Was World War 1 inevitable?

[glenn239]

The naval rivalries were not limited to that one, of course, as Russian and French armored cruisers also posed new challenges. Even diplomatic measures such as the Anglo-Japanese treaty had a cost, for England was obligated to match any other European power in the Far East. The two-power standard could no longer be upheld in home waters. Spare me the tale of Lord Salisbury, fatuous notions of an Anglo-German alliance and waiting for The queen to die....

 

The content of Salisbury's memo, those of the Anglo-German alliance discussions of 1901, and the failure of the German fleet to have an impact on either are not matters to be disputed. The Entente policies originated in an era when the Two Power Standard was applied to France and Russia and not Germany. Britain was interested in real fleets in the hands of rival powers, not paper fleets. At the time, Russia was the enemy which focused British attention, not Germany and not the High Seas Fleet, as you must know from the fact that the Anglo-German alliance discussions centered on Russian aggression in China, and the near-war between Britain and Russia in 1904.

 

I said nothing of a 'partial mobilization' on July 25, just the 13 corps.

 

You stated,

 

The limited mobilization was 13 corps vs. Austria, ordered by the Tsar on 25 July.

 

1) No mobilization was ordered by Russia on July 25th. You have confused the decision to activate the Period Prepatory to War (pre-mobilization measures) with Russia's later two mobilization decrees.

 

2) 13 corps (over half the Austrian army!) would most certainly qualifty as a partial mobilization.

 

For Russia to stand aside and let her Serbian ally to be destroyed by A-H would have proven an even more bitter defeat.

 

At the time that Russia undertook mobilization at Germany, Serbia had not even been invaded, leave alone defeated. Further, there was ample evidence available to St. Petersburg that Berlin was moving to restrain the Austrians, such that whatever war did occur would have been settled without recouse to such silly hyperbole as Serbia being 'destroyed'. (What you meant to say was that Serbia might have faced a defeat similar to Bulgaria's in 1913. Well, Bulgaria was defeated and the world kept turning....)

 

Therefore, the Russian decision to mobilize at Germany was premature and entirely inappropriate to the situation. St. Petersburg's logical choice was to unify the Entente diplomatically and await the Anglo-German mediation in Vienna based upon Halt in Belgrade. If, by about August 30th, this had not borne fruit then mobilization could have been undertaken at that point. Consult the histories of the Russian-Japanese War, the wars of 1911, 1912, 1913 and the war leading to the Treaty of San Steffano on the normal diplomatic procedure for Great Powers when wars contrary to their interests were underway.

 

The telling evidence ought to be that the A-H declarations of war vs. Russia and the western Allies came a week after that of the Germans. Nobody should have doubts about who was pulling the strings in the July Crisis.

 

Please start making more of an effort to check your facts. It is the simplist of things to know of the crisis that Austria-Hungary did not declare war on the western Allies. France and Great Britain declared war on Austria-Hungary.

 

The Austrian delay of their DOW on Russia was, in my opinion, prompted by the hope that the Russian main weight would then fall on Germany. Berchtold was playing more games with Berlin.

 

You do mention that Berlin was 'pulling the strings'. Interesting idea. One thing Berlin was concerned about was the attitude of Italy. Question - since the Germans were obviously in charge and dictating policy to Vienna, what concessions to Italy did the Germans force their vassal Austrians into making in July 1914?

 

Totally false, disingenuous [your trademark?]: count the number of armies again and note 2:1 aligned vs Germany and 1:1 vs. A-H.

 

Perhaps common is not your best sense.

 

I said Russia deployed 5 armies against Austria-Hungary and 2 armies against Germany, with a third following later. The two vs. Germany were 1st and 2nd and later, 10th. The five vs. Austria were 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th. You indicated that the French wished Russia to make her main concentration against Germany. Well, France might have wanted many things. She did not get her wish, and the "G" variant to the Russian war plan stayed on the shelf in favor of the "A" variant's strong attack into Galicia.

 

This decision on Russia's part to send their main weight against Austria speaks volumes as to the degree to which a fear for France motivated them, don't you think? Russia was "terrified" for France's safety, but not quite concerned enough to divert any of the five armies pouring across the Austrian frontier....

 

The Germans therefore waited until Russia mobilised (on 30 July) before launching their own (on 1 August) and were thus able to paint the Russians up as the aggressors.

 

Moltke's pressure on the government prior to the confirmation of Russian mobilization on the morning of the 31st stemmed from intelligence that the Russians were undertaking a massive and undeclared mobilization at Germany. Therefore your premise that Russian mobilization measures were unrelated to Moltke's attitude is not sustainable.

 

With respect to mobilization and war guilt, an interesting question naturally arises: If the Entente Powers did not think that the order of mobilization was important to that of determining war guilt, then why did the Entente Powers co-ordinate the falsification of their diplomatic records in an attempt to show that Germany and Austria had mobilized first?

[FlyingCanOpener]

Perhaps I shall be forgiven for somehow trusting more the evaluations of Arthur Marder in days of yore or James Goldrick in present day that establish the Anglo-German naval race as fully on by 1900-01. "...some form of naval rivalry with Germany..." -- really? The naval rivalries were not limited to that one, of course, as Russian and French armored cruisers also posed new challenges. Even diplomatic measures such as the Anglo-Japanese treaty had a cost, for England was obligated to match any other European power in the Far East. The two-power standard could no longer be upheld in home waters. Spare me the tale of Lord Salisbury, fatuous notions of an Anglo-German alliance and waiting for The queen to die....

 

I suppose it would be useless to toss the Fleet Act of 1900 in your corner too, considering the party involved?

[Ken Estes]

Sadly, you continue to dissemble and ‘cook’ your history.

 

Cf. “Lord Salisbury's famous memorandum in May 1901, by which negotiations were permanently terminated, cuts to the heart of the matter.” Such sensationalism belies the almost continuous search for a way out of the isolation that Great Britain found herself in by 1898. Not only Salisbury but other Tories such as Landsdowne and Chamberlain made similar efforts; why not point out Salisbury’s “famous” courting of the Russians in the Boer War? These diplomatic probes continued for years around the turn of the century, as Great Britain reacted to her worsening position. Hell, even Delcassé, the French foreign minister, considered a German agreement before choosing the Entente with Britain.

 

Here, everybody can read some of the Docs on German Foreign Policy about Anglo-German alliance discussions and decide for themselves:

 

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/dugdale/alliance.htm

 

Your flaunting of textbook diplomatic history may go far in explaining your abysmal ignorance of how armies, navies, soldiers and sailors operate and think. It reminds me of how I warned at the Naval Academy in the mid-70’s against hiring dipl hist. to teach naval history there, as their training did not lend well to our needs.

 

Suffice to say that even Volker Berghan remains satisfied with the Marder interpretation of the dawn of the Anglo-German naval race, giving the same quotes I did in a previous thread where you raised this silliness. In addition he intones,

Because the Reich immediately threatened the European balance of power, England ultimately had no other choice but to settle her colonial disputes so that her back would be free for the organization of an anti-German alliance system. However, to contain Germany by diplomatic means in conjunction with Russia and France was in itself hardly an adequate response to the German challenge. After all, this challenge did not take the shape of a diplomatic strategy, but was based on a long-term naval armaments programme. In view of this the British Foreign Office could offer an indispensable political support by creating ententes which shifted the military balance of power in England’s favour. But no amount of diplomacy could compensate for the fact that the balance depended upon the outcome of the arms race which the Reich had initiated in 1898.[Germany and the Approach to War in 1914, 48]

 

Can you see that the generally accepted interpretations exist for a reason, and no amount of deconstructionism offered by you can alter that?

 

As to the face-off on the eastern front in 1914, I could care less about your view that “No mobilization was ordered by Russia on July 25th. You have confused the decision to activate the Period Prepartory to War (pre-mobilization measures) with Russia's later two mobilization decrees.” I am not reading from a diplomatic history text that separates the days into the Period Preparatory for War, and then other phases. Just what do you think the Tsar ordered at his 25 July Council of Ministers then? I’ll go with Robert Doughty, “decided to initiate preparations for mobilizing thirteen corps against Austria.” [Pyrrhic Victory, 48 – D. also calls this a partial mobilization].

 

As to the concentration of four [not five] Russian armies vs. Austria, you can check your facts, and learn that these forces operated mostly on the defensive and narrowly managed to stem the Austrian attacks, which then fell apart as Brusilov took Lemberg. The Russian major offensive fell vs. Germany, where 2 Russian armies faced 1 German, winning at the frontier. BTW, your citing the 9th and 10th Armies on the Rus side shows more cooking vice bookkeeping, as these were not in the initial order of battle for the frontier battles and were only forming to the rear of the two army groups in September at the time of Masurian Lakes, after the 2nd Army had already been destroyed and the two right flank Russian armies in Galicia had been broken by the Austrian offensive. But that does not satisfy your grasp of the events does it? Only if the Russians put more armies vs. Germany, denuding their front with Austria, would Germany be considered the important foe?? If Brusilov’s 8th Army offensive vs. Lemberg was a “strong attack,” what the Hell is a two army offensive into E. Prussia? There were never “five armies pouring across the Austrian frontier” in August. Conrad’s withdrawal came on 11 September, after the Germans had also lost the Marne battles.

 

In the end, we finally have the answer to my Q of why you do this deconstruction [was that your education in history?]: you are apparently building a case for German innocence in the July Crisis, which has nothing to do with the topic of the thread.

 

Bits and pieces: I am surprised to ‘learn’ from you that the A-H did not declare war on France and GB. They declared war on Russia 6 Aug; that does not put them at war with the allies? The latter certainly made it official on 12 Aug. What’s your point? As to your taunting “Question - since the Germans were obviously in charge and dictating policy to Vienna, what concessions to Italy did the Germans force their vassal Austrians into making in July 1914?” – surely you jest. The Italians had no intention of honoring the Triple Alliance in the July Crisis, easily pointing to Art. VII of the 4th renewal of the treaty, requiring a “full exchange of opinion between Austria and Italy before the presentation of the ultimatum to Serbia.” [Robert A. Kann]

Edited May 11, 2008 by Ken Estes

[Ken Estes]

I suppose it would be useless to toss the Fleet Act of 1900 in your corner too, considering the party involved?

He likes to ignore the 98 and 00 Laws, calling them paper fleets not of concern to GB, because they do not suit him, nor fit the narrow construct of some dipl historians, who like to say that the Anglo-French Entente was not directed against Germany [just to be contrarian, and nichey]. The fact that the Two-Power Standard treats Ger and Fr vice Fr and Rus as of Feb04, some months before the Entente is signed, you will not learn from the likes of Glenn, I imagine.

[hojutsuka]

BTW, your citing the 9th and 10th Armies on the Rus side shows more cooking vice bookkeeping, as these were not in the initial order of battle for the frontier battles and were only forming to the rear of the two army groups in September, after the 2nd Army had already been destroyed at Masurian Lakes and the two right flank Russian armies in Galicia had been broken by the Austrian offensive.

[picky mode] The Russian army defeated at the Battle of Masurian Lakes was Rennenkampf's 1st Army. Samsonov's 2nd Army had been destroyed earlier in the Battle of Tannenberg. [/picky mode]

 

Sorry to be picky. I applaud your efforts to educate Glenn, though it looks like a hopeless quest.

 

Regards,

Hojutsuka

[Ken Estes]

[picky mode] The Russian army defeated at the Battle of Masurian Lakes was Rennenkampf's 1st Army. Samsonov's 2nd Army had been destroyed earlier in the Battle of Tannenberg. [/picky mode]

 

....

Right, I was writing too fast, fix made. Cheers, Ken

[swerve]

...

In 1914, the Ottoman Empire was edging towards war with Greece. The British were dragging their heels on two dreadnoughts that would have given the Porte superiority at sea, and Belgrade was concerned about the situation. ...

 

In 1914, Turkey no longer had a land border with Greece, & Italy controlled the Dodecanese. A war could only have been naval, geographically very restricted, & stood a good chance of provoking international intervention. Greece could still rely on the W. European unwillingness to permit Turkey to regain any territories inhabited by Greeks, & the de facto guarantee of Greek territorial integrity resulting from it.

 

Greece also had a new dreadnought (Salamis) under construction, in Germany, which would have given them a partial counter to the two new Turkish ships, & the remainder of the Greek navy (particularly the new armoured cruiser Georgios Averof ) had shown itself superior to the rest of the Turkish fleet in 1912-13. The Turks could not rely on their two dreadnoughts giving them superiority.

 

The logical target of any Turkish irredentism was not Greece, but Bulgaria, which was isolated from its erstwhile allies by the Second Balkan War, had a land border with Turkey, & a substantial Turkish population on the Bulgarian side of that border. But in any case, what evidence do you have of any serious Turkish war plans?

[glenn239]

Your flaunting of textbook diplomatic history may go far in explaining your abysmal ignorance of how armies, navies, soldiers and sailors operate and think.

 

This would imply that the Admiralty set British foriegn policy, when it did not. The Prime Minister was entrusted by the crown to this task, and through him, his Foreign Minister. In 1901 there is no credible argument but that Russia formed the focal point of British attention. (Who - precisely - do you think it was Britain was seeking an alliance with Germany against?)

 

I read with interest the comments that Great Britain's outlook in 1901 must have been with respect to, first and foremost, the German fleet laws. However the fact remains that the basis by which England and Germany were negotiating in 1901 had nothing to do with fleets, but rather (from the British perspective) China. Or more specifically, methods to oppose Russian penetration into China. Are you suggesting that the British were indeed truly fearful of the German fleet, and were therefore duplicitous in these discussions to the purpose of embroiling Germany with Russia? I would not agree to such a mendacious interpretation; the fear was Russia.

 

Suffice to say that even Volker Berghan remains satisfied with the Marder interpretation of the dawn of the Anglo-German naval race, giving the same quotes I did in a previous thread where you raised this silliness.

 

The Triple Entente was a natural development explicable purely in terms of the needs and aims of the three powers - especially Britain. Her friendships with France and Russia were ends in themselves, vital for her imperial interests, and not means of checking Germany, and remained so. Rather than seeking friendly agreements with France and Russia because of the German threat, Britain tended to see Germany as a threat because of the agreements she sought and obtained from France and Russia.

 

Paul Schroeder.

 

Schroeder's interpretation is the correct one - the Entente policy preceded the naval race with Germany.

 

The fact that the Two-Power Standard treats Ger and Fr vice Fr and Rus as of Feb04, some months before the Entente is signed, you will not learn from the likes of Glenn,

 

We are discussing the origins of the Entente policy, which commenced with Anglo-French negotiations three years prior to 1904. At that time (1901), Russia and France were of great concern. Recall that Great Britain entered into an alliance with Japan in 1902. (Unless it is the theory that Japan was to be towed to the North Sea and used to plug the Helgoland, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was obviously not directed against Germany). By 1905 the threat had receded with the French Entente and the Russian transfer of much of its battle fleet to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean,

 

"The German navy was not really taken seriously by the government or the Admiralty until 1906-07, by which time the Entente Cordiale was a fixture in British policy.

 

Paul Schroeder.

[glenn239]

Bits and pieces: I am surprised to ‘learn’ from you that the A-H did not declare war on France and GB. They declared war on Russia 6 Aug; that does not put them at war with the allies? The latter certainly made it official on 12 Aug. What’s your point?

 

You stated that Austria-Hungary declared war on the western powers. You were wrong to make this statement and you were corrected on the matter. Additionally, you were asked to make a greater effort to double-check for such inane whoppers prior to posting. Now we are to understand that the source of your confusion is that Russia, Great Britain and France were, apparently, one and the same country. Very interesting.

 

 

I’ll go with Robert Doughty, “decided to initiate preparations for mobilizing thirteen corps against Austria.”

 

The Period Prepatory to War was indeed the initiation of preparations for mobilization, much like getting up for breakfast is the initiation of preparations for going to work. It was, however, not mobilization itself (much like having breakfast is not the same as driving your car to work) and your statement remains in error - Russia ordered no mobilizations on the 25th of July, leave alone a massive 13-corps effort.

 

As an aside, you do understand that insisting upon a Russian mobilization of 13 corps prior even to Austria's breaking relations with Serbia would be, in a war guilt debate, akin to blowing your own foot off with a blunderbuss?

 

As to the concentration of four [not five] Russian armies vs. Austria, you can check your facts, and learn that these forces operated mostly on the defensive and narrowly managed to stem the Austrian attacks, which then fell apart as Brusilov took Lemberg.

 

That the Russian action in Galicia both overbore the defending Austrian armies and was an act militarily offensive in character is not to be disputed.

 

BTW, your citing the 9th and 10th Armies on the Rus side shows more cooking vice bookkeeping, as these were not in the initial order of battle for the frontier battles and were only forming to the rear of the two army groups in September at the time of Masurian Lakes.

 

I did not say 9th army was one of the first four, I said 9th army attacked Austria-Hungary,

 

"By the thirteenth day of mobilization the Russians had forty-five infantry divisions and over eighteen cavalry divisions in the Galician theater. The 9th army forming in Poland added another eight-and-a-half infantry divisions.

 

On August 23rd the 4th Russian army and the 1st Austro-Hungarian army ran into each other....The 9th army, forming in Poland, detached a corps to reinforce <4th army's> right

 

Strachan, The First World War, 351 and 352

 

Only if the Russians put more armies vs. Germany, denuding their front with Austria, would Germany be considered the important foe?

 

You suggested that Russia undertook an unprovoked mobilization at Germany on account of her relation with France. You now understand that Russia in actual fact ignored French pleas, activated the "A" variant (which the French did not wish them to do), and poured 5 armies into Galicia. That is to say, you have an unresolved ambiguity with your interpretation of events, since you want to suggest the security of France was instrumental in Russian thinking, but do not wish to admit the main Russian effort was not directed at Germany. Perhaps then 53 Russian infantry divisions took the wrong turn at Warsaw?

 

As to your taunting “Question - since the Germans were obviously in charge and dictating policy to Vienna, what concessions to Italy did the Germans force their vassal Austrians into making in July 1914?” – surely you jest. The Italians had no intention of honoring the Triple Alliance in the July Crisis.

 

If Austria-Hungary was indeed the stalking horse, or vassal of, Germany, then it would be Berlin as the overlords and puppeteers which would set Austrian policy towards Italy. You indicate that Berlin did not wish to do so, but this conjecture on your part has no basis in fact,

 

"At that, I explained at length to <Berchtold>, according to the tenor of the secret dispatch of 15 inst of what tremendous importance it appeared to us <Germany>to be that the people here in Vienna should come to an understanding with Rome regarding the aims to be sought in case of war, and attempt to keep Italy on their side. Berchtold disclosed great optimism, and seemed to think that Italy could not possibly be so despicable an ally as to turn against the Monarchy. I said in reply that in case of a prospective conflict with Serbia only, the alliance would not come into question and that Italy could very easily take a stand by the side of Serbia, if only morally; but even this might presage evil for the stability of the Triple Alliance, and it would unquestionably inflame Russia's lust for war. This struck the Minister as very evident, yet he would not of his own accord mention the question of compensation; even when Hoyos, who had been drawn into the conversation, expressed the conviction that the Italians would have to be given something.....

 

On the other hand, I had a long conversation with Hoyos immediately afterward, during which he mentioned the subject of the Trentino of his own accord, and asked me whether this was the compensation that we had in mind, to which I replied in the affirmative....<Hoyos> furthermore advanced the point of view that, as a matter of fact, Italy had no right to claim compensation on the strength of the agreement."

 

Excerpt, D.D. no. 87. Stolberg to Jagow, 18 July 1914.

 

So the question remains - if Austria was a marionette doing Germany's bidding, then why is the the compensation offer to Italy - which Berlin viewed being of 'tremendous importance' in the matter - never made? As a friendly suggestion, perhaps another series of tantrums to divert attention away from the matter is the best strategy, rather than admit that Vienna was not as powerless in the matter as you'd like to suppose.

[Corinthian]

Keep at it gentlemen. Am learning with these posts (although am many times quite bewildered).

[Ken Estes]

Your flaunting of textbook diplomatic history may go far in explaining your abysmal ignorance of how armies, navies, soldiers and sailors operate and think.

 

This would imply that the Admiralty set British foriegn policy, when it did not. The Prime Minister was entrusted by the crown to this task, and through him, his Foreign Minister. In 1901 there is no credible argument but that Russia formed the focal point of British attention. (Who - precisely - do you think it was Britain was seeking an alliance with Germany against?)

 

I read with interest the comments that Great Britain's outlook in 1901 must have been with respect to, first and foremost, the German fleet laws. However the fact remains that the basis by which England and Germany were negotiating in 1901 had nothing to do with fleets, but rather (from the British perspective) China. Or more specifically, methods to oppose Russian penetration into China. Are you suggesting that the British were indeed truly fearful of the German fleet, and were therefore duplicitous in these discussions to the purpose of embroiling Germany with Russia? I would not agree to such a mendacious interpretation; the fear was Russia.

 

Suffice to say that even Volker Berghan remains satisfied with the Marder interpretation of the dawn of the Anglo-German naval race, giving the same quotes I did in a previous thread where you raised this silliness.

 

The Triple Entente was a natural development explicable purely in terms of the needs and aims of the three powers - especially Britain. Her friendships with France and Russia were ends in themselves, vital for her imperial interests, and not means of checking Germany, and remained so. Rather than seeking friendly agreements with France and Russia because of the German threat, Britain tended to see Germany as a threat because of the agreements she sought and obtained from France and Russia.

 

Paul Schroeder.

 

Schroeder's interpretation is the correct one - the Entente policy preceded the naval race with Germany.

 

The fact that the Two-Power Standard treats Ger and Fr vice Fr and Rus as of Feb04, some months before the Entente is signed, you will not learn from the likes of Glenn,

 

We are discussing the origins of the Entente policy, which commenced with Anglo-French negotiations three years prior to 1904. At that time (1901), Russia and France were of great concern. Recall that Great Britain entered into an alliance with Japan in 1902. (Unless it is the theory that Japan was to be towed to the North Sea and used to plug the Helgoland, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was obviously not directed against Germany). By 1905 the threat had receded with the French Entente and the Russian transfer of much of its battle fleet to the bottom of the Pacific Ocean,

 

"The German navy was not really taken seriously by the government or the Admiralty until 1906-07, by which time the Entente Cordiale was a fixture in British policy.

 

Paul Schroeder.

That would be Paul W. Schroeder prof emeritus at Illinios-Urbana? Is he your icon, such that his words alone carry universal weight, with no source given for them? There is no basis for your blithe assertion that "Schroeder's interpretation is the correct one - the Entente policy preceded the naval race with Germany." My basis is that the Admiralty clearly sees the German naval race as on in 1901, and the diplomats are playing the Great Game with the Russians, trying other means to break GB's isolation, such as your "famous" memo on German cooperation, which is all failure by 1901, leading to the Anglo-Japanese pact a year later, the first entry by GB into the permanent alliance game. So, back to the beginning of all your quibbling, the Anglo-German naval race still precedes the British entry into entente with France and Russia; these are of course separate pacts and you do no good by using the term triple entente, for shame.

Equally inane are your jumps to distort the words of others: "This would imply that the Admiralty set British foriegn policy, when it did not." No such implication exists, except in your rather twisted thinking. Same for "Great Britain's outlook in 1901 must have been with respect to, first and foremost, the German fleet laws." You have a problem with discourse, do you not?

 

But the real distortion comes with "We are discussing the origins of the Entente policy, which commenced with Anglo-French negotiations three years prior to 1904." No, sorry, you are discussing it, I guess with yourself. I know you like to redefine themes en march in order to look better. I was simply recalling the generally accepted notion that the opening of the Anglo-German naval race preceded the discussions with the French. As for the Great Game, declining relations with Germany, isolation of GB in the late 1890s, seeking support for British positions in China; these diplomatic projects are always in play. Or are you only capable of thinking of one thing at a time? Maybe it's the moment for you to intoduce some more "famous" memos, although you omitted the modifier when you mentioned the Grey-Cambon exchange of 1912 on another thread, much more recognized. Why is that? Why use the term "famous" at all? More of your hauteur?

Edited May 13, 2008 by Ken Estes

[PCallahan]

Keep at it gentlemen. Am learning with these posts (although am many times quite bewildered).

 

I agree -- this is a fascinating thread

[Ken Estes]

You stated that Austria-Hungary declared war on the western powers. You were wrong to make this statement and you were corrected on the matter. Additionally, you were asked to make a greater effort to double-check for such inane whoppers prior to posting. Now we are to understand that the source of your confusion is that Russia, Great Britain and France were, apparently, one and the same country.

The Period Prepatory to War was indeed the initiation of preparations for mobilization, much like getting up for breakfast is the initiation of preparations for going to work. It was, however, not mobilization itself (much like having breakfast is not the same as driving your car to work) and your statement remains in error - Russia ordered no mobilizations on the 25th of July, leave alone a massive 13-corps effort.

As an aside, you do understand that insisting upon a Russian mobilization of 13 corps prior even to Austria's breaking relations with Serbia would be, in a war guilt debate, akin to blowing your own foot off with a blunderbuss?

That the Russian action in Galicia both overbore the defending Austrian armies and was an act militarily offensive in character is not to be disputed.

I did not say 9th army was one of the first four, I said 9th army attacked Austria-Hungary....

You suggested that Russia undertook an unprovoked mobilization at Germany on account of her relation with France. You now understand that Russia in actual fact ignored French pleas, activated the "A" variant (which the French did not wish them to do), and poured 5 armies into Galicia. That is to say, you have an unresolved ambiguity with your interpretation of events, since you want to suggest the security of France was instrumental in Russian thinking, but do not wish to admit the main Russian effort was not directed at Germany. Perhaps then 53 Russian infantry divisions took the wrong turn at Warsaw?

If Austria-Hungary was indeed the stalking horse, or vassal of, Germany, then it would be Berlin as the overlords and puppeteers which would set Austrian policy towards Italy. You indicate that Berlin did not wish to do so, but this conjecture on your part has no basis in fact,

So the question remains - if Austria was a marionette doing Germany's bidding, then why is the the compensation offer to Italy - which Berlin viewed being of 'tremendous importance' in the matter - never made? As a friendly suggestion, perhaps another series of tantrums to divert attention away from the matter is the best strategy, rather than admit that Vienna was not as powerless in the matter as you'd like to suppose.

 

I have noted your playing fast and loose with history before, but the combination of arrogant dissembling, disengenuous and outright dishonest rhetoric in the above, simply amounts to dancing on the carpet. "Is not to be disputed" "you were corrected on the matter" "you were asked to make a greater effort to double-check for such inane whoppers prior to posting" would be the arrogance part.

 

The blue highlights denote your strange extrapolations, which you purport to be my thoughts for you to dispute. Not so. These represent your recasting of some imaginary debate, again fast and loose.

 

Now, if I may: I wrote that the Austrian declaration vs. Russia and the western allies came a week later. Right, only Russia was correct and A-H never declared war on the western allies.

 

"Russia ordered no mobilizations on the 25th of July...." Again, so what do you make of the Tsar's decision to mobilize 13 corps at that date? Oh, yes, that would be part of the "Period Preparatory..." and thus not part of the discussion, right?

 

As to your still-distorted "That the Russian action in Galicia both overbore the defending Austrian armies and was an act militarily offensive in character is not to be disputed.

I did not say 9th army was one of the first four, I said 9th army attacked Austria-Hungary...."

You were caught putting Russian 9th and 10th armies in the initial border line-up. I point out that you do not understand the difference between forming and in the line. That a corps could be put into the lines of the defending Russian armies in Galicia does not change the condition.

 

"I did not say 9th army was one of the first four, I said 9th army attacked Austria-Hungary...." Tsk! You said there were five arrayed initially against A-H...what happened? Later, you tried to add 9th and 10th, and I pointed out they were forming later on their fronts and not to be confused with the initial concentrations.

 

Only Brusilov's 8th Army had an offensive mission, ultimately succeeding, whereas the other armies on the Galician front fought defensively against the Austrian offensive. The to antagonists each had offensive plans in Galicia in 1914, but the actions of the armies were not all offensive. You earlier noted five Russian armies pouring across the A-H frontier; where'd that go?

 

Thus I point these things out, dear wonderful Glenn, but I shall not chastise you and ask you to make a greater effort to double-check for such inane whoppers. BTW, save your memo quotes for when it is on a topic of discourse, not part of your scheme to redirect to topics not raised.

 

So, what's your real complaint?

Edited May 14, 2008 by Ken Estes

[glenn239]

The logical target of any Turkish irredentism was not Greece, but Bulgaria, which was isolated from its erstwhile allies by the Second Balkan War, had a land border with Turkey, & a substantial Turkish population on the Bulgarian side of that border. But in any case, what evidence do you have of any serious Turkish war plans?

 

I've not seen anything detailing the specific military plans of any of the Balkans countries in the first half of 1914. The Hollow Detente and Italy, Least of the Great Powers give a good overview of the situation in the Aegean just before the war. The German White Book contains an interview with Pasic detailing his reading of the Balkans balance of power at the time, and where Serbia felt the threat to her security lay. His assessment was along the same lines as the Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold's as laid out in the 24 June policy paper. Generally speaking, both Serbian and Austrian officials thought Bulgaria and Turkey would move to overthrow the settlements of the 1912 and 1913 wars. Pasic, worried that his ally Greece was being distracted by the Ottomans, wished to see the intervention of the Great Powers on the side of Athens. Italy was also pressing in the Aegean, greatly complicating her relations with Athens and Constantinople, to say nothing of Paris, London and Berlin.

 

Sarajevo cut across these fault lines. What would have occurred without the war can't be known, but it seems scarcely possible that another large Balkans war could have been avoided - Bulgaria and Turkey had no interest in the status quo. If war had occurred it probably would have dragged in the Great Powers. On July 5th, the German government gave Vienna a blank cheque to settle accounts with Serbia. One of the great 'what ifs' is what would have happened had Berchtold, instead of sending an ultimatum to Belgrade, instead had exploited the blank cheque by moving ahead with the 24 June policy of seeking alliance with Bulgaria and Turkey.

[glenn239]

"Russia ordered no mobilizations on the 25th of July...." Again, so what do you make of the Tsar's decision to mobilize 13 corps at that date? Oh, yes, that would be part of the "Period Preparatory..." and thus not part of the discussion, right?

 

Strachan's account is typical,

 

The council concluded by agreeing to ask Vienna to postpone its deadline by forty-eight hours, by urging Belgrade to be conciliatory, and by giving permission for four military districts, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan, to prepare for mobilization. The Tsar ratified these decisions at a further meeting of the council on 25 July. Thus, from the very outset Russia included a military element in its response to the crisis. On 26 July Russia began to recall reservists, in a phase preliminary to moblization itself. On 28 July, in response to Austria-Hungary's mobilization against Serbia, the four districts already alerted were ordered to mobilize.

 

Strachan, The First World War, 83

 

You indicate that 13 corps (26 divisions) were mobilized on 25 July. Strachan states that on the 26th of July Russia commenced activities 'preliminary' to mobilization, and then mobilized the four districts on the 28th.

 

You were caught putting Russian 9th and 10th armies in the initial border line-up. I point out that you do not understand the difference between forming and in the line. That a corps could be put into the lines of the defending Russian armies in Galicia does not change the condition.

 

I stated that "Russia deployed 5 armies against Austria-Hungary and 2 armies against Germany, with a third following later. The two vs. Germany were 1st and 2nd and later, 10th. The five vs. Austria were 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th."

 

You indicate that 9th and 10th were not concentrated at the same time as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th. This is correct, and in no way obviates the point made; that Russia sent five armies against Austria to only three against Germany,

 

By the 25th day, five more divisions had arrived; by the 30th another five, and six cavalry divisions - making in all forty-five infantry divisions. As well, IX Army was diverted late in August from Warsaw to the Austro-Hungarian front, such that by the 30th day of mobilization, the Russian armies operating on the Austrian front contained fifty-three and a half infantry divisions and eighteen cavalry divisions; the Austrians presenting by then thirty-seven infantry divisions and some Landsturn brigades, with two German Landwehr divisions and ten cavalry divisions.

 

Stone - The Eastern Front, 84

 

If a concern for a German offensive against France was the primary factor in Russian thinking, then the "G" variant would have been ordered as France requested so that the maximum concentration of force could be deployed against the dangerous foe - Germany.

 

Only Brusilov's 8th Army had an offensive mission, ultimately succeeding, whereas the other armies on the Galician front fought defensively against the Austrian offensive.

 

"The armies in Galicia adopted in essence two plans - one by Alexeyev, for a stroke against the Austrian railways leading to Cracow, and one by the General Staff, under Danilov, for an attack along the Carpathians from the eastern border of Galicia....Alexeyev's attack would cut their communications; Danilov's would bind them in eastern Galicia, and prevent them from disturbing operations against the Germans. In practice, Danilov, once in Stavka, had decided to give backing to Alexeyev's scheme as well as his own, because it would cover the concentration of the new IX Army being assembled around Warsaw. These two, almost irreconcilable, schemes were adopted and dressed up, in orders issued by Stavka, as a plan for 'double envelopment' of the Austro-Hungarian army.

 

Stone, 83-84

 

The Russians did not deploy 53.5 infantry divisions to Galicia for the purpose of defense. Stone indicates the 4th and 5th Russian armies (the western grouping) had an offensive mission ,but the plan of attack was defective. The Austrians got a fleeting chance during a meeting engagement near the border to crush the western Russian pincer before the other could close for battle. The second spearhead was the two armies of the eastern grouping (not one army as you stated - 3rd army was marching with 8th army). That the Russian offensive was poorly concieved and executed does not mean that it was not an offensive.

[glenn239]

I was simply recalling the generally accepted notion that the opening of the Anglo-German naval race preceded the discussions with the French. As for the Great Game, declining relations with Germany, isolation of GB in the late 1890s, seeking support for British positions in China; these diplomatic projects are always in play.

 

Naval considerations did not impact upon British foriegn policy in the period - not in the Foriegn Office's attempts to secure an entente with Germany against Russia and then afterwards with France, and not in Salisbury's 1901 rejection of joining the Triple Alliance. The dominating factor when seeking Germany's hand at the turn of the century was Russia, and afterwards it remained Russia. Later, when the Anglo-German naval race was on at full throttle, the Foriegn Office's policy was not to be influenced by the prospect of a naval agreement,

 

Above all, no naval agreement would have ended Anglo-German rivalry or caused Britain to abandon the anti-German coalition....In fact, Nicholson, Hardinge, Crow and other influential foriegn-policy leaders were deathly afraid of a naval agreement. As Hardinge argued, the Russians, "must not think for a moment that we want to improve our relations with Germany at their expense. We have no pending questions with Germany, except that of naval construction, while our whole future in Asia is bound up with the necessity of maintaining the best and most friendly relations with Russia. We cannot afford to sacrifice in any way our entente with Russia - even for the sake of a reduced naval program."

 

Paul Schroeder, World War 1 as Galloping Gertie

 

The dominating factor in British policy was the fear of losing control of relations with Russia. If this occured, it would be Germany and the unstable Kaiser that would be advantaged.