Was World War 1 inevitable?

[Corinthian]

Was it inevitable? Would it still have happened without the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand? What other spark could ignite WW1?

 

I must admit, I haven't exactly been paying much attention to WW1 discussions on this Grate Site, even if I find WW1 far more fascinating than WW2.

[Xavier]

definitely, the assassination was the spark/excuse everyone was waiting for.

France wanted Alsace/Lorraine back

Russia had it's Pan-Slavism

Austria-Hungary was quite interested in the Balkan as well

Germany wanted to keep the French from gaining back Elsaß-Lothringen and wouldn't mind some Lebensraum in the East either and Willy wanted his place in the Sun.

The British Empire, not exactly keen on war but feeling seriously threatened by the Hochseeflotte

And with the Alliances there is practically no way NOT to involve everyone either.

[glenn239]

The British Empire, not exactly keen on war but feeling seriously threatened by the Hochseeflotte

 

Would the removal of the Serbian battle fleet from the European naval equation have led to an advantage for the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea?

[Richard Lindquist]

Would the removal of the Serbian battle fleet from the European naval equation have led to an advantage for the High Seas Fleet in the North Sea?

 

I hope that was tongue-in-cheek. Serbia was a land-locked country with no naval forces.

[Ken Estes]

Hard to argue for 'inevitability' in any series of events in history, but once the Tsar went to full mobilization, vice the partial one, it became almost certain; even Sazanov, the Rus foreign minister said it at the time. That event and the German 'blank check' given to A-H earlier, set things up for the first round of a Eur Civil War that was at the same time considered inconceivable.

[jakec]

Better question: was it inevitable from the moment William II (unexpectedly) took the throne?

[RETAC21]

Better question: was it inevitable from the moment William II (unexpectedly) took the throne?

 

Unexpected? what was unexpected? his father died and he was the heir, it would matter little wether he died later since by the William's ideas were firmly planted. World War 1 is fought in 1935 rather than in 1914...

[dpapp2]

Russia was inciting the Balkans against Austria-Hungary. France was financing the Russian economic and military expansion. The German-Russian clash was inevitable, as Germany would have to attack Russia before the latter would get too strong. As this goal aligns perfectly with AH security issues, the CP alliance looks quite natural. IMO the German-Russian war was overdue, delayed only by the Russian defeat from Japan.

[glenn239]

I hope that was tongue-in-cheek. Serbia was a land-locked country with no naval forces.

 

Yes. The poster indicated that the balance of naval power motivated Great Britain to take sides in a Balkans dispute. Since Serbia possessed no fleet, and it was inconceivable that the diminutive Austrian fleet would seek battle with Great Britain, I do not follow the reasoning. A war between these two nations would not impact the naval balance in the North Sea with Germany.

 

Better question: was it inevitable from the moment William II (unexpectedly) took the throne?

 

The long delay between his ascension to the throne and the outbreak of the war would indicate that the answer is 'no'.

[glenn239]

The German-Russian clash was inevitable, as Germany would have to attack Russia before the latter would get too strong.

 

If Great Britain allies with Germany, then France is forced from the Dual Alliance and Russia becomes isolated by the Concert of Europe without recourse to war. If Great Britain instead supports Russian designs in the Balkans, then the burden of maintaining the balance of power (upholding weak Austria against strong Russia) falls exclusively upon isolated Germany and a war becomes virtually assured.

[Archie Pellagio]

We had this discussion a few months ago.

 

As far as i'm concerned a large war amongst the european powers was always going to happen.

 

That it would happen as WWI happened is not guaranteed (sides could well be different)

but Europe in that era was simply too heavily militarized and nationalistic that sooner or later someone would tread on eachother's toes and the web of diplomacy would entangle everyone.

[p620346]

I hope that was tongue-in-cheek. Serbia was a land-locked country with no naval forces.

 

Several years ago, I remember reading an article entitled "WAS THERE A SERBIAN NAVY' in Warship International Magazine.

[Ken Estes]

Russia was inciting the Balkans against Austria-Hungary. France was financing the Russian economic and military expansion. The German-Russian clash was inevitable, as Germany would have to attack Russia before the latter would get too strong. As this goal aligns perfectly with AH security issues, the CP alliance looks quite natural. IMO the German-Russian war was overdue, delayed only by the Russian defeat from Japan.

Uh, before the Rus became too strong to do what? Answer: to deny Germany her place in the sun, not to attack and place the German Empire in danger. Germany had the #1 army and #2 Navy in 1914, with no serious rivals. In the terms of Prince Bismarck [dismissed by Stupid Willie], Germany was a 'satiated power.' She remained unassailable and, so typically, her greatest danger was...herself. Uncannily, this would be repeated 25 years later, for effect. This is why history remains more interesting than fiction.

[Colin Williams]

Many of the existing countries in Europe were under substantial internal stress due to the pressures of both nationalism and socialism. There was a strong mindset among the ruling elite in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and the Ottoman Empire that some sort of limited war would be at least a temporary solution to some of the political problems. A regional conflict in the Balkans seems inevitable, but whether that had to expand into a full blown world war isn't clear. Certainly Kaiser Wilhelm was more responsible than any other German for needlessly provoking the British into a naval arms race and driving them into the Entente with France. He also had an extremely unstable and dangerous effect on German foreign policy. If, for example, he dies in an accident early in the 20th Century, I could see Europe avoiding a world war. OTOH, perhaps the world war would simply take a far different form in response to the same intrinsic cultural and political attitudes but a different set of personalities and circumstances.

[Ken Estes]

Many of the existing countries in Europe were under substantial internal stress due to the pressures of both nationalism and socialism. There was a strong mindset among the ruling elite in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and the Ottoman Empire that some sort of limited war would be at least a temporary solution to some of the political problems. A regional conflict in the Balkans seems inevitable, but whether that had to expand into a full blown world war isn't clear. Certainly Kaiser Wilhelm was more responsible than any other German for needlessly provoking the British into a naval arms race and driving them into the Entente with France. He also had an extremely unstable and dangerous effect on German foreign policy. If, for example, he dies in an accident early in the 20th Century, I could see Europe avoiding a world war. OTOH, perhaps the world war would simply take a far different form in response to the same intrinsic cultural and political attitudes but a different set of personalities and circumstances.

The only country under pressure from socialism [all had probs with nationalism, the most important -ism of the 20th C. and today] would have been the German Empire, and the internal pressures of Wilhelmine Germany remained mostly self-inflicted. Much of the problem lay with the paranoias of the ruling elites, and the Austrian fear of the Serbs approached clinical levels, such that they devoted 5/9 of their forces to Serbian fronts in war planning in the event of war with S. and Russia, much to the disgust of the German genl staff.

[swerve]

Many of the existing countries in Europe were under substantial internal stress due to the pressures of both nationalism and socialism. There was a strong mindset among the ruling elite in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and the Ottoman Empire that some sort of limited war would be at least a temporary solution to some of the political problems. ...

 

Ah you sure about the Ottoman Empire? It went through two losing wars in rapid succession just before WW1, which made everyone, including the leadership, painfully aware of its military weakness. Even Enver Pasha couldn't believe that a country which could be beaten in short order by Italy, or a few Balkan states which could barely co-operate (they started fighting each other as soon as they'd beaten Turkey), could benefit in any way from a war, however limited, with any of the Great Powers.

[glenn239]

Uh, before the Russia became too strong to do what? Answer: to deny Germany her place in the sun, not to attack and place the German Empire in danger

.

 

The Russian threat to the German position in Europe was not against Germany directly, but to her ally Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Nothing underscores this more than the fact that the entire Russian army mobilized in July 1914 in reaction to a minor Balkans conflict.

 

Certainly Kaiser Wilhelm was more responsible than any other German for needlessly provoking the British into a naval arms race and driving them into the Entente with France.

 

The Entente with France proceeded the naval race, and therefore could not have triggered the British willingness to associate with France. The Kaiser had been in power for over a decade before London showed any interest in a French connection, suggesting that his influence in the matter was not decisive. Queen Victoria’s death in 1901 marked the moment when London started talking with Paris, leading to the speculation that at least part of the driving force behind the change in British policy was domestic, as the Queen would not have gone along with it.

 

Ah you sure about the Ottoman Empire? It went through two losing wars in rapid succession just before WW1, which made everyone, including the leadership, painfully aware of its military weakness.

 

In 1914, the Ottoman Empire was edging towards war with Greece. The British were dragging their heels on two dreadnoughts that would have given the Porte superiority at sea, and Belgrade was concerned about the situation.

 

I think that Vienna was too pessimistic about the situation in July 1914, and too unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to crush terrorist Serbia. In 1913, Serbia undercut her own long-term security by defeating Bulgaria in such a fashion that another war between the pair was inevitable. It was Austria’s best course to await the recovery of Bulgaria and then attack Serbia concentrically. An Ottoman-Greek war would have served handily to the end, as Greece was Serbia’s only reliable ally in the Balkans. Austria could have surrendered primacy in Albania to Italy, which would have set Rome against Belgrade and Athens as well.

[Ken Estes]

The Russian threat to the German position in Europe was not against Germany directly, but to her ally Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Nothing underscores this more than the fact that the entire Russian army mobilized in July 1914 in reaction to a minor Balkans conflict.*

 

**The Entente with France proceeded the naval race, and therefore could not have triggered the British willingness to associate with France. The Kaiser had been in power for over a decade before London showed any interest in a French connection, suggesting that his influence in the matter was not decisive. Queen Victoria’s death in 1901 marked the moment when London started talking with Paris, leading to the speculation that at least part of the driving force behind the change in British policy was domestic, as the Queen would not have gone along with it.....

 

 

* There was a partial mobilization ordered initially by the Tsar to handle the Serbian-Austrian crisis, but the full mobilization ordered the following day was to fight Germany, as per the Franco-Russian Entent, leading to the Tannenberg-Masurian Lakes debacles.

**That would be news to Tirpitz, who ignited the Anglo-German naval race with the Fleet Laws of 1898 and 1900. Only the 1907 Fleet Law, adding a fifth battle squadron, would qualify as your 'naval race'?

[Przezdzieblo]

I do not know the latest literature about that thread, but I can recommend "The Guns of August" by Barbara Tuchman. I always thought about it as some kind of WWI "Bible". Tuchman get to many sources from the events, made a lot of work collecting stuff and turned it into one of the best history lecture I ever read (and, modestly, I can admit that during studies read at last few books ).

 

Tuchman describes situation - who wanted war, who did not, who did not know if he wanted, who did not wanted but could do nothing etc. There is some description of human weakness, which at goverment or monarch level was one of major factors that things goes wrong. Tuchman also gives great explanation why, when turned on, huge mobilization machinery of the biggest European army at the time was unstoppable.

[glenn239]

There was a partial mobilization ordered initially by the Tsar to handle the Serbian-Austrian crisis, but the full mobilization ordered the following day was to fight Germany, as per the Franco-Russian Entente, leading to the Tannenberg-Masurian Lakes debacles.

The Russian mobilization against Germany preceded that of Germany’s own, and therefore was not prompted by any threat to France. Were it the case that Russia’s mobilization was caused by Germany’s, then it would have been Russia (and not Germany) which would have dispatched the 12 hour ultimatum to cease mobilization.

 

**That would be news to Tirpitz, who ignited the Anglo-German naval race with the Fleet Laws of 1898 and 1900. Only the 1907 Fleet Law, adding a fifth battle squadron, would qualify as your 'naval race'?

 

In 1901-1904 there was no “naval race”. The Royal Navy out-tonned the High Seas fleet at that time by a margin of about 3.5 or 4 to 1. The “race” refers to a later period in time - about 1908 – when the Entente policy was long in place and the British were feeling the angst of the Dreadnought Revolution.

[Ken Estes]

The Russian mobilization against Germany preceded that of Germany’s own, and therefore was not prompted by any threat to France. Were it the case that Russia’s mobilization was caused by Germany’s, then it would have been Russia (and not Germany) which would have dispatched the 12 hour ultimatum to cease mobilization.

In 1901-1904 there was no “naval race”. The Royal Navy out-tonned the High Seas fleet at that time by a margin of about 3.5 or 4 to 1. The “race” refers to a later period in time - about 1908 – when the Entente policy was long in place and the British were feeling the angst of the Dreadnought Revolution.

Once more, you carry on with your own brand of interpretation, virtually fact-free. In 1914, one does not mobilize vs. Germany without allies. Unlike your strange version of the Anglo-French Entente, the one with Russia [1894] had specific provisions based upon many years of staff talks and mutual pledges for early offensives. The French president and prime minister were where at the time that the Balkan crisis brewed up? Let's see, that would be St. Petersburg [departed there July 23]. The limited mobilization was 13 corps vs. Austria, ordered by the Tsar on 25 July. The 1910-13 annual staff talks all confirmed Germany's defeat as the "first and principal objective" of France and Russia and the subsequent defeat of Germany's allies as secondary objectives. In the last one, the Russians confirmed their offensive to begin on the 14th day. Beginning October, 1913, the wireless link between Paris and Bobruisk was exercised twice daily. That's how allies prepare for operations, and you ought to note the difference vis a vis the British and French [non-existant] arrangements for army operations.

 

I am not going to rewrite my previous citations showing how the RN considered the naval race as on in 1900-1901, there being no need to resurrect all earlier threads. I don't mind if you keep your delusions. They suit you, it seems.

[glenn239]

The Franco-Russian agreement was to a military alliance and certainly not an "Entente" as your post suggests. Whether or not the staff talks associated with this alliance confirmed Germany as the primary target in a war is of a secondary character to the fact that in the real event Russia sent 5 armies against Austria-Hungary in Galicia versus 2 against Germany (followed later by a third). In any event, the point remains that Russia mobilized her entire army in July 1914 in reaction to a minor Balkans war of no great importance to the balance of power in Europe.

 

The partial mobilization of four military districts against Austria-Hungary was not ordered on "July 25th". You've confused the decision to proceed with the Period Prepatory to War with that of a partial mobilization, which came some days later.

 

The Anglo-German alliance talks were active in the years up to and including the first half of 1901. This fact alone is one of great awkwardness for the position that some form of naval rivalry with Germany was 'on' at that point; it was not. Lord Salisbury's famous memorandum in May 1901, by which negotiations were permanently terminated, cuts to the heart of the matter. To recall, Salisbury said that an alliance with Germany would cause Britain to become a junior partner to the Triple Alliance whereby the burden of securing the European frontiers would be more difficult than would be the case of having to defend the British Isles against France. More importantly, that to ally with Germany would incur the wrath of France and prevent the resolution of colonial disputes. Note that Salisbury mentions nothing of naval rivalries. His concern is mending colonial fences with France, which is the point; the Entente with France preceded the naval race, and naval considerations did not cause the Entente policy.

Edited May 10, 2008 by glenn239

[Ken Estes]

Perhaps I shall be forgiven for somehow trusting more the evaluations of Arthur Marder in days of yore or James Goldrick in present day that establish the Anglo-German naval race as fully on by 1900-01. "...some form of naval rivalry with Germany..." -- really? The naval rivalries were not limited to that one, of course, as Russian and French armored cruisers also posed new challenges. Even diplomatic measures such as the Anglo-Japanese treaty had a cost, for England was obligated to match any other European power in the Far East. The two-power standard could no longer be upheld in home waters. Spare me the tale of Lord Salisbury, fatuous notions of an Anglo-German alliance and waiting for The queen to die....

 

I said nothing of a 'partial mobilization' on July 25, just the 13 corps. Cut the dissembling. The partial mobilization of the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan came on July 29, following the news of the A-H declaration of war on Serbia. Even the German records show that they recognized that the Russian mobilizations demonstrated no sure intent to go to war; everybody knew that the partial mobilization had to be followed by a full one, given the slower performance of the Russian system; the Tsar being the last to recognize, and follow through on July 30. For Russia to stand aside and let her Serbian ally to be destroyed by A-H would have proven an even more bitter defeat. The timing of the German ultimatum to Russia was mere subterfuge, showing a desire to somehow assign responsibility to the Rus for the war; this will be Glenn's role in this thread, I imagine, asserting the Germany fought a purely defensive war. Thus the fault was the Brits?? Fritz Fischer's analyses gave the Rus the benefit of trying to the end to prevent the war, even though Sazanov was convinced that full mobilization was the only recourse they had. The telling evidence ought to be that the A-H declarations of war vs. Russia and the western Allies came a week after that of the Germans. Nobody should have doubts about who was pulling the strings in the July Crisis.

[Ken Estes]

The Franco-Russian agreement was to a military alliance and certainly not an "Entente" as your post suggests. Whether or not the staff talks associated with this alliance confirmed Germany as the primary target in a war is of a secondary character to the fact that in the real event Russia sent 5 armies against Austria-Hungary in Galicia versus 2 against Germany (followed later by a third). In any event, the point remains that Russia mobilized her entire army in July 1914 in reaction to a minor Balkans war of no great importance to the balance of power in Europe.....

Totally false, disingenuous [your trademark?]: count the number of armies again and note 2:1 aligned vs Germany and 1:1 vs. A-H. Allowing Serbia to be crushed by A-H cannot be viewed as "of no great importance" in Europe.

 

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atl...%20map%2004.htm

[BillB]

Perhaps I shall be forgiven for somehow trusting more the evaluations of Arthur Marder in days of yore or James Goldrick in present day that establish the Anglo-German naval race as fully on by 1900-01. "...some form of naval rivalry with Germany..." -- really? The naval rivalries were not limited to that one, of course, as Russian and French armored cruisers also posed new challenges. Even diplomatic measures such as the Anglo-Japanese treaty had a cost, for England was obligated to match any other European power in the Far East. The two-power standard could no longer be upheld in home waters. Spare me the tale of Lord Salisbury, fatuous notions of an Anglo-German alliance and waiting for The queen to die....

 

I said nothing of a 'partial mobilization' on July 25, just the 13 corps. Cut the dissembling. The partial mobilization of the military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan came on July 29, following the news of the A-H declaration of war on Serbia. Even the German records show that they recognized that the Russian mobilizations demonstrated no sure intent to go to war; everybody knew that the partial mobilization had to be followed by a full one, given the slower performance of the Russian system; the Tsar being the last to recognize, and follow through on July 30. For Russia to stand aside and let her Serbian ally to be destroyed by A-H would have proven an even more bitter defeat. The timing of the German ultimatum to Russia was mere subterfuge, showing a desire to somehow assign responsibility to the Rus for the war; this will be Glenn's role in this thread, I imagine, asserting the Germany fought a purely defensive war. Thus the fault was the Brits?? Fritz Fischer's analyses gave the Rus the benefit of trying to the end to prevent the war, even though Sazanov was convinced that full mobilization was the only recourse they had. The telling evidence ought to be that the A-H declarations of war vs. Russia and the western Allies came a week after that of the Germans. Nobody should have doubts about who was pulling the strings in the July Crisis.

 

Just a spot of reinforcement regarding the bolded bit. The German SPD was the largest socialist party in the world and there was a real fear in the German government that the socialists would oppose mobilisation and war against anyone but Russia. The socialists viewed the latter as the most reactionary power in Europe and their antipathy went back to the involvement of Russian troops in crushing the 1848 Revolution. The Germans therefore waited until Russia mobilised (on 30 July) before launching their own (on 1 August) and were thus able to paint the Russians up as the aggressors. It worked because no true socialist could oppose fighting reactionary Russia, and the few dissenting socialists were marginalised into their own party. The membership of the SPD and their supporters thus answered the call to arms like good Germans and the Kaiser was able to declare the Burgfrieden on 4 August 1914; hence the line in his speech "I recognise parties no more; I recognise only Germans!"

 

BillB