British Army Doctrine and Training in WW2

[BillB]

I most humbly beg your pardon for insulting you.

 

I know very well that you are NOT of the "God Is An Englishman" school, which is why I was astonished when YOU dragged out "hackneyed and dare I say predictable response"s.

 

BTW, you did not address the substance of my objections.

1] Arras proves the BA could perform well in battle in 1940 at brigade level.

1a] It also is a pretty good indicator that the BA couldn't get the troops planned for the battle TO the battle. Even given the French traffic FUBARs, the British were just as FUBARed (Hard not to be when one is in France, of course).

 

2] COMPASS proves nothing vis-a-vis British vs. Germans.

 

3] Most scholars give run-of-the-mill German infantry an edge over Allied infantry of any nation given a level playing field. And German infantry practiced "Foot Blizkriegs" (if I may) in 1870, 1914, and 1939-42. It was only the trenches of WW1 that slowed them down.

 

4] Okay if insulted YOU with "Anglophilic," how about crediting me with the sense not to be in bed with the Rommel Was God bunch?

 

Can you PLEASE stop jumping to the conclusion that I will automatically make an Anglophobic remark to any question? I really would like to discuss this seriously.

 

Thanx for making it unnecessary for me to set Lastdingo straight. We could probably have said it in chorus...

Calm down with the humbleness son, I was actually more irritated than insulted. Ref the hackneyed & predictable bit, mebbe you ought to consider a recent cracking quote from Gregory in another thread: "...it's a well known fact that well known facts are usually neither well known nor facts." IOW evidence & ideas being bandied about for pernicious purposes does not mean that the evidence & ideas are automatically without merit. Oh, and I didn't put you in the Rommelophile camp either, that was you - I just cited him to illustrate the point as he is the poster child par excellence for the Germanophiles, and I didn't jump to the Anglophilic conclusion either, altho I rather think you have made your own petard in that regard.

 

Worry not, I will address your points and we will have the discussion you are after but based on your original post as you have moved the goalposts just a tad in this one. And you'll have to wait your turn, as lastdingo needs putting straight again.

 

BillB

[Anthony EJW]

@BillB;

 

My assessments of German vs. British doctrine quality concerning infantry and artillery stem directly from German AND English-language sources, like for example Gudmundsson (among many others). I have never seen English or even German sources stating that the British were superior to Germans in anything else than details like a few months advance in sound ranging and the like.

 

Judging on basis of the available literature (I certainly consumed a significant share, maybe one meter of desk width on WW1), it was like that:

The British were not as advanced as Germans in infantry/artillery tactics. The last survivors of WWI are dead, so there's nothing but literature to analyze about the question.

 

A couple of extracts from Australian historians…

 

Despite [the British]accomplishments it has been fashionable in some historical circles to make claims for superior German tactical skill while deprecating British efforts. A good example of this tendency to overrate German achievements occurs in connection with the territorial gains they achieved in March 1918. Bruce Gudmundsson has interpreted the German employment of storm trooper tactics as an indication of the degree to which the German leadership responded to the nature of warfare on the western front. Putting aside the fact that these operations did not bring victory, that the Ludendorff offensives left the German army in a worse position strategically than it had been in at the beginning of the year, and that the Germans were only able to retrain a small part of their formations in the new doctrine, these tactics were also unable to significantly negate the defender's firepower advantage and were therefore doomed to fail. Holger Herwig's comment that the attack on 21 March was more of a gambler's desperate last throw of the dice that a well conceived and integrated operation that had any chance at victory, is the more balanced assessment.

 

The storm troopers relied on mass, manoeuvre and portable firepower to negotiate the enemy's defences. However, the German army of 1918 did not have the technical sophistication, equipment and training to neutralize British defensive strength completely through these means. Furthermore, the German gunners were particularly deficient at counter-battery fire and were not nearly as adept as the British at locating and neutralizing the enemy's artillery. The gains against Gough's Fifth Army in March were indeed large, and did cause tremendous concern among the Allied leaders, but once the situation stabilized they also became meaningless as the Germans had struck against an overextended defender protecting a strategically unimportant zone. The real test of the new German tactics came in Flanders in April when they made a similar effort against the much stronger British defences that guarded the channel ports. Then the inability of the Germans to master British firepower soon resulted in the collapse of the attack, its failure revealed the feebleness of their bid for victory. Historians are therefore wrong to give too much credit to German tactical genius and overlook British accomplishments, especially if, by comparison, one considers how easily Rawlinson's Fourth Army penetrated the Hundenburg Line- the strongest defensive position on the western front- and within a few hours made the position untenable for the Germans.

 

Seeking Victory on the Western Front, Albert Palazzo

 

Fourth Army, between the end of July and 11 November 1918, had won a spectacular series of victories. They had forced the Germans out of territory overrun in the opening phase of the Ludendorff offensive. And, much more significantly, they had overwhelmed defensive positions which only a few months before might well have been deemed impregnable. In sum, since August 1918 the British had revealed that the superiority which the defensive had enjoyed over the offensive in the first three years of the war no longer applied.

 

Certainly it might be argued that this point had already been effectively demonstrated by the Germans in the assaults they had launched between March and June. But Ludendorff had gained ground by expending the one commodity which neither his army nor the armies of Britain and France could afford; namely infantry. For this reason the great Ludendorff offensive had been an exercise in unmitigated folly.

 

Fourth Army's offensive, by contrast, was noteworthy for its entirely appropriate use of available resources. Although its objectives could not be achieved without a succession of infantry advances involving some measure of loss among foot soldiers, this aspect of battle was kept within affordable limits. Other forms of weaponry such as shells, bullets, tanks, gas and aircraft played a greater part in destroying the powers of resistance of their adversaries and opening the way for a succession of limited, but ultimately decisive, advances.

 

The fact that the British were not having to pay for their successes with an insupportable levy in the lives of their infantry has largely gone unnoticed. Indeed it has often been proclaimed that these operations were extremely costly in the blood of the fighting soldiers, and that therefore there was no superiority in the methods which Rawlinson was employing over those earlier employed by Ludendorff. This is a complete misconception, as the following comparison makes clear. Back on 1 July 1916 in the disastrous opening to the battle of the Somme, the British suffered 20,000 men killed. Between August and November of 1918, in the course of a succession of unrelenting advances, Fourth Army sustained about 20,000 killed. The contrast between the price of failure on one day in 1916 and of success in more than three months in 1918 is so marked that it may be wondered why it has gone unnoticed. The explanation is simple. Consideration has always been given not to the number of men killed but to the number of men who became 'casualties'. For the later part of 1918 that figure happened to include a substantial number who fell sick on account (primarily) of the 'Spanish' influenza epidemic which was just then sweeping not only Western Europe but the whole world. When we subtract this quite irrelevant consideration from overall picture, we find ourselves in a position to appreciate the ture nature of the success which the British Army ... was accomplishing by the last phase of the war.

Command on the Western Front, Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson

 

"...the British switch to defended locales instead of a continuous line in 1918 was similar in essence to the German elastic defence, and would have worked in a similar manner had it been finished and had 21 March not been foggy."

Backslope defenses and elastic defense tactics were German standard in 1917 and were tested many times, whereas you mention that the British adopted something like that in as late as 1918 and didn't succeed? It's quite obvious who was ahead of whom.

 

While I would agree that the Germans were ahead of the British in defensive terms largely due to more practice and deeper digging. However, it should be remembered that the German positions attacked in 1917 had much greater advantages in guns, manpower and preparation time than the Allies in general and the BEF forces in particular that were attacked in 1918. The British government had not only decided on an embargo on replacements to the BEF but had agreed an extension of the BEF frontage with the French. Obviously this meant that some point in the line was going to have to give, and that was Fifth Army. One thing I was interested in reading was that when Fifth army took over the French front in early 1918 they not only found that the French trenches were not as extensive as the ones they had vacated, but that French farmers were in the process of reclaiming trench lines for farming (!)

 

I think a better comparison would be between assaults on defensive positions of similar strengths, say between the initial BEF assault during Arras in 1917 and the German efforts to recapture this territory in 1918.

Edited March 25, 2008 by Anthony EJW

[lastdingo]

these tactics were also unable to significantly negate the defender's firepower advantage and were therefore doomed to fail.

I'd like to emphasize this. The material superiority was quite obvious.

Tanks were allied monopoly.

Light machine guns, motorized transport and planes were almost allied monopoly (the production figures are shocking).

Artillery ammunition and food were extreme allied advantages.

Western Allies were superior in manpower.

 

The course of the First World War (even not of 1918) cannot be explained if the British were superior to Germans in infantry and artillery tactics as was claimed earlier in this thread.

 

The British Empire (in action against the Turks with much smaller effort than the Germans were against Romania/Italy/Russia) and France failed to break the German lines in 1915-1917 and exploit that before reserves sealed the breaks. Not a single offensive yielded significant territorial gain. Their only significant territorial gain happened when the Germans decided to shorten the front-line to save manpower and partially withdrew to the Siegfried line (while not being under attack at those sections of the front).

 

The front-line of 1918 that the Germans penetrated much broader and much deeper than any Western Allied offensive did in 1915-1917 was much shorter and therefore much easier to defend than the front-lines that the Germans defended in 1915-1917. This is significant.

 

The ultimate failure of the German army is easily explained with the obvious material disadvantages, physical and mental exhaustion. An officer who's a mental wreck himself after more than 150 days of front-line service in four years cannot make his men hold a line or even attack any further.

 

I mentioned the sound-ranging stuff before, so it doesn't come as a surprise to me. That technique was superior, but the British artillery was not as useful in really overcoming defenses as the German artillery in 1917-1918, counter-battery fire doesn't change that. It should also be seen in the context of strong Allied air superiority of 1918.

 

Military historians have sometimes a Germanophilia, and this is a cheap excuse to call all English-language sources that rate the German tactics higher than the British ones.

 

But I didn't argue against that.

 

Let's recall the quote:

Given that the British Army had ended WW1 with the best training and the best doctrine of any of the combatants,

 

I replied with "I don't see that as given." "correct" (armor), "incorrect" (infantry), "doubtful" (artillery).

 

The sources on my point concerning infantry are overwhelmingly one-sided in both languages. The one contradicting book that was quoted so far has not convinced its reviewers (google for a minute and you see several reviews).

 

My point about British artillery doctrine/tactics/whatever in relation to the German one was quite moderate - I called it "doubtful". This requires much less justification than a bold assertion of one-sided superiority.

The success of Eastern front breakthrough operations in 1917 and Western front breakthrough operations of 1918 was not matched by Allied artillery before the exhaustion of the German army by mid-1918. The Allied superiority in ammunition supply during all of 1914-1918 on the Western front is out of question. This means it's doubtful whether actual tactics or simply sheer volume (as well as lots of other factors) helped the Allied (British) artillery to finally succeed in 1918.

I know that the British had an ammunition shortage sometime in the war. But that was a shortage by their standards. In comparison to that the Germans had almost no ammunition most of the time.

 

 

In short; my assertions of "incorrect" and "doubtful" are well-supported and rather moderate in comparison to the assertion of British tactical omni-superiority by 1918. I'm not inclined to prove my point anymore till a huge volume of contradicting evidence comes my way (I'm always willing to learn...if there is something left to learn in the specific topic).

Those who think the British were tactically superior in infantry and superior (not only superior with doubts, but superior without doubt) by 1918 are asked to prove their point.

[Grapple]

Seriously though, the training manuals of the time which I have read through seem to have very clear details on the basics of infantry combat. The signals manuals are also quite developed. Where you get into sticky bits is how everyone is supposed to work with Armor and light armor. The pamphlets for the Armored Forces operations, especially Armored Car and Recce Squadrons are quite light in rules

Here is my totally amateur opinion about the subject

 

I have always wondered if this had to do with the British regimental system.

 

The advantage was the such a system produced individual units which were hard to crack. They were loyal and proud of their units

 

Yet on the other hand it made them not play well with other units since they weren’t part of the regiment. .

So an infantry regiment would fight well as an infantry unit but would not work as well with an artillery or armor unit since they weren’t part of the regiment. And since WW2 was an “Ad hoc combined arms” war while WW1 was a “planned the battle in advance” war then the regimental system held back the British from combined arms fighting in WW2. The faster pace of WW2 meant that you needed units to work together faster without the need for some high level planning.

 

So what the British need to have done is to merge their infantry/armor/artillery into combined regiments so that they had the advantage of unit loyalty and pride along with having a combined arms unit.

 

The Germans had a strange advantage in that with their army being limited to 100,000 mostly infantry with no armor or aircraft, so when they expanded their army their men expanded out into the armor and aircraft units but had come from the infantry. So they did not have as much of the “us vs them” that was drilled into other armies in regards to infantry/armor/artillery.

 

So in the heat of battle when a German infantry officer went and asked that the artillery unit to stand and fight off some attacking British or French tanks the artillery officer might be an ex-sergeant from the infantry so he saw his duty to help his fellow soldiers

 

While the British infantry officer on the other hand might be reluctant to ask the British artillery unit for help since it was not only not part of the regiment but not even infantry. While the British artillery officer saw his primary duty to the honor of the artillery regiment and the worse thing that can stain that honor would be to lose his guns.

 

This is not to say that the Germans always worked well with each other or that the British never did but the Germans did have an advantage in that the wall between units was not as high.

Edited March 25, 2008 by Grapple

[67th Tigers]

Those who think the British were tactically superior in infantry and superior (not only superior with doubts, but superior without doubt) by 1918 are asked to prove their point.

 

No need, it's been done. http://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/0300066635/

[Paul Lakowski]

No need, it's been done. http://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/0300066635/

 

Wow we have evolved to the point where a single book can prove the point, halleluiah!!!!!

 

"This new thinking amazes me Sir Bedevere, tell me again how sheep’s bladders can be employed to prevent earthquakes?"

 

Each side sees things from their own point of view so naturally they think they are the best.

[lastdingo]

No need, it's been done. http://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/0300066635/

 

You're funny.

One book against hundreds, but it proves your point? That's a joke.

 

A serious discussion among adults on a serious topic looks different than "See, I have a book. It's right, I am right."

I have dozens of books. I don't even care to mention those as many are in German language and could be called biased LIKE YOURS.

[thekirk]

I see your Paddy Griffith, and raise you a John Mosier...

 

Unfortunately, very little military history is written without a partisan viewpoint informing its author. Particularly when you start talking the nitty-gritty detail of operational art, and minor tactics. Everyone is certain that their pet unit or nationality did it best, and the rest of them were damn fools or lousy at war.

 

One of the most informative books I've read on the subject is "A Perspective On Infantry", by John A. English. Not coincidentally, it's also one of the least partisan. Well worth the read, if you're interested in the topic of British tactics and training.

Edited March 26, 2008 by thekirk

[BillB]

I'd like to emphasize this. The material superiority was quite obvious.

Tanks were allied monopoly.

Light machine guns, motorized transport and planes were almost allied monopoly (the production figures are shocking).

Artillery ammunition and food were extreme allied advantages.

Western Allies were superior in manpower.

 

The course of the First World War (even not of 1918) cannot be explained if the British were superior to Germans in infantry and artillery tactics as was claimed earlier in this thread.

 

The British Empire (in action against the Turks with much smaller effort than the Germans were against Romania/Italy/Russia) and France failed to break the German lines in 1915-1917 and exploit that before reserves sealed the breaks. Not a single offensive yielded significant territorial gain. Their only significant territorial gain happened when the Germans decided to shorten the front-line to save manpower and partially withdrew to the Siegfried line (while not being under attack at those sections of the front).

 

The front-line of 1918 that the Germans penetrated much broader and much deeper than any Western Allied offensive did in 1915-1917 was much shorter and therefore much easier to defend than the front-lines that the Germans defended in 1915-1917. This is significant.

 

The ultimate failure of the German army is easily explained with the obvious material disadvantages, physical and mental exhaustion. An officer who's a mental wreck himself after more than 150 days of front-line service in four years cannot make his men hold a line or even attack any further.

 

I mentioned the sound-ranging stuff before, so it doesn't come as a surprise to me. That technique was superior, but the British artillery was not as useful in really overcoming defenses as the German artillery in 1917-1918, counter-battery fire doesn't change that. It should also be seen in the context of strong Allied air superiority of 1918.

 

Military historians have sometimes a Germanophilia, and this is a cheap excuse to call all English-language sources that rate the German tactics higher than the British ones.

 

But I didn't argue against that.

 

Let's recall the quote:

I replied with "I don't see that as given." "correct" (armor), "incorrect" (infantry), "doubtful" (artillery).

 

The sources on my point concerning infantry are overwhelmingly one-sided in both languages. The one contradicting book that was quoted so far has not convinced its reviewers (google for a minute and you see several reviews).

 

My point about British artillery doctrine/tactics/whatever in relation to the German one was quite moderate - I called it "doubtful". This requires much less justification than a bold assertion of one-sided superiority.

The success of Eastern front breakthrough operations in 1917 and Western front breakthrough operations of 1918 was not matched by Allied artillery before the exhaustion of the German army by mid-1918. The Allied superiority in ammunition supply during all of 1914-1918 on the Western front is out of question. This means it's doubtful whether actual tactics or simply sheer volume (as well as lots of other factors) helped the Allied (British) artillery to finally succeed in 1918.

I know that the British had an ammunition shortage sometime in the war. But that was a shortage by their standards. In comparison to that the Germans had almost no ammunition most of the time.

In short; my assertions of "incorrect" and "doubtful" are well-supported and rather moderate in comparison to the assertion of British tactical omni-superiority by 1918. I'm not inclined to prove my point anymore till a huge volume of contradicting evidence comes my way (I'm always willing to learn...if there is something left to learn in the specific topic).

Those who think the British were tactically superior in infantry and superior (not only superior with doubts, but superior without doubt) by 1918 are asked to prove their point.

My, you do rate yourself pretty highly don't you. Anything left to learn indeed. Mebbe being a bit more specific, rather than relying on leaping about all over a four year conflict to keep things nice and vague would be a good starting point. Then, when you've quite finished with your adult behaviour in shifting the goalposts from the beginning of the discussion and erecting and demolishing straw men (the only person ranting on about "British omni-superiority" would be you, for example), perhaps you could address the points made by Anthony EJW and the works by Palazzo, Prior, Wilson, along with Herwig, Bidwell and indeed Griffiths. Given that the first four provide academic, peer reviewed evidence that actually addresses your question and pretty much demolish your allegedly wide-reading based position. And no, playing the "oh they must be biased" card won't cut it. Also, as you are so quick with the "source please", mebbe you could provide some actual references from all this reading you claim to have done to support some of the above assertions, given that they run totally counter to getting on for three decades of study from where I'm sitting.

 

BillB

[Anthony EJW]

I see your Paddy Griffith, and raise you a John Mosier...

 

No need to be insulting! While Griffith does love to be controversial it's obvious that a lot of original research went into his work on WW1 and I think that there is a lot of good stuff buried in his book- not something that can really be said of Mosier.

Edited March 26, 2008 by Anthony EJW

[thekirk]

I dunno, Anthony. I think Mosier makes some good points, particularly in his WWII works. WWI, not so much.

 

I do think those good points are buried in the dross, but he does have a few. His most recent tome has been bathroom reading for most of this winter, and I find his take on the non-superiority of the Germans something of a breath of fresh air. However, he's got some issues, and there are a lot of glaring errors, which make me class his work in the category of popular non-fiction, as opposed to historical reference.

 

Paddy Griffith really doesn't belong in a lump with Mosier, and I apologize for that. However, I will submit that they both have their hobbyhorses, and they absolutely insist on riding them into the ground... In that, they're much alike.

[Rich]

Paddy Griffith really doesn't belong in a lump with Mosier, and I apologize for that. However, I will submit that they both have their hobbyhorses, and they absolutely insist on riding them into the ground... In that, they're much alike.

 

Mosier at least is fun to read, in a trainwreck kind of way. And Paddy Griffith has no hobbyhorses, he broke them all as a child, being the inveterate iconclast that he is.

[Colin Williams]

I still think there is a failure to appreciate the military value of facial hair, particularly in WW1.

 

The World Beard and Moustache Championships

[Colin Williams]

Mosier at least is fun to read, in a trainwreck kind of way. And Paddy Griffith has no hobbyhorses, he broke them all as a child, being the inveterate iconclast that he is.

 

I was stunned to see a favorable blurb by Carlo D'Este on the jacket of a recent Mosier book. I can't imagine how D'Este can think well of Mosier's opinionated stuff.

[67th Tigers]

You're funny.

One book against hundreds, but it proves your point? That's a joke.

 

A serious discussion among adults on a serious topic looks different than "See, I have a book. It's right, I am right."

I have dozens of books. I don't even care to mention those as many are in German language and could be called biased LIKE YOURS.

 

You're discussing WW1 British combat performance without reference to the most major work in the field, the one that everyone references these days. I think that is a problem.

 

For those without heads in the sand, it's worth noting Griffith has another book on WW1 out soon: http://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/?product_id=1608

[History Buff]

For those without heads in the sand, it's worth noting Griffith has another book on WW1 out soon: http://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/?product_id=1608

 

Oh that trees should die for such a buffoon.

[Rich]

I was stunned to see a favorable blurb by Carlo D'Este on the jacket of a recent Mosier book. I can't imagine how D'Este can think well of Mosier's opinionated stuff.

 

Incestousness is endemic in history and in publishing. I know of at least one recent new book review where the glowing review was the product of one of the authors writing partners. So D'Este may have a new project in the works with the same publisher....OTOH of course, like I said, Mosier is fun to read, so long as you suspend disbelief.