The new strategy of Iraqi Shias

[crazyinsane105]

The Mahdi Army: New Tactics for a New Stage

 

By Fadhil Ali

Iraqi radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has issued a statement describing a new strategy for attacking Coalition forces (alkufanews.com, June 13). The statement follows a year of intense military pressure against his Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and a series of confusing and sometimes contradictory decisions. The hard-line cleric, who has not been seen in public for months, issued orders to reorganize his militia into a civilian branch and a small but select armed wing commissioned to fight Coalition forces. Only three months earlier al-Sadr had announced his retirement and admitted failure in his efforts at “liberating Iraq” (see Terrorism Monitor, May 1).

 

Muqtada’s statement was proclaimed in the mosques by his aides during the weekly prayer of his followers on Friday, June 13 (almanar.com, June 13). A written copy—signed the previous day—was published on a pro-Sadr web site: “Everyone knows that we will not abandon the resistance against the occupiers until liberation or death, but you individuals in Jaysh al-Mahdi should know, and this is an obligation on you, that the resistance will be restricted to a group which will be authorized by a written statement by me soon. Those will be people with experience, management, awareness and sacrifice. They would have a prior permission—firstly from the religious ruler through their appointed command and secondly from the supreme command—through secret and private structures. Hereby weapons will be only for them and they will direct the weapons to the occupiers only, every other usage of weapons will be prohibited. The other part of Jaysh al-Mahdi with its thousands and millions will struggle against western secular ideology and emancipate the heart and minds from domination and globalization. They will be under a cultural, religious and social title and will be prohibited from carrying and using weapons…” (alkufanews.com, June 13).

 

Since the foundation of the militia shortly after the invasion in 2003, the fighters of JAM have not hesitated to fight in large formations and initiate confrontations in their strongholds. They were involved in severe clashes with the U.S. military in major uprisings inside the poor Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad and southern Iraq in 2003 and 2004. The fighting against Iraqi forces in Basra last March provided a clear example of JAM tactics. JAM also has the ability to recruit thousands when necessary and sometimes shows them in military parades. Until the government intensified its crackdown against JAM starting in late 2007, Iraqi Sunnis were complaining of JAM’s coordination with Iraqi security forces to commit acts of sectarian violence. As part of the al-Sadr movement, JAM was a popular organization rather than a secret one, with regional offices in every Shiite neighborhood. These features are about to change in Muqtada’s reorganization.

 

The announcement of the new strategy came after JAM suffered successive setbacks in the continuing crackdown by the Iraqi government, but al-Sadr had also launched a protest movement against the security pact now under negotiation between the American administration and the Iraqi government. Al-Sadr called his followers to rally against the agreement, which aims to legalize and organize the American military existence in Iraq after its UN mandate ends in 2008. Al-Sadr called on Iraqis to “protest against the deal every week after the Friday prayer until the agreement is called off.” He announced in a statement that the protests will continue until the government agrees to hold a public referendum on the American military existence in Iraq. In response to his call, thousands of al-Sadr’s followers marched in Baghdad, Basra and other parts of southern Iraq protesting the long-term security agreement. American flags and an effigy of Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki were burned (al-Jazeera, May 31).

 

New Tactics for a New Stage

 

Dr. Asma’a al-Mossawi, a senior member of al-Sadr’s political movement, explained the link between the new tactics and the U.S.-Iraqi security pact. In an interview one day after al-Sadr announced the new plan she said:

 

"It is not a reaction—Muqtada’s new order—but a new strategy to deal with the current situation in Iraq considering the pressures that will lead to the signing of the security agreement with the American forces without the approval of the Iraqi people… We believe that in the coming period of time there will be new moves against the American forces. During the last five years there were painful operations against them while they were among the Iraqi people. [in] the next period the American forces will be in their bases—this requires preparing a trained force from al-Mahdi Army, a force that should be experienced and works secretly guided by intelligence information to execute tasks quickly and return."

 

Dr. Mossawi did not rule out coordination between other insurgent groups and the new JAM military wing which will be chosen and led by Muqtada (Asharq al-Awsat, June 14).

 

A Way around the Ban

 

In a sign that they insist on having their own militia, the followers of al-Sadr announced that they would not participate in the regional election that is supposed to be held later this year, but they would support other candidates: “We will not contest [the election] as an independent party but we will coordinate with other parties that serve the same national goals… it will be impossible to bar us from the election, we have plenty of options on how to participate.” The Sadrists have been negotiating lately with former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari, who was expelled from the Dawa Party of current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki after forming his own National Reform Movement. The Sadrists went further and said that they might even support their old opponent, former secular Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in the upcoming poll (al-Hayat, June 16). Last April Nuri al-Maliki offered the Sadrists the choice of disbanding their militia or being denied participation in the election and political life (see Terrorism Monitor, May 1).

 

The Beginning of the Campaign

 

It seems that the propaganda campaign of al-Sadr has started in the province of Babil, south of Baghdad, where leaflets are distributed daily urging people to store weapons and fight the U.S. army. The local police believe that in addition to JAM other insurgent groups are involved. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party and the extremist Shiite cult of the “Soldiers of Heaven” are among the suspect groups (see Terrorism Monitor, February 22). The leaflets carry slogans like: “The national resistance is the only choice for the Iraqi people to drive out the occupiers and their agents.” They also urge people to store ammunition, follow what is published on the internet about “the armed Iraqi revolution” and get ready for the zero-hour (al-Hayat, June 23).

 

Babil province is one of the areas where the Iraqi forces have not yet launched any major operation against the JAM. Shiites are the majority there, except in the northern part adjacent to Baghdad where there is a concentration of Sunnis. The Sadr movement has grown further from the governing Shiite coalition and looks more open to coordinate with non-sectarian parties. Many former members of the pro-Saddam Fidayeen militia are believed to have infiltrated JAM after the fall of Saddam, providing the possibility of coordination against the common enemy, the Iraqi government.

 

Conclusion

 

Iran and many Iraqi Shiites, especially Ayatollah Kadhum al-Ha’iri—an influential pro-Iran cleric and patron of al-Sadr—have condemned the prospective security deal between Washington and Baghdad (iraqshabab.net, May 21; see also Terrorism Focus, June 18). Al-Sadr and his followers will most likely concentrate their efforts against any kind of U.S.-Iraq agreement; after a year of setbacks they will try to gain a new momentum based on the legitimacy of the support of senior Shiite clerics. In this way and by claiming to restrict their attacks on the Coalition forces only they will try to gain national support. To succeed, the long-term security deal must be handled by both the American and Iraqi governments carefully and not overshadow the recent security progress in Iraq. With the Kurds supporting the agreement and the Sunnis saying it is necessary, the big mission is to convince the Shiite majority. Unlike Iranian religious leaders, influential Iraqi Shiite clerics like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have not put a veto on the deal in principle. After meeting al-Sistani, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), said that the Grand Ayatollah indicated that the agreement should consider four points:

 

1. Recognition of the national sovereignty of Iraq

2. Transparency

3. The formation of a national consensus

4. Ratification by the Iraqi parliament (Elaph.com, June 4).

 

Sistani’s blessing for any major political deal has become a must in post-war Iraq, let alone a situation like the current one where Iran and many leading Shiite clerics are openly against the agreement. Sistani’s position appears to be negotiable, but the parties involved will need to work to gain his approval. On the other hand, August 22 will mark the renewal date for al-Sadr’s six-month suspension of JAM’s military activities. This might provide a suitable benchmark for al-Sadr and his reorganized JAM to launch a new page of the insurgency.

 

http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/ar...ticleid=2374267

 

 

 

And here's another article:

 

Iraq’s Shia Reject Direction of U.S.-Iraqi Negotiations on Security Pact

 

By Babak Rahimi

The news of the security pact currently under negotiation by Baghdad and Washington that would allow the U.S. forces to stay in the country beyond the expiry of the UN mandate in December 2008 has generated swift reaction from Shia Iraqis (al-Jazeera, June 5). The Shia factions, who maintain the largest electoral body in post-Baathist Iraq, have strongly rejected the deal. The pact is seen by some Shia as a major threat to the country’s sovereignty, and has even been described as a form of “modern slavery” that will introduce the country to a new era of colonialism (Iran News, June 10).

 

With respect to the Shia leadership, the reaction has been a unified one. The reclusive Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most revered cleric in the Shia world, released a statement declaring that so long as he is alive, he will not allow the pact to be signed by the Iraqi government (Fars, June 8). As a stern warning to Washington, Sistani’s statement is reminiscent of the time when he urged his followers to rise up against U.S. involvement in the transfer of power in the form of council-based elections in 2003. Ayatollah Sadiq Husseini Shirazi, another prominent Shia cleric, described the security pact as a way to dominate the Muslim nation of Iraq and deprive Iraqis of their national right to self-rule (Fars, June 8). Shirazi’s statement stems from a religious-nationalist conviction that Washington aims to undermine the country’s religious identity by keeping Iraq dependent on U.S. power. Abdulstar Albtat, a representative of Muqtada al-Sadr, and Jalal al-din al-Saqir, a representative of Abdul Aziz Hakim’s Iraqi Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), rearticulated the Shia opposition to the security deal. Both representatives described the plan to build 50 U.S. military bases in Iraq as an illegal attempt to deprive the country of its sovereignty (Fars, June 8).

 

Tehran is in lockstep with Shia Iraqis on this issue. During an important official state meeting between Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran denounced the pact and demanded Iraqi elected officials resist U.S. domination (Etelaat, June 9). In a speech at Qom, Ali Larijani, the newly elected speaker of the Iranian parliament, provided an alternative security plan for Baghdad—the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq (IRNA, June 5). With the recently signed military pact between Baghdad and Tehran enhancing cooperation between the two nation’s militaries (IRNA, June 9), the Shia-dominated Maliki government has, in return, promised Tehran that it will not allow any U.S. attacks on Iran from Iraqi territories (Fars, June 8).

 

Although the fate of the U.S.-Iraqi security pact remains uncertain, a security deal that would include the possible creation of long-term U.S. military bases in Iraq will certainly generate anger among most Shias. The first and obvious reason behind this is Iraqi nationalism. With a long history of foreign intervention, Iraqis, especially Shia, are prone to see a prolonged U.S. presence in the country as an act of occupation. The second reason is strategic: With Shia factions now vying for power ahead of local elections in October, the news of the deal has provided groups such as the largely Shia Fadhila (Islamic Virtue) Party in Basra and the Sadrists in Baghdad with new ammunition to oppose the U.S. forces and, hence, enhance their legitimacy in the Shia community.

 

In light of the internal division between Iraqi Shia groups, the long-term presence of U.S. troops in Iraq may involve serious consequences for the security of a country that is still politically unstable. The most important institution to play a crucial role in opposing such a deal will be the Shia clerical establishment in Najaf. Ayatollah Sistani has largely kept aloof from politics since the Samara bombing of 2006. If the deal goes through, the Grand Ayatollah will most certainly oppose it, sparking major uprisings in the southern regions with the potential of spreading throughout the country. In an interview, Sistani’s son, Muhammad Reza Sistani, warned that the possibility of an extended presence of U.S. troops in Iraq will not only be rejected by his father but will force him to call the faithful to rise up against the Americans. Such a warning is reminiscent of Ayatollah Khomeini’s call for mass revolt when the Shah of Iran signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Washington in 1964. The statement by Khomeini eventually contributed to the 1979 Iranian revolution, which led to the toppling of the Pahlavi dynasty. How Washington handles the terms of the security pact in the coming months will be crucial not only for the future of Iraq’s security, but also for how Shia politics will evolve in the upcoming elections.

[lastdingo]

The security agreement is either the dumbest idea or the most brilliant idea ever of the State Dept.

 

It's the dumbest idea ever if it shall be signed.

 

It's the most brilliant idea ever if it's intended to create an opportunity for the Iraqi government to emancipate from the U.S. masters and gain legitimation among Iraqis.

[crazyinsane105]

The security agreement is either the dumbest idea or the most brilliant idea ever of the State Dept.

 

It's the dumbest idea ever if it shall be signed.

 

It's the most brilliant idea ever if it's intended to create an opportunity for the Iraqi government to emancipate from the U.S. masters and gain legitimation among Iraqis.

 

Agreed with your first part.

 

For the second part, what in the world was the whole reason for the Iraq war? We simply shifted power from the Iraqi Sunnis (the natural counterweight to the Iranians) to gung ho pro-Iranian parties and militias. And this cost us over 4000 US soldiers and nearly a trillion dollars so far, and all this just so some government we think is pro-American (when they really aren't) can be legit in the eyes of Iraqis (who aren't fond of us).

[m1a1mg]

Agreed with your first part.

 

For the second part, what in the world was the whole reason for the Iraq war? We simply shifted power from the Iraqi Sunnis (the natural counterweight to the Iranians) to gung ho pro-Iranian parties and militias. And this cost us over 4000 US soldiers and nearly a trillion dollars so far, and all this just so some government we think is pro-American (when they really aren't) can be legit in the eyes of Iraqis (who aren't fond of us)....while simultaneously allowing us to take our eyes off the fight we were beginning to win in Afghanistan and additionally stopping us from fighting the true threat, the Pakistanis.

There, helped you.

 

I know quite a few folks in that AO. I'm not looking forward to the news releases. God bless their souls.

Edited July 15, 2008 by m1a1mg

[Colin]

Actually I think the Iraqis are far more fond of the US than most people think, but after generations of terror being inflicted on them, they are shy of saying so. Even so many iraqis prefer the US military to their own government as they know the US soldiers are as fair as can be and decent folk.

[crazyinsane105]

There, helped you.

 

I know quite a few folks in that AO. I'm not looking forward to the news releases. God bless their souls.

 

Don't really see how the Pakistanis were much of a threat when Musharraf was in power, but yes, the US was by no doubt winning the Afghan war early on until the invasion of Iraq. Plus as for going against Pakistan...kinda hard when that country is the absolute sole provider of 80% of logistical services to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Push that country far enough and within days US forces will have no fuel for their vehicles and just be sitting ducks for the Taliban. The fight against the Taliban is pointless now. Back in 2001 the Taliban were pretty much done for, they've made a comeback not because of Pakistan's ISI but because of NATO and US incompetence.

[m1a1mg]

Don't really see how the Pakistanis were much of a threat when Musharraf was in power, but yes, the US was by no doubt winning the Afghan war early on until the invasion of Iraq. Plus as for going against Pakistan...kinda hard when that country is the absolute sole provider of 80% of logistical services to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Push that country far enough and within days US forces will have no fuel for their vehicles and just be sitting ducks for the Taliban. The fight against the Taliban is pointless now. Back in 2001 the Taliban were pretty much done for, they've made a comeback not because of Pakistan's ISI but because of NATO and US incompetence.

You're welcome to your opinion, but if you believe Mushi, or anyone else in the Pakistani government, has control over Waziristan, you are badly mistaken.

[crazyinsane105]

Actually I think the Iraqis are far more fond of the US than most people think, but after generations of terror being inflicted on them, they are shy of saying so. Even so many iraqis prefer the US military to their own government as they know the US soldiers are as fair as can be and decent folk.

 

I have to disagree. The US came into Iraq promising freedom, democracy, etc. and all in return the Iraqis got bombed pretty badly and their standard of living was thrown down ever more. Granted they faced the same persecution under Saddam, but when was the last time Saddam promised Iraqis the same thing the US had been promising, especially the Iraqi Shias? When democracy comes with its hands dabbed in blood, its hard to take it very seriously. Sure the average American soldier is most likely far nicer than the average Republican Guard commando, but Saddam's guys just killed anybody opposed to him where as the US went around saying it could change the condition of the Iraqi people. I think that is the difference.

[m1a1mg]

Some light reading for you: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/world/asia/15isi.html

[crazyinsane105]

You're welcome to your opinion, but if you believe Mushi, or anyone else in the Pakistani government, has control over Waziristan, you are badly mistaken.

 

Waziristan is one lawless piece of Pakistan I admit, but do you honestly think that the entire Afghan insurgency is based in that territory? Or in FATA for that matter? Why not start by cutting off the funding of the Taliban, which comes heavily by opium? Most people in the tribal belt only help the Taliban because they are given money to do so. Don't believe me? When the Soviets installed bases and fortifications all over the Afghan-Pakistan border, the only way these bases survived was because the local Pashtuns traded with the Soviets-this has been reported by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence. Cut off the Taliban's money supply, and you'll see a massive drop in support from many people across the Pakistani border. The Taliban don't get arms, men, and shelter for free just because their Pashtun brothers want to see them victorious in Afghanistan. When the opium production started to soar in Afghanistan and when the Taliban finally decided to use this money, THAT'S when things started to get hairy for NATO.

[DaveDash]

I have to disagree. The US came into Iraq promising freedom, democracy, etc. and all in return the Iraqis got bombed pretty badly and their standard of living was thrown down ever more.

 

You're talking about 1991 right? That U.N sanctioned war where most of the west bombed Iraq back into the stone age as not to risk 'casualties', then promoted a failed coup without any support, and pretty much packed up, left, and made sure the country couldnt eat properly for the next 12 years?

 

Because if you're talking about 2003+... that's remarkably different.

Edited July 16, 2008 by DaveDash