Gettysburg: Little Round Top

[Marek Tucan]

Watching the movie Gettysburg and reading The Killer Angels (to catchall the dialogs, some esp. Southern characters had a bit complicated accents ) did lead me to question: How important was the fight for Devil's Den and then Little Round Top in the grand scheme of battle? Would've the Union lost the battle if Colonel Strong with his brigade didn't rush to the LRT or would it be just relatively insignificant hillock, which would mean just Confederate advantage but not the fate of the battle?

 

(of course, I know that the battle meant severe losses for two of Longstreet's divisions that made things complicated on the last day, but still)

 

and do anyone know of good online source on the whole battle?

[Guest aevans]

Even if the Round Tops hadn't been defended successfully, the delay caused by an attemtp to hold them would have provided enough time for an adequate defense to be posted behind them. Also, the Confederate attackers were pretty much spent by the time they got to Little Round Top, so it's hard see how they could have exploited a breakthrough there.

 

The Wikipedia article is actually a pretty good overview.

[DKTanker]

Even if the Round Tops hadn't been defended successfully, the delay caused by an attemtp to hold them would have provided enough time for an adequate defense to be posted behind them. Also, the Confederate attackers were pretty much spent by the time they got to Little Round Top, so it's hard see how they could have exploited a breakthrough there.

 

The Wikipedia article is actually a pretty good overview.

OTOH, had they been left undefended, which almost happened, the CSA would been in position to easily roll up the Union line.

[Rich]

OTOH, had they been left undefended, which almost happened, the CSA would been in position to easily roll up the Union line.

 

Unlikely, considering that except for Sweitzer and Barnes most of the Fifth Corps was stacked up along the Wheatfield Road, from about the base of Houck Ridge east to the Taneytown Road, and the Sixth Corps was coming up behind them as well. And that further north was Hunt with the bulk of the artillery reserve. But there is no way that the Confederates could have gotten artillery up on LRT from their line of approach, at least in any reasonable time, which would have left the assault reduced to a narrow thrust down a hogback ridge into a deployed infantry and artillery line? I just don't see how in that sitauation they could have gotten off much more than a bunch of penny-packet, uncoordinated attacks?

 

Well, at least that's my opinion off the top of my head.

[Old Tanker]

Do east of the two hills the supply train was parked off Baltimore Pike (?) or what ever road runs past the east side of the cemetary. The USSS were based behind a wall there shooting into the CSA flank as they assaulted LRT.

 

They may have caused chaos in the trains but don't know how disrupted it would of been to the battle itself.

[Rich]

Do east of the two hills the supply train was parked off Baltimore Pike (?) or what ever road runs past the east side of the cemetary. The USSS were based behind a wall there shooting into the CSA flank as they assaulted LRT.

 

They may have caused chaos in the trains but don't know how disrupted it would of been to the battle itself.

 

Er, sorry, but that's Michael Shaara's version of what happened....in a novel....based partly on an old man's reminisance that he palmed off as his "official report" of the battle....as opposed to the actual report he wrote after the battle? Tom Desjardin has about the best account of the fight on Little Round Top and debunks a lot of what is assumed about that action. BTW, trying to go down the east side of LRT is about as difficult as going up the east side, I've done it a bunch of times, the first around 1962 IIRC. About the only realistic possibility at the time I believe would be to try to cross east near the saddle where Oates and Chamberlain fought it out, but that was pretty heavily wooded on the east side? Essentially the tendency would have been to follow the cleared land, the crest and western side of LRT down into the Plum Run Valley to Hauck Ridge had been clear cut recently for firewood IIRC my great-great-aunt said (her dad, my great-great-granddad, was president of the borough council and wrote the reply to Early's requisition), it is pretty obvious in the photos taken then. Which meant the natural route of advance was along the cleared hogback....all twenty yards wide or so of it....or along the front of LRT through Plum Run. Which, as I said, leads directly to two divisions of the Fifth Corps (including Vincent) on the Wheatfield Road. A simple "left face" and they are in line of battle.

[Old Tanker]

Er, sorry, but that's Michael Shaara's version of what happened....in a novel....based partly on an old man's reminisance that he palmed off as his "official report" of the battle....as opposed to the actual report he wrote after the battle? Tom Desjardin has about the best account of the fight on Little Round Top and debunks a lot of what is assumed about that action. BTW, trying to go down the east side of LRT is about as difficult as going up the east side, I've done it a bunch of times, the first around 1962 IIRC. About the only realistic possibility at the time I believe would be to try to cross east near the saddle where Oates and Chamberlain fought it out, but that was pretty heavily wooded on the east side? Essentially the tendency would have been to follow the cleared land, the crest and western side of LRT down into the Plum Run Valley to Hauck Ridge had been clear cut recently for firewood IIRC my great-great-aunt said (her dad, my great-great-granddad, was president of the borough council and wrote the reply to Early's requisition), it is pretty obvious in the photos taken then. Which meant the natural route of advance was along the cleared hogback....all twenty yards wide or so of it....or along the front of LRT through Plum Run. Which, as I said, leads directly to two divisions of the Fifth Corps (including Vincent) on the Wheatfield Road. A simple "left face" and they are in line of battle.

 

 

Sorry but ,the blued comment is exactly what I was talking about. That is where the USSS were firing from but reportedly they were pretty thin in numbers .

 

I also have walked over the area going back to the '70s before much was cleared in the battle area of the 20th Maine. I also have come through from e to w off the Baltimore Pike but don't know if any road , trail or cow path existed in 1863 from that direction.

[Rich]

Sorry but ,the blued comment is exactly what I was talking about. That is where the USSS were firing from but reportedly they were pretty thin in numbers .

 

Yeah, I know, it's just that the actual evidence of their participation and numbers is pretty thin. They started the day in the dustup in the Herbst Woods (I think it was, crikey my mind is going, the reconnaissance in force by the 3rd Maine, supposedly led by Berdan - another war story). After that IIRC they fell back to somewhere in front of the Rose farm, screening the left flank of the position being developed by....damn CRS....anyway the brigade running down Hauck Ridge with outposts in Plum Run Valley. But after that their movements get pretty hazy.

 

I also have walked over the area going back to the '70s before much was cleared in the battle area of the 20th Maine. I also have come through from e to w off the Baltimore Pike but don't know if any road , trail or cow path existed in 1863 from that direction.

 

IIRC the northwest side was pretty clear from the firewood cutting, and the woodlots remaining intact on the western and southern lower slopes of BRT were pretty open, because cattle shaded there when grazing in the meadows, so kept the underbrush clear (along with the periodic fire). But the upper slopes and the southern and eastern side were heavily wooded IIRC. And the topography of the battle area of the 20th Maine was changed substantially in the 1890s when it was leveled and regraded - at Chamberlain's behest - so that the visiting vets in wheelchairs could get about. So it's actually difficult to visualize what that area really looked like in July 1863, no photos were ever taken before the work was done, except for some long-distance shots IIRC. I'll have to check some of my base maps, but I just don't recall any east-west paths or trails in that area and no roads really south of the Weickert House (I think, damn CRS and laziness)?

 

Anyway, kind of nice to have something to talk about that draws me back to my roots.

[BP]

OK, the Confederates take the Round Tops. Where do they go? They're actuallly not the best artillery positions, advancing down them forces attackers to straddle the little ridge. Additionally the Union forces can theoretcially then collapse back to strong positions even as far back as Power's Hill, which is in the route of march for both Sykess and Sedgwickss corps, and the bulk of the Confederate forces are on the other side of the Ridge anyway, where they are committed to attacking in force and unavailable to support success on the south side of the Tops.

 

Longstreet ordered the attack up the Emmitsburg Road, and I always felt Hood wanted to freelance too much with his attack up the Round Tops. So now Hood is wounded and out of the action, the Confederates aren't poised to truly reinforce any success they have on the Tops, and then what? They either hold to no great effect, abandon or are later driven off by stronger Union forces coming into the battle later the day or the next.

 

Besides, they would have gotten terribly tangled up in the Round Top Campground and outlet mall if they had forced their way up, over and down to the south.

[Rich]

OK, the Confederates take the Round Tops. Where do they go? They're actuallly not the best artillery positions, advancing down them forces attackers to straddle the little ridge.

 

Actually it's a horrible artillery position, facing any direction. But especially north or northwest, there was simply no room for more than a single gun.

 

Additionally the Union forces can theoretcially then collapse back to strong positions even as far back as Power's Hill, which is in the route of march for both Sykess and Sedgwickss corps, and the bulk of the Confederate forces are on the other side of the Ridge anyway, where they are committed to attacking in force and unavailable to support success on the south side of the Tops.

Absolutely....but are you channeling Golluem? "Filthy Sykessess and Sedgwickssess". Sorry, I couldn't resist.

 

Longstreet ordered the attack up the Emmitsburg Road, and I always felt Hood wanted to freelance too much with his attack up the Round Tops. So now Hood is wounded and out of the action, the Confederates aren't poised to truly reinforce any success they have on the Tops, and then what? They either hold to no great effect, abandon or are later driven off by stronger Union forces coming into the battle later the day or the next.

 

To be technical, Lee ordered it, based on faulty morning reconnaissance and the typical piss-poor staffwork the ANV should have become rightly famous for. And the original plan was for Hood to quide left on the Pike, ith McLaws to his left, right guiding on the Pike? Who came up with that one. So the initial attack was an improvisation done off the cuff as they realized the original plan was crap, and then became further discombobulated when Hood went down after his lead brigades jumped off, leaving them leaderless (I'm not sure Robertson, Law, et al even knew he was done until they were well on their way?)

 

Besides, they would have gotten terribly tangled up in the Round Top Campground and outlet mall if they had forced their way up, over and down to the south.

 

Nonsense, the Camprground and Mall are miles apart and they would have had to crossed Route 15 (Bypass) and the traffic is murder there trying to get into the Mall.

[BP]

Actually it's a horrible artillery position, facing any direction. But especially north or northwest, there was simply no room for more than a single gun.

 

Exactly. Folks say that the Confederates could put artillery up there and "destroy the Union army". Uhhh, how many guns? OK, in the best instance they manhandle eight, ten, twelve cannons if the gunners aren't particularly homophobic. They hammered away with 130+/- guns to support Pickett's charge to little effect. Harass? Yes. Destroy? Nah.

 

And who holds Little Round Top? The Texans- and particularly the Alabamans who engaged Chamberlain- were thoroughly used and abused by that time. And guaranteed first thing the next morning many more fresh Union troops are available than Confederate.

 

You also brought up a good point about command and control as well. Supposedly it took Hood's aide the better part of an hour to find Law and deliver the order for him to assume command, and he wasn't probably more than a quarter mile away. Yikes.

 

Nonsense, the Camprground and Mall are miles apart and they would have had to crossed Route 15 (Bypass) and the traffic is murder there trying to get into the Mall.

 

 

Good point. OK, I am getting my spatial relations a little bit wrong. But nonetheless, they would have been jammed up behind grayhairs in wagons in the left lane doing 5mph with the horses' left blinkers on.

[Richard Lindquist]

Lee's plan was to attack up the Emmitburg Road toward Cemetery hill. First Law, then Robertson, wandered off toward the east and lessened the force of Longstreet's assault at the decisive point. Hood was wounded before he could get the division sorted out and Law was pretty lackadasical in assuming command and making things happen. When Law went off to assume command of the division, he never really designated a successor in brigade command. Law's brigade and part of Robertson's fought the battle for Little Round Top strictly on the initiative of the individual regimental commanders and without coordination.. As I have noted before, the entire general officer community of the ANV chose 1-3 Jul 1864 to have "bad days".

[Jeff]

Richard

 

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