D-Day Europe

[DesertFox]

I have heard a bunch of different items with D-Day that Rommel was not near the beaches and that Hitler would not release the troops / tanks earmarked to repel an invasion.

 

What I am curious is what would have happen if Rommel had been near the beaches and Hitler had released teh tanks / troops to repel the invading forces?

[John Dudek]

I have heard a bunch of different items with D-Day that Rommel was not near the beaches and that Hitler would not release the troops / tanks earmarked to repel an invasion.

 

What I am curious is what would have happen if Rommel had been near the beaches and Hitler had released teh tanks / troops to repel the invading forces?

 

Allied Air would have had an absolute field day with such a target rich environment, while the offshore bombardment ships would blast the German Armored concentrations much like they did at Salerno.

[DougRichards]

Plagiarizing a BBC website:

 

"1945: US drops atomic bomb on Berlin"

The first atomic bomb has been dropped by a United States aircraft on the German city of Berlin.

President Harry S Truman, announcing the news from the cruiser, USS Augusta, in the mid-Atlantic, said the device was more than 2,000 times more powerful than the largest bomb used to date.

[Marek Tucan]

Might such a situation even help for faster Allied advance? If Panzers are to attack against such a mighty firepower, they might get weakened enough they'd pose much less problems once Allies gather forces for assault, no?

[binder001]

So many "what ifs" in this scenario. There have been articles and books on what if the 1stSS LAH counter attacked on 6/6-7. Basically, look at Omaha Beach - that's likely where Rommel would have struck. The 29th and 1st Divisions were ashore, but barely. They had lost personnel, equipment, etc so their firepower was greatly reduced. Units were mixed and disorganized and even with 16 - 24 hrs needed for a Panzer Division to assemble and move to the battlefield, the Americans were not very far ashore. One of the weakest ares was communications. I would help to have all four Iowa class BB's sitting right off Omaha Beach if nobody has a commo net to tell them where to put their fire. Remember the stories of destroyers operating close to the beach? That was so they could identify targets to engage. Go over the bluffs above Omaha and the Navy was functionally blind. Yes, there were Navy observation pilots in Spitfires overhead but how well could they direct fire onto multiple combined arms battlegroups chewing up the troops as they came off the beaches? I'm not a fan of the SS, but given how fiercly the LAH fought in Normandy, it would have been a bloody mess for both sides. The Germans probably couldn't drive the US troops back into the sea due to air and naval support, but Omaha probably would have to be abandoned as it would be costly to try and reinforce and supply the guys ashore. More ifs - if the LAH was involved containing Omaha, could the British take Caen and wheel around to trap them against advancing forces from Utah? Probobably not with Monty in charge, but it's fun to think about. All the US forces would have to come ashore at Utah which might diminish the Americans build up of troops and supplies. The Germans would have the advantage of dealing with two separated enemy forces. As implied in an earlier post - the Allies would probably keep their lodgement, but at an even greater cost. The war goes on (possibly without Eisenhower, who would carry the blame for the failure at Omaha) and Berlin gets nuked in the summer of 1945, or the US troops meet up with the Russians who are waiting at the Rhine.

[Marek Tucan]

Would he have enough informations to strike at Omaha? Or would he try to stop Brits from reaching Caen? Won't he see them as more dangerous enemy?

[Ken Estes]

Would he have enough informations to strike at Omaha? Or would he try to stop Brits from reaching Caen? Won't he see them as more dangerous enemy?

 

The early use of German armor would of necessity have centered on Caen and its surrounding countryside, the flank closest to Germany and the one closest to the pre-invasion positions of the PzDiv. The closer one approaches to the Cotetin Peninsula, the worse the conditions for employing armor, on either side. So Utah would have survived, and maybe Omaha would have not received German reinforcements, but the British beaches would have seen stiff fighting inland and the Pegasus Bridge enclave might have been overwhelmed. However, the German losses in driving close to the beaches and the allied firepower [as Rommel had feared] would have depleted the German armored Corps that later stopped Monty cold in Opn Goodwood, etc.

 

Take care not to overestimate naval gunfire against mobile targets. The results at Gela/Sicily, Salerno against the German armored thrusts were exaggerated, not the least by the naval folk, but to be fair everybody made decisive claims: air, armor, infantry, tank destroyers, arty. As pointed out, once over the bluffs at Omaha [the only beaches completely dominated by them] the NGF had a hard time providing quick response vs observed targets. But the German LC would have suffered damage from naval barrages and the areas near the British beaches did not favor armor and the Brit/Can troops would have caused considerable damage to tanks and APCs running down narrow roads leading to the beach towns.

 

Only in the sad IJN Naval Bombadment doctrine thread, can one see blind trust in the power of naval guns to change things ashore...not shared at the time by professionals.

[Mk 1]

Take care not to overestimate naval gunfire against mobile targets. The results at Gela/Sicily, Salerno against the German armored thrusts were exaggerated, not the least by the naval folk, but to be fair everybody made decisive claims: air, armor, infantry, tank destroyers, arty. ...

 

Only in the sad IJN Naval Bombadment doctrine thread, can one see blind trust in the power of naval guns to change things ashore...not shared at the time by professionals.

Naval gunfire might not have been "decisive" against moving targets ... but a Panzer Division on the attack is not always moving. It must form-up its combat task forces somewhere, some time, prior to each bound forward.

 

The best case for indirect fire against a combined arms attack comes in those cases where the defender is able to find enemy concentrations prior to jumping-off. Keep in mind the level of aerial surpremacy that the allies maintained over the Normandy beachheads. Whether it was the ships guided by land-based FOs, or aerial detection and aerial FOs, or even just the aerial assets conducting the strike, any efforts to concentrate by the panzers would be at significant risk.

 

A single task-force caught by a 6-inch cruiser while forming-up will put a divisional attack off plan. First bound, second bound on the first day, first bound on the second day ... it would have happened. Once the axis of the German thrust was identified, it would probably have happened repeatedly.

 

I just can't see how the Germans could have wielded the concentrated fire-power that they needed for a Panzer attack to work.

 

-Mark 1

[Colin Williams]

In order to get other Panzer divisions above the beaches on D-Day, the Germans would need to base them much closer. Both Utah and Omaha are pretty hard to get to (and to expand out from), but I suppose Bayeux would have been a possibility, at least to intervene at Omaha and Gold. Of course, putting a panzer division in Bayeux would not have gone unnoticed and might well have earned the town a special visit from Bomber Harris.

[shep854]

Would pre-planned H&I shoots have been effective in isolating the beaches?

[Guest aevans]

Would pre-planned H&I shoots have been effective in isolating the beaches?

 

Above and beyond the already extensive (unintentional) carpet bombing and battleship/cruiser shoots you mean?

[Ken Estes]

Naval gunfire might not have been "decisive" against moving targets ... but a Panzer Division on the attack is not always moving. It must form-up its combat task forces somewhere, some time, prior to each bound forward.

 

....

That, Mark, would have to be called a "fleeting moment" [Help me! .... cannot resist a pun!]

[shep854]

Above and beyond the already extensive (unintentional) carpet bombing and battleship/cruiser shoots you mean?

 

To rephrase: How well did the NGF fire and aerial bombardment isolate the beaches from German reinforcement? Was NGF effective during dark?

[On the way]

So many "what ifs" in this scenario. There have been articles and books on what if the 1stSS LAH counter attacked on 6/6-7. Basically, look at Omaha Beach - that's likely where Rommel would have struck. The 29th and 1st Divisions were ashore, but barely. They had lost personnel, equipment, etc so their firepower was greatly reduced. Units were mixed and disorganized and even with 16 - 24 hrs needed for a Panzer Division to assemble and move to the battlefield, the Americans were not very far ashore. One of the weakest ares was communications. I would help to have all four Iowa class BB's sitting right off Omaha Beach if nobody has a commo net to tell them where to put their fire. Remember the stories of destroyers operating close to the beach? That was so they could identify targets to engage. Go over the bluffs above Omaha and the Navy was functionally blind. Yes, there were Navy observation pilots in Spitfires overhead but how well could they direct fire onto multiple combined arms battlegroups chewing up the troops as they came off the beaches? I'm not a fan of the SS, but given how fiercly the LAH fought in Normandy, it would have been a bloody mess for both sides. The Germans probably couldn't drive the US troops back into the sea due to air and naval support, but Omaha probably would have to be abandoned as it would be costly to try and reinforce and supply the guys ashore. More ifs - if the LAH was involved containing Omaha, could the British take Caen and wheel around to trap them against advancing forces from Utah? Probobably not with Monty in charge, but it's fun to think about. All the US forces would have to come ashore at Utah which might diminish the Americans build up of troops and supplies. The Germans would have the advantage of dealing with two separated enemy forces. As implied in an earlier post - the Allies would probably keep their lodgement, but at an even greater cost. The war goes on (possibly without Eisenhower, who would carry the blame for the failure at Omaha) and Berlin gets nuked in the summer of 1945, or the US troops meet up with the Russians who are waiting at the Rhine.

 

IIRC with the Germans flooding the area behind the beaches, any counter attack by German armour would have been channeled into the few good roads leading into the beaches. They would have been picked off by allied naval bombardment or by allied air power. The best thing for them to do would have been to marshall first and than perform a nighttime counter attack, and try to push the allied back to the beaches without getting harrased by air.

[swerve]

In order to get other Panzer divisions above the beaches on D-Day, the Germans would need to base them much closer. ...

 

That's what Rommel wanted, on the grounds that Allied air power would render movement from positions further back impossible. He wanted to defeat the invasion on the beaches, arguing that once firmly established, it would be impossible to repel - and he pointed to the precedents in the Med. If that meant losing all the panzers, so be it, as long as it got the job done. If they succeeded, they wouldn't be needed again for a while, & could eventually be replaced. Preserving the panzers at the cost of letting a beachhead be firmly established would merely postpone their loss slightly, in his view.

 

I don't know if his plan could have succeeded, but he was right about the alternative.

[Marek Tucan]

But the trick is the Panzer Divs weren't stationed close to the beaches so even if he was at his CP on June 6, I doubt his presence would change much.

 

EDIT: And if PzDivs were moved to the coast, the Allies would know about it and would change their plans.

Edited April 25, 2008 by Tuccy

[Ken Estes]

But the trick is the Panzer Divs weren't stationed close to the beaches so even if he was at his CP on June 6, I doubt his presence would change much.

 

EDIT: And if PzDivs were moved to the coast, the Allies would know about it and would change their plans.

21st PzDiv was, and was roughly handled in the process. Would greater numbers have counted? How many beaches would have been thus covered by the 8-10

PZ and Mech divs? The Atlantic coast of FR/BE/NETH is a long one. Remember, pulling them out of beach hides and moving laterally along poor coastal

roads to the 'right' beach to repel the attack likely would have made them even more vulnerable than the interior moves demonstrated.

[Paul in Qatar]

It is hard to see how the Germans could have improved their situation in Normandy faster than the Allies could. The French transport net was battered all to heck, with only winding river routes pretty well open. In the opening days (say D to D+3) it would have been a near thing, but then Allied numbers would have take a dramatic turn for the better. At the same time, the clouds cleared (about when zactly? Anyone?) and Allied airpower would have doubled or more its combat effect.

 

So the Germans win on D+2 or lose even faster than the historical case as they would have shot their wad sooner.

[Ken Estes]

The Allies remained well aware of the principal threat to a continental landing, versus the kind in the Pacific, usually against easily isolated islands. So, whereas in the Pacific one would pummel the islands with days of prep fires, on the continent, surprise and speed ranked higher, for there the danger was the ability to reinforce over high speed land approaches vs. the much slower buildup ashore of combat power. Accordingly there were only about 30-odd minutes of NGF before the assualt waves went in. The interdiction campaign had done good work and only those mobile units in the immediate vicinity of Caen could respond, never enough.

 

Only the ability to read Allied traffic would have allowed the Germans to do better, and guess that Normandy was more important to defend than, say, Pas de Calias or upper Cotetin. As noted before, the Allied intel could have seen such redeployment and cued the invasion elsewhere [OTOH, did not do so for Market Garden!].

[DesertFox]

Only the ability to read Allied traffic would have allowed the Germans to do better, and guess that Normandy was more important to defend than, say, Pas de Calias or upper Cotetin. As noted before, the Allied intel could have seen such redeployment and cued the invasion elsewhere [OTOH, did not do so for Market Garden!].

 

Victor's disease?

[Ken Estes]

Victor's disease?

No, it remains more commonplace than that; the ability to conceive of plans in which the enemy conforms to your plan has existed throughout the ages, in war and peace.

[Rich]

21st PzDiv was, and was roughly handled in the process. Would greater numbers have counted? How many beaches would have been thus covered by the 8-10

PZ and Mech divs? The Atlantic coast of FR/BE/NETH is a long one. Remember, pulling them out of beach hides and moving laterally along poor coastal

roads to the 'right' beach to repel the attack likely would have made them even more vulnerable than the interior moves demonstrated.

 

Okay, luckily I've had a wonderful three-day weekend of fun, so can now approach this latest bit of lunacy without audibly retching.

 

To put it bluntly, the entire premise is cow flop on so many levels it needs more adjusting of history to work than even the pathetic Sealion and Samurai Conquer the World threads require.

 

21. Panzer was deployed exactly as Rommel hoped to deploy the Panzer divisions and acheived ziltch. Well, no, not exactly, they did prevent a battalion of infantry and a squadron of tanks from reaching Caen.

 

There weren't 8 to 10 divisions to cover the coast, although more than that were in the West. In HG-B only Lehr, 2. and 21. Panzer, and 12. SS were actually deployable, as was 17. SS-Panzergrenadier in AG-G. So five. BTW, 2. Panzer was filling exactly the same role for 15. Armee as 21. Panzer was for 7. Armee, leaving Lehr and 12. SS as the only practical mobile reserve for an entire theater. But of course Rommel was going to fix that....by deploying 12. SS at Avraches? Gee, maybe he wasn't actually talking about deploying the Panzer divisions on the beaches?

 

1. SS-Panzer had just absorbed over 4,000 replacements in the two weeks prior to the invasion, and had over 1,000 key personnel in Germany for specialist training on 1 June. It also had just over one-quarter of its wheeled transport operational and had none of its halftracks and half its tanks.

 

Of course then they have to get to a place where they can actually attack OMAHA. So maybe its a good thing they have so few vehicles, since there were so few ways to get them across the Aure, seeing as they would pretty much be forced to come via Caen to Bayeux, from Belgium.

 

Gurk! Sorry, upchuck reflex is kicking in; I just can't stick with this any longer. Urp!