believe I got my copy of the Cairo Test from you, Jeff. However, I didn't know that the German round was infact a composite round. I thought they just shot a German 75mm at the target.

 

Ok. I thought perhaps you had managed to secure additional bits of the report. Hunnciutt talks a bit about the trials, but he doesn't get into the nitty gritty of the shot records. However he does provide a very interesting bit of insight regarding the 75mm composite rounds. I can email Hunnicutt's write-up on the subject to you if you don't already have it.

 

Rgds

JD

[jwduquette1]

Bringing the Grant into the disscussion -- as I see it -- has more to do with mapping out capability of the 75mm M61 and M72 projectiles. Moreover, part of the original question at the start of the thread was:

 

"What do you guys think? Was killing Mark IV mostly about trying hit it in the sweet spot with M61? Or just shooting M72 at it until the Mark IV was dead?"

Edited May 31, 2009 by jwduquette1

[Mobius]

Ok. I thought perhaps you had managed to secure additional bits of the report. Hunnciutt talks a bit about the trials, but he doesn't get into the nitty gritty of the shot records. However he does provide a very interesting bit of insight regarding the 75mm composite rounds. I can email Hunnicutt's write-up on the subject to you if you don't already have it.

 

Rgds

JD

I'll take any tidbit from you or Hunnicutt.

Thanks.

[DougRichards]

Doug:

 

Actually, re-reading Jonathan's post that you quoted, there is no incorrect premise at all: Jonathan never once mentioned the M3 Medium in his original post. In fact, in the sixth paragraph, he uses the term "ETO" which effectively removes the M3 Medium from consideration. Jonathan re-states his original query in Post #9:

 

Lieste first mentions the M2 75mm gun in Post #6, and supertsar and Kip Swanson bring the M3 Medium up again in Posts # 23 & 24 . . . but again, I think that you're putting words in Jonathan's mouth that don't belong there.

My point about your statement

is that you are comparing apples to oranges. A Soviet medium tank in May of 1942 on the Eastern Front was not a German medium tank in May of 1942 in the Western Desert.

[sic]

 

To say that just because the Germans rejected a similar gun and ammunition combination due to their experience against Soviet medium tanks does not automatically mean that Western Allied use of that gun in a different theatre became obsolete overnight. The experiences of the participants were different.

Mark

 

Actually the same thought came to me at about 2.00am this morning re the 'M3'. one of the problems of stating an M number without a qualifying description. I recognise now that the original question was in regard to the M3 Gun, not the M3 Medium taank, nor the M3 Light tank, nor the M3 halftrack or the M3 whatever else.

 

I am still inclined to say that the M3 gun was an unsatisfactory tank killer in comparison to other guns fielded at the time, which is why the 76mm gun was put into production. It may have been just able to deal with a Panzer IV from the front, but at the same time it is quite posssible that the 76mm gun was responssible for most PZ IV kills by Shermans in the ETO.

[bad-dice]

[

The anti-tank ammunition that you refer to was actually converted from German 75mm APCBC ammo. The Brits had substantial stocks of this explosive-loaded ammunition (from the L/24 7.5cm gun of the Pz IV) captured during the relief of Tobruk in late 1941. The resulting 75mm AP-Composite ammunition was apparently very effective against Pz III and Pz IV targets, as Mobius notes. The penetration was on par with the new U.S. M61 75mm APCBC ammunition, which, apparently, was not available for use by the time of the Gazala battles.

Thanks Mark, perhaps my memory is at fault here although I cannot remember German rounds being mentioned. I am pretty sure it was a comment by Rich, who may be able to clear it up if he reads this. I’ve tried to find the thread without success.

 

From Hunnicutt's Sherman, page 90:

Apparently this 75mm AP-Composite ammunition was available for use by the British units equipped with the Grant before the Gazala battles took place. I have not been able to find any information on how that ammunition might have been distributed or used. According to Hunnicutt "About 6000 rounds were captured by the Germans in the dumps at Capuzzo during the retreat to Alamein." That leaves some 9000 75mm AP-Composite rounds unaccounted for, out of the original 15,000 that were converted.

 

[Just a side note: that would make an availability of 89 75mm AP-Composite rounds per M3 Grant tank at the beginning of the Gazala battle . . . 15,000 AP-Composite rounds, divided by 167 Grants available to the British at the beginning of the battle. That is not to say that each Grant received that allotment, or that any rounds were even issued . . . just that that would be the numeric availability of the ammunition.]

80-90 rounds per tank loaded and in the first line replenishment capacity seems reasonable to me. With the remainder centrally stored further back and available for replenishment as needed. But the Cappuzzo storage area was still a forward storage area as the British were preparing for their own offensive. This made it a hostage to fortune as was also the case with a great deal of the other supplies being readied for this effort.

Although I cannot refer to Rich’s original post I did make the following note on the British Grant in my 20th Century Wargame Rules: “Ineffective (M72) ammo. Brits had hybrid round for Gazala. Lost all stocks in retreat but recaptured them after Alamein. US Lee’s in Tunisia had effective M61 round.” which fits in with your comment about the dumps at Capuzzo.

 

My opinion: I think that the reason that the Grant is spoken so highly of during the Gazala fighting is simply due to the shock that it put to the Germans. It certainly was cut from a different cloth than the tanks the Germans had been used to facing, and I think that the Germans were absolutely stunned by its presence . . . and ultimately thankful that British generalship didn't live up to the opportunity that presented itself due to that shock (and capability). You can see it in Rommel's writings about the battle.

I don’t necessarily disagree. But to be specific, the Grant was able to have an effect on the DAK tanks at a longer range than they were used to from the current British tanks.

 

Regarding your comment on the lack of praise for the Grant in later battles, I think that if you look carefully, you will find 'glowing accounts' of Grants in the battles throughout the summer of 1942. It was, after all, after the defeat at Gazala that the Grant came to be nicknamed 'Egypt's Last Hope'. Again, looking at the historical accounts, you will see that the British armor handlers husbanded the Grants throughout the summer, continually resisting allowing them to be frittered away in hopeless tactical situations. They knew that the Grant's capabilities far outstripped anything else that the British armory had to offer, and they strove to ensure that those capabilities were employed at decisive points.

Mark

I would be interested in the glowing combat accounts you know of after Gazala. I have not found any. The only account I can find is of a short lived counter attack at Alam el Halfa where the Grants used were brewing up too quickly and were called back.

 

I think we are losing sight of the fact that the Germans did not stand still with their armour. Both PzIII and PzIV upgraded their protection levels pretty steadily. At Gazala the Grants would be up against (from memory) mainly PzIIIH (30 + 30mm) and PzIIIJ (50mm), and PzIVF1 (50mm), as the main German threats. By Alam el Halfa the Germans would be using PzIIIL (50+20mm). I have seen a photo of a an earlier short barrel 50mm gun PzIII brought up to L armour standard although I don’t know how wide spread this practice was. So the effectiveness of the Grant against German armour should be expected to diminish by Alam el Halfa. Added to this was the 50mmL60 gun using PzGr40 APCR ammo and the PzIVF2 with the 75mmL43.

 

The Grant of course did not fight against PzIVH or J.

 

Cheers

Rob

Edited May 31, 2009 by bad-dice

[Buq-Buq]

Doug:

 

I'd certainly have to agree with you that someone decided that the 75mm M3 gun was unsatisfactory at some point for whatever reason*, 'which is why the 76mm gun was put into production.'

 

I have to say, though, that this last bit

 

It may have been just able to deal with a Panzer IV from the front, but at the same time it is quite posssible that the 76mm gun was responssible for most PZ IV kills by Shermans in the ETO.

 

seems awfully hard to quantify.

 

:-)

 

 

 

 

Mark

 

 

* Interestingly enough, 'at some point' appears to be 'sooner, rather than later,' since the specifications for what became the M4 Medium Tank — which were written in September of 1941 (before the M3 Grant Medium Tank and its 75mm M2 Gun had even seen combat, and had been proven either adequate or inadequate, depending on your point of view in this thread) — included a 3 inch gun as an alternate armament for the M4-series Medium Tank, along with the 105mm howitzer. In fact, the first M4 Medium Tank mounting a 76mm T1 L/57 gun was tested in August of 1942, before the first M4 Medium Tanks even saw combat.

[DougRichards]

Doug:

 

I'd certainly have to agree with you that someone decided that the 75mm M3 gun was unsatisfactory at some point for whatever reason*, 'which is why the 76mm gun was put into production.'

 

I have to say, though, that this last bit

seems awfully hard to quantify.

 

:-)

Mark

* Interestingly enough, 'at some point' appears to be 'sooner, rather than later,' since the specifications for what became the M4 Medium Tank — which were written in September of 1941 (before the M3 Grant Medium Tank and its 75mm M2 Gun had even seen combat, and had been proven either adequate or inadequate, depending on your point of view in this thread) — included a 3 inch gun as an alternate armament for the M4-series Medium Tank, along with the 105mm howitzer. In fact, the first M4 Medium Tank mounting a 76mm T1 L/57 gun was tested in August of 1942, before the first M4 Medium Tanks even saw combat.

 

And some early M4 Shermans had the L28.5 M2 gun, but I doubt whether any saw combat.

[Buq-Buq]

Rob:

 

This quote from Naill Barr's Pendulum of War (page 62) sums up what I referred to as 'glowing accounts', without digging up anything specific:

 

Yet it was not for nothing that the officers and men who crewed the Grant tanks called them 'ELH', or 'Egypt's Last Hope'. In a campaign in which RAC crews had been trained to accept that their weapon was the decisive element on the battlefield, the Grant stood out as the most powerful tank available to the British. The few Grants left to Eighth Army were precious. Armour commanders were unlikely to hazard their last few ELHs in what they considered a risky operation. British tank crews had also become cautious. Too many crewmen had charged invisible anti-tank gun screens too many times. At Gazala, where British tank strength had been wiped out in a matter of hours, British tank crews had learned the most important lesson the hard way — their tanks could not take on German opposition on their own. The unsupported charge of anti-tank guns — which had seemed the only alternative with tanks armed with two-pounders — would not happen again. In fact, it was the very advantages which the Grant tank conferred on its crews which made such caution possible. A Grant tank could duel and spar with its German opposite number at long range; a Crusader could not . . .

As I said earlier, note that it is after the Gazala battles that the Grant came to be known as 'Egypt's Last Hope'. The tank would not have gained that nickname if Egypt itself was not threatened (prior to the May-June Gazala battles it was not), or if the qualities and performance of the tank during that period had been on par with, say, the Crusader.

 

 

As a side note on the use of the M61 75mm ammunition . . . the American 1st Armored Division apparently also used M72 ammunition for a short period in Tunisia. Here is a note I wrote a few months ago on another forum regarding the M72 ammo in Tunisia:

 

It is interesting that you bring up the M72 AP Shot . . . these pictures were taken at the beginning of December, before the latest ammunition trends had reached the U.S. forces in North Africa. In the period of time between the departure of 1st Armored Division from the U.S. (to Ireland, and thence on to the TORCH landings) and December 1942, the Americans had down-graded the M72 round for the 75mm M2 & M3 gun to the status of 'training ammunition'. Of course, the 1AD had already left for war, and "they fought with what they brung" — uncapped M72 AP Shot.

 

This episode came to light when a delegation, including LTG Devers and BG Barnes, visited U.S. troops in Tunisia at the end of December. As The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division (by George F. Howe) says: "[Devers and Barnes] stopped for a two-day visit, having just come from observing with British Eighth Army in Libya . . . Barnes discovered to his amazement that Combat Command B was not yet receiving armor-piercing ammunition adopted since it had left the United States, but was using what now passed for training ammunition. No wonder the 37mm antitank gun and even the short 75mm tank gun seemed so futile against a Mark IV!"

 

Obviously, this photo proves that some of the newer M61 APCBC ammo was actually available to U.S. forces in North Africa. The scale of issue of this more potent ammunition would be interesting to know.

 

 

 

Regarding the story of the 75mm AP-Composite ammunition (as jwduquette1 has alluded to in his notes with Mobius), this has a nice write-up in Hunnicutt's Sherman. Additionally, another version of the 75mm AP-Composite story (which more detail, but basically backing up what is to be found in Hunnicutt) can be found in Arch Whitehouse's Tank. Whitehouse's account is written from the point of view of American Ordnance officer G. B. Jarrett.

 

 

OK, that's it for now. I believe I've wandered . . .

 

 

 

 

Mark

[jwduquette1]

Came across this photo while looking for something else. Photo of a M3 Crew in N. Africa holding various flavors of 75mm ammunition for LuluBelle. The dude with the yellow arrow above his head is holding 75mm M72 AP. Most of the other dudes are holding 75mm M61 APC. The big guy in the middle is holding HE. The dude 2nd from the right is holding a camel.

 

Edited June 7, 2009 by jwduquette1