why did Admiral Halsey not use TF64 reinforce TF16 & 17 in the battle of the santa cruz islands?

[TRYTRY]

If he concentrated three Task Forces, the surface ships of Admiral Lee could protect USS Hornet & USS Enterprise. I think more powerful AA defence perhaps could survive USS Hornet. Even though She was damaged as history, the two new BB could repulse IJN's surface ships.

[KingSargent]

If he concentrated three Task Forces, the surface ships of Admiral Lee could protect USS Hornet & USS Enterprise. I think more powerful AA defence perhaps could survive USS Hornet. Even though She was damaged as history, the two new BB could repulse IJN's surface ships.

He was stupid? He wanted to keep TF 64 in position to intercept a Tokyo Express run? TF 64 couldn't have joined in time? Some ships didn't have fuel available for the high-speed steaming required to join and operate together?

 

Lots of possible reasons, including it was USN doctrine at the time to operate in dispersed groups for air action.

[Old Tanker]

I'm just finishing up Sea of Thunder , by Evan Thomas a history of naval warfare in the PTO that focuses on four (4) players including Halsey.

 

 

Pertaining to the Santa Cruz battle:

He blamed the poor preformance on his having a new staff , poor communications ( slow) and Adm. kinkaid. He took from Adm. Kinkaid the command of fleet carriers for the rest of the war. Adm. Kinkaid commanded invasion fleets and invasion support fleets from then on.

[glenn239]

Of course it was Kinkaid's fault. All Halsey did was send him into battle outnumbered and outgunned, without a crucial strategic objective and with an existing potential to lose all the remaining operational USN fleet carriers in one afternoon.

 

With respect the original question, I'd vote for deficient American doctrine. US handling of their battleship resources in 1942 was near to abysmal.

[TRYTRY]

I examined the Struggle for Guadalcanal & The Battle of Santa Cruz Islands.

Admiral Lee swept iron sound at night in Oct. 25, compel IJN to cancel that night's "Tokyo Express". Before daylight, he retired southward. TF16 & 17 was too far for he to meet.

If Admiral kinkaid deployed TF16 & 17 between San Cristobal & Santa Cruz instead east of Santa Cruz, USN would get a chance to concentration.

[KingSargent]

Like Glenn says, there wasn't really a reason to go out to meet the IJN at Santa Cruz.

 

Just like there wasn't really a reason to keep an offensive going up The Slot in 1943, and there wasn't a reason to leave San Bernardino Strait totally uncovered (thereby slipping it to Kinkaid again) while he chased Ozawa's decoys in 1944, nor a reason to hang around typhoon waters when typhoons were predicted in 1945.

 

Let me think.... Did Spruance ever do phukkups like that?

[TRYTRY]

Like Glenn says, there wasn't really a reason to go out to meet the IJN at Santa Cruz.

 

Just like there wasn't really a reason to keep an offensive going up The Slot in 1943, and there wasn't a reason to leave San Bernardino Strait totally uncovered (thereby slipping it to Kinkaid again) while he chased Ozawa's decoys in 1944, nor a reason to hang around typhoon waters when typhoons were predicted in 1945.

 

Let me think.... Did Spruance ever do phukkups like that?

keep an offensive going up The Slot in 1943? Which operation do you mean?

My idea is that the history was at least not the best for USN. Admiral Halsey had occasions to take TF16 &17 westward at night in 24-25 or 25-26, and added Admiral Lee's one battleship, three cruisers, six destroyers to Admiral Kinkard. This idea don't need any cheat like removing war fog, it just concentrate forces in hand.

[TRYTRY]

Of course it was Kinkaid's fault. All Halsey did was send him into battle outnumbered and outgunned, without a crucial strategic objective and with an existing potential to lose all the remaining operational USN fleet carriers in one afternoon.

 

With respect the original question, I'd vote for deficient American doctrine. US handling of their battleship resources in 1942 was near to abysmal.

As Admiral Nimitz reported to Under Secretary of the navy James Forrestal in early September, he had not enough oil tankers to support new battleships' operation. Under Secretary alloted more oil tankers to Pacific Fleet in mid-September. This shortage should limit battleships' operation.

[glenn239]

Let me think.... Did Spruance ever do phukkups like that?

Not so much. At Midway he dropped the ball by permitting Hornet and Enterprise to remain inactive for crucial hours after Nagumo’s three carriers were crippled, essentially letting Fletcher down and forcing TF17 into a 1-on-1 duel with Yamaguchi. Additionally, I have a hard time believing that the Spruance of 1944 would have ever permitted torpedo bombers to be left to fend for themselves (certainly Fletcher would have never done so, IMO).

 

Then again, Midway was his first carrier battle, and Spruance was a quick learner.

 

As Admiral Nimitz reported to Under Secretary of the navy James Forrestal in early September, he had not enough oil tankers to support new battleships' operation. Under Secretary alloted more oil tankers to Pacific Fleet in mid-September. This shortage should limit battleships' operation.

 

While it is true the Allies were short of tankers during the period, they were not so short of them that supply could not be found for military units that were deemed crucial to an operation. King pestered Nimitz on regular occasion during 1942 to get him to use the battleships available, and Nimitz constantly declined. No doubt had Nimitz accepted, King would have moved Heaven and Earth to acquire the necessary logistic support for him, even at the expense of another operation or to the economy. At Guadalcanal this omission almost came home to roost, where the invasion force was placed in extreme peril during the battle of Savo Island because a covering force that should have included at least 4 battleships was composed only of cruisers and destroyers. Later, the campaign was almost lost for a lack of willingness to send in battlewagons to duke it out at night. When Lee was finally unleashed in November, the Japanese suffered a heavy defeat.

[KingSargent]

keep an offensive going up The Slot in 1943? Which operation do you mean?

Bougainville, New Georgia, Munda, etc. Halsey can't blamed for Guadalcanal, he wasn't in charge of SoPac then, but the whole Solomons campaign was an unnecessary and wasteful diversion to gain territory that was even less than worthless - no economic value and hazardous to your health. I know all the arguments about how many skintillion Japanese airplanes we killed in the Solomons, but we could have killed just as many fighting for something of strategic value.

 

My idea is that the history was at least not the best for USN. Admiral Halsey had occasions to take TF16 &17 westward at night in 24-25 or 25-26, and added Admiral Lee's one battleship, three cruisers, six destroyers to Admiral Kinkard. This idea don't need any cheat like removing war fog, it just concentrate forces in hand.

He could/should have concentrated near Guadalcanal (you know Bill, the objective?) and avoided the oiler shortage Glenn speaks of.

[Old Tanker]

keep an offensive going up The Slot in 1943? Which operation do you mean?

Bougainville, New Georgia, Munda, etc. Halsey can't blamed for Guadalcanal, he wasn't in charge of SoPac then, but the whole Solomons campaign was an unnecessary and wasteful diversion to gain territory that was even less than worthless - no economic value and hazardous to your health. I know all the arguments about how many skintillion Japanese airplanes we killed in the Solomons, but we could have killed just as many fighting for something of strategic value.

 

My idea is that the history was at least not the best for USN. Admiral Halsey had occasions to take TF16 &17 westward at night in 24-25 or 25-26, and added Admiral Lee's one battleship, three cruisers, six destroyers to Admiral Kinkard. This idea don't need any cheat like removing war fog, it just concentrate forces in hand.

He could/should have concentrated near Guadalcanal (you know Bill, the objective?) and avoided the oiler shortage Glenn speaks of.

 

We can disagree to disagree on the SoPac Campaign.

We learned and the Jap. fell into a war of attrition and lost. Plus we cannot forget the SoPacCampaign was to ensure that Oz survived.

The skill sets we gained and the lost experienced people and equipment the EoJ lost were a critical factors when going into the central Pacific and the Philipines.

To go into the central Pac. inexperienced and up against the cream of the crop IJN aviators and better trained fleet would of been much more difficult.

We grabbed the iniative in the SoPac and never relenquished it.

[KingSargent]

Not so much. At Midway he dropped the ball by permitting Hornet and Enterprise to remain inactive for crucial hours after Nagumo’s three carriers were crippled, essentially letting Fletcher down and forcing TF17 into a 1-on-1 duel with Yamaguchi. Additionally, I have a hard time believing that the Spruance of 1944 would have ever permitted torpedo bombers to be left to fend for themselves (certainly Fletcher would have never done so, IMO).

Of COURSE Hornet and Enterprise were "inactive." Why, all they had to do was try to reorganize shattered airgroups* and keep up CAP against Japanese strikes. No, they weren't busy at all....

 

* Hornet didn't even have an airgroup. VT-8 had all been shot down, about 40% of VF-8 had splashed out of gas, and VS-8 and VB-8 had had to go to Midway to refuel. Hard to run a battle with maybe 16 F4Fs left.

 

Then again, Midway was his first carrier battle, and Spruance was a quick learner.

Spruance wasn't even a carrier admiral or an aviator, he was commanding Halsey's CA screen when he got bumped to Head Honcho when Halsey got the Itchy Crud. Maybe NOT being a CV-obsessed aviator allowed him to keep his eye on operational goals instead of haring off after decoys.

 

While it is true the Allies were short of tankers during the period, they were not so short of them that supply could not be found for military units that were deemed crucial to an operation. King pestered Nimitz on regular occasion during 1942 to get him to use the battleships available, and Nimitz constantly declined. No doubt had Nimitz accepted, King would have moved Heaven and Earth to acquire the necessary logistic support for him, even at the expense of another operation or to the economy. At Guadalcanal this omission almost came home to roost, where the invasion force was placed in extreme peril during the battle of Savo Island because a covering force that should have included at least 4 battleships was composed only of cruisers and destroyers. Later, the campaign was almost lost for a lack of willingness to send in battlewagons to duke it out at night. When Lee was finally unleashed in November, the Japanese suffered a heavy defeat.

Maybe Fletcher wouldn't have abandoned Turner and the Marines if Hornet had been at Guadalcanal too? Hornet and TF1 - Pye's old slow BBs - were covering HI, a not unreasonable diversion since the Japanese were still capable of mischief in the Central Pacific.

"King would have moved Heaven and Earth to acquire the necessary logistic support for him, even at the expense of another operation or to the economy." Here we go again . When will you realize that "moving Heaven and Earth" doesn't make non-existant ships appear? The main USN or IJN shipyard is NOT "Willpower." What other operation was King going to expend? TORCH? Even if King pulled every oiler out of the Atlantic, could they get to the Solomons by August 1? NO.

"Battle of Savo Island because a covering force that should have included at least 4 battleships". And which 4 BBs might those be? North Carolina was the only new BB in the Pacific, she was brand new and untried, and she was needed in the CV screen. Do you really think Fletcher would have given her up?

Pye's BBs were off HI as mentioned, and what would old, slow, and clumsy BBs do in Ironbottom Sound anyway? These were not the modernized and radar-directed gunfire equipped ships of Surigao Strait, they were in essentially pre-Pearl Harbor fit.

We didn't get beat at Savo because we didn't have BBs, we got beat because commanders who were rummy from lack of sleep for days made some decisions that looked reasonable to their bleary eyes at the time. We didn't need the BBs for fire support, we really didn't need the CAs. Having the BBs there would have attracted the Japanese torpedo-bomber strikes to them. Even if the Bettys missed, what makes you think exhausted BB sailors would perform any better than exhausted CA sailors in the night surface action? All we needed was 35K ton BBs with 24" torpedoes in ther guts.

"When Lee was finally unleashed in November, the Japanese suffered a heavy defeat." Lee was unleashed because there wasn't anybody else left, not because anybody thought sending BBs into Ironbottom Sound was a good idea. In fact Lee didn't fight in Ironbottom Sound, he kept to the northwest of Cape Esperance where he had maneuvering room, especially a clear escape route south.

And Lee almost didn't inflict that "heavy defeat." His DDs were soggy toast and South Dakota was a crippled wreck (as far as immediate combat was concerned) when Washington got a good firing solution and blew Kirishima all the way to Ameratsu. The Japanese still had CAs, CLs, DDs, and lots of torpedoes, and they were faster. They had a chance to take out two new USN BBs and they didn't try.

[KingSargent]

We can disagree to disagree on the SoPac Campaign.

We learned and the Jap. fell into a war of attrition and lost. Plus we cannot forget the SoPacCampaign was to ensure that Oz survived.

The skill sets we gained and the lost experienced people and equipment the EoJ lost were a critical factors when going into the central Pacific and the Philipines.

To go into the central Pac. inexperienced and up against the cream of the crop IJN aviators and better trained fleet would of been much more difficult.

We grabbed the iniative in the SoPac and never relenquished it.

1. Japanese in the Solomons were no threat to OZ. We know NOW that the Japanese never had any intention of going to OZ, but it would have been obvious THEN to anybody who could read a map that an airfield on Guadalcanal could not cut OZ's logistical throat.

 

2. We went to Guadalcanal because it was something we could maybe do after Midway had reduced the IJN offensive threat and King and the PTO boys wanted to get the Navy committed to ongoing ops in the Pacific before FDR and the CCS could yank it to the Atlantic.

 

3. The effort that Big Mac put into New Guinea combined with the effort that PTO/SoPac put into the Solomons would probably have gotten us the Netherlands East Indies, at least Borneo oil. That was a strategic target the Japanese had to fight for, it was healthier, it was economically valuable, it was closer to our "forward base" in OZ, and the girls were prettier.

 

4. We DIDN'T go for the NEI because the USN was not going to fight under Big Mac's command. Yet another reason to have left him on Corregidor and pulled Wainwright out. Wainwright had a better brain and a smaller ego.

 

5. Not exactly germane to this issue, but in July 1942 Big Mac swore up and down that if the Navy gave him two CVs and a Marine division he could go straight to Rabaul and take it. Two weeks later he said the Navy couldn't take Guadalcanal with THREE CVs and a Marine division. Of course he was right about that, but that only makes his posturing about going straight to Rabaul look even more ridiculous.

[Old Tanker]

1. Japanese in the Solomons were no threat to OZ. We know NOW that the Japanese never had any intention of going to OZ, but it would have been obvious THEN to anybody who could read a map that an airfield on Guadalcanal could not cut OZ's logistical throat.

Were they going to stop at the 'Canal and what was interest in Santa Cruz Is . ? Cut off Oz supplies or severly disrpupt them including use of IJ forces based at Pt Morseby. Solomons and Moresby to starve out Oz.

2. We went to Guadalcanal because it was something we could maybe do after Midway had reduced the IJN offensive threat and King and the PTO boys wanted to get the Navy committed to ongoing ops in the Pacific before FDR and the CCS could yank it to the Atlantic.

I understand that some serious concerns over Jap. forces continuous advances plus where do you draw a line in the Pac. I don't believe it was a make-work project ..but...

 

3. The effort that Big Mac put into New Guinea combined with the effort that PTO/SoPac put into the Solomons would probably have gotten us the Netherlands East Indies, at least Borneo oil. That was a strategic target the Japanese had to fight for, it was healthier, it was economically valuable, it was closer to our "forward base" in OZ, and the girls were prettier. Darwin good or no good for big advanced base . We've debated before , Aussies say no.

 

4. We DIDN'T go for the NEI because the USN was not going to fight under Big Mac's command. Yet another reason to have left him on Corregidor and pulled Wainwright out. Wainwright had a better brain and a smaller ego. Cannot disagree plus longer logistics .

 

5. Not exactly germane to this issue, but in July 1942 Big Mac swore up and down that if the Navy gave him two CVs and a Marine division he could go straight to Rabaul and take it. Two weeks later he said the Navy couldn't take Guadalcanal with THREE CVs and a Marine division. Of course he was right about that, but that only makes his posturing about going straight to Rabaul look even more ridiculous.

 

 

Good place as any since Solomon's were invaded to stop and start bleeding IJF. If we didn't fight in SoPac. what would of happened in PNG during the same period and IJF left to do whatever in Solomons ? Fiji ? Santa Cruz ? New Cal. ?

[capt_starlight]

Were they going to stop at the 'Canal and what was interest in Santa Cruz Is . ? Cut off Oz supplies or severly disrpupt them including use of IJ forces based at Pt Morseby. Solomons and Moresby to starve out Oz.

 

It was not intended to "starve out Oz". Oz was too self-sufficient in all the staples to even contemplate it.

 

Guadalcanal and Tulagi were part of planning for operations to follow Midway - the eventual seizure of Fiji (though not necessarily the holding - there was some debate between the IJA and IJN planners) and New Caledonia. Combined it would have forced convoys further south and allowed increased attrition of them (combining to slowdown the build-up in Australia of men and munitions) as well as giving them domination of the Coral Sea and thereby the approaches to Rabaul (which was in turn an advance "defended base" for Truk).

 

There is an interesting PDF for those who are interested in the Japanese side of the story at ==> http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf (or direct to the 2.6MB pdf at => http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/WebI...df?OpenElement)

 

This book is a translation of sections of the Japanese official history (Senshi sôsho), covering the invasion of Rabaul, the battles along the Kokoda Trail and at Milne Bay, and the destruction of the Japanese forces at Buna, Gona and Giruwa in northern Papua.

While not directly concerned with SoPac operations it gives a heck of lot of background to the move into the Solomons as will as the effect of that campaign on that in New Guinea....

 

Good place as any since Solomon's were invaded to stop and start bleeding IJF. If we didn't fight in SoPac. what would of happened in PNG during the same period and IJF left to do whatever in Solomons ? Fiji ? Santa Cruz ? New Cal. ?

 

See above....

[KingSargent]

"1. Japanese in the Solomons were no threat to OZ. We know NOW that the Japanese never had any intention of going to OZ, but it would have been obvious THEN to anybody who could read a map that an airfield on Guadalcanal could not cut OZ's logistical throat.

Were they going to stop at the 'Canal and what was interest in Santa Cruz Is . ? Cut off Oz supplies or severly disrpupt them including use of IJ forces based at Pt Morseby. Solomons and Moresby to starve out Oz.

How? Port Moresby was a rathole - "two tin sheds and a rickety pier." The CCS thought it was San Francisco 'cause the dot on the small globe was the same size. How are the Japs going to improve it enough to be a base? Send convoys around the end of PNG and all down the coast under Ozzian and US air bombardment from N. OZ? Lug construction materials and roll drums of gas over the Owen Stanleys? Eat grubs from the jungle?

Port Moresby was unsuppliable and unsustainable from the Japanese side of PNG. Flying in supplies just means you have to carry or fly in gas for the return trip.

 

The Solomons were no threat. If the Japanese keep going cut them off at the base of the pecker. The farther out on a logistical limb they move, the better for us.

 

2. We went to Guadalcanal because it was something we could maybe do after Midway had reduced the IJN offensive threat and King and the PTO boys wanted to get the Navy committed to ongoing ops in the Pacific before FDR and the CCS could yank it to the Atlantic.

I understand that some serious concerns over Jap. forces continuous advances plus where do you draw a line in the Pac. I don't believe it was a make-work project ..but...

It wasn't a make-work project. It was an interservice political plot to keep the USN a] in the Pacific, and b] out of Big Mac's hands. It didn't do much to advance the war, but it did exactly what the admirals thought was most important.

 

As for "where do you draw the Lines?" it was an aero-naval war in the biggest body of water on Earth. Who draws lines in water? PacWar strategy was a replay of Western Front WW1 - frontally assault this trench line while you give the enemy time to build a new one behind it. You sail right through and find a nice unoccupied island, seize it and build an airfield to interdict the Japs left behind. What are they gonna do? Walk on water to assault your islands?

 

3. The effort that Big Mac put into New Guinea combined with the effort that PTO/SoPac put into the Solomons would probably have gotten us the Netherlands East Indies, at least Borneo oil. That was a strategic target the Japanese had to fight for, it was healthier, it was economically valuable, it was closer to our "forward base" in OZ, and the girls were prettier.

Darwin good or no good for big advanced base . We've debated before , Aussies say no.

 

Did I say Darwin? Did anybody hear me say Darwin? There are lots of places more suitable for advanced bases than Darwin. They aren't as close to the NEI, but they are not as far away as Pearl Harbor was from Guadalcanal. If you're going to take a big step anyway, you might as well make sure your foot doesn't come down in shit.

Besides, if we could improve Espiritu Santo, we could improve Darwin.

 

4. We DIDN'T go for the NEI because the USN was not going to fight under Big Mac's command. Yet another reason to have left him on Corregidor and pulled Wainwright out. Wainwright had a better brain and a smaller ego.

Cannot disagree plus longer logistics .

 

I missed something there OT. What are you saying?

 

Good place as any since Solomon's were invaded to stop and start bleeding IJF. If we didn't fight in SoPac. what would of happened in PNG during the same period and IJF left to do whatever in Solomons ? Fiji ? Santa Cruz ? New Cal. ?

Who CARES what happens in a latrine llike PNG or Guadalcanal? Santa Cruz was looked at by the US and rejected as being even worse than Guadalcanal. Fiji and New Caledonia are a long way away.

 

Also, we would be attacking the very objective the Japanese went to war for, and we would be fighting the EXACT SAME ENEMIES. The troops the Japanese sent to PNG and the Solomons largely came from NEI. By 1943 the IJA had ONE REGIMENT left as garrison for the whole NEI. If the Japanese are fighting to hang onto the NEI oil, they aren't going to be sending their ships and troops and airplanes to ratholes farther east.

 

Going head-on into the NEI would not be fun, but at least we wouldn't have more men incapacitiated by Jungle Rot than bullets, and we woudn't be spread all over that part of the globe. If we want to bleed the Japanese, let's bleed for something worthwhile.

[TRYTRY]

He could/should have concentrated near Guadalcanal (you know Bill, the objective?) and avoided the oiler shortage Glenn speaks of.

My English is poor. I can not complete understand your mean of objective. I have said time of the concentration, so I imagine you point the location? I think it is a acceptable concentration point in the middle of San Cristobal & Santa Cruz.

The Struggle for Guadalcanal don't mention the fuel shortage in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. I noticed that Professor Morison had introduced the fuel shortage in other Battle like Marianas, I think this issue should not exist in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands.

Edited March 12, 2008 by TRYTRY

[swerve]

...

As for "where do you draw the Lines?" it was an aero-naval war in the biggest body of water on Earth. Who draws lines in water? PacWar strategy was a replay of Western Front WW1 - frontally assault this trench line while you give the enemy time to build a new one behind it. You sail right through and find a nice unoccupied island, seize it and build an airfield to interdict the Japs left behind. What are they gonna do? Walk on water to assault your islands?

Did I say Darwin? Did anybody hear me say Darwin? There are lots of places more suitable for advanced bases than Darwin. They aren't as close to the NEI, but they are not as far away as Pearl Harbor was from Guadalcanal. If you're going to take a big step anyway, you might as well make sure your foot doesn't come down in shit....

 

So, what you're saying is "Sail through, grab undefended or lightly defended islands, and build airfields to turn them into forward bases." North of PNG? That's the shortest route from the USA to Borneo.

[Old Tanker]

To adhere to Sargant's NEI strategy Mac had to go. Mac's strategy was to return to the Philipines to avenge getting his butt kick out in '42 bypassing the NEI.

However taking the Philipines did cut off the shipping routes from the NEI to Japan as much of the IJN was Singapore based and Bruni fueled. Kinney did want the B-29's to bomb the oil facilities in the NEI but was overruled by those wanting the B-29s up north and pounding Japan directly.

[KingSargent]

My English is poor. I can not complete understand your mean of objective. I have said time of the concentration, so I imagine you point the location? I think it is a acceptable concentration point in the middle of San Cristobal & Santa Cruz.

The Struggle for Guadalcanal don't mention the fuel shortage in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands. I noticed that Professor Morison had introduced the fuel shortage in other Battle like Marianas, I think this issue should not exist in the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands.

By "objective" I mean the focus of the campaign was Guadalcanal. Diverting effort away from that is stupid, especially when you have to leave a covering force (TF64) for the 'canal anyway.

 

"Fuel shortage" in this case is not a shortage of overall fuel in the A/O (Area of Operations), it is a function of where tankers were, how long fuelling would take, and how much mileage the ships had left without refuelling. IOW, could TF64 make it to join TF16/17 (assuming you decide to leave the 'canal uncovered) and have enogh fuel left for the high-speed runs CV operations require? If they do NOT, how long is it going to take them to refuel and get to an oiler, THEN get to TF16/17?

 

IMHO Halsey would have been much better advised to concentrate his TFs southeast of Guadalcanal, with oilers in the vicinity, and hit anyone threatening the whole reason for being there - Guadalcanal itself.

 

I hope I am clearer now.

[KingSargent]

To adhere to Sargant's NEI strategy Mac had to go.

And letting Big Mac go is a loss precisely how?

 

Mac's strategy was to return to the Philipines to avenge getting his butt kick out in '42 bypassing the NEI.

However taking the Philipines did cut off the shipping routes from the NEI to Japan as much of the IJN was Singapore based and Bruni fueled.

This is quite true, but wouldn't it be simpler to just go for the NEI oil than waste all that time and resources screwing around in PNG and the Solomons, then bypassing the oil so "I have returned" could happen?

 

Kinney did want the B-29's to bomb the oil facilities in the NEI but was overruled by those wanting the B-29s up north and pounding Japan directly.

The whole US PacWar plan was foisted on us by the US's own Bomber Barons. They got the biggest and most expensive program in WW2 (the B-29 Program) and then tailored the Pacific War around getting bases so the B-29s could perform the magic of Strategic Bombing. Nobody was going to divert B-29 resources to the NEI under that plan.

 

Personally, I think that going for oil is the way to do it. The Japanese HAVE to fight for it, so you get the attrition that historically came in PNG and Solomons. After you take the oil - or gain a position that prevents Japan from using it - the rest of the war against a fuelless opponent is pretty easy.

[KingSargent]

So, what you're saying is "Sail through, grab undefended or lightly defended islands, and build airfields to turn them into forward bases." North of PNG? That's the shortest route from the USA to Borneo.

No I am talking about taking places like Majuro and Ulithi. What turned out to be biggest links in US supply chain across the Pacific were undefended.

And the Central Pacific drive went to the Gilberts before the Marshalls. WHY? The Giberts aren't even in the way, they are not self-sufficient, and if we bypass them to take the Marshalls before the Japanese can fortify that chain, the Gilberts turn into large POW camps we do not even have to feed.

 

We spent time, money, and lives taking Tarawa. Then we got smart and just sailed into Majuro (which was sort of the middle pip on the five side of a die in relation to Japanese-occupied islands), used the huge lagoon for an anchorage and replenishment depot, and built airfields to keep the Japanese on the surrounding islands suppressed.