Did the US test the 88/L71?

[Ken Estes]

May as well start with direct quotes...plenty if you knpw where to dig...

 

[book cover, data brandished]

 

"In the weeks that followed many officers and men stationed at home listened intently to the stories brought back by the survivors from the BEF. One such was LTC Kennedy, CRE of the 23rd Division, who was invited to a conference of staff officers pf 2 AA division on 1 June. Kennedy told the whole sory story...skip sentences...and how did the AA guns perform, in Kennedy's experience? Most memorable was an incident in which a 3.7" AA gun, its muzzle lowered, had blown two tanks to smithereens. Used as such, reported Kennedy, 'it is undoubtably a magnificant weapon.'

 

Indeed it was, the 3.7" AT potential would come to be widely remarked upon, and Pile, drawing from his earlier expertise, later reflected that it was a pity it was never installed in tanks."

 

Seems to me we have already accounted for usage that prior to now was MIA. Its like any other bit of history...as time passes more and more comes to the surface...If you asked David Fletcher about the churchill gun carrier today...(after publishing his book on the churchill) he would likely admit to you for example there is at least secondary evidence to support the fact that churchill gun carriers may in fact have seen service in Italy in the hands of the canadians....information he did not have at the time of the writing of his book.

 

Then we have Allenbrooks comments following the battle of france as well...

 

[book cover brandished]

 

and lastly the RA histories themselves...I can pull quotes from those but I dont intend to make a living out of this...several pointing to the extensive issue of AP ammunition to both the 40mm LAA and 3.7" and DF preparations for engaging german armor...and from there on to the middle east with more than a couple of instances including the New Zealand plans for deploying massed 3.7" in the anti-armor fight.

Ah, at last we have the products of your 'research' [maybe better termed 'mesearch'] by which you [since you know where to dig] will prove all. Apart from posting excellent dustcovers, showing meticulous care of your library, we have no quote from Allan Brooke, and a tertiary source, relating that a certain LTC related a "Most memorable was an incident in which a 3.7" AA gun, its muzzle lowered, had blown two tanks to smithereens. Used as such, reported Kennedy, 'it is undoubtably a magnificant weapon.' Well, folks, there we have it, case closed? But, killing two German tanks in WWII may not prove more than the reduction of German inventory. Where was this, what was the situation whereby a 3.7in and German tank met each other. Was it a deliberate AT setup, or, as in the case of all arty, did these guys simply defend themselves when the enemy showed up? There is a difference and it relates to the [perhaps lost] context of this threadjack.

 

You write of attitude, yet you seem quite singleminded, so much so that you eschew the actual subtopic at hand. Nobody has stated that the 3.7in could not or did not kill tanks. The matter remains, it was not a DP gun and was used only incidentally as an ad hoc AT gun, as well as conventional arty roles that every idle AAA piece can provide.

 

BTW, what you continue to call the "official history" is I take it a regimental history series, not a product of the govt. As such, it remains a secondary source, just as Kenneth Macksey, The Tanks, is of the RTR, or anything written by most TN authors. Published by a commercial press, it likely has the sponsorship of the RRA, but this carries no additional weight, as an official history might. What would be important is what sources the author has used to compile it. If he has relied excessively on veteran's memory, so much the peril.

 

If one were to look for relevant details, try:

Doherty, Richard Wall of Steel. The History of the 9th (Londonderry) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (SR). (North-West Books, Limavady, 1988)

Sherrard, William The War Diary of William Sherrard, 9th (Londonderry) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (SR) (North-West Archaeological and Historical Society, 2006)

 

The last being a primary source, for which you have evident fame of consulting.

 

...because 9th HAA served extensively in No Africa and Italy, might help in understanding just what it was the RRA was doing with these guns:

 

GHQ Middle East Forces 11.1939 - 18.05.1940

Brigadier, Anti-Aircraft (BAA), Middle East 18.05.1940 - ?

2nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade, British Troops Egypt under this command in 01.1941 *

9th Army, Palestine / Syria 06.08.1942 - early 12.1942

8th Army, North Africa 12.1942 - ? (for a time it came under command of the CRA 51st (Highland) Division)

2nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Tripoli 23.01.1943 - 01.08.1943

12th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, X Corps 01.08.1943 - ?

66th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, AFHQ Troops, Italy & the Balkans (06.1944) - 29.08.1944

32nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade, 5th AA Group, AA Command 11.1944 - 01.1945

65th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, 5th AA Group, AA Command 01.1945 - 05.1945

 

You do not mention another RRA history, Routledge, Brigadier N W, OBE TD History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 1914–1955 (Brassey’s, London, 1994). Does he uphold your views as well?

 

So, attitude? I think not. I am simply responding to your barrages, some of which has been simple pimping. As a professional officer and as a professional historian, I have my standards of evidence and a healthy skepticism to complement things I read on websites.

 

As for your "and lastly the RA histories* themselves...I can pull quotes from those but I dont intend to make a living out of this...several pointing to the extensive issue of AP ammunition to both the 40mm LAA and 3.7" and DF preparations for engaging german armor...and from there on to the middle east with more than a couple of instances including the New Zealand plans for deploying massed 3.7" in the anti-armor fight." - Don't give up your day job for the likes of me.

 

* You use this term as well, "RA Histories." Is it an alternate term of yours for the published regimental histories, or is this finally some primary source material, say from NA?

Edited May 8, 2009 by Ken Estes

[Ken Estes]

Imperial War Museum: 3.7 Never used in a dual AT/AA role. Too heavy, took too long to set up. 1938 Dual gunnery training stopped. Took too long to train gunners for both. Not surprising with hard to zero fixed sight. Welded on as an afterthought.

 

Used as Coastal Defense....BY THE GERMANS 9.4cm Flak Vickers M.39...as a field expedient, as WestWall was a backwater and the Germans adapted foreign material for use, as the best was sent East .

 

Two recorded Direct Fire roles used in emergency situations by official histories. El Adem Box, under Denys Red C.O. of El Adem Box, fired 200 rounds of 3.7 in ground support role.....Hmmm 200 rounds with negligible results... accuracy?. German Panzerwaffe was always cognizant of artillery brackets against panzers, and would withdraw under perceived artillery barrages. With the 3.7 having a high rate of fire, it can be seen that as artillery barrage was in use and the Panzers withdrew accordingly. But it impressed the Germans to attack elsewhere. Burma Feb 1944 added in artillery barrage in Japanese attack against British positions. Mixed results, it did add to artillery barrage, but did it hit anything?

 

Funny, what Cary Erickson dug up most closely approximates the conventional understanding of the 3.7-inch employment in WWII. I also read scoffs vs. IWM, but these are at least professional historians and the like.

[Ken Estes]

[reserved for further use]

Edited May 8, 2009 by Ken Estes

[Ken Estes]

Going back to the American 90mm gun, there was the 90mm towed AT project which never really got anywhere. one of the versions closest to service use weighed 6,800lbs or a little more than 1/3 the weight of the AA gun. It might have been faster to set up and certainly required a smaller gun pit and less camoflage. Might not have been too much worse for general bombardment use either. Just pointing out what is sometimes given up in a dual purpose design.

While the 90mm AT gun did not make it into WWII, the T8 was sent to Korea, served with both USMC and army units there. By then, however, there were no more T-34s to be found.

[scotsman]

Ryan, you are starting to worry me, as you are verging on hysteria.

 

When I write There is nothing in there that states or even implies that said gun cannot obtain a hit. So do calm down a bit. There is nothing for you to 'suss out.'

 

If you look back, you had shifted to how a tank's gunfire is 'spotted' for fall of shot, you were not writing then about AA guns. Do try to keep up. The rest of your rant seems to be about you or me and that is not the topic. Nobody sez that gun X cannot ever hit tgt B; the Q is, are such guns really suited for it. So-called 'research' by your pal to find single instances where a tank was hit or KO'd during WWII do not make any contribution, beyond brandishing one's assumed skills and library.

 

We are not even talking about 'attitude'! What nonsense.

 

Told you...its a never ending of can'ts...followed by further deorgatory remarks...

 

page 204 same work

 

"To meet these ventualities, in late june the bofors crews were issued AP ammunition. Instructions were given to reduce the height of the parapets, so enabling the guns to fire on tanks and other ground forces. HAA weapons too, would have an important field role against the panzers - particularly the 3.7's, which had already demonstrated their anti-tank value in france." It was at that same time significant increase in AP ammunition took place...the field marshall's own book citing the meetings he went to secure this outcome.

 

No offense Ken, but you seem to think insult and sarcasm are in fact a substitute for research and reading. They are not...you have not provided a single primary technical citation that supports any ofyour claims...you simply hop from one accusation or put down to the next. Nonsense is not being able to substantiate your own (shrill) position...

 

He who shouts the loudest and hurls the most insults does not win the debate....I'll proceed to further take this apart over the weekend. Undoubtably that will give you more time to formulate another set of meaningless insults and personal attacks which have nothing to do with the discussion at hand. (Next we can look at the RA histories and their citation of battery action, or that of the diaries of individual regiments like the 2nd Canadian)

[Ken Estes]

Told you...its a never ending of can'ts...followed by further deorgatory remarks...

 

page 204 same work

 

"To meet these ventualities, in late june the bofors crews were issued AP ammunition. Instructions were given to reduce the height of the parapets, so enabling the guns to fire on tanks and other ground forces. HAA weapons too, would have an important field role against the panzers - particularly the 3.7's, which had already demonstrated their anti-tank value in france." It was at that same time significant increase in AP ammunition took place...the field marshall's own book citing the meetings he went to secure this outcome.

 

No offense Ken, but you seem to think insult and sarcasm are in fact a substitute for research and reading. They are not...you have not provided a single primary technical citation that supports any ofyour claims...you simply hop from one accusation or put down to the next. Nonsense is not being able to substantiate your own (shrill) position...

 

He who shouts the loudest and hurls the most insults does not win the debate....I'll proceed to further take this apart over the weekend. Undoubtably that will give you more time to formulate another set of meaningless insults and personal attacks which have nothing to do with the discussion at hand. (Next we can look at the RA histories and their citation of battery action, or that of the diaries of individual regiments like the 2nd Canadian)

Dream on, o innocent one. The Bofors 40mm was never in question. Why bring it up now, lack of other material? How had the 3.7s demonstrated their AT value in France beyond killing two German tanks. Which work are you citing as same one, since the FM had no quote thus far in your posts? One still awaits the weight of evidence that it had a dual role, vice self-defense. I did not claim to have primary sources at hand; you did. There is no need for them to demonstrate the German conversion of flak to AT guns, non-DP. The "can'ts" seem to be in your head, right? can't shake them off?

 

You are the one who seems to have the competitive hackles up, as from the beginning of your posting on this hijack of Mobius' thread. I simply see unusual and unsupported claims, and I am not alone, it would seem. Fangen Sie an!

[scotsman]

Ah, at last we have the products of your 'research' [maybe better termed 'mesearch'] by which you [since you know where to dig] will prove all. Apart from posting excellent dustcovers, showing meticulous care of your library, we have no quote from Allan Brooke, and a tertiary source, relating that a certain LTC related a "Most memorable was an incident in which a 3.7" AA gun, its muzzle lowered, had blown two tanks to smithereens. Used as such, reported Kennedy, 'it is undoubtably a magnificant weapon.' Well, folks, there we have it, case closed? But, killing two German tanks in WWII may not prove more than the reduction of German inventory. Where was this, what was the situation whereby a 3.7in and German tank met each other. Was it a deliberate AT setup, or, as in the case of all arty, did these guys simply defend themselves when the enemy showed up? There is a difference and it relates to the [perhaps lost] context of this threadjack.

 

You write of attitude, yet you seem quite singleminded, so much so that you eschew the actual subtopic at hand. Nobody has stated that the 3.7in could not or did not kill tanks. The matter remains, it was not a DP gun and was used only incidentally as an ad hoc AT gun, as well as conventional arty roles that every idle AAA piece can provide.

 

BTW, what you continue to call the "official history" is I take it a regimental history series, not a product of the govt. As such, it remains a secondary source, just as Kenneth Macksey, The Tanks, is of the RTR, or anything written by most TN authors. Published by a commercial press, it likely has the sponsorship of the RRA, but this carries no additional weight, as an official history might. What would be important is what sources the author has used to compile it. If he has relied excessively on veteran's memory, so much the peril.

 

If one were to look for relevant details, try:

Doherty, Richard Wall of Steel. The History of the 9th (Londonderry) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (SR). (North-West Books, Limavady, 1988)

Sherrard, William The War Diary of William Sherrard, 9th (Londonderry) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery (SR) (North-West Archaeological and Historical Society, 2006)

 

The last being a primary source, for which you have evident fame of consulting.

 

...because 9th HAA served extensively in No Africa and Italy, might help in understanding just what it was the RRA was doing with these guns:

 

GHQ Middle East Forces 11.1939 - 18.05.1940

Brigadier, Anti-Aircraft (BAA), Middle East 18.05.1940 - ?

2nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade, British Troops Egypt under this command in 01.1941 *

9th Army, Palestine / Syria 06.08.1942 - early 12.1942

8th Army, North Africa 12.1942 - ? (for a time it came under command of the CRA 51st (Highland) Division)

2nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Tripoli 23.01.1943 - 01.08.1943

12th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, X Corps 01.08.1943 - ?

66th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, AFHQ Troops, Italy & the Balkans (06.1944) - 29.08.1944

32nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade, 5th AA Group, AA Command 11.1944 - 01.1945

65th Anti-Aircraft Brigade, 5th AA Group, AA Command 01.1945 - 05.1945

 

You do not mention another RRA history, Routledge, Brigadier N W, OBE TD History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: Anti-Aircraft Artillery, 1914–1955 (Brassey’s, London, 1994). Does he uphold your views as well?

 

So, attitude? I think not. I am simply responding to your barrages, some of which has been simple pimping. As a professional officer and as a professional historian, I have my standards of evidence and a healthy skepticism to complement things I read on websites.

 

As for your "and lastly the RA histories* themselves...I can pull quotes from those but I dont intend to make a living out of this...several pointing to the extensive issue of AP ammunition to both the 40mm LAA and 3.7" and DF preparations for engaging german armor...and from there on to the middle east with more than a couple of instances including the New Zealand plans for deploying massed 3.7" in the anti-armor fight." - Don't give up your day job for the likes of me.

 

* You use this term as well, "RA Histories." Is it an alternate term of yours for the published regimental histories, or is this finally some primary source material, say from NA?

 

You're making it SO easy...

 

page 168.

 

Quote:

3rd July 1941.

Also making plans to employ 3" (20cwt) AA guns to engage 70 and 90 ton German tanks should any of these monsters be landed to overcome beach defences.

 

page 173

 

Quote:

21st July 1941.

Then proceeded to see Beaverbrook concerning production of A/T ammunition for 3.7" and 3" AA guns to deal with large tanks should they be landed.

 

page 182

 

Quote:

9th September 1941.

Motored onto Larkhill for anti-tank trials.....Had 2 pdr, 6 pdr, 25 pdr, 75mm, Bofors and 3.7" AA gun all firing.

 

So much for your assertions about the good F.M. and his writings...I really don't see how the tactical context of the quoted incident even applies. They did exactly what the LW flak guys did when their position was threatened in Normandy or elsewhere...they engaged in battery self protection. We already have evidence of the New Zealanders in norrth africa planning for a massed 3.7" AT deployment in operations, so your point is now what?

 

I think your point on 'official' is rather pointless as well...the author is a member of the Royal Artillery Historical Society which is not a govt. organization, not a product of the government, so you fail on that assertion as well... You discount the memory of veterans in their battle accounts, and then cite an individual war diary? Not even a unit history? Anyone else having trouble following the logic trail besides me? Its one or the other....you cant discount a source and then cite then same as credible and viable...

 

As for Routledge, yes, and he provides substantial accounts of HAA and LAA firing in the DF role against all manner of ground targets, as did the AA guns of any nation, including the US 90mm as required. In some instances he specifically cites armor, in other instances he cites the attacking unit as armored which can likely safely assume the usual mix of ground targets typical of a panzer division. Again whats your point? I can haul out the book and list citatitions, I have it right here...I really don't have the time or energy to do that if you have that source at hand. If you have in fact read it then you will know that to be the case....

 

Attitude...yes....unfortunately...primary citations Ken...not your opinion...the barrages to date have ALL been yours unfortunately....and follow a typical pattern...belittle and attack, followed by discounting any source provided as not meeting some arbitrary standard you assert, followed by a lack of any primary citations of your own...rinse and repeat...

 

I Sir, have seen very little evidence of a 'professional officer' to date, and I state that as an ex-officer myself. None of your discussion style has lent itself to a reasonable mannered discussion of the material at hand. Personal attacks and sarcasm have no place i such discussions...and your posts are laced with them.

 

I suppose you'll try to tell us next that the gentleman charged with helping defend the UK in her darkest hour had some sort of deep dark darth vader like career motives for writing the above in his personal diaries....and had little or no understanding of the true science of war...

Edited May 8, 2009 by scotsman

[C.G.Erickson]

And your homoerotic sexual fantasies are on topic?

WTF

[Ken Estes]

You're making it SO easy...

 

page 168.

 

Quote:

3rd July 1941.

Also making plans to employ 3" (20cwt) AA guns to engage 70 and 90 ton German tanks should any of these monsters be landed to overcome beach defences.

 

page 173

 

Quote:

21st July 1941.

Then proceeded to see Beaverbrook concerning production of A/T ammunition for 3.7" and 3" AA guns to deal with large tanks should they be landed.

 

page 182

 

Quote:

9th September 1941.

Motored onto Larkhill for anti-tank trials.....Had 2 pdr, 6 pdr, 25 pdr, 75mm, Bofors and 3.7" AA gun all firing.

 

So much for your assertions about the good F.M. and his writings...I really don't see how the tactical context of the quoted incident even applies. They did exactly what the LW flak guys did when their position was threatened in Normandy or elsewhere...they engaged in battery self protection. We already have evidence of the New Zealanders in norrth africa planning for a massed 3.7" AT deployment in operations, so your point is now what?

 

I think your point on 'official' is rather pointless as well...the author is a member of the Royal Artillery Historical Society which is not a govt. organization, not a product of the government, so you fail on that assertion as well... You discount the memory of veterans in their battle accounts, and then cite an individual war diary? Not even a unit history? Anyone else having trouble following the logic trail besides me? Its one or the other....you cant discount a source and then cite then same as credible and viable...

 

As for Routledge, yes, and he provides substantial accounts of HAA and LAA firing in the DF role against all manner of ground targets, as did the AA guns of any nation, including the US 90mm as required. In some instances he specifically cites armor, in other instances he cites the attacking unit as armored which can likely safely assume the usual mix of ground targets typical of a panzer division. Again whats your point? I can haul out the book and list citatitions, I have it right here...I really don't have the time or energy to do that if you have that source at hand. If you have in fact read it then you will know that to be the case....

 

Attitude...yes....unfortunately...primary citations Ken...not your opinion...the barrages to date have ALL been yours unfortunately....and follow a typical pattern...belittle and attack, followed by discounting any source provided as not meeting some arbitrary standard you assert, followed by a lack of any primary citations of your own...rinse and repeat...

 

I Sir, have seen very little evidence of a 'professional officer' to date, and I state that as an ex-officer myself. None of your discussion style has lent itself to a reasonable mannered discussion of the material at hand. Personal attacks and sarcasm have no place i such discussions...and your posts are laced with them.

 

I suppose you'll try to tell us next that the gentleman charged with helping defend the UK in her darkest hour had some sort of deep dark darth vader like career motives for writing the above in his personal diaries....and had little or no understanding of the true science of war...

Is this the sarcasm you are writing about? SO easy to what? I can see you have never tried to be a teacher, for your idea of logical progression remains deficient. I was waiting for a FM quotation, for you said there would be one and yet gave none on your previous post. Now you have given some, of no real value on the Q of DP HAA guns, but you are now content with evidence they prepared for self defense, which is all I was saying was the case for these guns, thus not a DP intent or design. Nor was DF against all manner of ground targets the Q. It was the idea of a DP gun capable in AA and AT modes. You keep trying to move the goal posts yet charge me with belittling you, when I try to steer you back from your flummoxing to the subtopic at hand. My point on what is an official history stands; you simply skirt it with more evasion and obscurants. As for primary sources, I provided one from NARA showing the US far from having a DP capability in the 90mm M1 and M2 AA gun, seeking to make improvements in DF for 1944. No evidence that it was considered an AT weapon by the US in that doc. Nor do you provide any such documentation, just that Brooke attended firing demonstrations, when their backs were to the wall in 1940. I am as tired as you are of having to repeat, but nobody -- including me -- has asserted that these guns could not be fired at a tank, or might hit one. But they certainly were not so employed as a rule, for obvious reasons, some of which we have suggested.

You discount the memory of veterans in their battle accounts, and then cite an individual war diary? Not even a unit history? Anyone else having trouble following the logic trail besides me? Its one or the other....you cant discount a source and then cite then same as credible and viable...

I don't think anybody can follow that, except for Ryan Gill. You are the one citing an individual war diary -- Allan Brooke's. I simply listed some sources likely to show what was being done with these guns that you have not been able to demonstrate. I do not discount vet memory, but memoirs and oral histories are the least reliable of all primary sources, for reasons that ought to be obvious for you, were you not so....stiff.

 

I suppose that your nose is out of joint because you have not been given the tumultuous welcome Ryan promised you, back around page 4 or so, that we'd just fall all over your 3.7in stuff. But he can also tell you that TN is a demanding crowd and if you can't handle the pressure -- you originally agreed to disagree, but look at you now -- there seems little I can do to help you with such a problem. You seem to wish that we eat it all and ask no questions. I, and perhaps others, am still looking for the Tigers and Panthers struck down by the DP 3.7in employed as AT guns in the field armies in Europe and elsewhere. I am still looking for some evidence of suitable controls and effectiveness in the AT mission, for which it just does not seem to have been employed, except in extremis and self-defense. This is why offering "We already have evidence of the New Zealanders in norrth africa planning for a massed 3.7" AT deployment in operations" does not appeal, for it did not happen, nor do we have any details of what they had in mind, hence my suggestion on looking at a regt in the field vice your secondary and tertiary inferences, devoid of any detail sufficient to show what happened. I don't discount your sources, I am just waiting for them to produce plausible evidence vice inference, which you seem not able to distinguish.

 

The devil is in the details. "Personal attacks and sarcasm" dot your screed above, BTW, so I'd say checkfire on your sanctimony.

[Ken Estes]

WTF

I think that I did say he could put a liplock on scotsman if he wanted to. Ryan is very touchy boy. Needs careful handing.

 

[edit to add] t'was my entry Thu 7 May 2009 1726

Edited May 8, 2009 by Ken Estes

[rmgill]

I think that I did say he could put a liplock on scotsman if he wanted to.

[edit to add] t'was my entry Thu 7 May 2009 1726

 

Exactly:

Wow, you don't say? Primary research no less? I am filled with admiration. Well I tell you, Ryan, you can put a liplock on Scotsman if you like, but keep your opinions about me to yourself. You don't know me, and we can keep it that way.

 

 

As to careful handling, I think you're just having a go here because your usual preferred people to argue with over trivialities and nonsuch are off on hiatus due to the recent kerfuffule with Paul of Saud and the Texans. I still think you've got some sort of issue where you think you're a Clint Eastwood NCO and have to bring up swapping spit in the bathroom or some such when you can't get someone to agree with your stilted logic.

 

Ken, you're doing the board a disservice by throwing the insults when you can't get agreement with your own position. Stop resorting to Paul's, 5150 and Phil Golins tactics. You should be better than that. You're a published author, you've got things to bring to the table as an experienced tanker. But strict adherence to your own forces doctrine when discussions on general history are mistaken. So is ridicule of other people in the 1st person when they're trying to bring additional knowledge to the table.

 

If you've got some data showing an engagement where German Tanks ran over a HAA battery, by all means, post it. But the point at hand is the effective use of the heavy guns in real engagements with AP ammo over direct fire sights which, when they occurred seemed to have left he German tanks holding the dirty end of the stick. Frankly I'd figure you, as a Marine would appreciate novel use of weapons rather than sticking to the "it's not what it's designed for" dogma.

 

So far, where it comes to meat of discussion, you're coming up woefully short. It really is quite pathetic. You want to continue to throw insults, please, by all means, start a thread over on the FFZ. I'd rather talk with CG and Argus and others on the various points of tactical employment of AAA in the ground role than argue with you about what ever tiny nit you disagree with and then get it all blown out of proportion.

[C.G.Erickson]

I think that I did say he could put a liplock on scotsman if he wanted to. Ryan is very touchy boy. Needs careful handing.

 

[edit to add] t'was my entry Thu 7 May 2009 1726

Naughty Ken....

[scotsman]

Dream on, o innocent one. The Bofors 40mm was never in question. Why bring it up now, lack of other material? How had the 3.7s demonstrated their AT value in France beyond killing two German tanks. Which work are you citing as same one, since the FM had no quote thus far in your posts? One still awaits the weight of evidence that it had a dual role, vice self-defense. I did not claim to have primary sources at hand; you did. There is no need for them to demonstrate the German conversion of flak to AT guns, non-DP. The "can'ts" seem to be in your head, right? can't shake them off?

 

You are the one who seems to have the competitive hackles up, as from the beginning of your posting on this hijack of Mobius' thread. I simply see unusual and unsupported claims, and I am not alone, it would seem. Fangen Sie an!

 

 

What ARE you talking about...read the full quote: "particularly the 3.7's, which had already demonstrated their anti-tank value in france"

 

If you have access to Rutledge then you know full well there are citations in his work that discuss 3.7" AT usage in the battle around Calais, and follow-on usage of virtually every gun available in and around Dunkirk. You can look them up or I can go the time and trouble of posting them here for you.

 

It seems me that you are still completely and totally hung up on a very restrictive definition of the term DP. Myself, and many others, have already pointed out that we do not agree with your restrictive definition of said term as it might be applied to many weapons...not the least of which was the HAA of many nations.

 

From where I sit...you have made no primary citations at all...only assertions and opinion...so I take it that your comments above are in fact a recognition of this.

 

The 88mm is NOT the 3.7" experience, nor the US 90mm experience. Its apples and oranges...and it would seem you are unwilling to simply accept that in the end it was quite a different war experience for these Allied gunners and their equipments than was the 88mm German experience. Your DP premise is is based on the German experience with the 88mm necessarily being applied in parallel to the HAA of other nations, when its plain that it in fact thats not the case.

 

I have not found a single instance of mobile 3.7" being stripped of HAA instruments for the sake of DF capabilities...which is the foundation of your claim for lack of DP capability for the 88...yet 3.7" was obviously employed in DF and AT till the end of the war. Much of the regimental data in fact indicates that mobile allied HAA spent the vast majority of its time firing in these secondary roles rather than the primary...due to a lack of LW presence.

 

I'll simply state that I disagree with your DP definition and leave it at that....as for 'unusual and unsupported claims', I take that to mean anything that does not agree with your myopic definition of DP...

 

[rmgill]

Is this the sarcasm you are writing about? SO easy to what? I can see you have never tried to be a teacher, for your idea of logical progression remains deficient. I was waiting for a FM quotation,

 

Ken, the British didn't have 'Field Manuals' as far as I'm aware of. They did have Military Training Pamphlets and Handbooks. Here's Pamphlet No8 Q.F fixed ammunition-Part10- QF 3.7inch.

 

You'll note the pamphlet lists the following AP rounds.

 

Cartridge, Q.F. ,3.7-in AP Shot/T

Cartridge, Q.F. ,3.7-in APCBC Shot/T

Cartridge, Q.F. ,3.7-in SAP Shot/T

Cartridge, Q.F. ,3.7-in Practice Shot/T

 

Now you have given some, of no real value on the Q of DP HAA guns, but you are now content with evidence they prepared for self defense, which is all I was saying was the case for these guns, thus not a DP intent or design. Nor was DF against all manner of ground targets the Q. It was the idea of a DP gun capable in AA and AT modes.

 

He's cited how the guns were ALSO used in indirect fire roles alongside the conventional Royal Artillery in firing long range stonks. In fact, I've seen a few references that point to their great utility as conventional field artillery.

 

Here's one location I've seen the details.

 

Anti-Aircraft Artillery

 

As the war progressed the air threat decreased and both heavy and light AA units were used in the field role. HAA batteries equipped with the 3.7-inch HAA gun had long range (18,600 yards at full charge), unrestricted top traverse and were typically handled as medium artillery, and often used for CB tasks. Their high rate of fire and time fuzes were an added bonus, the latter were particularly useful. In Italy statistics reveal that many HAA regiments fired only a few thousand rounds at air targets but perhaps 50 times as many at ground targets! Most of this fire was indirect although HAA units were not officially issued with the necessary fire control equipment until late 1944. A reduced charge was introduced for ground fire in order to reduce barrel wear.

 

40-mm LAA was usually used for direct fire, although there is at least one recorded incident of LAA being used for indirect fire controlled by an air observation post (AOP). There were occasions, particularly in Italy, when LAA batteries temporarily operated mortars. More frequently LAA fire was used to mark the edges of a barrage, their tracer provided a line, to help keep the infantry on the right course. This 'directional aid' was first used at El Alamein. LAA fire was also a feature of the 'pepperpot' element that characterised large fireplans from late 1944.

 

One problem was that AA guns were designed to fire short bursts at infrequent targets. However, in the field role, particularly 3.7-inch when firing as part of a fireplan, they were required to fire for periods of a few hours. This caused equipment failure and the guns got so hot that paint on the barrels blistered and on one occasion at least the barrels were visibly drooping. A second possible issue was that 3.7-inch HAA shells had been designed to produce quite large fragments to maximise damage to aircraft. This meant that a burst produced fewer and bigger fragments that needed to create battlefield casualties. Of course this didn't matter too much when neutralisation was required.

 

In the final months of the war in NW Europe HAA brigades were used as AGRAs in major fire plans.

 

My point on what is an official history stands; you simply skirt it with more evasion and obscurants. As for primary sources, I provided one from NARA showing the US far from having a DP capability in the 90mm M1 and M2 AA gun, seeking to make improvements in DF for 1944. No evidence that it was considered an AT weapon by the US in that doc.

 

If we're arguing on the point of dual purpose alone and not on the issue of capability of being used in the anti-tank role, then would use as conventional field artillery as a regular matter of course where tens of thousands of rounds fired at ground targets in an indirect role imply a clear dual use if not an explicit dual purpose? I'll concede that the guns, as designed were not dual purpose from the start. Because then there'd have been direct fire sights fitted by Vickers from the factories on the Mk I.

 

BUT, as the war progressed and the British were pushed against the wall, the more unconventional role of engaging ground targets with anti-aircraft weapons was taken up unofficially and then later officially in the form of AP shot and reduced charge HE rounds for the intermediate fire against indirect targets. So, the weapon, started out as a single purpose weapon, that of Heavy Anti-Aircraft firing at Air targets under director control. But evolved into an excellent weapon for firing at air targets under radar director control AND into a long range artillery piece which could fire ground support missions as part of their own AGRAs.

 

Due to the nature of the battlefield and the strategy, by the time the 3.7s were no longer needed in GREAT numbers for the defense of britain, the german ability to attack on a strategic level had more or less ended. Defensive engagements by 3.7s were rare, not due to the lack of the design, but because the Germans rarely got that far into the depth of the British rear areas where the 3.7s were typically cited. If the design was faulty for engaging ground targets over direct sights, it would stand to reason that the few engagements wouldn't have been a walkover for the 3.7s.

 

I don't think Scotsman has disagreed with this basic contention at all.

[rmgill]

Naughty Ken....

 

I think he thinks he's a Clint Eastwood character.

[C.G.Erickson]

I think he thinks he's a Clint Eastwood character.

I have shared many a beer with Ken

He is a fine example of an American Military officer.

Debating amongst military circles is a norm for purposes of establishing doctrine or whatever.

Do debates get heated? Yes

I would charachterise all American Officers as Clint Eastwood types. With that meant as a compliment.

[scotsman]

Is this the sarcasm you are writing about? SO easy to what? I can see you have never tried to be a teacher, for your idea of logical progression remains deficient. I was waiting for a FM quotation, for you said there would be one and yet gave none on your previous post. Now you have given some, of no real value on the Q of DP HAA guns, but you are now content with evidence they prepared for self defense, which is all I was saying was the case for these guns, thus not a DP intent or design. Nor was DF against all manner of ground targets the Q. It was the idea of a DP gun capable in AA and AT modes. You keep trying to move the goal posts yet charge me with belittling you, when I try to steer you back from your flummoxing to the subtopic at hand. My point on what is an official history stands; you simply skirt it with more evasion and obscurants. As for primary sources, I provided one from NARA showing the US far from having a DP capability in the 90mm M1 and M2 AA gun, seeking to make improvements in DF for 1944. No evidence that it was considered an AT weapon by the US in that doc. Nor do you provide any such documentation, just that Brooke attended firing demonstrations, when their backs were to the wall in 1940. I am as tired as you are of having to repeat, but nobody -- including me -- has asserted that these guns could not be fired at a tank, or might hit one. But they certainly were not so employed as a rule, for obvious reasons, some of which we have suggested.

I don't think anybody can follow that, except for Ryan Gill. You are the one citing an individual war diary -- Allan Brooke's. I simply listed some sources likely to show what was being done with these guns that you have not been able to demonstrate. I do not discount vet memory, but memoirs and oral histories are the least reliable of all primary sources, for reasons that ought to be obvious for you, were you not so....stiff.

 

I suppose that your nose is out of joint because you have not been given the tumultuous welcome Ryan promised you, back around page 4 or so, that we'd just fall all over your 3.7in stuff. But he can also tell you that TN is a demanding crowd and if you can't handle the pressure -- you originally agreed to disagree, but look at you now -- there seems little I can do to help you with such a problem. You seem to wish that we eat it all and ask no questions. I, and perhaps others, am still looking for the Tigers and Panthers struck down by the DP 3.7in employed as AT guns in the field armies in Europe and elsewhere. I am still looking for some evidence of suitable controls and effectiveness in the AT mission, for which it just does not seem to have been employed, except in extremis and self-defense. This is why offering "We already have evidence of the New Zealanders in norrth africa planning for a massed 3.7" AT deployment in operations" does not appeal, for it did not happen, nor do we have any details of what they had in mind, hence my suggestion on looking at a regt in the field vice your secondary and tertiary inferences, devoid of any detail sufficient to show what happened. I don't discount your sources, I am just waiting for them to produce plausible evidence vice inference, which you seem not able to distinguish.

 

The devil is in the details. "Personal attacks and sarcasm" dot your screed above, BTW, so I'd say checkfire on your sanctimony.

 

Did you or did you not make this statement Ken?

 

"we have no quote from Allan Brooke"

 

Were you or were you not in fact provided with his quotes?

 

If No continue...if Yes...'checkfire' in your own words....

 

Your 'discussion' of this is entirely circular and you try to frame it in a fashion that supports the initial supposition you made...that the 88mm (and hence apparently any other HAA) is not 'DP' in your view of the world. Every time an opposition assertion or citation is made, you simply close the loop by attacking the source as non-applicable or irrelevant to your view of the definition of DP. What was done to optimize the 88mm was not done to the guns of other nations and yet all of them in fact engaged in secondary DF and AT as required...often in the case of the Allied guns to the near exclusion of rounds fired in the primary mission due to lack of suitable targets.

 

I don't think the gunners of either side would care one iota about your restrictive definition of DP...if someone tells them to drop the barrel and engage (and they are provisioned for it) they are in fact engaging in their secondary roles regardless of how demanding the individual tactical situation might be, or what the equipment of the gun mount is. Effectiveness is immaterial to the immediate tactical imperative...

 

To me that is DP, to you it is not. Your definition is based on primary design intent apparently as it applies only to optics and gunshield etc, while mine is based on actual combat usage. provisioning of complimentary ammunition, and a demonstrated intent to use the weapon in the secondary role.

 

No-one has moved the goal post...contrary to your claim.

 

To the best of my knowledge all users continually attempt to adapt or improve their guns to the job at hand...in the instance of both 3.7" and 90mm (which is in your Korean assertion above) both guns were on their way out in favor of missiles...and I dont find it surprising at all that mods were proposed to make better use of them in a DF role as that was all that was left. I am quite sure though that the US commanders in and around the bulge would have answered your AT question with 'Damn right! And anything else I can get to kill a German tank with too!'

 

The Allied experience of HAA by the time 1944 rolled around was in fact as you laid out...there wasn't the same tactical imperative to shoot DF as the Germans had in the defense of the Reich...but the guns were heavily exercised in all their secondary missions in DF and indirect...

 

Your original claim in all of this discussion was that the 88mm was not DP ...fine... your opinion. Understand that others have a different one...which I believe to be every bit as well founded as you probably believe you assertion is...'nuff said....

 

Your secondary claim was the fire control of said HAA weapons did not in fact allow for effective usage in a secondary DF or AT role, in defense of which you offered up a rounds/kill data point from Jentz with no tactical context or backing. When provided with opposition evidence for Allied HAA operating in DF/AT in an unmodified state in 1940 (not having their principal AA instruments removed for the sake of DF), you took issue with that.

 

You ask for evidence of Tigers and Panthers and I provided you with the war experience of a 3.7" gunner polled by an RA LTC - not by myself. I still have not gotten around to locating that original scan, but I have written the LTC again personally (today) on this and he is asking for involvement of the RSA in confirming/denying the experience and locating additional records. I'm sure I'll likely be told those records are sufficient in your view as well. Many of the vets are now dead or passing on, and time has been short to collect their experience...once gone...all we are left with is the written records we can lay our hands on. I'm doing the best I can as is an RA LTC, if you can do better, by all means step up to the plate...

 

You were provided a picture of the tobruk sight modification (which granted most people unfamiliar with 3.7" do not know even existed)..and yet you question 'some evidence of suitable controls' when its already been provided. Suitable is in the eyes of the beholder and therein lays our disagreement...suitable to me means its on the bloody gun and it was used....suitable to you apparently means something else...

 

Point taken on tactical plans...but it does display tactical intent does it not? It certainly calls into question the supposition that higher HQ were pathologically against employment of said weapon in that role...

 

Finally...Ill post a scan of a document which certainly should meet your primary source criteria...it certainly completely discounts the IWM observations made earlier about the training of gunners in a DF/AT role.

Edited May 8, 2009 by scotsman

[scotsman]

Is this a primary source in your eyes???

 

[scotsman]

I have shared many a beer with Ken

He is a fine example of an American Military officer.

Debating amongst military circles is a norm for purposes of establishing doctrine or whatever.

Do debates get heated? Yes

I would charachterise all American Officers as Clint Eastwood types. With that meant as a compliment.

 

I resemble that remark!!!

[Przezdzieblo]

If Tigers hunt in the neighbourhood

Who you gonna call...

 

 

?

[scotsman]

In support of the information Ryan posted...here is the shot record of second canadian in a segment of the normandy campaign...

 

 

As you can see they fired far more ammunition against ground targets than they did shooting at aircraft. The data gets even more skewed as the unit approached the Rhine and took part in Opn Veritable...among others...

 

Unfortunately, I don't have a similar level of detail for many of the other HAAA regiments, which is what the RA LTC is now chasing for me...this is about as 'primary' as it gets....and certainly shows just how heavily Allied HAA had begun to skew towards their secondary missions...in part due to LW target starvation...and in part because they were judged to be highly effective when so employed...

 

They were not 'ineffective' in their 'DP' fire support pursuits and had in fact extensively practice in both DF and indirect shoots before they shipped to normandy...with the exact training dates and ranges listed in the source document.

Edited May 8, 2009 by scotsman

[scotsman]

I don't think Scotsman has disagreed with this basic contention at all.

 

Nope thats pretty much it...it got used Ad hoc...was effective...purpose built ammunition and sights were produced, introduced, trained for, and used...and there was tactical intent and use on the part of many to use said weapon/sights in the several secondary missions...DF general support, DF AT, counter-mortar, and normal indirect fire...

 

The gun (and more importantly some of the command and control around the gun) were multimission/DP in every sense of the word. By the time of Normandy, the battery HQ in fact had R/F equipment identical to that found in normal 25pdr or 5.5" RA units for participation in both counter-mortar and large scale indirect shoots. They could and did recieve and fire 'normal' indirect fire missions...

 

2nd Canadian History even cites a discussion of timed AP firing as lane markers for night attacks ala El Alamein...so its obvious the ammunition was actually with the guns in that unit (unlike the comments concerning tank engagement in holland where it was noted by the gunner that the AP ammo was delivered to the guns after they got their AT mission tasking)

[mkenny]

...

 

 

What is striking about that list is how much of it was in static 'siege' warfare. The reduction of the Channel Ports and other German 'hold-outs' after the front moved into Holland

[Ken Estes]

Ken, the British didn't have 'Field Manuals' as far as I'm aware of. They did have Military Training Pamphlets and Handbooks. Here's Pamphlet No8 Q.F fixed ammunition-Part10- QF 3.7inch. ....

You are one cool dude, Ryan. FM was a repeat of scotsman's FM for FM Sir Alan Brooke, and he stated that there was a quote on the posting where he placed the cover [remember all that flourishing?], yet there was none...posts later he blithely said he was continuing.

 

But don't let reality intrude on what you think and say I am writing, you have wracked up a pretty clear record of that....

[scotsman]

What is striking about that list is how much of it was in static 'siege' warfare. The reduction of the Channel Ports and other German 'hold-outs' after the front moved into Holland

 

They actually moved about a fair bit according to the regimental records...obviously being a mainland unit they werent involved in any channel island opns, but they were involved on the reduction of the channel ports to include Calais. As per previous post though, the ratio of air defense to ground shoots actually worsens the closer got to Germany proper...there are spikes of enemy air activity but the vast majority of their time was spent in ground shoots or indirect fire...