Paratroopers During WW2

[DougRichards]

It was a Tetrarch Doug, the 6th Airborne Div didn't use M22s until the Rhine crossings the following year. AFAIK the Hamilcar didn't break up; the tank it was carrying came unshackled somehow and went through the nose. Not nice either way though.

 

BillB

Thanks for the correction re the Tetrach vis-a-vis the M22:

 

Are there any indications why the paras moved from the Tetrach to the M22? Specifications re weight, speed, HP, etc were similar, it seems that the M22 was only slightly more heavily armoured, but that it was slightly less well armed than the Tetrach (US 37mm vs Brit 2pdr), and a few Tetrachs were also used in the Rhine crossings. I have a source that quotes the Tetrachs being in service until 1950.

 

It is also instructive that the Germans never attempted an air assault light tank: the PzIV carried by the Messerschmidt Me-321 Gigant were not really intended for assault, so much as for delivery, but given the right circumstances, that is a perimeter established by parachute troops, followed by tanks delivered within that perimeter by Gigant, they could have proved very useful.

 

Of course the Soviets tried their air-launched tanks.....

 

Re British vs Germans airborne: I guess that the Brits took a while to get into their stride, so to speak, as the Germans had longer times to train, practise and indoctrinate.

[BillB]

Thanks for the correction re the Tetrach vis-a-vis the M22:

 

Are there any indications why the paras moved from the Tetrach to the M22? Specifications re weight, speed, HP, etc were similar, it seems that the M22 was only slightly more heavily armoured, but that it was slightly less well armed than the Tetrach (US 37mm vs Brit 2pdr), and a few Tetrachs were also used in the Rhine crossings. I have a source that quotes the Tetrachs being in service until 1950.

 

It is also instructive that the Germans never attempted an air assault light tank: the PzIV carried by the Messerschmidt Me-321 Gigant were not really intended for assault, so much as for delivery, but given the right circumstances, that is a perimeter established by parachute troops, followed by tanks delivered within that perimeter by Gigant, they could have proved very useful.

 

Of course the Soviets tried their air-launched tanks.....

 

Re British vs Germans airborne: I guess that the Brits took a while to get into their stride, so to speak, as the Germans had longer times to train, practise and indoctrinate.

Ref the first bit, the Tetrarch was only a stop gap in the airborne role. It originated pre-war as a private venture light tank from Vickers and was considered obsolete in the light tank role by late 1941. I think the original plan was to unload them on the Soviets but in September 1941 they cancelled that plan because they were the only tanks in the British inventory suitable for airborne use; 20 were sent to Russia in early 1942 though to honour an existing agreement. The date I have for them being withdrawn from service is 1949.

 

The Locust was designed as an airborne tank from scratch in the US, following a British initiative at the beginning of 1941; the latter took the thing to Washington because they lacked the design and production capacity. As far as I can tell the 6th Airborne Armoured Recce Regiment used the Tetrarch in Normandy and during the Ardennes, but they had been replaced by Locusts before Operation VARSITY. I suspect they were worn out and/or suffering from a lack of spares. They only deployed eight tanks by Hamilcar for VARSITY and they were all Locusts; only 4 made it to the LZ, and only 2 made it off the LZ in working condition.

 

Ref the Sovs with their air-launched tanks, credit where it's due, they did eventually come up with the BMD... Ref the bit about the Brit v German airborne, I'm not cop0nvinced that the latter were as good as they are routinely assumed to have been. They certainly displayed a reluctance if not outright refusal to adapt their operating procedures even when they were shown to be severely flawed.

 

BillB

[BillB]

Lecture on World War II from a professor Childers on DVD...I don't believe he specified on Market Garden other than the troops failed to reach their objective and that there were massive casualties.

 

If the stuff youv'e relayed in here is accurate I'd treat what Prof Childers says about airborne forces with caution as it is not especially accurate, and I don't see anything in his academic bio to suggest otherwise. The guys at Arnhem did reach the most important of their objectives within 6-7 hours of landing, they held one end of it for longer than specified, and the massive casualties only occurred in the week of fighting that followed. As a matter of interest why were you watching an academic lecture on DVD?

 

Id the part on dropping troops into the ocean accurate?

He also talks that the Germans flooded fields and paratroopers drowned in 2 or 3 feet of water due to teh weight of their gear and being unable to entangle from their parachutes....

Ref the dropping into the sea, quite likely but I've never come across any verifiable evidence, which is why I asked you for clarification - I thought you'd found some. Further to Ken Estes' comment re the scattering map at St Mere Eglise, there are two very good maps in Gordon A. Harrison's Cross Channel Attack showing the 82nd and 101st Divisions' drop patterns. It has the Div DZs marked with colour coded dots to show where all the sticks came down in relation to their DZ. Furthest south was a stick from the 82nd that came down 25 miles astray, one stick from the 101st came down 20 miles north and three others came down 21 miles west.

 

If anyone was dropped into the sea they were likely from the 101st. The latter had the most easterly DZs, and the drop pattern shows a lot of overshoots extending east from the landing area right up to the sea. They also have a fair few sticks marked as coming down in the inundated areas between the beach causeway exits, while the 82nd show a lot in an inundated area located between two DZs (DZ T and DZ O). As I said in my post to FALightFighter, the flood was anywhere up to 12 feet deep in places, and in addition to the vast loads the guys were carrying I should also have mentioned that IIRC US parachute of the time did not have a quick-release system like the British X-Type parachute. Getting out of the harness required the paratrooper to unbuckle the harness, which is why so many guys jumped with knives strapped to calfs or upper arms; I think there may have been a special pocket on the fly front of the 1942 Pattern Jump Suit for a knife of some kind. Not a good idea after a hard landing, doped up with dramamine, under water, in the dark and with 100lb + of kit strapped on your body...

 

BillB

[Argus]

IIRC the Rhodesians hold the record for the number of actual combat drops, with some units doing two or three in a day on occasion. Of course they were mostly single C-47 loads, not massed landings, dropping sticks to cut of Ters for Fire Force ops - in lie of helicopters (as someone mentioned above).

 

shane

[RETAC21]

Which thread?This one? If not, I can only point to the links I´ve given in my second post here for a really great list of WW2 jumps of all nations.

 

That's it, I didn't see it IIRC there was a drop in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.

[Archie Pellagio]

The problem with modern airborne ops is that their primary role is to secure an objective prior to ground forces showing up, (ie bridge, oil field etc) which in modern times is often not amazingly necessary due to the incompetence of most of our enemies (thus SF/Rangers can achieve it in smaller numbers or even just have the ground elements roll up to it) and the general nature of having large helo-mobile forces close by.

 

Haiti is a good example of one where airborne forces would've been employed where noone else could've (in the neccary time frame) had they not been recalled.

[Rubberneck]

Luke

 

3rd world interventions work well for airborne ops.

 

I have serious doubts about airborne ops against a country with any kind of air force or modern integrated air defense system.

[Archie Pellagio]

Luke

 

3rd world interventions work well for airborne ops.

 

I have serious doubts about airborne ops against a country with any kind of air force or modern integrated air defense system.

 

I agree about Third world intervention, but the key element of airborne operations is they meet up with heavier forces to ensure supply either overland or by sea. Sooner or later you need real forces.

[Rubberneck]

No doubt.

 

Airborne forces are really a glorified raiding force.

 

They literally have no operational mobility once they land, and within days they are out of supplies. Now, they don't a great deal, but none the less, they have to be resupplied with the simple beans, bullets, water, etc...

[BillB]

No doubt.

 

Airborne forces are really a glorified raiding force.

 

They literally have no operational mobility once they land, and within days they are out of supplies. Now, they don't a great deal, but none the less, they have to be resupplied with the simple beans, bullets, water, etc...

Don't agree with that, Rubberneck. On the strategic level airborne forces can be used for power projection, as they can be deployed globally in a fraction of the time it takes to deploy other types of forces, and at the operational level they can do a lot more than merely raiding - the ops in support of the D-Day landings are a case in point. IMHO you are blurring the two roles (raiding v operational/startegic) as has largely been the case since the 1940s. Ref the operational mobility, that can be remedied by seizing a an airfield to fly in vehicles or even helos, and an airborne force along Sov/Russian lines with BMD-type vehicles has plenty of operational mobility without that. I would also argue that an airborne force is no more reliant on external resupply than a sea-landed force up until a large beach/seahead has been secured. Altho it is invariably taken as a given, having give the matter some thought I am not really convinced that airborne forces are not viable against an enemy with an air force or integrated AD either. I think it would just take a sufficiently large, properly configured and equipped suppression effort, and I also think that current technology like low level parachutes, satnav and night visions would permit a reversion to night drops.

 

BillB

[Rubberneck]

Bill

 

We'll have to disagree about this one.

[BillB]

Bill

 

We'll have to disagree about this one.

Is that disagree as in I can't/won't prove my contention?

 

BillB

[Ariete!]

Is that disagree as in I can't/won't prove my contention?

 

BillB

 

Pillock

Edited May 13, 2008 by Ariete!

[Rubberneck]

I thought we were better than that...man alive...

I simply didn't want to write out multiple paragraphs reinforcing my argument - I do that with my Master's program already and don't want to continue the process here.

[BillB]

I thought we were better than that...man alive...

I simply didn't want to write out multiple paragraphs reinforcing my argument - I do that with my Master's program already and don't want to continue the process here.

Only kidding - hence the smiley(s)! How's the Master's going?

 

BillB

[Rubberneck]

Well enough. I'll be 75% complete by the end of June, and then am taking about a two month break from classes, and will re-engage in September. Hope to complete the entire program by APR 09.

 

I may be in an Army school starting in the summer of 09 - if I am selected, I get another Master's if I graduate...

[Jim Martin]

In answer to the mention of Crete, it was for all intents and purposes a catastrophic operation for the Germans. Losses were so high that Hitler decreed that no further large scale airborne ops ever be undertaken. The airborne forces alone came close to annihilation, and the only thing that saved the situation was the airlanding forces--and THEY only arrived on the ground through fearless and reckless flying on the part of transport plane pilots, who had to fly into a runway swept by enemy fire. The end of the runway was a JU-52 graveyard by the end of the battle. Even with the reinforcement of the airlanding forces, it has been persuasively argued that the British withdrawal from the island was premature, and the battle was yet theirs to win at the time of their withdrawal.

[baboon6]

In answer to the mention of Crete, it was for all intents and purposes a catastrophic operation for the Germans. Losses were so high that Hitler decreed that no further large scale airborne ops ever be undertaken. The airborne forces alone came close to annihilation, and the only thing that saved the situation was the airlanding forces--and THEY only arrived on the ground through fearless and reckless flying on the part of transport plane pilots, who had to fly into a runway swept by enemy fire. The end of the runway was a JU-52 graveyard by the end of the battle. Even with the reinforcement of the airlanding forces, it has been persuasively argued that the British withdrawal from the island was premature, and the battle was yet theirs to win at the time of their withdrawal.

 

I don't know about that. The British were entirely dependent on the sea for reinforcement and resupply, and the Germans had control of the air. The Royal Navy was already taking serious losses from the Luftwaffe's Ju87s and 88s. Where I believe the Commonwealth forces did screw up was first in withdrawing from Maleme airfield (because of a communications problem) and second in not launching a counter-attack quickly enough and in sufficient strength to retake Maleme. The attack came late and was effectively only two coys strong- this at a time when Freyberg still had nearly a brigade in reserve, waiting for a seaborne invasion which was never going to come (the RN had already destroyed or scattered the small German/Italian seaborne force). Predictably the attack failed. By the time Freyberg committed his reserve and also allowed coastal defence guns to be used against land targets, it was too late. The German reinforcements (which eventually did include a seaborne element) had by now tipped the balance in favour of the Axis.