Panzerfausts at Wofheze.

[Von Richter]

Do you think that soldiers in training sixty miles behind the lines would carry Panzefausts?

Battalion Krafft stopped the Airborne Recce's 'race to the bridge' on the afternoon of the 17th in a well placed ambush. There are no accounts of them letting fly with any short range anti-tank weapons, although they had at least one flamethrower with them. The reason I ask, is that even just a couple of the Airborne's light tanks would have made short work of the Jerry ambush, and opened up the way to the bridge

[Marek Tucan]

I thought KG Krafft was engaged near to the landin zones, not actually on the routes to Arnhem but slowing down organised departure from the zones?

 

Anyway, IMHO even few Tetrarchs would be grat for the initial push as the heaviest armor Paras faced in the early operations were some halftracks and light armored cars that were able to block Paras as mobile pillboxes. 2pdr or 3in howitzer would tear them apart.

[DougRichards]

Any FLaK units nearby? German 20mm and 37mm FLaK guns should have been able to deal with Tetrachs' light armour, specially if using some of that AP ammunition that most German FLaK guns were meant to have handy.

[Marek Tucan]

AFAIK no flak enroute to Arnhem, then on the Southern end of the bridge IIRC a pair of 20s but abandoned.

[Chris Werb]

Any FLaK units nearby? German 20mm and 37mm FLaK guns should have been able to deal with Tetrachs' light armour, specially if using some of that AP ammunition that most German FLaK guns were meant to have handy.

 

Would they have AP if they were well behind the front line?

[DougRichards]

Would they have AP if they were well behind the front line?

Even the 12.8cm on Flaktowers had an allocation of AP if some sources are to be believed.

[DougRichards]

I thought KG Krafft was engaged near to the landin zones, not actually on the routes to Arnhem but slowing down organised departure from the zones?

 

Anyway, IMHO even few Tetrarchs would be grat for the initial push as the heaviest armor Paras faced in the early operations were some halftracks and light armored cars that were able to block Paras as mobile pillboxes. 2pdr or 3in howitzer would tear them apart.

 

Light armoured cars? SdKfz222? With 20mm guns? 24mm penetration at 500 yards, against a Tetrach's max armour of 16mm?

 

The Tetrach's minimum armour was 4mm, which was not capable of keeping out a sustained burst of 7.92mm from an MG34 or MG42. In an ambush situation with German troops holding heir fire until the light tanks were in the kill zone a couple of MGs firing into the rear of a Tetrach would be very effective.

Edited June 29, 2008 by DougRichards

[Marek Tucan]

Even the 12.8cm on Flaktowers had an allocation of AP if some sources are to be believed.

 

But was that allocation filled when they were in deep rear?

[Marek Tucan]

Light armoured cars? SdKfz222? With 20mm guns? 24mm penetration at 500 yards, against a Tetrach's max armour of 16mm?

A tad worse compared to 2pdr 47mm @500yards against 15mm. And for sure at those 500 yards beats PIAT

[DougRichards]

A tad worse compared to 2pdr 47mm @500yards against 15mm. And for sure at those 500 yards beats PIAT

I agree with the 2pdr penetration figures, my point was that the SdKfz222 had a weapon, a machine cannon capable of rapid fire - rapid adjustment if the first round missed - capable of stopping a Tetrach. The Tetrach's weapons could certainly destroy a 222, but if first had to locate it, which would be hard in an ambush situation, then get off the first shot, which if missed would take longer to reload than the 222's weapon.

 

The Tetrach, in an ambush, would also be forced into buttoning up, which would also mean that finding a light amoured car, and firing, would be more difficult.

[Von Richter]

When Major Gough's Recce Squadron got lumbered with the coup-de-main job, racing to the bridge from the landing zones, he tried to get a Troop of tanks. He knew full well how vulnerable his jeeps were even to slight opposition. His request was turned down and they went with what they'd got. As it turned out Krafft's mob, a skirmish line really, had no big problem stopping the 'dash for the bridge' in it's tracks.

Always wondered iffen a couple of tanks had come trundling from the treeline wether the Jerry's would have legged it quicker that they did on that Sunday afternoon?

[Marek Tucan]

I agree with the 2pdr penetration figures, my point was that the SdKfz222 had a weapon, a machine cannon capable of rapid fire - rapid adjustment if the first round missed - capable of stopping a Tetrach. The Tetrach's weapons could certainly destroy a 222, but if first had to locate it, which would be hard in an ambush situation, then get off the first shot, which if missed would take longer to reload than the 222's weapon.

 

The Tetrach, in an ambush, would also be forced into buttoning up, which would also mean that finding a light amoured car, and firing, would be more difficult.

 

The Tetrarch would be supporting either Gough's jeeps or infantry, who will be able to sniff out ambushes and point tank's crew to their targets. Moreover German "ambushes" enroute to Arnhem were, to my understanding, rather meeting angagements of infantry+very light armor vs. infantry+no armor. In such a situation, having armor vastly beats not having it.

 

As for the vulnerability, Shermans were also vulnerable to almost every German tank or ATG in 1944, yet I hope you aren't suggesting they were worthless

[BillB]

When Major Gough's Recce Squadron got lumbered with the coup-de-main job, racing to the bridge from the landing zones, he tried to get a Troop of tanks. He knew full well how vulnerable his jeeps were even to slight opposition. His request was turned down and they went with what they'd got. As it turned out Krafft's mob, a skirmish line really, had no big problem stopping the 'dash for the bridge' in it's tracks.

Always wondered iffen a couple of tanks had come trundling from the treeline wether the Jerry's would have legged it quicker that they did on that Sunday afternoon?

I wasn't aware that the Jerrys had legged it on that Sunday afternoon mate, I think that was the problem. A couple of points. First, I think Gough's moaning about the vulnerability of his Jeeps and looking for tanks had more to do with him trying to get out of a mission he didn't want, and I don't think his position holds water. The SAS did all sorts of junketing about in Jeeps all on their own in France before D-Day and ranged a lot further after it, and they got on okay without a parachute brigade as back up. The coup de main failed for two reasons. First, Gough and his men simply took far too long getting their act together on the LZ. They didn't move off from their FUP until two full hours after landing, and were the last unit to get moving in the whole first lift. If they'd moved with the urgency the situation and mission warranted they'd have been past the ambush site before Krafft's men got there [Like the way you've switched from describing the latter as a "well placed ambush" in your first post to the more accurate running into a skirmish line, Von... ]

 

Second, Gough's men simply abandoned the coup de main mission at the first opportunity. The lead section of two Jeeps were shot up and all nine occupants killerd or captured at c.15:45. Thereafter IIRC there was no serious attempt to locate the enemy ambush position never mind outflank/bypass it, which is a bit remiss for recce troops and especially for blokes who were supposed to be going hell-for-leather to secure a vital objective. An inconclusive firefight broke out when some of the recce troops went forward to investigate the shot up vehicles on foot, Gough was recalled to see Urquhart at c.16:30, and his men seem to have simply hung around in place for another two hours or so before retiring to the LZ for fresh orders at c.18:30.

 

With ref to the Tetrarchs, at first I thought they lacked the lift capability but it looks like the requisite Hamilcars and Halifax tugs could have been found; Hamilcar stocks were replenished to pre D-Day levels with 64 available and there appears to have been sufficient Halifax tugs too, given that the some were used to tow Horsas on 17 September. Problem is where the Tetrarchs were to come from. The 6th AARR was the only unit of its kind. It didn't leave Nomandy until 4-5 September, was not fully concentrated again until the second week of the month, and after three months in the line was in no fit state to participate in MARKET; unfortunatley I've not managed to pin down how many vehicles if any they brought out with them. I'm also not sure that any Tetrarchs were available, given that the 6th AARR was partially re-equipped with Cromwells while still in Normandy, and in the post-Normandy reorganisation the Tetrarchs were replaced with Locusts. Finally, a factor that no one seems to question is whether Gough's men could have seized and held the bridge if they'd got there as they were supposed to, with or without Tetrarchs. If the para battalions had moved at the same speed then in addition to the fixed defences that required an AT gun and flamethrowers to quell IIRC Gough would also have soon been up against Haupsturmfuhrer Grabner and the bulk of SS Panzer Aufklarungs Abteilung 9 and prolly other elements like SS Panzer Pionier Abteilung 9 who reached the area in the late afternoon/early evening. I think the coup-de-main force would have been up against it at that rate, with or without a troop of Tetrarchs

 

The fatal factors at Arnhem were the 1st Para Brigade's poor and arguably unworkable plan, its tardy execution and the speed of the German response (that said, it is frequently overlooked that the 1st Para Brigade did actually secure the bridge with a few more troops than were assigned by the plan, and they managed to hold it for as long as assigned too). Nonetheless, I don't really see how adding a handful of Tetrarchs into the mix would have made a sufficiently significant difference to any of that.

 

BillB

[jakec]

Agreed. Good for a 'what-if?' wargame though...

[Marek Tucan]

I'd agree that Tetrarchs would be of little use for Gough's group, but they might be crucial in supporting the infantry advance.

Edited July 1, 2008 by Tuccy

[BillB]

I'd agree that Tetrarchs would be of little use for Gough's group, but they might be crucial in supporting the infantry advance.

Well Tuccy, I don't really see why that would be the case if the para battalions maintained their historic schedule; indeed, unloading and sorting out the Tetrarchs might have delayed thigs yet further. On the first day the 2nd Parachute Battalion reached its objective without need of armoured support, and the 3rd Parachute Battalion laagered up without needing such support either. The only place I can see where the Tetrarchs might have been of some use was supporting the 1st Parachute Battalion, but leaving aside that the latter were moving away from rather than toward Arnhem and the road bridge, the Tetrarchs would have been terribly vulnerable to infantry attack advancing thru the wooded terrain. Plus I don't think they would have made much impression on the 10 half-tracks from SS Panzer Aufklarungs Abteilung 9 that blocked the 1st Battalion advance. The latter may have included some Sdkfz 251/9s mounting short 75mm guns and even if not there was also Kampfgruppe Allworden with its two Panzerjager IVs and a number of PaK 40s. After midnight on the first day then all bets are off, as the blocking line established in the western outskirts of Arnhem by Kampfgruppe Spindler and Kampfgruppe Harder was backed up with tanks and StuGs, against which the Tetrarchs would not have made much impression either.

 

BillB

[Von Richter]

Two great replies there Bill, most appreciated.

If memory serves the railway embankment was Krafft's right flank with a section on that little hill the other side of the 'jeep trail', a well placed ambush.... on the end of a skirmish line!

Felicitations,

The Von.

 

Edited July 3, 2008 by Von Richter