Lectures on First World War

[Anthony EJW]

While John Mosier's book has been roundly criticized on this Grate Sight,

 

And rightly so- the author is highly biased and doesn't even have the saving grace of having done useful primary research.

 

it does contain some nuggets. One point that mosier made is that the way the BEF was formed caused the troops of "Kitchener"s Army" which conducted most of the early attacks on the Somme to be trained by "dugouts" from the Boer Woer (Bar War?). The cadres which would have been most useful in instructing these troops were killed or incapacitated for further service at Ypres, Nueve Chappelle, and Lens-Loos. What remaining officers and NCOs that were left were needed to reconstitute the regular army formations.

The British army was tiny in comparison to the other major European powers and didn't have the deep reserves of NCOs and offiers that the other powers enjoyed. Given the massive expansion that occured as Britain geared up to fight a continental war meant I suspect that the army would have been short of NCOs, officers and above all staff even without the fighting of 1914-15. Obviously totally sitting out the fighting until 1916 would have been best for the British army, but there was politically pretty important that the France wasn't left to fight the war on her own!

 

From the point of view of staff planning, organizations, logistics, division/corps level tactics, artillery procedures, use of engineers, etc, the BEF had made great strides from 1914. At the level of battalion and company, Kitchener's Army was young, enthusastic, well-drilled, and tactically uninstructed.

 

The British army did have a number of failings that had to be corrected rather rapidly during the Somme battles- overall, however, I think that an army that had effectively been built from scratch between 1914-15 being able to fight the German army to a standstill was a significant achievement.

 

As shown in the Blackadder series "the plan involves getting up out of our trenches and walking slowly towards the German machineguns".

 

Ah yes, that great historically accurate work...

[Colin Williams]

Actually, more reliable studies, such as the work by Prior and Wilson, show that the British on the Somme were not totally devoid of tactical skill. As was typical of the British Army, tactics and training varied from one unit to another, but the idea of the 1st day of the Somme as a spectacle of solid waves of green soldiers marching steadily into the machine guns has been fairly well debunked. That is not to say something of that sort didn't happen in some places and at some times or that the level of tactical sophistication in most units was where it would be in 1917 or 1918.

 

The real problems on the first day of the Somme were with the limited amount of artillery support in the days leading up to the attack, the lack of proper ammunition for the required fire missions, the dispersal of the already inadequate artillery support throughout the German defensive system due to Haig's intent to break through in a single attack, the emphasis on destruction over neutralization, the lack of a proper rolling or lifting barrage at this point in the war, the failure to put a high priority on counter-battery fire, the failure to create adequate gaps in the German wire, and the unfortunately long amount of time between the end of the barrage and the arrival of the first British infantry at the German trenches. No amount of tactical skill can save troops caught in the open by impenetrable coils of barbed wire and swept by machine gun fire from secure entrenchments. Even when the British succeeded in capturing German trenches they often lost them to counterattack because the reinforcements were decimated by German artillery firing into no-man's land and never arrived.

[Ken Estes]

....

 

The British army did have a number of failings that had to be corrected rather rapidly during the Somme battles- overall, however, I think that an army that had effectively been built from scratch between 1914-15 being able to fight a portion of the German army to a standstill was a significant achievement.

....

There, fixed it for you! Ever hear of France, Russia?

[BillB]

I think Colin has it right. Even allowing for the first day on the Somme and the alleged unsuitability of the New Army units for anything other than the very basic, British infantry tactics were still superior to the German article. The latter sacrificed tactical dispersion for close control as a matter of deliberate policy; that's why eyewitness accounts, contemporary illustrations and even photo evidence show German infantry advancing virtually shoulder to shoulder in big clumps at Mons et al in 1914, at Vedun in 1916 and again in 1918. In this light the kindermord at Langemarck in 1914 was mebbe not so atypical as is usually assumed, and I think it casts a bit of a different light on the criticisms levelled at the French for all that attaque a l'outrance business. The Germans did not address this as a matter of general policy until the Reichswehr of the 1920s, and I think this also casts a different light on the motivation underlying the development of the Stosstruppen. Far from being evidence of superior German tactical thinking, I think it can be argued that it was actually a stop-gap measure to offset deficient general infantry training.

 

The German officer corps was aware of the cost of this policy from 1870 (St Privat IIRC) but were willing to accept the increased casualty toll. The British followed the German model in the Boer War and the casualties it caused there prompted a tactical rethink c.1908 IIRC, and the BEF went to war with the result in 1914. There is clear photographic evidence of BEF infantry using tactical dispersion, cam and concealment etc in 1914. Ref British artillery, it proved more than adequate over the course of the whole Somme battle. IIRC whichever Crown Prince was commanding the German Army on the Somme said so after the event. It is also relevant to point out that in combination the British infantry and arty tactics during the Battle of the Somme forced the Germans to rethink their subsequent defensive practices, which they are hardly likely to have bothered to do had the British tactics been ineffective.

 

BillB

[BillB]

While John Mosier's book has been roundly criticized on this Grate Sight, it does contain some nuggets. One point that mosier made is that the way the BEF was formed caused the troops of "Kitchener"s Army" which conducted most of the early attacks on the Somme to be trained by "dugouts" from the Boer Woer (Bar War?). The cadres which would have been most useful in instructing these troops were killed or incapacitated for further service at Ypres, Nueve Chappelle, and Lens-Loos. What remaining officers and NCOs that were left were needed to reconstitute the regular army formations.

 

As I understand it the "dugouts" had been replaced by NCOs posted in from Regular battalions at the front or by men promoted from within the New Army units themselves before they went to France - remember that the standard of manpower in many if not most of the latter was far higher than pre-war Regular recruits. There were a lot of men serving in the ranks by choice in New Army battalions who were more than qualified for commissions, for example.

 

From the point of view of staff planning, organizations, logistics, division/corps level tactics, artillery procedures, use of engineers, etc, the BEF had made great strides from 1914. At the level of battalion and company, Kitchener's Army was young, enthusastic, well-drilled, and tactically uninstructed. As shown in the Blackadder series "the plan involves getting up out of our trenches and walking slowly towards the German machineguns".

You were doing alright there until you cited Blackadder, Richard. Please. You'll be citing Hogan's Heroes or Rat Patrol as accurate representations of the US Army during WW2 next. Given the loads the lads were carrying on 1 July it would have been physically difficult if not impossible for them to do much more than advance slowly. The assault waves from the 36th Ulster Div dumped their kit and made a rush at the Schwaben Redoubt (the white gloves and Orange sashes seem to have done the trick!) and actually achieved their objective as planned IIRC. And let's remember why the assault waves were loaded up like donkeys - they were carrying all the kit necessary to consolidate and hold because it was unclear how long it would be before reinforcements and resupply would be able to make it forward. Which suggests that the planners were well aware of the difficulties they were facing, and in turn undermines this idea of waves of men wandering blithely cross no-man's land. The main problem on 1 July was not so much tactical deficiency, but deficiencies in comms, command and control.

 

BillB

[Anthony EJW]

The British army did have a number of failings that had to be corrected rather rapidly during the Somme battles- overall, however, I think that a portion of an army that had effectively been built from scratch between 1914-15 being able to fight a portion of the German army to a standstill was a significant achievement.

 

 

There, fixed it for you! Ever hear of France, Russia?

 

There, fixed it for you! Ever heard of the Ottoman Empire, etc etc etc

 

During the Somme campaign the Germans cycled some 95 divisions through the battle, 43 of them twice and 4 three times. As the German total was 175, of which 125 were in the west, that was a pretty big portion of the German army.

Edited April 26, 2008 by Anthony EJW

[glenn239]

It appears from the answers given so far that there were problems with British tactics and doctrine when the Somme began.

 

Leaving aside difficulties in training, the rapid expansion of the BEF, etc., whose responsiblity was it to ensure that the BEF was tactically competitive with the German Army?

[BillB]

It appears from the answers given so far that there were problems with British tactics and doctrine when the Somme began.

And?

 

Leaving aside difficulties in training, the rapid expansion of the BEF, etc., whose responsiblity was it to ensure that the BEF was tactically competitive with the German Army?

[glenn239]

It appears from the answers given so far that there were problems with British tactics and doctrine when the Somme began.

 

And?

 

And by 1918, it appears that the British Army was pretty good with their doctrine and tactics. So, who dropped the ball prior to the Somme, and how was it picked up such that 2 years later the BEF stood shoulder to shoulder with the best armies in the world? Just curious.

[BillB]

And by 1918, it appears that the British Army was pretty good with their doctrine and tactics. So, who dropped the ball prior to the Somme, and how was it picked up such that 2 years later the BEF stood shoulder to shoulder with the best armies in the world? Just curious.

For some reason the last bit of my last post is missing. Nobody dropped the ball. British infantry tactics were superior to the German or French in 1914 because the BA suffered badly following Prussian tactical practices al la 1870 in the Boer War and adapted accordingly, and continued to do so after the outbreak of WW1. The problem was due to scale. The British Army always played second fiddle to the RN for obvious reasons, size wise and funding wise, and being primarily configured and intended to act as an Imperial police force it was thus never really intended to go toe to toe with Continental mass armies.

 

Consequently in 1914 the BA was a small, long-service, all-volunteer professional force with no recourse to expansion via mass conscription like its Continental contemporaries. They had to recall reservists in 1914 to send a BEF of 100,000 to France in 1914; he French had around that number of conscripts in their army in 1914, and they expanded that to c.1.5 million in a matter of days. The pre-war British Regular and Territorial Army was virtually destroyed holding the line while the mass New Army was built literally from scratch, and the latter had to rely upon on-the-job training because there was nothing else to deploy. It takes time to put together an army from scratch, more time to train and equip it, and even more time to assimilate and disseminate all the tactical, operational, command and tecnological developments that had occurred while the process was underway. Consequently the BA only started to get its act together properly by 1917, and hit its stride the following year.

 

BillB

[Colin Williams]

Of course it's also worth pointing out that everyone was on a steep learning curve when it came to offensive trench warfare, with the problem exacerbated by the fact that defenses were constantly improving. All other issues aside, the Germans came into the war with a decided edge by virtue their long focus on capturing fortifications and their deployment of howitzers with the field army. I recall reading that just before the war that a member of the siege (fortress?) artillery branch of the British Royal Artillery suggested to officers of the field artillery that indirect fire would play an important role in any future continental war. He was met with disbelief.

[BillB]

Of course it's also worth pointing out that everyone was on a steep learning curve when it came to offensive trench warfare, with the problem exacerbated by the fact that defenses were constantly improving. All other issues aside, the Germans came into the war with a decided edge by virtue their long focus on capturing fortifications and their deployment of howitzers with the field army. I recall reading that just before the war that a member of the siege (fortress?) artillery branch of the British Royal Artillery suggested to officers of the field artillery that indirect fire would play an important role in any future continental war. He was met with disbelief.

I'd agree with that, as it's is what I meant by it taking "...even more time to assimilate and disseminate all the tactical, operational, command and tecnological developments that had occurred while the process was underway." Ref the Germans, agreed they had an edge, altho mebbe not as great as you appear to be suggesting. After all, they had to borrow Skoda 305mm howitzers from the Austro-Hungarians to deal with the fixed defences at Liege even though that was a longstanding feature of their plans, and they only finally cracked it by deploying a handful of brand-new Krupp 420mm pieces rushed up straight from the factory IIRC. The RA also deployed howitzers with the "field army". Divisional artillery included 4.5 Howitzers from 1911, and I believe the British mix of 18 Pounder, the 4.5 Howitzer and 60 Pounder was a pretty similar mix capabiity wise to that of the Germans with their 77mm, 130mm, 150mm & 210mm combo. I think it was the sheer number of the latter that provided the edge rather then capabilities.

 

Ref the RA guy being disbelieved for stating that indirect fire would be an important feature of the next war, mebbe so but that view was far from universal. The idea that arty had to be light and mobile drawn from the Boer War was offset by the group of RA observers under General Sir Ian Hamilton who accompanied the Japanese Army during the Russo-Japanese War. Hamilton had a hand in the selection of the 18 Pounder over the 13 Pounder, and their observations on the importance of weight of fire and indirect fire were widely disseminated in lectures and military journals before 1914. Two of Hamilton's men argued this against a higher ranking officer at a General Staff conference in 1911, for example, and IIRC Hamilton's men were also responsible for all first-line RA pieces being capable of indirect fire by 1914.

 

BillB

[glenn239]

I think you’ve done a good job explaining why Haig has many defenders, and not just deriders. Obviously, given the BEF’s ascendancy in 1918, Haig’s command style must have been in some ways leading edge. However, I want to go back to the problems with wartime expansion. You wrote,

 

The British Army always played second fiddle to the RN for obvious reasons, size wise and funding wise, and being primarily configured and intended to act as an Imperial police force it was thus never really intended to go toe to toe with Continental mass armies.

 

I don’t think this is entirely accurate. From at least 1911 onwards (and probably more like 1905 onwards) the British Army saw an important – indeed crucial - mission in France. If it came to blows, the intention existed to deploy a powerful (for the BEF, at any rate) expeditionary force on the left flank of the French army. This army could not have been assigned a continental mission on any terms other than going ‘toe to toe’ with the German army. And once undertaken, it seems incredulous to imagine but that the British would be committed in the greatest strength possible to the defeat of the German army.

 

Considering then that the commitment to a continental war appears to have been open-ended, and that given the nature of Germany at that time, it follows that when Great Britain was to enter into such a war it automatically entailed a massive increase in the size of the army. If so, then I don’t think it’s correct to imagine a sudden requirement to massively increase the size of the British army could have been a surprise. Question – did the army’s leadership continuously pressure the government in the pre-war period to make detailed preparations for the wartime expansion of the standing army, and if this was not done, who is to blame for that oversight if not the British Army itself?

[BillB]

I think you’ve done a good job explaining why Haig has many defenders, and not just deriders. Obviously, given the BEF’s ascendancy in 1918, Haig’s command style must have been in some ways leading edge. However, I want to go back to the problems with wartime expansion. You wrote,

 

The British Army always played second fiddle to the RN for obvious reasons, size wise and funding wise, and being primarily configured and intended to act as an Imperial police force it was thus never really intended to go toe to toe with Continental mass armies.

 

I don’t think this is entirely accurate. From at least 1911 onwards (and probably more like 1905 onwards) the British Army saw an important – indeed crucial - mission in France. If it came to blows, the intention existed to deploy a powerful (for the BEF, at any rate) expeditionary force on the left flank of the French army. This army could not have been assigned a continental mission on any terms other than going ‘toe to toe’ with the German army. And once undertaken, it seems incredulous to imagine but that the British would be committed in the greatest strength possible to the defeat of the German army.

 

Sorry mate, but you are barking up the wrong tree and doing your usual trick of extrapolating all sorts of dodgy assumptions from an inaccurate premise. It is an established and inescapable fact that Britain was a maritime and not a land power, and therefore based its military strength on the Royal Navy rather than Army between the mid-Sixteenth Century and the second half of the Twentieth Century. This is especially the case in the run up to 1914, when the bulk of British military spending was consumed by the naval arms race with the Germans.

 

By going toe to toe I meant trying to fight a land war against the Germans on something like equal terms, not simply engaging the German Army alongside the French. The former contention is ludicrous in any case because the British simply did not have the manpower even if they were so inclined - remember the formation of the New Army caused all sorts of dislocation in industry and that despite introducing conscription in 1916 they were still running out of manpower by 1918 to maintain a force a fraction of the size of the German Army. The 1914 BEF was intended to be a token land force serving alongside the French Army while the main British contribution to the Alliance came from the RN, nothing more. This was nothing new, it was the standard pattern of British military involvement on mainland Europe going back to at least Marlborough's time; the British engagement in the Napoleonic War is prolly the clearest example of this strategy. Incredulous as you may find it, there was thus never a British intention pre 1914 to engage with the Germans on land on the scale that you seem to think. Remember also that *everyone* with the odd exception like Kitchener expected the war to be of short duration. , so there would be no need or indeed time to implement a massive expansion of the BA.

 

Considering then that the commitment to a continental war appears to have been open-ended, and that given the nature of Germany at that time, it follows that when Great Britain was to enter into such a war it automatically entailed a massive increase in the size of the army. If so, then I don’t think it’s correct to imagine a sudden requirement to massively increase the size of the British army could have been a surprise. Question – did the army’s leadership continuously pressure the government in the pre-war period to make detailed preparations for the wartime expansion of the standing army, and if this was not done, who is to blame for that oversight if not the British Army itself?

As I have already pointed out, the idea that British involvment in a Continental war before 1914 was in any way "open ended" or that any massive increase should therefore have been "automatic" is simply wrong. You are assuming that because the British High Command maintained contacts with their French counterparts as directed by their political masters in line with the 1904 Entente Cordiale means there was any intention to commit British land forces on a Continental scale. That is an erroneous assumption because it simply was not the case. It does not therefore follow that enaging in war alongside France would entail a massive increase in the size of the BA, because the BEF was intended to be a token force.

 

The Army leaders did not therefore pressure the government pre war to make plans for a massive expansion because there was never any intent to fight in a way that would make that necessary, and in any event I doubt the necessary funding was available due to naval spending. There were plans to expand the Army by recalling reservists and mobilising the Territorial Force up to the size deemed necessary for Home Defence and maintaining a token land force alongside the French Army, and they actually worked very well. On that basis there was no "oversight" and no "blame" to apportion. Even if there were, the military leadership would not be the place to look. The Army was the servant of the politicians sitting in Westminster not their masters, a salient fact that has been consistently overlooked.

 

The basic flaw in your approach is that you are judging the past with the benefit of a massive dose of 20/20 hindsight, rather than taking proper account of the situation from the perspective of the time; in essence you are trying to castigate the leadership of the pre-1914 British Army for lacking powers of clairvoyance.

 

BillB

[glenn239]

By going toe to toe I meant trying to fight a land war against the Germans on something like equal terms, not simply engaging the German Army alongside the French.

Interesting comments. You write,

 

You are assuming that because the British High Command maintained contacts with their French counterparts as directed by their political masters in line with the 1904 Entente Cordiale means there was any intention to commit British land forces on a Continental scale. That is an erroneous assumption because it simply was not the case.

 

Which leads to the question – It being the case that the British Army was aware of the mission and preparing to fight the German army as an ally of the French from 1905 onwards then how – precisely – did the British Army picture the process whereby final victory was achieved?

 

The Army leaders did not therefore pressure the government pre war to make plans for a massive expansion because there was never any intent to fight in a way that would make that necessary.

 

Which seems a rather square peg for a rather round hole –armies are employed to win wars, not merely start them. Once in Flanders or Belgium it was inconceivable that the British army would abandon the French to their fate. Further, that if the French did not require British assistance to defeat Germany, then precisely why was the BEF being dispatched in the first place? Therefore, the issue of how the war was to be won rises to the top as a question of the highest importance to the British Army. You indicate,

 

The basic flaw in your approach is that you are judging the past with the benefit of a massive dose of 20/20 hindsight, rather than taking proper account of the situation from the perspective of the time; in essence you are trying to castigate the leadership of the pre-1914 British Army for lacking powers of clairvoyance.

 

If not the pre-war British Army leadership’s responsibility, then whose responsibility do you think it was in the pre-war period to predict the dimensions of the continental mission and lay the requirements to win such a war in front of the politicians? Was Sir Edward Grey and Lord Haldane to transform themselves into military experts and answer it themselves? It might be suggested that military leadership is not responsible for planning potential military operations or anticipating military requirements to fulfill a mission. But I would suggest rather that one of the fundamental duties of any military hierarchy is to anticipate the requirements and communicate these to the government that they serve.

[Ariete!]

...the seminal Fire-Power, British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945. Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell.

 

Any suggestions on the same sort of thing but from a French, German or American perspective?

 

(In English, I beg you!! )

[BillB]

Interesting comments. You write,

Which leads to the question – It being the case that the British Army was aware of the mission and preparing to fight the German army as an ally of the French from 1905 onwards then how – precisely – did the British Army picture the process whereby final victory was achieved?

 

It only leads to that question if one is in pursuit of evidence to support your flawed and untenable position. The BA was not aware of any such mission from 1905, never mind preparing to implement it. The idea of sending an Expeditionary force to France only emerged five years or more later than that date, and in the interim the CID also looked at schemes involving *fighting* the French along with Russia and Germany. The BA, or indeed the RN or government did not picture any process or theorise on how victory in any hypothetical war against Germany was to be achieved, for the simple reason that it was a given that any British land role on the continent would be token at best; this view was one of the few things the BA, British government and RN were anything like agreed on.

 

Which seems a rather square peg for a rather round hole –armies are employed to win wars, not merely start them. Once in Flanders or Belgium it was inconceivable that the British army would abandon the French to their fate. Further, that if the French did not require British assistance to defeat Germany, then precisely why was the BEF being dispatched in the first place? Therefore, the issue of how the war was to be won rises to the top as a question of the highest importance to the British Army.

 

It is nothing of the kind. It only looks that way to you, because your understanding of the matter is both flawed and tenuous, and because you are trying to make what bit of evidence you have fit with your preconceived notions and personal preferences. Consequently, we have yet another list of inaccurate and/or erroneous assumptioons. So,

 

1. The job of the BA was not to win or start anything, it was to carry out the instructions of the elected civilian government in Westminster. You seem to be confusing this as the staus quo with the atypical German example, which has been aptly described as an army with a state attached. In the British case it had been that way ever since the end of Cromwell's experiment with military dictatorship in the latter half of the C17, and it is why all the planning and policy decisions at the time under discussion was carried out by the Committee of Imperial Defence, to whom the Admiralty and War Office were subordinate. You also seem unaware that the period leading up to 1914 was marked by a great deal of disagreement between the Admiralty, the War Office and the General Staff over policy and strategy; at one point the RN refused to guarantee the safety of any expeditionary force despatched across the Channel, for example, while the Army refused to set aside troops for the RN's preferred strategy of launchiong raids on the German North Sea and Baltic coasts.

 

2. It was by no means "inconceivable" that the BEF would be withdrawn if the situation required - IIRC the matter was considered in 1914 when it appeared that the German advance was coming west after Mons, Le Cateau and Nun's Wood, and again in 1918 during Operation MICHAEL. Furthermore, you seem unaware of something called Operation DYNAMO that was implemented in almost identical circumstances twenty-six years later.

 

3. As I have already pointed out at least once, the BEF was despatched as a token force to suppport the French ground effort. As far as the British government was concerned, that was only to be done on the event of a German violation of Belgian neutrality (a salient fact that has been conspicuously absent in your ill informed hypothesising) and even that had not been set in stone by 1914. The head of the General Staff, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, was in favour of despatching the BEF to France at the outbreak of hostilities between France and Germany, but this was *not* accepted as official policy; as I said, the government had not definitivley agreed to that even in the event of an invasion of Belgium. It is also germane to note that Wilson, the most ardent supporter of despatching an expeditionary force, only ever justified the idea a measure to support French "morale" (the precise word he used) and that he was adamant that in no circumstances should that commitment exceed six infantry and one cavalry division. When one considers that the French Army had c.81 Divisions in 1914 and the German Army c.100 Divisions the token natureof the British commitment is clear.

 

4. Given all this verifiable evidence, the issue of how the war was to be won clearly did not rise to the top as a question of the highest importance to the British Army; indeed it did not rise as a question at all. The war was to be won by the French and Russians, possibly with a token British land presence in France & Flanders, with the assistance of a naval blockade of Germany by the Royal Navy. That had been the British strategy for c.200 years, and in the event that was largely what happened.

 

You can keep finding ever more convoluted ways of asking the same question for as long as you like, but that will not alter the fact that it is an irrelevant because it is totally divorced from the easily verifiable historical facts.

 

If not the pre-war British Army leadership’s responsibility, then whose responsibility do you think it was in the pre-war period to predict the dimensions of the continental mission and lay the requirements to win such a war in front of the politicians? Was Sir Edward Grey and Lord Haldane to transform themselves into military experts and answer it themselves? It might be suggested that military leadership is not responsible for planning potential military operations or anticipating military requirements to fulfill a mission. But I would suggest rather that one of the fundamental duties of any military hierarchy is to anticipate the requirements and communicate these to the government that they serve.

Please, spare me the dense, convoluted verbiage and attempts to construct straw men. Your understanding of civil-military relations appears to be as lacking as that of the BA in the pre-1914 period, and I have addressed this above. Instead of making poorly to unsupported assertions and suggestions, might I suggest that your time would be better spent doing some background reading to address your tenous grasp of matters. A good starting point would be John Gooch The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c.1900-1916 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974)

 

BillB

[Colin Williams]

Nice post Bill, but aren't you overstating things a bit? After all, whether or not the British had defined a clear strategic role and composition for an expeditionary force, they were in talks with the French by 1906 and were building toward a continental capability. Also, I don't think the resulting BEF could be characterized as a token force. Although small, the British could reasonably expect that two corps could tip the balance between victory and defeat for the French or at least provide the Belgians with sufficient force to make the Germans think twice about invading.

[Ken Estes]

Nice post Bill, but aren't you overstating things a bit? After all, whether or not the British had defined a clear strategic role and composition for an expeditionary force, they were in talks with the French by 1906 and were building toward a continental capability. Also, I don't think the resulting BEF could be characterized as a token force. Although small, the British could reasonably expect that two corps could tip the balance between victory and defeat for the French or at least provide the Belgians with sufficient force to make the Germans think twice about invading.

I think we have to be careful to recognize what the soldiers and sailors of the day thought they were doing and why, before we apply our known standards and definitions of the present day to their situations. What we consider a 'continental capability' might not have been a topic or a term of reference they would have understood at the time. The British use of land forces in the wars of the continent usually revolved around token forces, used to forge an alliance of superior land powers that usually did the heavy lifting, and this continued through the wars of the French Revn and Empire, Marlborough and Wellington notwithstanding.

 

In the early 18th century the British Army gained a series of startling victories during the War of Spanish Succession. John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, commanded the British forces. At Blenheim, Marlborough saw his first and greatest victory fought on 13 August 1704 with an allied army of 56,000 men, of which 9,000 were British infantry and cavalry. The British Brigade played a significant part in the attack on the French defences in Blenheim. This period also saw the introduction of the red uniform coat for British infantry.

[BillB]

Nice post Bill, but aren't you overstating things a bit? After all, whether or not the British had defined a clear strategic role and composition for an expeditionary force, they were in talks with the French by 1906 and were building toward a continental capability. Also, I don't think the resulting BEF could be characterized as a token force. Although small, the British could reasonably expect that two corps could tip the balance between victory and defeat for the French or at least provide the Belgians with sufficient force to make the Germans think twice about invading.

 

Ref the overstating bit, remember I was arguing a case against glenn 239's erroneous assumptions, and thus only cited the specific bits of evidence related to that. I think there is plenty more to show that I am not overstating the case. Ref the relevance of the contacts with the French, IMO they are routinely overstated when you look at British activities in this regard in the round IIRC they spent a lot of time talking to the Japanese after 1905, possibly as much as the French, and the idea of an expeditionary force in anything more than vague terms does not appear to have appeared until 1910. Furthermore, I am unaware of any evidence that the British were doing any building toward a "continental capability". As I said above (and below!) Wilson and the General Staff were the main driver for a BEF and he was adamant that it should consist of six infantry and one cav division, and he faced a lot of opposition from others in the War Office and especially the Admiralty. The RN were against anything more than deploying raiding forces against German coastal targets, and wanted to keep the Army on British soil in its entirety to counter any German invasion - IIRC this underlay the creation of the Territorial Force in 19108.

 

With ref to the BEF being a token force, I'll grant you that deploying c.half the total British Regular Army could be seen as something more than token from a British perpective. However, a seven division force cannot been seen as anything othe than token when deployed in a war where everyone else is deploying ten times that number or more. Furthermore, I think the evidence shows that the British considered it a token force too, given that Wilson explicitly stated that the main driver for deploying the BEF was to support French morale, and that on no account was it to be any larger than seven divisions. More to the point, a Continental deployment on that scale could be done without impinging on the British economy or expanding the Army.

 

Ref the BEF being a sufficeiently large force to deter any German invasion of Belgium, I don't think that a force of seven divisions deployed on Belgium's western borders was ever likely to force a modification of the Schlieffen Plan, altho they had no knowledge of that, of course. However, the fact that it was never intended to deploy the BEF anywhere other than on the French left, and that Wilson and the rest of the Brit GS are all on the record from 1911 onward as considering that any German incursion into Belgian territory would only result from a rebuff of the expected German attack in the area of Verdun-Maubeuge supports the contention that the deployment was token in nature. I'd also suggest that it was aimed more at preventing the Germans from seizing ports from which to launch an invasion of Britain, given that the British were not confident of the belgian ability to put up protracted resistance to a German invasion, and that the BEF's objective on moving into Belgium was to secure Antwerp rather than confront the invaders. Finally, although Britain was obliged to protect Belgian neutrality by treaty from 1839 and the Army tok that into account in its planning, there was no concrete arrangement for the BEF to be deployed in the event of a German invasion of Belgium as far as the British government was concerned as late as 1914.

 

BillB

[Ken Estes]

Bismarck was asked what he would do if the British Army landed troops on German soil, in one of the last war scares of his time as chancellor; his answer, "have them arrested!"

[Colin Williams]

Furthermore, I am unaware of any evidence that the British were doing any building toward a "continental capability".

 

Bill,

 

More when I have time later, but just a quick comment on this point. Please note that I wrote "continental capability" rather than the usual "continental commitment". By this I mean simply that British Army planning, organization, training and equipping from the end of the Boer War until 1914 constituted a systematic effort to transition from a predominantly colonial force to one capable of meeting a European-style (thus also including the Japanese and Ottomans) army on the field of battle. Whether this battle would take place in Belgium or the Balkans or Manchuria is beside the point. In fact, one of the many fascinating aspects of the 1914 conflict is how well prepared all the combatants were for the campaign (with the Austro-Hungarians and Russians being partial exceptions). This is often lost in the complaints about how unprepared the combatants were for 1915-18.

[BillB]

Bill,

 

More when I have time later, but just a quick comment on this point. Please note that I wrote "continental capability" rather than the usual "continental commitment". By this I mean simply that British Army planning, organization, training and equipping from the end of the Boer War until 1914 constituted a systematic effort to transition from a predominantly colonial force to one capable of meeting a European-style (thus also including the Japanese and Ottomans) army on the field of battle. Whether this battle would take place in Belgium or the Balkans or Manchuria is beside the point. In fact, one of the many fascinating aspects of the 1914 conflict is how well prepared all the combatants were for the campaign (with the Austro-Hungarians and Russians being partial exceptions). This is often lost in the complaints about how unprepared the combatants were for 1915-18.

My apologies, being focussed on glenn239's erroneous extrapolations I missed your "capability" rather than "commitment". You have hit the nail on the head with the above, and I agree absolutely on all points.

 

[edited to add] On reflection I think I would add one caveat. Assuming that I have understood you correctly, I'm not sure I agree with the idea that the BA was configured for colonial operations and that the c.1908 reforms/re-equipment were a reorientation toward more a "conventional" capability, as I don't think the BA was ever configured for anything less. Most of the stuff the BA was involved in up to 1899 was small scale expeditionary work, and the 2nd Boer War was a first in terms of scale and dealing with an enemy equipped with modern arms and operating procedures. AIUI the British approach in South Africa was not based on colonial experience but on European and particularly Prussian practices given that the latter had fought and won a series of wars against first line European opponents between 1864 and 1871. Ops in South Africa exposed the inadequacy of these practices in the face of modern small-arms and artillery and it is that which sparked the British rethink, reoganisation and re-equipment.

 

BillB

[glenn239]

As I have already pointed out at least once, the BEF was despatched as a token force to suppport the French ground effort. As far as the British government was concerned, that was only to be done on the event of a German violation of Belgian neutrality (a salient fact that has been conspicuously absent in your ill informed hypothesising)

British policy on the matter was set down in the famous exchange of notes of 1912, in which it was decided that at the appropriate time during a crisis the French and English General Staffs would consult and agree to a joint plan of action.

 

Given all this verifiable evidence, the issue of how the war was to be won clearly did not rise to the top as a question of the highest importance to the British Army; indeed it did not rise as a question at all.

 

It appears that there is consensus on this point amongst the posters that have a deeper knowledge of pre-war British military planning than I that the British army failed to anticipate the obvious possibility of the rapid expansion of the army being needed to support a floundering partner. Since it has been stated on this thread that poor tactical performance of the BEF at the commencement of the Somme offensive, in relation to the superlative performance of the same army later, was related to the rapid wartime expansion of the army, does it then not followsthat there was a failure within the British government to anticipate and plan for this fairly obvious contingency?

 

Question repeated – if not the British army, then upon what organization did the responsibility fall upon to anticipate the military requirements of a particular mission?

Edited May 12, 2008 by glenn239

[RETAC21]

British policy on the matter was set down in the famous exchange of notes of 1912, in which it was decided that at the appropriate time during a crisis the French and English General Staffs would consult and agree to a joint plan of action.

It appears that there is consensus on this point amongst the posters that have a deeper knowledge of pre-war British military planning than I that the British army failed to anticipate the obvious possibility of the rapid expansion of the army being needed to support a floundering partner. Since it has been stated on this thread that poor tactical performance of the BEF at the commencement of the Somme offensive, in relation to the superlative performance of the same army later, was related to the rapid wartime expansion of the army, does it then not followsthat there was a failure within the British government to anticipate and plan for this fairly obvious contingency?

 

Question repeated – if not the British army, then upon what organization did the responsibility fall upon to anticipate the military requirements of a particular mission?

 

Nobody? the war was supposed to be ended by Christmas!