Jump to content

The T-62


Dawes
 Share

Recommended Posts

  • Replies 246
  • Created
  • Last Reply

Top Posters In This Topic

Guest JamesG123

The T-62 was designed and built as a tank destroyer not an MBT. It was not built in as large numbers as the T-55s and was soon eclipsed by the much more advanced T-64. It was more capable than the T-55 and as we've seen in the recent Russian-Georgian conflict, they still soldier on today, but generally over looked because it was rapidly surpassed technically and its superiority over the T-55 is largely irrelevant today.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The T-62 was designed and built as a tank destroyer not an MBT.

 

:huh: First time I've heard the T-62 described as such.

 

Maybe because the Arab experience with the T-62 was a result of that tank not being produced in sizable numbers as the T-64 etc? Sorta like the relative that no one likes to talk about.... :unsure:

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I have a short description of the T-62 in Michael Norman's Soviet Mediums T44, T54, T55 & T62, but it's only a paragraph long and it seems as if the T-62 had entered service only a decade before the book was published. It just says that the T-62 is probably armed with a 115mm gun, and has an elongated hull that resembles that of the T-55, with a new turret shape. Nothing really important. In regards to literature, it seems that the T-64 doesn't get much attention either. In fact, Steven Zaloga published a book on the T-62 for Osprey before he published one on the T-64.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

In reading about the history of Soviet armor, the T-62 doesn't appear to have merited as much attention as the T-54/-55 series or the later T-64/-72/-80 vehicles. Is this particular MBT seen as less of a success than the others?

Well, yes. 20,000 manufactured compared to around 80-100,000 (for the T-54/55 counting China, Czech, and Poland). It was made not as a replacement to the T-55 but to spearhead their formations but when the T-64 and T-72 came along they became moot points.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The only reason why T-62 appeared was because T-64 development took 5 years more than it should have. It's a stop-gap tank in a situation where Soviet command felt it was falling critically behind the West in armor capability and the future MBT development is stalled. For a stop-gap tank I'd say it actually turned out to be incredibly successful and influential.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Speaking of the T-62, is there any new info on 115mm APFSDS rounds floating around out there? ;) Specifically the Kamerger? I know Tekhnika and Vooruzheniye did a series of articles last year on Soviet tank develpment, but I think I only have pdf's through July or August (Thank you Sergei M). Did the series of articles continue? There was some great info there.

 

Gavin

 

The only reason why T-62 appeared was because T-64 development took 5 years more than it should have. It's a stop-gap tank in a situation where Soviet command felt it was falling critically behind the West in armor capability and the future MBT development is stalled. For a stop-gap tank I'd say it actually turned out to be incredibly successful and influential.
Edited by Gavin Kratz
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Was there any specific reason the Russians jumped so fast from the 115mm gun to the 125mm as opposed to continued ammunition development? Did the development of German and British 120mm guns cause the Russians to panic a bit?

 

One reason I hear replicated alot concerning this particular issue was the introduction of the British Chieftain MBT and the problem of penetrating the British MBT frontally. Now whether this is true or not (myth's being repeated often enough become truth, etc) I really couldn't say although I'd be interested to see if it really if there is any truth in it.

 

In regards to the T-62 as a tank destroyer, this would certainly apply to the IT-1 - a T-62 chassis fitted with guidence/lauching equipment for the 9M7 Dragon missile, there was another ATGM armed version with a simple launcher (AT-3 Sagger?) mounted externally, although I've never seen a picture of this variant. As for the standard tank, more like an upgunned T-55.

 

When the IDF captured a few after the Arab-Israeli wars, did they ever make public their findings/thoughts/opinions on the T-62?

 

I do recall reading in Zaloga's Soviet Artillery & Design Practices that the 115mm weapon was a result of a large calibre tank gun being tested but never fielded as a stabiliser powerful enough to cope with the recoil couldn't be built/wasn't available at the time. Does anyone have any dates on this project, or an Objekt #?

 

As you can probably tell, I'm a T-62 and a KV-2 fan. :lol:

Link to comment
Share on other sites

In regards to the T-62 as a tank destroyer, this would certainly apply to the IT-1... ...As for the standard tank, more like an upgunned T-55.

It seems that for the largest part of it's development, Object 166 was referred as "tank destroyer", although the project both started and ended (by T-62 going into service) as a "medium tank".

there was another ATGM armed version with a simple launcher (AT-3 Sagger?) mounted externally
Although there were attempts to outfit existing tanks with AT-3 launchers, AFAIK no "tank destroyers" ('eavy ones) or "missile tanks" used them. All known proposed "IT-1 variants" used 3M7 missile.

 

I do recall reading in Zaloga's Soviet Artillery & Design Practices that the 115mm weapon was a result of a large calibre tank gun being tested but never fielded as a stabiliser powerful enough to cope with the recoil couldn't be built/wasn't available at the time. Does anyone have any dates on this project, or an Objekt #?

Doesn't seem to be true. It is said that U-5TS was derived from 100-mm D-54T tank gun, by reboring it to 115-mm diameter and removing the muzzle brake. It was decided from the start that the gun should be smoothbore, and the only proposed (not really...) alternative for U-5TS was T-12 100-mm AT gun. Later developments (Object 166B, Object 167) had 125-mm gun, but that was after T-62 entered service.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The true importance of the T-62 was due to its implementation of a large smooth-bore cannon which enabled much higher velocities than possible with rifled cannons.

 

The influence of the T-62 can be seen from the German and US adoption of the 120mm smooth-bore cannon for the Leo2/M1 family. Before the advent of the T-62, tank cannons were rifled.

 

The tank was very similar to the T-55 in almost every respect (size, speed, armor). The main difference was in the adoption of the 115mm. The critical deficiency of the T-62 was that after each shot the gun had to elevate off target, align with the ejection to eject the shell, and then be brought back onto target. This made it hard to make accurate shot corrections.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Egyptians seemed to be quite impressed with T-62 firepower. An excerpt from Lt.General Sa`d al-Diyn al-Shazliy, chief of staff of Egyptian Army who prepared the 1973 Yom kippur War.

 

The T-62 tanks provided a classic example of this. From the President's February visit we had learned that Moscow was to supply us with 200. We had to plan, in advance, how best to absorb them.

 

February 26: A meeting to settle the question. Sadiq in the chair. The T-62s, with their 115mm guns, were so powerful that, properly deployed, they could exert decisive influence on a battle. I proposed they be allocated to our two armored divisions and kept in reserve to deploy as and when the battle demanded. The Minister, along with Gamasiy and Guwhar, argued that they should replace the T-55s in our two independent armored brigades. (The difference being that our armored divisions functioned as independent battle formations; while the independent armored brigades-independent, that is, of the rest of our armor-were used as support formations.) The T-55s released from the brigades would in turn replace the older T-34s in other formations. I urged this would risk dissipating the potential impact of the T-62, especially if the independent brigades were dispersed in battle, as they could well be, to reinforce a variety of field formations. The Vice Minister, General Hasan, agreed with me.

 

February 27: The meeting resumed, this time with Soviet advisers. Sadiq sounded my colleagues one by one. Hasan had changed his views. I had not. Then the Soviet advisers spoke. They all agreed with me. Sadiq, displeased and with all his intelligence officer's antennae roused, turned to the Senior Soviet Adviser, "I see," he said to General Okunev, "you and General Shazliy are in complete agreement."

 

http://egyptianchronicles.freewebsitehosti...Crossing23.html

 

The link contains Sa`d al-Diyn al-Shazliy memories on the Suez Channel crossing, and is very interesting, especially to anyone interested in the 1973 war.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It wasn't a tank destroyer, but rather an unimportant (initially) side project started by Leonid N. Kartsev as a means of improving upon the T-55. Originally, it was to have the DT-54TS gun, but Kartsev started expirimenting with a 115mm smoothbore as a means of countering the armor of the Centurion and M48 series (a similar caliber weapon was fitted to the original production T-64). It was quickly discovered that cramming that thing into a T-55 wasn't going to work, so that called for a larger turret, a larger turret ring, a longer hull.... and if you're going to do all that, you might as well build a new tank. Thus begat Object 166.

 

Soviets were initially unimpressed, because Object 430 (which later became the T-64) was already well along in development, and Object 166 was seen as a rather expenive upgrade to the T-55. Then, fate interviened when an Iranian M60A1 fell into their hands and completely freaked out the General Staff. Object 166 was more or less ready, while Object 430 needed more work. They immediately rushed Object 166 into production as a stopgap measure.

 

Most telling of all is the fact that the T-62 ended production before the T-55 did. So it was not considered as highly important tank after the development of the T-64/72/80 series. In an ironic postscript, the 100mm HVAPDS ammo developed for the D-100 made the 115mm gun almost pointless. The cheaper T-55 stayed in production much longer because of this and the number of speciality vehicles based on its chasis.

 

Overall, as far as Soveit tanks go, the T-62 was fairly unremarkable (note that I'm not saying it was *bad*, and it can probably be best compared to the M48A5, which was also an evolutionary upgrade). Common criticisms included the fact was slow and couldn't keep up with BMPs, was more expensive, and the ejection system hurt ROF and second shot accuracy. Export customers appreciated the bigger gun though (like Egypt).

 

- John

Edited by Kensuke
Link to comment
Share on other sites

The T-62 was two and a half times more expensive than the T-55 for marginal improvements in firepower and armor protections. Most T-62 production was either kept in the Soviet Union or exported overseas, very little went to its Warsaw Pact allies (Bulgaria being an exception). Over all, it’s a good tank, I like it, and you see less catastrophic turret separations with it than the newer T-72. It was made for a certain POINT in time, like the M-47 was rapidly produced for a certain critical stop-gap period and then afterwards it became unnecessary with T-64 production. Apparently The North Koreans think enough of it that they continued to produce and modify their T-62’s rather than switch over to T-72 production. It’s my understanding they got a hold of a few from China or Russia around 1989 or 1990 and after evaluating it they decided to take parts and pieces off the T-72 to use on their T-62’s rather than simply manufactured their own T-72 clones (as they have been with the T-62). Interestingly enough North Korea was the last nation to build T-62’s having built around 2,000 of them with production just ending relatively recently around 1997.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The most common complaint I heard was with the gunnery system. From what I remember (and my memory is not perfect) when you lock it onto a target and fire the gun must depress to kick out the burning-hot empty shell out the ejector otherwise it bounces around and injures the crew. The problem is this eats time and slows the amount of rounds it can fire in a fast engagement as the gun must them track back to the coordinates it was locked onto after each firing.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest JamesG123

It was infamous for that in the same way that the T-72s supposedly grabbed arms and such. Probably more exaggeration than a common problem. The tank was a "tank destroyer" in that it was built as a direct response to the new generation of 105mm western MBTs. and it was fielded in a specific anti-tank role. Yeah it was classified as a medium tank or MBT, but I have read more than once of it being more a TD than just a regular tank.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It was infamous for that in the same way that the T-72s supposedly grabbed arms and such. Probably more exaggeration than a common problem. The tank was a "tank destroyer" in that it was built as a direct response to the new generation of 105mm western MBTs. and it was fielded in a specific anti-tank role. Yeah it was classified as a medium tank or MBT, but I have read more than once of it being more a TD than just a regular tank.

 

Again. I think that's absurd, and I'd welcome a source to back it up.

 

All MBTs are designed to engage other MBTs, so that's not a very relevant to point out that they had the upgun it to remain competitive with western designs. Under that argument, the M60 and later model Centurions were TDs because they had bigger guns than the T-55, while the T-64 was a TD because it had a bigger gun than anything that mounted the L7.

 

Historically, TDs are smaller. lighter, faster, simplier, and cheaper versions of tanks. This is especially true for most Soviet designs. The T-62 is the antithesis to that. It was larger, heavier (though only slightly in comparison to the T-55), slower, more complex, and more expensive. Furthermore, it didn't sacrifice any armor or crew protection as TDs are want to do. Likewise, there were a number of tanks with big-ass guns that could be considered Heavy Tanks (T-10, M-103, etc.), but still not TDs because they had none of the above qualities/downsides of a TD.

 

True Post-war TDs would include the FV 4101 Charioteer, while modern TDs would include the various light AFVs that can mount ATGMs.

 

The T-62 an MBT.

 

- John

Edited by Kensuke
Link to comment
Share on other sites

From Soviet aspect the British MBTs was to few of importance. On a scale of NATO the number of British MBT was much too small. The principal reason is to find much more in the 105 mm L7. The USA used this Gun in large number into the M60.

By the way, the T-62 is technological on almost same level as the T-55. In the books "Battle vehicles of Uralvagonzavod" is written, the costs lie only around 15% more highly. An extraordinarily low-priced solution for substitution of the old T-55 MBT at the seam to NATO. The 115 mm of Gun knew into the 60' s destroy almost all MBT. 1974 received the T-62 a new sight with independently stabilized line of sight TShS-41U , that was a lack of the first T-62.

 

I think, the T-62 was a lock-up, because the T-64 did not come from the place away because of many problems. But nevertheless, were 20'000 (!) T-62 in 10 years to then the T-72 took over the relay stick. And naturally, the T-62 developed as MBT.

Edited by Stefan Kotsch
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Just got an idea, why wasn't T-62 offere in 1980s, say with "M" upgrades (Volna FCS, Basny ATGM, laser RF, BDD)
Only Cuba got T-62M, and only because they inherit them from a Russian brigade based there. T-55 users would go for upgrades rather than buying T-62M. Bojan mentioned about a comparison made in Yugoslavia between T-62 obtained from Egypt and T-55. The latter with advanced ammo was comparable to the former.

 

as a "low-tech" export counterpart to T-72, esp. for countries operating lots of T-55s due to similarity of vehicles?

 

T-72 had better performance and potential for upgrades. From a political point of view (always important in Cold War) it could be better to sell latest T-72 than older T-62, even if they were export models.

 

In the books "Battle vehicles of Uralvagonzavod" is written, the costs lie only around 15% more highly.

 

This is new, as the publications I have stated that cost was much higher.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest JamesG123
Just got an idea, why wasn't T-62 offere in 1980s, say with "M" upgrades (Volna FCS, Basny ATGM, laser RF, BDD) as a "low-tech" export counterpart to T-72, esp. for countries operating lots of T-55s due to similarity of vehicles?

 

Because they wanted to sell them shiny new T-72s, and the Generalissimos wanted high-tech toys, not refreshed antiques.

 

 

Again. I think that's absurd, and I'd welcome a source to back it up.

 

Perrett's Soviet Armor since 1945, pg. 37:

 

"In fact, although the T-62 did eventually assume the role of an MBT, the initial intention was that it should serve in parallel with the T-55 regiments in units which replaced the tank division's heavy tank/tank destroyer regiments which had the task of shooting in the medium tank's attack and picking off enemy armour at long range."

 

 

Historically, TDs are smaller. lighter, faster, simplier, and cheaper versions of tanks. This is especially true for most Soviet designs. The T-62 is the antithesis to that. It was larger, heavier (though only slightly in comparison to the T-55), slower, more complex, and more expensive. Furthermore, it didn't sacrifice any armor or crew protection as TDs are want to do. Likewise, there were a number of tanks with big-ass guns that could be considered Heavy Tanks (T-10, M-103, etc.), but still not TDs because they had none of the above qualities/downsides of a TD.
Ah, no. You are confusing Western and Soviet design approaches and categorization schemes. The Soviet perspective with the tank destroyer was the SU-85 to the ISU-122. Not exactly "lighter, faster, smaller". Though from the perspective of the JS/T-10 heavy tank, I suppose the T-62 fit that characterization.

The T-62 was a T-55 enlarged just enough to fit a larger gun, nothing more. And it was done specifically to give it a greater tank killing ability. While it was in production and front line service it was not considered "just another MBT" either by the Soviets nor in the armies they equipped and advised. They were kept in separate formations and roles. THAT is the only thing that they share with US or European TD tactics and organization.

 

True Post-war TDs would include the FV 4101 Charioteer, while modern TDs would include the various light AFVs that can mount ATGMs.

 

Irrelevant. You are comparing apples to oranges grown 30 years apart.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Perrett's Soviet Armor since 1945, pg. 37:

 

"In fact, although the T-62 did eventually assume the role of an MBT, the initial intention was that it should serve in parallel with the T-55 regiments in units which replaced the tank division's heavy tank/tank destroyer regiments which had the task of shooting in the medium tank's attack and picking off enemy armour at long range."

 

 

Ah... ok then, I get it then. Thanks. :)

 

The T-62 as "TD" (not TD - no quotation marks) comes from Mr. Perrett's observations that T-62 units replaced the heavy tanks and TD units.

 

So, it's a "TD" because it replaced those heavy tanks and TDs and performed the role of such AFVs (i.e., "plinking" at AFVs from long range in support of T-55 advance).

Edited by TomasCTT
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest JamesG123
The T-62 as "TD" (not TD - no quotation marks) comes from Mr. Perrett's observations that T-62 units replaced the heavy tanks and TD units.

 

That was just the reference that came to mind and was readily at hand. There are many others. Alejandro's post earlier in this thread is also a good supporting statement to this fact:

 

February 26: A meeting to settle the question. Sadiq in the chair. The T-62s, with their 115mm guns, were so powerful that, properly deployed, they could exert decisive influence on a battle. I proposed they be allocated to our two armored divisions and kept in reserve to deploy as and when the battle demanded. The Minister, along with Gamasiy and Guwhar, argued that they should replace the T-55s in our two independent armored brigades. (The difference being that our armored divisions functioned as independent battle formations; while the independent armored brigades-independent, that is, of the rest of our armor-were used as support formations.) The T-55s released from the brigades would in turn replace the older T-34s in other formations. I urged this would risk dissipating the potential impact of the T-62, especially if the independent brigades were dispersed in battle, as they could well be, to reinforce a variety of field formations. The Vice Minister, General Hasan, agreed with me...

 

But sorry I don't have a copy of the minutes from the meeting of the Soviet High Command when the doctrine for the T-62 was formulated. ;)

 

Perhaps some of our Soviet/Russian experts can chime in?

 

Bottom line is that if the balloon had gone up in the 60's and you had found yourself in the Fulda Gap being engaged by T-62s you could be pretty sure that the unit you were facing was not an MRR, but a specific unit tasked to anti-tank work (I can't recall its specific designation off hand). As the T-62 became eclipsed by the T-64, then yeah, it became just a plain ol' tank, medium type. But for a while it was something distinct from just a "tank".

Edited by JamesG123
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now
 Share


×
×
  • Create New...