Dec 7, 1942

[DesertFox]

This is kind of varied as far as a question

 

First, Could Japan have held out for a year without attacking the US and their attempts to get new resources?

How bad was their fuel and other supply situation

 

Second, would the US President have found a way to declare war on Germany and/or Japan before then?

What kind of plans did he seem to have for getting into war?

 

If Japan would still have the resources to attack Pearl Harbor in Dec 1942 and the US did not get engaged in the war before then, how would this effect force levels on both sides and how well prepared would the US be by then?

[Kit Hildreth]

This is kind of varied as far as a question

 

First, Could Japan have held out for a year without attacking the US and their attempts to get new resources?

How bad was their fuel and other supply situation

 

Second, would the US President have found a way to declare war on Germany and/or Japan before then?

What kind of plans did he seem to have for getting into war?

 

If Japan would still have the resources to attack Pearl Harbor in Dec 1942 and the US did not get engaged in the war before then, how would this effect force levels on both sides and how well prepared would the US be by then?

 

Funny, I was thinking about this awhile back; and it struck me that had the Japanese simply attacked the British'. French' & Dutch' colonial possessions in S.W Asia and ignored the Americans completely, they could have cleaned up, secured their oil & other raw material sources such as rubber. In so doing, thereby avoiding conflict with the American's who would have been stymied because of their highly publicised anti-colonial stance. Hitler would not have felt compelled to declare war on the U.S in solidarity with his Axis partner, and Roosevelt would have been hard put to go beyond lend-lease in Congress & the Senate. Thoughts?

[RETAC21]

Funny, I was thinking about this awhile back; and it struck me that had the Japanese simply attacked the British'. French' & Dutch' colonial possessions in S.W Asia and ignored the Americans completely, they could have cleaned up, secured their oil & other raw material sources such as rubber. In so doing, thereby avoiding conflict with the American's who would have been stymied because of their highly publicised anti-colonial stance. Hitler would not have felt compelled to declare war on the U.S in solidarity with his Axis partner, and Roosevelt would have been hard put to go beyond lend-lease in Congress & the Senate. Thoughts?

The Yanks reinforce the Philippines until the Japs couldn't tackle it and sit astride the Jap comms lines until they get an excuse to enter the war, promptly isolating Japan from the resources it needs to survive. When the US enters the war, the balance of power is not even close as they outnumber the Japanese in everything.

[John Dudek]

The Yanks reinforce the Philippines until the Japs couldn't tackle it and sit astride the Jap comms lines until they get an excuse to enter the war, promptly isolating Japan from the resources it needs to survive. When the US enters the war, the balance of power is not even close as they outnumber the Japanese in everything.

 

Yup, IIRC, there would have been at least one fully locked and loaded armored division using both Grant and M-3 Stuart Tanks, half tracks and all their other transport vehicles. There would also be at least one additional US National Guard Infantry Division in the Philippines by that time, possibly two. Those ten newly constituted Filippino Divisions would have been fully trained and equipped by 12/42. Their artillery arm would have been boosted by the gaining of all the 75mm guns from the US forces, that had been re-equipped by this time with 105mm's. The 90mm and 37mm flak guns promised by General Marshal would also be part of their TOE. The Forth Marine Regiment would have been substantially reinforced by the addition of all the remaining US Marines in China.

 

MacArthur's FEAF would have been substantially enlarged by the addition of numerous B-17, B-24, B-25, B-26 and A-20 Bombardment Groups. There would have been large numbers of P-39, P-40 and some P-38 Lightning Fighterplanes in their inventory by this time.

 

Admiral Thomas Hart's Asiatic Fleet probably wouldn't have had the hundreds of PT Boats that were requested, but there would have been dozens more of them than the single motor torpedo boat squadron under John Bulckley. By this time too, the Heavy Cruiser, USS Houston would have been sent stateside for modernization and replaced by a small number of light and heavy cruisers.

[John Dudek]

This is kind of varied as far as a question

 

First, Could Japan have held out for a year without attacking the US and their attempts to get new resources?

How bad was their fuel and other supply situation

 

Second, would the US President have found a way to declare war on Germany and/or Japan before then?

What kind of plans did he seem to have for getting into war?

 

If Japan would still have the resources to attack Pearl Harbor in Dec 1942 and the US did not get engaged in the war before then, how would this effect force levels on both sides and how well prepared would the US be by then?

 

IIRC, the Japanese signed a trade agreement with the DEI shortly before December 1941 to supply them with much needed oil and then, renegged on the deal following Pearl Harbor, preferring to invade and take over all of the oil fields instead.

Edited April 25, 2008 by John Dudek

[swerve]

IIRC, the Japanese signed an agreement with the DEI shortly before December 1941 to supply them with much needed oil and then, renegged on the deal following Pearl Harbor, preferring to invade and take over all of the oil fields instead.

 

I think you remember wrong.

 

Perhaps you are confused by the fact that the NEI government had been negotiating with Japan over increasing exports of raw materials, in particular oil, & some Japanese requests had been agreed to by the Dutch, by the beginning of June 1941. But the NEI government refused to accede to everything that Japan asked for, & talks were broken off without agreement. Three days later, the USA imposed oil export restrictions. The Japanese soon afterwards occupied all of French Indochina, apparently thinking that the implied threat might make the NEI government more malleable. It would also provide useful bases in the event of war, but that seems to have been thought of as a contingent advantage, not the intention - though one historian wrote of a "self-fulfilling prophecy".

 

The USA, Britain & the Netherlands almost immediately froze all Japanese assets, & imposed a complete oil embargo. The embargo was, in theory, not absolute: Japan could apply for licences to buy oil. But no licences were issued. The Japanese attempted to negotiate an end to the embargo with the USA, which was the chief instigator of it, but the USA insisted on Japanese withdrawal from various occupied territories first, & the Japanese insisted on the lifting of the embargo first, with less (& vaguely defined) withdrawal, & that only after a general peace agreement.

 

Note that the NEI government was on the sidelines. Its policy was determined by the Dutch government in London, which was dependent on the British government, which was very keen to involve the USA as closely as possible. The NEI couldn't act independently, & with Britain intending to fight to defend it (which the Japanese knew about), felt it had no motive to try. There were no further negotiations, AFAIK, between the NEI & Japan after 17 June 1941.

[John Dudek]

I think you remember wrong.

 

Perhaps you are confused by the fact that the NEI government had been negotiating with Japan over increasing exports of raw materials, in particular oil, & some Japanese requests had been agreed to by the Dutch, by the beginning of June 1941. But the NEI government refused to accede to everything that Japan asked for, & talks were broken off without agreement. Three days later, the USA imposed oil export restrictions. The Japanese soon afterwards occupied all of French Indochina, apparently thinking that the implied threat might make the NEI government more malleable. It would also provide useful bases in the event of war, but that seems to have been thought of as a contingent advantage, not the intention - though one historian wrote of a "self-fulfilling prophecy".

 

The USA, Britain & the Netherlands almost immediately froze all Japanese assets, & imposed a complete oil embargo. The embargo was, in theory, not absolute: Japan could apply for licences to buy oil. But no licences were issued. The Japanese attempted to negotiate an end to the embargo with the USA, which was the chief instigator of it, but the USA insisted on Japanese withdrawal from various occupied territories first, & the Japanese insisted on the lifting of the embargo first, with less (& vaguely defined) withdrawal, & that only after a general peace agreement.

 

Note that the NEI government was on the sidelines. Its policy was determined by the Dutch government in London, which was dependent on the British government, which was very keen to involve the USA as closely as possible. The NEI couldn't act independently, & with Britain intending to fight to defend it (which the Japanese knew about), felt it had no motive to try. There were no further negotiations, AFAIK, between the NEI & Japan after 17 June 1941.

 

It's obvious that you remember better than I do.~ I remember the bit about the negotiations that were going on, but not the results.

[Burncycle360]

Would the US have bolstered the Philippine garrison to a significant degree, or did they still have the mindset the fleet would come save them if anything happened?

[John Dudek]

Would the US have bolstered the Philippine garrison to a significant degree, or did they still have the mindset the fleet would come save them if anything happened?

 

 

Much additional equipment meant for the PI was already in the pipeline and sitting in warehouses awaiting trans shipment on 7 December, 1941. The weak link was there were not enough merchant ship hulls to carry it all, as it was still peacetime and the civilian merchant marine had not yet entirely been conscripted.

[EvanDP]

Much additional equipment meant for the PI was already in the pipeline and sitting in warehouses awaiting trans shipment on 7 December, 1941. The weak link was there were not enough merchant ship hulls to carry it all, as it was still peacetime and the civilian merchant marine had not yet entirely been conscripted.

Wasn't a lot of stuff meant for the Philippines diverted to the British under lend lease?

[swerve]

It's obvious that you remember better than I do.~ I remember the bit about the negotiations that were going on, but not the results.

 

Well, I didn't remember all that, but I was pretty sure no agreement had been reached, & remembered enough to know where to look for confirmation.

[John Dudek]

Wasn't a lot of stuff meant for the Philippines diverted to the British under lend lease?

 

 

After the German Declaration of war on 11 December, 1941, alot of that stuff was suddenly and immediately needed by the expanding US Armed Forces.

[thekirk]

IANAWWIINE (I Am Not A WWII Naval Expert), but I know enough to be dangerous, so here's my take on the "Pearl Harbor in 1942" thing:

 

I've always thought that WWII could have gone a lot worse in the long run for the Allies than it did, if some of the earlier Axis successes hadn't been so successful. Some of the early defeats, like Pearl Harbor, were actually blessings in disguise, in that they set trends that resulted in eventual victory for the Allies. We had to learn some lessons in blood, sadly. Some we didn't figure out until after the war, i.e. tank destroyers...

 

Imagine the impact if the Japanese had simply "threatened" the Philippines, and lured the Pacific Fleet into the battle on their own terms they'd always dreamed of and trained for, the "Hey-diddle-diddle, straight down the middle" Tsushima East attack by the battleships of the US Pacific Fleet, with the carriers playing the then-doctrinal role of screening and recon, rather than main battle force?

 

If the majority of the Pacific Fleet-in-being had been put on the bottom somewhere west of Midway, how long would Roosevelt have stayed in office? How much longer would the war have gone on?

 

Suppose the Japanese had a lot more insight into the American mind than they did: They'd put the onus of war on us, rather than them, by not attacking the Hawaiian Islands or the Philippines, and just go after the resources they needed in the NEI and Southeast Asia. Using the justification that Roosevelt was "starving Japanese children" by denying them oil and steel, any military effort on the US part would have been a lot more half-hearted. If we'd have gone to war, then, public opinion might not have reacted the way it did after Pearl Harbor, 1941, and the whole war would have gone very differently.

 

Had the Japanese been smart, they'd have given the US zero direct provocation for war, and tried to lure us into the "Big Battleship Battle" that they'd always planned and trained for, somewhere out in the Pacific. With a large chunk of our fleet lost, (and I assume that we'd have had big losses; witness what happened at Ironbottom Sound, for example, when we initially encountered the Japanese surface forces), the likelihood of war continuing on to victory on US terms is a lot less likely.

 

The curve of technological evolution would also have been different; would the money and the urgency have been there, for the development of radar, among other things? How much of the rearmament program would have gotten through Congress, if the Japanese had made it clear they didn't intend to threaten US interests?

 

I suspect that if that course of events had taken place, the "America Firsters" and pacifists would have taken the Presidency and Congress in 1944, by a landslide. Follow-on results would have been totally unpredictable.

 

Which is what makes "alternate history" so damn fascinating as navel-gazing. It still remains navel-gazing, though. Or, should I say "naval-gazing"?

[John Dudek]

IANAWWIINE (I Am Not A WWII Naval Expert), but I know enough to be dangerous, so here's my take on the "Pearl Harbor in 1942" thing:

 

I've always thought that WWII could have gone a lot worse in the long run for the Allies than it did, if some of the earlier Axis successes hadn't been so successful. Some of the early defeats, like Pearl Harbor, were actually blessings in disguise, in that they set trends that resulted in eventual victory for the Allies. We had to learn some lessons in blood, sadly. Some we didn't figure out until after the war, i.e. tank destroyers...

 

Imagine the impact if the Japanese had simply "threatened" the Philippines, and lured the Pacific Fleet into the battle on their own terms they'd always dreamed of and trained for, the "Hey-diddle-diddle, straight down the middle" Tsushima East attack by the battleships of the US Pacific Fleet, with the carriers playing the then-doctrinal role of screening and recon, rather than main battle force?

 

If the majority of the Pacific Fleet-in-being had been put on the bottom somewhere west of Midway, how long would Roosevelt have stayed in office? How much longer would the war have gone on?

 

Suppose the Japanese had a lot more insight into the American mind than they did: They'd put the onus of war on us, rather than them, by not attacking the Hawaiian Islands or the Philippines, and just go after the resources they needed in the NEI and Southeast Asia. Using the justification that Roosevelt was "starving Japanese children" by denying them oil and steel, any military effort on the US part would have been a lot more half-hearted. If we'd have gone to war, then, public opinion might not have reacted the way it did after Pearl Harbor, 1941, and the whole war would have gone very differently.

 

Had the Japanese been smart, they'd have given the US zero direct provocation for war, and tried to lure us into the "Big Battleship Battle" that they'd always planned and trained for, somewhere out in the Pacific. With a large chunk of our fleet lost, (and I assume that we'd have had big losses; witness what happened at Ironbottom Sound, for example, when we initially encountered the Japanese surface forces), the likelihood of war continuing on to victory on US terms is a lot less likely.

 

The curve of technological evolution would also have been different; would the money and the urgency have been there, for the development of radar, among other things? How much of the rearmament program would have gotten through Congress, if the Japanese had made it clear they didn't intend to threaten US interests?

 

I suspect that if that course of events had taken place, the "America Firsters" and pacifists would have taken the Presidency and Congress in 1944, by a landslide. Follow-on results would have been totally unpredictable.

 

Which is what makes "alternate history" so damn fascinating as navel-gazing. It still remains navel-gazing, though. Or, should I say "naval-gazing"?

 

Good points, but by 7/12/1942, the Essex Carriers would be coming on line, along with the numerous light cruiser hulled, aircraft carriers, plus the "New Battleships", USS Indiana, North Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, Alabama, Massachusetts and etc.

[Archie Pellagio]

Suppose the Japanese had a lot more insight into the American mind than they did: They'd put the onus of war on us, rather than them, by not attacking the Hawaiian Islands or the Philippines, and just go after the resources they needed in the NEI and Southeast Asia. Using the justification that Roosevelt was "starving Japanese children" by denying them oil and steel, any military effort on the US part would have been a lot more half-hearted. If we'd have gone to war, then, public opinion might not have reacted the way it did after Pearl Harbor, 1941, and the whole war would have gone very differently.

 

The problem is invading the DEI in particular and Malaya to a lesser extent is very difficult and risky without at least keeping the PI's busy.

 

Things like submarine torpedo effectiveness etc are still unknowns and would've posed a greater threat to planner's minds than they actually were as well.

[swerve]

The problem is invading the DEI in particular and Malaya to a lesser extent is very difficult and risky without at least keeping the PI's busy....

 

Risky because of the chance that the US might join in, but easier than in reality if the USA doesn't. Just have to hold back enough forces to screen the Philippines, in case the USA does decide to come out to play.

[stimson47]

Would the US have bolstered the Philippine garrison to a significant degree, or did they still have the mindset the fleet would come save them if anything happened?

 

The U.S. planned to reinforce the island to a certain extent. The planned reinforcements were supposed to be in place by July 1942 and included the following units:

 

-34th and 161st Infantry Regiments

-1 light tank battalion, 2 medium tank battalions

-field artillery brigade, plus two field artillery battalions

-anti-aircraft brigade

 

MacArthur wanted to replace the 45th Infantry Regiment (PS, which would fill out the other Scout units) with the 161st and use the 34th to fill gaps in the 31st and 161st and the two field artillery battalions would fill out the Philippine Division's divisonal artillery. These units would complete the reorganization of the PD from a square division to a triangular one. Marshall offered MacArthur a National Guard division (41st) in November 1941, but MacArthur rejected it because it would place a severe strain on shipping.

 

Equipment for the Philippine Army included:

 

-130 75mm guns

-48 155mm howitzers

-24 155mm guns

-anti-tank guns for infantry divisions

-60mm and 81mm mortars

 

This equipment would've rounded out the ten Filipino reserve divisions and given then a complete set of equipment. Additionally, the ten divisions would have completed basic training by the beginning of 1942.

 

It is possible that the U.S. might have sent more troops to the Philippines if the war did not start until December 1942, but it seems that the War Department was still concerned about the possibility of holding the islands. Although, Marshall agreed to most of MacArthur's requests after July 1941, they were not overally extravegant. MacArthur truly believed that given the proper equipment and support, the Philippine Army could adequately defend the island.

 

(See John Whitman, Bataan: Our Last Ditch)