What if Chennault's teachings were taken seriously by the US Army Air Corps?

[John Dudek]

General Claire Lee Chennault, founder of the "Flying Tigers" was a maverick and an old fighter pilot who served as an advisor and trainer in China against the Japanese in the late1930's. He correctly observed the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese Army and Naval aviation and devised ways of overcoming their superiority in aerial combat, while using US aircraft. He wrote a lengthy treatise on the subject, telling future US Pilots how to fight and triumph over the Japanese foe. He sent the information off to the US War Department, where it was filed away and largely forgotten.

 

My question is, what if Chennault's teachings were taken seriously and US P-40 Pilots were trained not to engage in dogfights with the Japanese, but instead to use the advantage of high altitude diving attacks, followed by low level, high-speed get-aways, before attempting to regain the altitude advantage?

 

I'm sure that we all know that the Flying Tigers racked up an unbelievable kill ratio in China against Japanese Army Oscars and the occasional Zero, but what would have happened had these teachings been extended to the entire US Army Air Corps? It might have had a significant effect on Pacific air operations during the early days of the war.

[lastdingo]

General Claire Lee Chennault, founder of the "Flying Tigers" was a maverick and an old fighter pilot who served as an advisor and trainer in China against the Japanese in the late1930's. He correctly observed the strengths and weaknesses of Japanese Army and Naval aviation and devised ways of overcoming their superiority in aerial combat, while using US aircraft. He wrote a lengthy treatise on the subject, telling future US Pilots how to fight and triumph over the Japanese foe. He sent the information off to the US War Department, where it was filed away and largely forgotten.

 

My question is, what if Chennault's teachings were taken seriously and US P-40 Pilots were trained not to engage in dogfights with the Japanese, but instead to use the advantage of high altitude diving attacks, followed by low level, high-speed get-aways, before attempting to regain the altitude advantage?

 

I'm sure that we all know that the Flying Tigers racked up an unbelievable kill ratio in China against Japanese Army Oscars and the occasional Zero, but what would have happened had these teachings been extended to the entire US Army Air Corps? It might have had a significant effect on Pacific air operations during the early days of the war.

 

The tactic works, but the Japanese had local air superiority also by quantity in their early offensives - they simply massed their (CV) forces.

 

And the tactic is not really convincing if you're faster or climbing faster (P-40 vs A6M2). It's furthermore an attrition tactic - you cannot really expect to intercept bomber strike if you dive every time enemy fighters come close to your interceptors.

Chennault had nothing in China that could not recover after a successful bomber strike - the USN had a different situation in 1941/42. The bases that were attacked with air strikes were usually set as invasion targets and ships rarely re-surface after successful bomber strikes.

[John Dudek]

The tactic works, but the Japanese had local air superiority also by quantity in their early offensives - they simply massed their (CV) forces.

 

And the tactic is not really convincing if you're faster or climbing faster (P-40 vs A6M2). It's furthermore an attrition tactic - you cannot really expect to intercept bomber strike if you dive every time enemy fighters come close to your interceptors.

Chennault had nothing in China that could not recover after a successful bomber strike - the USN had a different situation in 1941/42. The bases that were attacked with air strikes were usually set as invasion targets and ships rarely re-surface after successful bomber strikes.

 

True, but Jimmy Thatch came up with an effective naval equivelent, the "Thatch Weave" whereby two navy Wildcat fighters flying together could take on one or more Japanese Zeroes and still return to their carrier intact.

[ShotMagnet]

My impression is that what works best in one area of operation might not work best in another. I'm also of the impression that pilots in general tend to learn on the fly, as it were, and often adopt for themselves a sense of 'what works best'.

 

It has to be said also that a lot depends on who is flying what aircraft. What works well in a P-40 vs Hayabusa furball may not work as well if either/both aircraft are not present. There's a lot to be said as well for pilot quality. The better flyers will tend to do the better job, naturally; but again this might not translate into something which might ossify into doctrine.

 

It's also worth noting that pilots by their nature are a maverick bunch. Telling them what to do might prompt them to do something otherwise; whereas letting them learn on their own might be more useful, if more costly.

 

 

Shot

[shep854]

Applying Chennault's tactics would have resulted in some more Allied kills and maybe saved some Allied pilots (for a while), but wouldn't have materially changed the events of the time; the whole campaign was just too massive. Similar tactics were applied within a few months, anyway.

 

Sadly, the "2x4 upside the head" is the only way many people or institutions learn.

Edited March 27, 2008 by shep854

[JOE BRENNAN]

1. ... He sent the information off to the US War Department, where it was filed away and largely forgotten.

 

2. My question is, what if Chennault's teachings were taken seriously and US P-40 Pilots were trained not to engage in dogfights with the Japanese..

 

3. I'm sure that we all know that the Flying Tigers racked up an unbelievable kill ratio in China against Japanese Army Oscars and the occasional Zero...

1. Thach's tactical innovation was originally based on info from China pre-war in 1941. However that was a very different tactic. Also it (the Beam Defense Manuever or 'Thach Weave') wasn't much used in 1942, a notable exception being by Thach's division at Midway. And, the Japanese Navy fighters F4F's exclusively faced in 1942 often used 'energy' tactics also; it was per their own doctrine the preferred method based on experience in China, though they often fell back on close manuever, but the USN also observed them to often use hit and run tactics. And the F4F was no faster a plane than the Zero, slower in many cases, so that was all around a pretty different match up, especially considering the actual AVG opposition, see 3.

 

2. It stands to reason it would have helped, since other Allied (USAAF, RAAF, RNZAF) P-40's gravitated to such tactics later and got better results than early in the war. Judging the degree is what might be difficult.

 

3. Actually the AVG met mainly Type 97's (aka Ki-27, later 'Nate'), I counted the AVG record, air combat losses only by type as follows in Ford "Flying Tigers" which is based on AVG+ Japanese accounts:

Type 97: 35:11

Type 1 (Oscar): 11:3

Type 2 two seat (Nick): 3:1

Type 2 single seat (Tojo): few encounters, no apparent conclusive result

 

They met no Zeroes at all. They met the Type 97's earlier and the kill ratio gradually rose from only about even in the early combats, so it was a relatively favorable learning curve situation in that respect, even though the Japanese fighters were generally more numerous from the start. But the superior numbers consisted mainly of Type 97's even later on, the Japanese generally had fewer Type 1's in the active theater than Allies had P-40's and Hurricanes for most of the AVG period.

 

However before dismissing that performance, because it was mainly v. Type 97, consider other contemporary results v Type 97. In the PI the USAAC/F lost 4 P-40's and a P-35 to Type 97's and only *claimed* 7 Type 97's (unfortunately there's no good source AFAIK for Type 97 losses in PI, Japanese official history has less detail than for units which met AVG, at least 1 was lost, probably more but significantly less than 7). In DEI just one meeting w/ 1 loss each P-40 and Type 97*. Hurricanes in 1942 downed 5-6 Type 97's for 8 losses to Type 97's (the 5 or 6 is from overlapping claims with the AVG). But Hurricanes also had a disastrous record v Type 1's in that period: 4:20 though those combats were mainly Malaya and DEI not alongside AVG. USAAF P-40's (and P-39's) didn't meet Type 1's till end of '42, F4F's didn't meet any Japanese Army fighters till 1943.

 

There's a relative lack of solid comparative between Type 1 and Zero effectiveness in actual combat in 1942. On paper the Zero was a considerably better fighter, by general reputation the JNAF was a better air arm, but few Allied types met both in '42 to allow direct comparison. Hurricanes did, w/ 1942 record of 6:35 v Zeroes; or excluding the 1:19 performance in first combat over Ceylon when caught at low altitude, it was 5:16 (other combat Ceylon, few over Singapore and DEI), either way not vastly different than their result v the Type 1, and quite different than the AVG's record v Type 1.

 

I think one can argue with those figures that the Allies would have been much more effective if all equal to the AVG (via tactics or whatever other factors that distinguished them) but can probably bring in other factors (even legitimate ones) and say it's not 100% clear.

 

*this and following results from Shores "Bloody Shambles" it omits a few combats where the Japanese losses aren't known, but doesn't count known Allied losses in those combats either.

 

Joe

Edited March 27, 2008 by JOE BRENNAN

[Archie Pellagio]

Given that there was only one squadron of ki43's in service ca. 07/12/41 i've always been skeptical of the oscar claims by the AVG.

[lastdingo]

Given that there was only one squadron of ki43's in service ca. 07/12/41 i've always been skeptical of the oscar claims by the AVG.

 

Wasn't the AVG active for months past 7-12-41?

[John_Ford]

Wasn't the AVG active for months past 7-12-41?

 

Up to about May of '42 if I recall. The revolt came was when Washington sent some Regular Service asshole to the CBI who used some pretty heavy handed tactics to try and get the AVG Pilots to stay. The Majority were former Marine and Navy Drivers (Pappy Boyington) who told him to "Sod Off" and went home anyway. Only Chennault's personal appeal to the pilots kept some on (Tex Hill).

[Jerry W. Loper]

Wasn't the AVG active for months past 7-12-41?

 

The AVG flew its first combat sortie on December 20, 1941, and was officially disbanded

on July 4, 1942. The passing of the AVG does not mean that later units (China Air Task

Force or CATF, 14th Army Air Force, etc.) did not try to appropriate the name "Flying

Tigers."

[JOE BRENNAN]

Given that there was only one squadron of ki43's in service ca. 07/12/41 i've always been skeptical of the oscar claims by the AVG.

It was a little more than that: 2 regiments of the JAAF were equipped with Type 1's when the war started, 64th (the usual Type 1 opponent of the AVG later on) and 59th. The opening JAAF fighter OOB for the 1941 offensive (based in Indochina and Formosa) was 59 Type 1's, 9 preproduction Type 2's (Tojo's) and 195 Type 97's*. But the part of that force which ended up in Burma, where AVG was first deployed, and it mainly fought same units from southern China too, was all Type 97 for awhile. The first AVG victories over Type 1's were in late March; as mentioned the AVG operated through mid year. Also there weren't literally claims against 'Oscars' by the AVG, that codename system wasn't instituted till later. The two types which seemed to be recognized at the time were 'Army 97' and 'Navy 0' but in popularized accounts they all became 'Zeroes'. Attributing lots of 'Oscars' to the AVG is recent I think, based on knowledge they didn't really meet Zeroes, then assumption.

 

Again though, the Type 97 held its own, or more, against Hurricanes and USAAF P-40's in the same period. There was a definite difference in AVG performance against it, and larger difference between AVG and Hurricane results v Type 1's, or early P-40 ones v Zeroes, though those comparisons are a little less direct than the one v Type 97's.

 

* for context: JNAF land strength in theater was 115 Zeroes and 36 Type 96 ('Claude'), for 414 total Japanese fighters. There were 368 US, Brit and Dutch fighters excluding 28 obsolete P-26's and 101 Australian Wirraways based far from the initial operations; plus the AVG (technially Chinese AF) so overall numbers were about equal at the start.

 

Joe

[Yama]

There's a relative lack of solid comparative between Type 1 and Zero effectiveness in actual combat in 1942. On paper the Zero was a considerably better fighter, by general reputation the JNAF was a better air arm, but few Allied types met both in '42 to allow direct comparison. Hurricanes did, w/ 1942 record of 6:35 v Zeroes; or excluding the 1:19 performance in first combat over Ceylon when caught at low altitude, it was 5:16 (other combat Ceylon, few over Singapore and DEI),

 

Ouch.

But this is in line with Finnish experiences of the Hurricane (around dozen in service, and frequently encountered in combat 1942-43). It was considered poorly suited for fighter combat; it was lacking in agility ("Like if there was piece of rubber string between the stick and all control surfaces" was one pilots comment), had poor power/weight ratio which meant slow acceleration and mediocre climb rate (esp. in low altitudes), diving ability was poor, armament ineffective, rear visibility limited, etc. Finnish Hurricanes claimed only 5.5 air victories during their service. Lack of spare parts played major part, but overall it was considered useful only as a bomber interceptor. Hans Wind considered it as "easiest enemy fighter to shoot down".

[KingSargent]

When comparing the AVG to 1941-2 Allied units, remember the AVG were all experienced military fliers. Many of the P-40s in the PI hadn't even fired their guns yet. The RAF and RAAF Buffaloes in Malaya were FNGs as well. AIUI the RAF planes encounted in KB's IO raid were also inexperienced. If the KB pilots had been flying the Hurricanes and the RAF the Zeroes, I don't think much would have changed.

[JOE BRENNAN]

When comparing the AVG to 1941-2 Allied units, remember the AVG were all experienced military fliers. Many of the P-40s in the PI hadn't even fired their guns yet. The RAF and RAAF Buffaloes in Malaya were FNGs as well. AIUI the RAF planes encounted in KB's IO raid were also inexperienced. If the KB pilots had been flying the Hurricanes and the RAF the Zeroes, I don't think much would have changed.

As I suggested, other factors can always be brought in, unless the same unit at the same time were to use two different types or deliberately use two sets of tactics as a test. It rarely happens, especially the latter. However of the other factors I think readiness, rather than experience per se was the thing most lacking among Allied fighter units v the Japanese early in the war, though pilot experience per se in some cases, also perhaps tactics, and some a/c types might have more or less effective in fighter combat against those adversaies than their reputations elsewhere would suggest.

 

Hurricane v Zero was only partly Ceylon, that's why I gave the figure excluding the one wipe out because one typcial response is to exclude that as a fluke and then assume it's back to square one. But there were actually several other combats (the other one over Ceylon didn't find the Hurricanes at hopeless tactical disadvantage, plus a few Malaya/DEI that didn't either) adding up to 5:16 (and one more in Bruma in 1943 that also went against the Hurricanes) and also 4:20 v. Type 1's over 8 different combats where both sides' losses are known thru April '42. This wasn't a huge air campaign, so that's not actually such a small sample. So the analysis can't just focus on Ceylon. However in that case neither main Hurricane unit 30 and 261 sdns, was brand new, both had served in the Mideast though with little day combat v tough opposition (former was mainly a night intruder unit, latter had served in Syria and Iraq), but also had, as most RAF units in SEA in 1942 did, veterans of earlier European campaigns. The CO of 261 was an 18 victory ace just returning to combat after serious wounds in BoB, and a number of others had previous victory credits. And that was typical of other units, had combat veterans if not high level of overall unit training and cohesion. The AVG had almost nobody with previous combat experience (IIRC just Ajax Baumler who flew in Spain for the Republicans), though more flying experience on average; the US Army units were less experienced with no combat veterans at all.

 

The Japanese carrier fighter sdns didn't see a large amount of fighter combat as units from Dec '41-April 1942, most of the experience v the Allies up to then had been gained by the landbased fighter air groups, and they weren't switching people around. Many IJN pilots had China experience (many others not) but those were cohesive units, well practiced together if not actually extensively air combat experienced as units, thoroughly ready.

 

Joe

[Skip]

I always thought the Chennault's tactics required that you had hight advantage for them to work. In China he had the warning net that allowed the slow climbing P 40 to get the hight that it needed. It would not work so well with out the warnings.

[baboon6]

Up to about May of '42 if I recall. The revolt came was when Washington sent some Regular Service asshole to the CBI who used some pretty heavy handed tactics to try and get the AVG Pilots to stay. The Majority were former Marine and Navy Drivers (Pappy Boyington) who told him to "Sod Off" and went home anyway. Only Chennault's personal appeal to the pilots kept some on (Tex Hill).

 

What happened to the pilots who went home? Were they recommissioned into their original service?

[shep854]

What happened to the pilots who went home? Were they recommissioned into their original service?

 

Yep. Remember that Boyington went on to command VMF-214 (the "Black Sheep"). His AVG kills enabled him to claim to be the highest-scoring Marine aviator of WWII. I don't recall what the other returning pilots did, but it's pretty certain they got put to work.

[Bob B]

What happened to the pilots who went home? Were they recommissioned into their original service?

 

 

James Howard, originally a Navy pilot, went into the USAAF, later won the Medal of Honor over Germany. His P51 Mustang was named "Ding Hao!".

 

http://www.usaaf.net/moh/a_m/howard.htm

 

http://www.acepilots.com/eto/jim_howard.html

Edited March 31, 2008 by Bob B

[DKTanker]

Only Chennault's personal appeal to the pilots kept some on (Tex Hill).

Along with Robert Scott, God is My Co-Pilot and three others (I can't find the names just yet). Robert Scott was the first commander of the 23rd Fighter Group in China.

Edited March 31, 2008 by DKTanker

[rmgill]

As a side note, I had chance to mention the AVG to a chinese coworker here. He's from the PRC. His face lit up like a bulb and he began excitedly telling me about how much those guys were heros. Interesting that the Chinese government never tried to stomp out the AVG's reputation. Apparently it's quite solid in the eyes of the average chinese civilian.

[KingSargent]

But SURELY they point out that the AVG were all Brave Communists?

[JOE BRENNAN]

I don't know about that case but generally people refer to the AVG as "The Flying Tigers". But that name was also appropriated by not only by regular USAAF units of the China Air Task Force and later 14th AF (it's still the monicker of the 14th AF, space operations) but also the Chinese American Composite Wings, which included fighter and bomber units with mixed crews, as name suggests, under US command. There was discussion on another forum not long ago of a (Chinese) article about a Chinese veteran of the CACW, called 'Flying Tiger' in the article, so it includes Chinese heroes as far as they're concerned. Those crews were of course from the Nationalist AF not the Communists, but IME there's strong pride in China about past military successes by Chinese forces of any political flavor.

 

Joe

[Nobu]

As a side note, I had chance to mention the AVG to a chinese coworker here. He's from the PRC. His face lit up like a bulb and he began excitedly telling me about how much those guys were heros. Interesting that the Chinese government never tried to stomp out the AVG's reputation. Apparently it's quite solid in the eyes of the average chinese civilian.

 

Interesting. I once mentioned to a non-Asian coworker here around the time Bruckheimer's Pearl Harbor came out--aimed at an "average" American moviegoer I assume--that perhaps a quarter million "average Chinese folks" died in Japanese reprisals for aiding and abetting Doolittle Raiders escape to the Chinese main line of resistance. He had little clue.

 

Talk about stomping out a reputation.

[JOE BRENNAN]

a quarter million "average Chinese folks" died in Japanese reprisals for aiding and abetting Doolittle Raiders escape to the Chinese main line of resistance.

 

Talk about stomping out a reputation.

I think it was Japan's reputation in China that got pretty permanently stomped by that, and lots of other similar episodes. I don't think it was the reputation of whatever Japan gave as excuse in each particular case. Sorry if that's what you meant, wasn't really clear.

 

Aside from Communist ideology, which few in China pay attention to anymore, modern Chinese nationalism contains resentment against the US, as part of general resentment of Western disrespect of China in 19th-20th centuries in their view, plus some US-specific stuff on top. But, poor reputation of US in China in WWII because of Japanese atrocities?, that wouldn't make sense and in that particular case Chinese nationalism is fairly logical I think, though not in all cases. Fact is there's a reservoir of good will in China toward the US from the days of fighting the Japanese together.

 

Joe

Edited April 2, 2008 by JOE BRENNAN

[KingSargent]

I think it was Japan's reputation in China that got pretty permanently stomped by that, and lots of other similar episodes. I don't think it was the reputation of whatever Japan gave as excuse in each particular case. Sorry if that's what you meant, wasn't really clear.

 

Aside from Communist ideology, which few in China pay attention to anymore, modern Chinese nationalism contains resentment against the US, as part of general resentment of Western disrespect of China in 19th-20th centuries in their view, plus some US-specific stuff on top. But, poor reputation of US in China in WWII because of Japanese atrocities?, that wouldn't make sense and in that particular case Chinese nationalism is fairly logical I think, though not in all cases. Fact is there's a reservoir of good will in China toward the US from the days of fighting the Japanese together.

 

Joe

The US also had a better record (from China's POV) in the 19th Century than European states. We at least didn't demand major territorial concessions.