Eastern vs. Westen Artillery

[Kensuke]

Has there every been a qualitive assessment of Eastern vs. Wertern tube artillery around the 1960s through about 1980?

 

I note that despite the fact that neither side really seemed to share shell diameter, some interesting inferences can be drawn. Western guns seemed to emphasize low weight and ultimately standardized around two calibers (203mm was replaced with MLRS), while soviet designs seemed to emphasize range and a wide variety calibers (in addition to MLRS). Might it be inferred that Western armies were more concerned with high mobility and keeping the logistics trail to a minimum?

 

As an example, I notice that in some comparisons the Soviets seem to have a edge in capability. For instance, the Soviet 122mm howizers like the D-30 seems to have an edge over comparible 105mm pieces (M101/M102) in everything except weight. They fire heavier shells further and with the capability of traversing 360 degress without being moved. 122mm was also chosen over 107mm for continued production after WWII (Great Patriotic War), but I don't know why.

 

I also note that 130mm guns were capable of outranging 155mm guns in Vietnam.

 

What was the justification of 180mm as an intermediate between 152mm and 203mm/210mm? Or did Soviets consider the 180mm their answer to 203mm?

 

These seem like Vasilly questions.

 

- John

Edited January 23, 2009 by Kensuke

[Marek Tucan]

What was the justification of 180mm as an intermediate between 152mm and 203mm/210mm?

 

180mm was a service Navy caliber and AFAIK the S-23 field gun was based on the naval pieces.

 

Same for 130mm - btw Soviets made also field guns (both war and post-war) in 122mm.

[Guest aevans]

How do you define "quality" when you say qualitative? NATO and the Warsaw Pact almost certainly had different technical and tactical objectives in mind designing artillery systems, and equally competent engineers. They probably each achieved what they were aiming at.

 

The US anw Wast Germans for example were pretty much converted to 155 mm SPs by the mid-1980s, in their mechanized units that were likely to fight with Warsaw Pact mechanized forces. That would make the 122 mm and 152 mm pieces of the motor rifle and tank divisions look not so big a deal, on a "size matters" basis.

 

The 130 mm guns that outranged 155 mm howitzers in Vietnam is no surprise. Guns are supposed to outrange howitzers. That's why the US deployed 175mm guns (M107) near the DMZ.

[Kensuke]

How do you define "quality" when you say qualitative? NATO and the Warsaw Pact almost certainly had different technical and tactical objectives in mind designing artillery systems, and equally competent engineers. They probably each achieved what they were aiming at.

 

Which is part of my question. What were they aiming at? In other words, what made Soviet's abandon 107mm in favor of 122mm, while NATO forces felt 105mm was adequate for light howitzers?

 

Qualitive meaning comparisons between a NATO system and its closest equivlent in Warsaw Pact armories.

 

- John

[lastdingo]

107mm? Wasn't that only a MRL caliber?

 

The Soviets continued a tradition that began before WWI with their calibers; they simply happened to have 122mm as light howitzer caliber when all others had 105mm (which was better for mountain guns at least).

 

The Soviets continued to consider their light field artillery as capable of self-defense against tanks (D-30 with HEAT), but were rather slow in regard to SPHs.

[nigelfe]

107mm for guns/hows was abandoned in 1941 when they started moving factories eastwards.

 

USSR were late developers of SPs, and they still had lots of towed guns. They retained lots of 122mm, towed and SP, when most of NATO had become mostly 155mm and SP. However, in the 1970s and 80s they significantly increased their quantity of artillery

[Chris Werb]

107mm? Wasn't that only a MRL caliber?

 

And mortar and recoilless gun.

[Old Tanker]

Are their any real good books on artillery ?

 

Everyone I've read are pictures and specs not the evolution of techniques. Artillery became very sophisticated during WWI as specific fire patterns were implemented and the telephone and spotter plane came into use.

 

Probably just the Western victors bragging but reading that Brit and American artillery functioned better than German and Russian is stated in various accounts I have read . As the Egyptians in 1973 lined up their artillery in the basic linear hub to hub formation learned from the SU and still in practice since the Napoleanic era. How about accuracy and tightness of patterns along with response times etc .

 

However the SU developed the Katyusha into a formidable system ahead of the Western Allies especially in the broad scope of use.

 

So what is a good read and not just nuts n' bolts of tech specs ?

[Marek Tucan]

Will abuse the artillery topis for a question re. field artillery organisation.

Basic patterns I have seen yet:

4-gun battery (2 platoonsx2)

6-gun battery (2 platoonsx3)

8-gun battery (2 platoonsx4)

 

US field manuals seems to suggest that current SOP is 8-gun battery. Likewise it seems that Russians use 6-gun units except heavy arty where 4-gun batteries are used. What about the others? Brits? Israel? France? Germany?

What about WW2?

[BansheeOne]

Eight per battery in the Bundeswehr.

[Colin]

Canadian reserves units are 4 gun batteries armed with 105mm C3 howitzers, not sure of the current Regular force arty batteries. We have also seized the 81mm mortar from the infantry and given it to the artillery, a bad move in my opinion.

 

The effectiveness of the gun can change from things that do not show up in the books, things like transitioning from aiming points and aiming posts to collimeters, better fire control computers in the command posts, which could update all the old fire missions to a new location, GPS, radar on the guns for M/V etc. Expect many of the older guns to get upgraded "smart" sights that will link them directly to the CP.

[Guest aevans]

Which is part of my question. What were they aiming at? In other words, what made Soviet's abandon 107mm in favor of 122mm, while NATO forces felt 105mm was adequate for light howitzers?

 

Why did the British stick with the Napoleonic French adopt the 8-pdr for divisional foot artillery when everybody else was still using the 6-pdr? Why did the British keep the 25-pdr (87.6 mm) when the US and Germans had settled on the 105 mm? They felt it met their requirements. Some committe of staff officers studies whatever information they have and comes up with a specification for a desired effect for a certain type of artillery gun, then the manufacturers submit their prototypes, the prototypes are tested, and a system is chosen. Or politics decide that a certain manufacturer/design bureau has the inside track and their submission just happens to be the one chosen.

 

Qualitive meaning comparisons between a NATO system and its closest equivlent in Warsaw Pact armories.

 

BUt what do you mean by quality? Different armies have different goals in mind, even for the same general class of artillery.

[Kensuke]

I have to agree with Old Tanker here. The available information on the development of artillery systems is somewhat wanting. I'll have to see if Tony has anything on his site.

 

Incidently, I did find out the reason why British and American arty functed better than German and Soviet in WWII, on a shell for shell basis, can be traced to the forward observer. The Brits and Yanks tended to give their forward observers radios, while the Germans and Soviets had to string telephone wire. The Yanks had a better edge because they had highly portable radios that utilized dry cell batteries, when the brits were still using wet cells carted around in trucks and the like. It's been said that the most dangerous land weapon in WWII was actually a American 2LT with a SCR-536, a good map, and some basic math skills. OTOH, theres a lot to be said with the CRAPLOAD of arty the Soviets had. What they lacked in precision, they certainly made up for in sheer crushing weight.

 

Andy,

 

I don't know any better way to phrase my question, so let's try this... What were, the major vices and virtues of say, the M101/102 105 vs. the D-30 122mm?

 

- John

[FALightFighter]

Will abuse the artillery topis for a question re. field artillery organisation.

Basic patterns I have seen yet:

4-gun battery (2 platoonsx2)

6-gun battery (2 platoonsx3)

8-gun battery (2 platoonsx4)

 

US field manuals seems to suggest that current SOP is 8-gun battery. Likewise it seems that Russians use 6-gun units except heavy arty where 4-gun batteries are used. What about the others? Brits? Israel? France? Germany?

What about WW2?

 

US 6-gun batteries in 105 units operated as a single platoon, with all 6 guns controlled by 1 FDC. The only 2 x 3 units I know of where the reduced Force XXI SP and 155T batteries.

 

Current US practice is that BCT fires battalions (what we used to call DS, but are now organic to BCTs) are 2 batteries of 2 platoons of 4 guns, except the SBCTs, which remain 3 batteries of 6 guns. I don't think the SBCTs have 3 gun platoons. FA BDE fires battalions (what we used to call GS) are 3 batteries of 6 guns, and I'm pretty sure that they don't have platoons, but rather a single FDC.

[Kensuke]

Tuccy,

 

US Army organization is six towed guns in a battery, or eight SP guns or MLRS (I think) in a battery. I believe USMC is similar (except they don't have SP guns of course).

 

Colin,

 

Transferring mortars out of maneuver units and into the artillery units is genuinely stupid. It's been done before, but only in cases where there aren't enough howitzers to fully equip the arty batteries. The Finns did it in the Winter War I believe, and the Russians did it really early on in WWII. Either Canadian Reserves are hurting for tubes, or they're just plain dumb.

 

- John

[Guest aevans]

Incidently, I did find out the reason why British and American arty functed better than German and Soviet in WWII, on a shell for shell basis, can be traced to the forward observer. The Brits and Yanks tended to give their forward observers radios, while the Germans and Soviets had to string telephone wire.

 

That depends greatly on what you mean by "observer". Observer means different things at different times. In the US and (later) British system, the observer was routinely decoupled from the firing agency, being a liasion officer assigned from the artillery battalion. Using a radio to talk to the firing agency made sense, and allowed more flexibility in which firing agency one could talk to. In the German, Russian, and (in the beginning) British systems, the observer was the battery commander, talking directly to his own unit. But the Germans and Russians also had parallel artillery command structures, with their own fire direction capabilities and observers equipped with radios, or direct wires to the artillery HQ. A German corps ARKO (artillery commander), for example, was an officer assigned from GHQ, empowered and given the resources to command every battery of artillery in the corps, subordinate only to the direction of the corps commander and chief of staff.

 

BTW, the idea that an infantry platoon leader with a walkie-talkie could be an artillery observer is a bit overdone. Yes, he could call a mission up his chain of command and the battalion artillery liaison might transmit his mission to a battery or battalion for execution. But it's just as likely that the aritllery liaison might move to put himself in a position to observe for himself before doing anything, and take over the mission. It was even more likely that the mission would be handed off to battalion mortars, or the platoon commander be told to handle his own problems, can't you see we're busy?

 

Company commanders could usually at least get a hearing, and the battalion would probably fire his requests for preplotted concentrations or impromtu missions if he was the only thing going at the moment.

 

In any case, large concentrations of the most-dangerous-weapon-is-a-lieutenant-with-a-radio type would generally only be fired under the direct observation of the artillery liaison officer, not on the sayso of a frontline in extremis observer.

 

I don't know any better way to phrase my question, so let's try this... What were, the major vices and virtues of say, the M101/102 105 vs. the D-30 122mm?

 

Not tryingto be obstinate here, just trying to illustrate a point -- what is your standard for comparison? What may be a virtue to me may be a vice to somebody else. For example, a 122 mm shell may have a slightly larger casualty producing radius than a 105 mm, but the 105 mm operator may think that that is overkill for the size of the intended impact area, while the 122 mm operator may think that he is just making sure.

[Mote]

Are their any real good books on artillery ?

 

Everyone I've read are pictures and specs not the evolution of techniques. Artillery became very sophisticated during WWI as specific fire patterns were implemented and the telephone and spotter plane came into use.

 

Probably just the Western victors bragging but reading that Brit and American artillery functioned better than German and Russian is stated in various accounts I have read . As the Egyptians in 1973 lined up their artillery in the basic linear hub to hub formation learned from the SU and still in practice since the Napoleanic era. How about accuracy and tightness of patterns along with response times etc .

 

However the SU developed the Katyusha into a formidable system ahead of the Western Allies especially in the broad scope of use.

 

So what is a good read and not just nuts n' bolts of tech specs ?

 

Field Artillery and Firepower

[Guest aevans]

Field Artillery and Firepower

 

Good, good book. I have a copy myself. But it's too broad a survey, I think, to answer the question posed.

[FALightFighter]

Tuccy,

US Army organization is six towed guns in a battery, or eight SP guns or MLRS (I think) in a battery. I believe USMC is similar (except they don't have SP guns of course).

...

- John

 

John,

 

See my post- your description is too general (towed GS 155s are and were organized like SPs) and outdated (even your description is pre-modularity, which is now 4-5 years old, with only a couple of BDEs not converted to BCTs.

 

MLRS was 3 platoons of 3 launchers per battery, last BN (IIRC) converting to 2 platoons of 3 launchers in 2001. There were some ad hocceries with only 2 batteries in a BN (plus a TA battery with firefinder radars) in some divisional MLRS BNs, I'm not sure which ones, some had a third ARNG battery, lots of interesting things. With modularity, all MLRS BNs should be in Fires BDEs (I'm sure someone will point out an exceptional ARNG unit that has a different state COC, or has not converted yet), and should (again, with caveats) be 3 batteries of 2 platoons of 3 launchers each.

[FirstOfFoot]

That depends greatly on what you mean by "observer". Observer means different things at different times. In the US and (later) British system, the observer was routinely decoupled from the firing agency, being a liasion officer assigned from the artillery battalion. Using a radio to talk to the firing agency made sense, and allowed more flexibility in which firing agency one could talk to. In the German, Russian, and (in the beginning) British systems, the observer was the battery commander, talking directly to his own unit.

 

Errr... that's "system 1" and "system 2", as I understand it (or vice versa, not being a Gunner). As far back as WW2, the British fire control has functioned in the second method you described. Namely, the Battery Commander is the Battalion Commander's artillery adviser - he stands next to him in the fight, and commands the fire of his own battery (and controls all the others allocated to the task). Similarly, the Arty Regt CO is the Brigade Comd's Arty adviser; and the FOO at company level is a Lt or Capt from the supporting battery.

 

The communications may have changed, the system hasn't.

Edited January 24, 2009 by FirstOfFoot

[shep854]

Well, when it's said that the "most dangerous weapon" is a 2LT with a map, etc, the inference is the danger to the LT's own side !* That's why platoon sergeants were created...

 

*Check around; the statement is usually made by sergeants.

Edited January 24, 2009 by shep854

[CrossedSabres]

US 6-gun batteries in 105 units operated as a single platoon, with all 6 guns controlled by 1 FDC. The only 2 x 3 units I know of where the reduced Force XXI SP and 155T batteries.

 

Current US practice is that BCT fires battalions (what we used to call DS, but are now organic to BCTs) are 2 batteries of 2 platoons of 4 guns, except the SBCTs, which remain 3 batteries of 6 guns. I don't think the SBCTs have 3 gun platoons. FA BDE fires battalions (what we used to call GS) are 3 batteries of 6 guns, and I'm pretty sure that they don't have platoons, but rather a single FDC.

 

To expand a bit on FALightFighter's comments (he's correct, after all) -

When they were 6-gun SP batteries, some in practice used one 577 track as the FDC, and the other as a BOC (Battery Operations Center), so even if the TOE had two platoons of 3 guns each, it functioned as one platoon for Fire Control...

 

So, SP Batteries are now 8 guns each (in the BCTs), and that is how they were in the 80's, before the Army of Excellence designs (IIRC).

When I was in, I always made a point, whenever I happened to meet an 13E (Fire Direction) NCO, to ask how operations were back when SP batteries had 8 guns, if it was any more difficult than with 6.

There were unanimous that 8 wasn't any more difficult than with 6 - if you can run 3 guns you can run 4, and if you can run 6 in a battery, you can run 8.

 

Might as well have 8, then. (Especially considering how much "overhead" is in the HowBat TOE...)

[nigelfe]

You can find a lot of detail about the WW2 British arty system on my site, start at the Key Characteristics page http://members.tripod.com/~nigelef/keychars.htm for a list summary points, it links to the detail.

 

The main point is that the guys forward gave fire orders, they did not request fire. The thinking was and is that the guy at the front knows the situation and is therefore best placed to make the decisions.

 

This is the key difference with the traditional US request system (as FirstOfFoot correctly pointed out System 1 and System 2, terms which originated in the 1965 QSTAG and I think went into the later STANAG). This forward control stemmed from the pre-1914 doctrine that the battery commander was responsible for the tactical fire control of his battery and applied some other key lessons of WW1, notably that arty comds must always locate with the supported arm (ie avoid arty HQs on their ownsome with tac fire control). In 1938 they introduced troop comds in each battery who became the primary observers collocated with coys/sqns. Previously the BC often appointed one of his officers as an observing officer acting on his behalf with his authority, this was very common in WW1 and permitted by pre-1914 doctrine.

 

Contrary to what some of our American friends often think these (BCs and TCs) are not 'Liaison Officers', although liaison is one of their functions, they are commanders. This highlights an interesting point. UK has never recognised 'unity of command' as a principle of war (unity of effort is a different matter, and what's really important), this means they don't get into difficulties with one arty comd giving orders to units under another, control of fire is considered a control not a command matter. For impromptu fire all btys are considered to be 'in support' of anyone in range, no matter what command they're under.

 

When effective methods for concentrating multi-unit fire were introduced in 1942 the roles of 'authorised observer' and 'commander's representative' were created, these were authorised to order fire against impromptu targets using large numbers of batteries. Non authorised observers could always request fire but the arty comds job was to ensure authorised observers were where they were likely to be needed (and any arty observer could be authorised as needed), HF radios with longer range were better in these circumstances than shorter range VHF.

 

Of course non-impromptu fire ('programmed shoots') were a different matter and much more top down planning (but not totally top down, small scale programme shoot plans were be created by BCs and TCs).

 

My understanding of the Soviet system is that they were and are proponents of forward control, battery and arty battn comds establish 'Command Observation Posts'. However, their WW2 limitations (don't know about now) were an inability to concentrate more impromptu fire against a target other than by liaison with another battn's COP and inability to modify planned fire once it started or coordinate it with moving forces. I'm also very unclear about how COPs related to the supported unit.

 

I think WW2 Germany also tended to forward control, the short lived 18 Arty Div on the E Front used LtCols forward in armoured vehicles to order fire to the division. However, I've now idea what arrangements were for impromptu fire in normal divisions. But have somewhere come across mention of the need for higher authority approval to fire high charges (presumably to manage barrel wear), of course high charges probably wouldn't be needed for normal impromtu targets.

Edited January 25, 2009 by nigelfe

[Guest aevans]

The main point is that the guys forward gave fire orders, they did not request fire. The thinking was and is that the guy at the front knows the situation and is therefore best placed to make the decisions.

 

What a ridiculous notion. A lieutenant or captain in one terrain compartment shoots all of the division's artillery at a company probe, preempting the guy over the next hill from using the artillery on brigaed sized attack. Brilliant.

 

UK has never recognised 'unity of command' as a principle of war (unity of effort is a different matter, and what's really important), this means they don't get into difficulties with one arty comd giving orders to units under another...

 

"Unity of command" is just a strong version of "maintenance of aim", and incorporates unity of effort. And US observers don't "get into difficulties". They get the resources their target merrits, given the current situation.

[Guest aevans]

Good, good book. I have a copy myself. But it's too broad a survey, I think, to answer the question posed.

 

Hey, a plausible answer is in Bailey, but you have to read several sections and put two and two together. In WW2, the Soviets expected artillery to provide a destructive effect. The Western Allies, on the other hand, saw artillery as a means of providing a suppressive effect. Carry that forward into the Cold War, and the big tactical concern over ATGMs just reinforced for the Soviets that destructive fires were required, so they bought-in to heavier guns for "light" filed artillery. NATO got religion on this score in the 1960s and started deploying 155 mm SP guns in their mechanized forces. (Though the Brits stuck with the 105 mm Abbot SP until the '90s.) The 105 mm became the gun for light infantry divisions that would be deployed in places the Soviet mechanized forces weren't likely to go in large numbers -- mountains, Norway, and the Balkans, mostly.

 

So the actual comparable pieces are the D30/2S1 122mm vs the M109 155 mm.