Lectures on First World War

[RETAC21]

Dual post

Edited May 12, 2008 by RETAC21

[BillB]

British policy on the matter was set down in the famous exchange of notes of 1912, in which it was decided that at the appropriate time during a crisis the French and English General Staffs would consult and agree to a joint plan of action.

 

I beg to differ. I have already pointed you at a source that proves that the British General Staff are on the record as considering the despatch of a seven division expeditionary force to France in 1910, that it was agreed by 1914 that the BEF would occupy the left end of the French line, would advance into Belgium to secure Antwerp in the event of a German violation of Belgian neutrality and teritorial integrity, and that shows that the British Government had still not come to any such formal position as late as 1914. The source has full citation of a plethora of evidence drawn from primary contemporary sources. If you are not going to bother to look at stuff given to you in response to your questions then why do you bother posing them?

 

It appears that there is consensus on this point amongst the posters that have a deeper knowledge of pre-war British military planning than I that the British army failed to anticipate the obvious possibility of the rapid expansion of the army being needed to support a floundering partner. Since it has been stated on this thread that poor tactical performance of the BEF at the commencement of the Somme offensive, in relation to the superlative performance of the same army later, was related to the rapid wartime expansion of the army, does it then not followsthat there was a failure within the British government to anticipate and plan for this fairly obvious contingency?

 

Question repeated – if not the British army, then upon what organization did the responsibility fall upon to anticipate the military requirements of a particular mission?

 

Once again, you persist in repeating things that were and are not the case. There is no such concensus because the possibility of a massive expansion was not obvious to the pepole on the ground at the time, and the tactical performance of the BEF on the Somme was not "poor". The key here is in the bolded section of your first sentence, but you appear to lack the wit to understand the meaning of your own words and the import of them.

 

You can keep on repeating your fatuous and irrelevant question until you are blue in the face, but it will nonetheless remain fatuous and irrelevant. I have already answered this quite comprehensively, pointed you to evidence to support it, and am unwilling to waste my time and effort endleessly repeating myself merely because you are unable and/or unwilling to accept that the facts of the matter do not match your pre-formed opinions that owe more to your personal preferences than the historical record.

 

You may as well be asking in light of H.G. Wells' 1898 novel War of the Worlds, upon what organization did the responsibility fall upon to anticipate the necessary military requirements to repel a Martian invasion. It would make as much sense.

 

BillB

[glenn239]

that it was agreed by 1914 that the BEF would occupy the left end of the French line, would advance into Belgium to secure Antwerp in the event of a German violation of Belgian neutrality and teritorial integrity, and that shows that the British Government had still not come to any such formal position as late as 1914.

 

It appears that your answer is that, although the British army was aware of the potential for its involvement in a continental war, no one in the British government was responsible for anticipating the potential requirements of such a commitment? This is a counter-intuitive position. On the converse side, and for example, I would argue that Moltke's GGS (and ultimately, his boss the Kaiser) were deeply responsible for mis-estimating the potentiality of a British intervention, and I would not be displaced from this attitude by references to Martian invasions.

 

With respect to the British position on the matter, the Grey->Cambon note of November 1912 runs as follows,

 

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have

consulted together. It has been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

 

You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

 

I agreed that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involve action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the two Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

 

Kindly pray tell - where in this message is it stated that British cooperation with France was contingent soley upon a violation of Belgium by Germany? Next, should Germany come by way of Belgium as the army expected, would it be logical to have assumed that a war to defeat the enemy coaltion of potentially 140+ million people and eject it back out of Belgium would be made easier thereby? That is to say, if it is your opinion that the BEF would only activate to uphold Belgian neutrality, then at the very least the British army should have anticipated the force structure to accomplish that task, no?

Edited May 12, 2008 by glenn239

[BillB]

name='glenn239' post='567456' date='Tue 13 May 2008 0015']It appears that your answer is that, although the British army was aware of the potential for its involvement in a continental war, no one in the British government was responsible for anticipating the potential requirements of such a commitment? This is a counter-intuitive position. On the converse side, and for example, I would argue that Moltke's GGS (and ultimately, his boss the Kaiser) were deeply responsible for mis-estimating the potentiality of a British intervention, and I would not be displaced from this attitude by references to Martian invasions.

 

My answer does not "appear" to be anything. My answer is the position as laid out by the people involved at the time, and is based on fully verifiable evidence which you have been appraised of. It is not "counter-intuitive (except possibly to you in you self-confessed ignorance), and it is not unsupported personal opinion, erroneous assumption or invalid extrapolation. The error in your position has been repeatedly pointed out to you, although for reasons best known to yourself you cannot or will not acknowledge that fact.

 

With respect to the British position on the matter, the Grey->Cambon note of November 1912 runs as follows, SNIP

With respect to the British position I have laid out for you the background and contenxt in detail. Set against that, your cut'n'paste snippet is marginally relevant at best.

 

Kindly pray tell - where in this message is it stated that British cooperation with France was contingent soley upon a violation of Belgium by Germany? Next, should Germany come by way of Belgium as the army expected, would it be logical to have assumed that a war to defeat the enemy coaltion of potentially 140+ million people and eject it back out of Belgium would be made easier thereby? That is to say, if it is your opinion that the BEF would only activate to uphold Belgian neutrality, then at the very least the British army should have anticipated the force structure to accomplish that task, no?

 

Kindly pray tell, are you being deliberately obtuse, or are your reading and comprehension skills really as deficient as they appear to be? It has been repeatedly pointed out by myself and others that meeting the Germans en mass to eject them never figured at all in British planning by the War Office, The General Staff or the British government, for the simple reason it it flew in the face of three centuries of successful British involvement in Continental affairs and was an impossible task - even with the introduction of conscription in 1916 Britain could not muster sufficient manpower to come even close to meeting the Germans on the terms you seem to think possible. If that simple bit of historical truth flies counter to your preferences or comprehension, tough. I suggest you stop repeating your daft questions in a desperate attempt to extract the answer you want, go and get a copy of the Gooch book I pointed out to you and read it. It contains far more material than is necessary to refute your vexatious nonsense in every detail.

 

Let's cut to the chase, shall we. Your behaviour in this thread, and indeed in every discussion you have participated in - or more accurately derailed with your nonsense - on this board can only be interpreted in two ways. You are either terminally stupid or you are being deliberately obtuse and provocative, and the evidence points firmly at the latter. Despite projecting an air of genuinely seeking knowledge, you make no effort to engage in meaningful debate, you make no effort to follow up or even acknowledge info you hve requested if it runs counter to your assertions, you plough on with the latter even when they have been thoroughly discredited, you persist in asking the same questions over and over again even after they have been answered and/or comprehensively refuted, you ignore or dissemble when requested to back up your assertions, and you wilfully, deliberately and repeatedly misrepresent the words of others to suit your own purposes. As far as I'm concerned that amounts to trolling, and I know I am far from alone in that view. You have used up all your rope, and I can confidently predict that you will shortly be attracting some rather unwelcome attention unless you modify your behaviour and attitude.

 

BillB

[Ariete!]

Received my copy of "On Infantry" from Amazon yesterday and am tearing through it.

[BillB]

Received my copy of "On Infantry" from Amazon yesterday and am tearing through it.

Why?

 

BillB

[Ariete!]

I mean that I am reading it at a rapid pace. Have you read it?

[glenn239]

With respect to the British position I have laid out for you the background and context in detail.

The Grey-Cambon exchange of notes constitutes a binding element to British policy with respect to France. In it, there is no reference to Belgium. Therefore, any duty entertained therein on behalf of Great Britain towards France existed without respect to Belgium.

 

It has been repeatedly pointed out by myself and others that meeting the Germans en mass to eject them never figured at all in British planning by the War Office, The General Staff or the British government, for the simple reason it it flew in the face of three centuries of successful British involvement in Continental affairs.

 

The difficulty arising is getting an answer on whose failure it was that an obvious element of strategy was missed. I would think the British army’s was at fault; it was they that had the responsibility to anticipate the requirements of a continental mission and then to present these to the ruling government in the form of requirements. Once this was done, then the civilian government took charge for any failure to address these needs. You’ve detailed some theories for why the oversight occurred, but I’m talking of responsibility, not excuses. Next the question would be – did this failure in leadership constitute evidence in support of the topic of the thread, the clique “Lions led by Donkeys”, and if so, to what degree? My inclination would be that perhaps, but only to a moderate degree. Agreed or no?

[Mk 1]

The difficulty arising is getting an answer on whose failure it was that an obvious element of strategy was missed.

It seems to me that this kind of question really does border on trolling. Or perhaps it is just evidence of a severe shortfall in reading comprehension and reasoning skills.

 

The "difficulty is getting an answer" arises because there is no agreement on the "obvious" nature of the "element of strategy" that was missed. If you repeatedly ask a question with invalid assumptions, you will indeed find some difficulty in getting coherent answers. Perhaps I might suggest that you actually try to understand the answers you have received before you repeat your question for the Nth time.

 

I would think the British army’s was at fault; it was they that had the responsibility to anticipate the requirements of a continental mission and then to present these to the ruling government in the form of requirements.

You believe that the British Army should be blamed for not anticipating the requirements of a mission they had never been asked to undertake -- a mission that was contrary to the most recent 200 years of their means and methods, that was contrary to the stated intentions and priorities of their political masters, and was beyond the potential of their state.

 

Fine. Go off and blame them. Put up a flag, crash some symbols, and blare away on a trumpet, so that all will see you have found whom to fault. Just please don't do it here ... stop pestering us with your search for blame. You've asked. Members have, in good faith, given you answers with facts, references, and perspective. Your horse is dead. Stop beating it.

 

There was a lot of interesting information in this thread up through last week, but now for the last several pages it has nothing but this inane search for "who to blame", and two or three posters who have tried patiently to maintain a rational discussion around what might be described as the forum equivalent of a bar-mate with Tourette's Syndrome.

 

-Mark 1

[glenn239]

You believe that the British Army should be blamed for not anticipating the requirements of a mission they had never been asked to undertake -- a mission that was contrary to the most recent 200 years of their means and methods, that was contrary to the stated intentions and priorities of their political masters, and was beyond the potential of their state.

 

I've said nothing of the sort. Blame and responsibility imply two distinct things. The former term often involves a reprimand or punishment, the latter is associated with the structure of the organization. If the Space Shuttle launches without toilet paper, then the first (and basic) task in any investigation is to establish whose responsibility it was to load the dispenser. Once this is done, then an analysis of the events behind the failure establishes whom, if anyone, is to blame: Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher was responsible for the loss of the U.S.S. Lexington. Admiral Fletcher was not to blame for the loss of the Lexington.

 

BBill said:

 

 

I'd also suggest that it was aimed more at preventing the Germans from seizing ports from which to launch an invasion of Britain, given that the British were not confident of the belgian ability to put up protracted resistance to a German invasion, and that the BEF's objective on moving into Belgium was to secure Antwerp rather than confront the invaders.

and,

 

have already pointed you at a source that proves that the British General Staff are on the record as considering the dispatch of a seven division expeditionary force to France in 1910, that it was agreed by 1914 that the BEF would occupy the left end of the French line, would advance into Belgium to secure Antwerp in the event of a German violation of Belgian neutrality and territorial integrity.

 

The Grey-Cambon note defined the obligation. Close consultations would be initiated in this contingency:

 

if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression.

 

The BEF’s mission in these discussions is:

 

If these measures involve action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the two Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

 

The BEF’s continental assignment was defined firstly and most importantly by the British definition of aggression as it pertained to Germany, and then to the integration of its mission in cooperation with that of the French army to counter the aggression. For it to be the case that a German rupture of Belgian neutrality constituted the sole mission by which the BEF may fight, then it follows there can be no definition of German “aggression” prepared by British and French officials that was unrelated to a German invasion of Belgium:

 

The essential thing is that England shall not undertake to remain neutral between France and Germany even in the hypothesis of the attack seeming to come from our act. To take but one example, could the responsibility for aggression be legitimately imputed to us if a concentration of German forces in the Aix-la-Chapelle region compelled us to cover our northern frontier by penetrating into Belgian territory."

 

(Poincare to Cambon, March 1912 Albertini, The Origins of the War, Vol 1, pp 338).

 

and,

 

...If we were to promise Germany that we would remain neutral in the event of aggression against her, our hands might be tied when Germany was not really the victim of aggression. If, for instance, at a time when there was diplomatic tension between Germany and France, Germany concentrated troops upon Aix-la-Chapelle with the obvious intention of entering Belgium, France might be compelled to take the initiative. Germany was quite clever enough to make it appear that she was the victim, just as she was now making it appear that it was England who was intending to attack her, though it was absolutely true that neither England nor France was aggressive towards Germany...

 

Vol VI, no. 559, Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

 

This exchange details a definition of German aggression that was unrelated to Belgium - the concentration of elements of the German army in a particular region of Germany.

 

According to the Grey-Cambon exchange, the mission of the BEF was to be defined only at the time of tension by examining and adapting the plans of the two General Staffs. If the mission of the British Expeditionary Force was exclusively to secure Antwerp and the Channel Ports and there was no possibility of another, then the French General Staff could not have plans envisioning the use of the BEF in areas distant to northern Belgium or the Flanders area,

 

"The situation would be still more disquieting if the Germans, completely refusing their right wing, obliged us to cover considerable distances before being able to deliver battle. Our adversaries would thus place themselves out of reach of the British forces, which could not attack in the Treves region before the twenty-sixth day of the British mobilization. This situation would cause us to lose most precious time, which the Germans might put to profit by vigorously attacking our armies in Luxembourg. If they succeeded in defeating our right in the region of Nancy and to the south, while our armies in Belgium, finding at first nothing in front of them, had not yet obtained any results, they would place us in a critical situation...If the German concentration was effected principally in Lorraine, it would be to our interest at the start to use in Belgian territory only the space necessary to facilitate our movement in the general direction of Treves, while maintaining the possibility of gaining ground towards the north, if circumstances required it."

 

Joffre

 

In this scenario (a refused German right), the French Staff wished to use the BEF in an advance through the southern Ardennes in the direction of Treves. The British position on this matter, as defined by the Grey-Cambon note, was not a yeah or nay, but a "we'll discuss it at the time". From this I'd conclude that the potential assignment of the BEF was more robust than merely covering Antwerp or the Channel ports - the French Staff intended to use it in the decisive battle whereever that was to be fought.