Why didn't the Soviets react during Pershing 2 deployment?

[EchoFiveMike]

AFAIK, the US (and I assume the Soviets) never wanted to be in a mutual suicide pact.

 

They may never have wanted it, but they certainly did little to stop that eventuality when they had the opportunity to do so. S/F....Ken M

[bigfngun]

they certainly did little to stop that eventuality when they had the opportunity to do so. S/F....Ken M

 

Such as, nuke Russia circa 1960?

[EchoFiveMike]

Such as, nuke Russia circa 1960?

 

'52-57 is a much more advantageous window of opportunity for action without reprisal IMO. This also includes continuing to operate the Manhatten Project and associated programs at wartime levels throughout the '46-'48 period during which we could have had many more deliverable bombs than we did during the critical immediate postwar period of European instability.

 

This discussion will never go anywhere productive, it completely depends on your fundamental belief structure and that can not be altered by mere discussion on the internet. S/F....Ken M

[JWB]

'52-57 is a much more advantageous window of opportunity for action without reprisal IMO. This also includes continuing to operate the Manhatten Project and associated programs at wartime levels throughout the '46-'48 period during which we could have had many more deliverable bombs than we did during the critical immediate postwar period of European instability.

 

This discussion will never go anywhere productive, it completely depends on your fundamental belief structure and that can not be altered by mere discussion on the internet. S/F....Ken M

Many more deliverable bombs? We had about 1000 bombs in 1952. 650 in 1951. 450 in 1950. 250 in 1949. Pick your doomsday.

[EchoFiveMike]

Many more deliverable bombs? We had about 1000 bombs in 1952. 650 in 1951. 450 in 1950. 250 in 1949. Pick your doomsday.

 

Given the realities of operating over extended distances before reaching primary targets in a severe antiaircraft environment without any meaningful defense suppression period, you could easily see 50+% non delivery rates. So your #'s shrink rapidly. Plus redundant counterforce targeting is going to "waste" bombs. And this time period has mostly small(<50kt) bombs so you need multiple bombs per major industrial area. Plus bombs that you'll want to hold back for reserve. So figure 1000 bombs as an extremely rough minimum (1952) and the USSR already has deliverable nuclear weapons with which to strike back at European targets, or perhaps a one way attack against the West coast. A 20kt "Joe-1" or 40kt "Joe-2" against Paris, London or Seattle would not be a "Good Thing", especially against a public unfamiliar with being on the recieving side of a SBC (which I why I rule out a Soviet retaliatory nuclear attack on Germany, it still lacked good targets).

 

A problem larger than the bombs themselves were the delivery systems. It would argueably be sometime in '49 or '50 before SAC was really capable of performing a strike in the discussed manner anyways, and there were no small bombs capable of delivery by aircraft other than B29's,B50's, and B36's yet. S/F....Ken M

[jakec]

Yes its often forgotten now how successful KGB disinformation efforts actually were during the cold war. Best example of their kind of operation is the campaign against the Neutron bomb. There clearly was a similar effort directed against GLCM and Pershing, to the point that the West German politicians who demanded it be introduced were a few years later campaigning that it not be deployed at all.

 

demosthenes, did you have a look on the CIA FOIA website? I dont specifically recall any documents related to this area, but I do recall at least one discussing likely Soviet efforts to counter Star wars. Likely you will find similar works on the Pershing debate.

One of the most successful and effective KGB disinformation efforts concerns AIDS and the rumours KGB successfully planted that AIDS was a CIA biowar plot (documented by Mitrokhin). Still circulate on the internet to this day...

Edited February 14, 2008 by jakec

[demosthenes]

I think it was mentioned in the Mitrokhin archive that one of the very first books on the Kennedy assasination (with a standpoint that it was a CIA putup job) was actually bankrolled by the KGB. Wouldnt surprise me if they stirred it up on the MLK and Robert Kennedy assassinations as well.

 

In answer to the question, I think its clear that the USSR preferred action through subversion or even the use of terrorism in preference to direct action by the time the 1980s came along. Partly this was due to a relative inferiority complex vis the US (The USSR was never a true world superpower, because it lacked a global capability) and partly because they believed due to their own doctrine that the West would defeat themselves so why would they need to fight them. I would also suggest that the Soviet lack of artistry in foreign affairs may well be due to the fact they simply didn't wargame situations the way the West did.Consequently It was their tendency to avoid sticky international situations post 1962. The one occasion when they did get involved (1973 war) they very quickly backtracked when the US dug their heals in.

 

If you can characterise Soviet foreign policy post Khrushchev, I would call it 'unadventurous'. In that context their lack of overt aggression vis the Pershing and GLCM deployments is hardly surprising. Not that it didnt freak them out secretly of course.

 

I agree with your analysis, but I'd have to add that Soviet covert intervention continued through the late 80s (such as Angola).

[DKTanker]

Agreed, though it only happened in the 3rd world, where there was little chance of anything escalating into something they couldnt control. In fact I get the impression that even in Angola they often used Cuban troops.

So, was Angola primarily run out of Moscow or was it an independent Cuban foray with some input from the Kremlin?

[JWB]

Given the realities of operating over extended distances before reaching primary targets in a severe antiaircraft environment without any meaningful defense suppression period, you could easily see 50+% non delivery rates. So your #'s shrink rapidly. Plus redundant counterforce targeting is going to "waste" bombs. And this time period has mostly small(<50kt) bombs so you need multiple bombs per major industrial area. Plus bombs that you'll want to hold back for reserve. So figure 1000 bombs as an extremely rough minimum (1952) and the USSR already has deliverable nuclear weapons with which to strike back at European targets, or perhaps a one way attack against the West coast. A 20kt "Joe-1" or 40kt "Joe-2" against Paris, London or Seattle would not be a "Good Thing", especially against a public unfamiliar with being on the recieving side of a SBC (which I why I rule out a Soviet retaliatory nuclear attack on Germany, it still lacked good targets).

 

A problem larger than the bombs themselves were the delivery systems. It would argueably be sometime in '49 or '50 before SAC was really capable of performing a strike in the discussed manner anyways, and there were no small bombs capable of delivery by aircraft other than B29's,B50's, and B36's yet. S/F....Ken M

USA had a variety of warheads > http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Weapons/Allbombs.html

 

USSR didn't have a deliverable warhead until 1954. Stalin refused to fund the production program after First Lightning. Everything else was just R&D, propaganda, saber rattling, etc.

[Ken Estes]

....

 

In answer to the question, I think its clear that the USSR preferred action through subversion or even the use of terrorism in preference to direct action by the time the 1980s came along. Partly this was due to a relative inferiority complex vis the US (The USSR was never a true world superpower, because it lacked a global capability) and partly because they believed due to their own doctrine that the West would defeat themselves so why would they need to fight them.

....

 

Stuart, I think you are overlooking [although I know you do not] the important accession of Andropov to the Gen Secretariate, etc. In 1982, the USSR leader thus was a KGB man, who perforce knew (1) that the US/NATO wasn't going to attack, and (2) that the USSR remained badly outclassed in several important areas, technical and operational. After that, there is no going home, and the accession of his protege Gorbachov sealed the fate of the regime.

 

However, Bolshie or not, they are still the Rus and the chance of them having the same viewpoints, goals as the rest of the west remains no better than, say, the 13th C. So much for 'looking into Putin's eyes and seeing a man I could deal with....'

[jakec]

The problem with that is that Andropov was just a prisoner of Communist doctrine as everyone else. Its pretty much on record in the memoirs of Stasi Chief Markus Wolf that Andropov thought there was going to be a war. Operation Ryan is not the work of a man who is certain of the West position. In his defence, he was hardly at his best in his physical condition.

Andropov certainly recognised the weaknesses of the USSR better than most of his contemporaries (in the USSR OR the West at that time), but it seems probable from his endorsement of OP RYAN and related activity that he did not "know the West" as Ken Estes suggests he might.

 

A fundamental problem in the Soviet machinery not mentioned yet is that they did not really do separate analysis and synthesis of intelligence but rather fed raw material up to policymakers. So in 1980-84 policymakers were bombarded with endless RYAN reports of NATO preparations for nuclear war, ergo NATO must be planning to strike.

 

Interestingly, given material released since the Cold War, the real external threat to the USSR was not NATO nuclear aggression but the Reagan administration's economic warfare such as getting the Saudis to drop the bottom out of the oil market. As we have seen in recent years, Russia with and without oil money is a completely different beast.

[Ken Estes]

I did not venture to say that Yuri was about to stop the train, and his doctrinaire credentials remain untarnished. I am simply saying that he knew the real intelligence as well as the agitprop and had to understand the significance. Nor can anyone in the Kremlin, I suppose, be sure of the west, viz the Generalissimos 'understanding' the West prior to Jun41.

[Ariete!]

As to the original question:

Given the existence of vast SL-ICBM and LB-ICBM arsenals plus SAC bombers and all the tactical nukes, the Pershing and Cruise missiles did not present a particular magnification of the actual military threat to the Soviet Union.

 

They were clearly a political response to the Soviet emplacement of SS20s which were themselves primarily deployed for the military goal of trying to prise the “certainty” of a US nuclear umbrella over Western Europe. The mobility/relative deployment stealth/rapid flight time were by products, in my understanding, of that weapon.

 

Having lived and having been politically semi-active through that period, I remain amazed at Reagan’s and Thatcher’s (but especially Kohl’s) steadfastness in the face of a really frenzied campaign by the pacifist left.

 

The Soviets countered mostly through political means, as was appropriate, and I believe they probably came fairly close to winning that particular battle.

 

It is ironic that one of the early successes of the post-Reagan Soviet “capitulation” was the IRBM treaty.

 

Another funny side-point is that the considerable expenditure of the soviets on Italian communists was used for everything BUT pacifist activities They basically recapitalized the Italian CP just as it was beginning its long road to becoming a social-democratic party. Hah!.

 

 

On a personal note, I’ve always been nauseated by the mix of mendacity / naivete’ of the then pacifist movement and the fact that no one in Europe ahs ever been brought to account for all that Soviet money they took.

[jakec]

It is ironic that one of the early successes of the post-Reagan Soviet “capitulation” was the IRBM treaty.

And to this day, the securocrats in Russia consider the INF Treaty a huge mistake and are doing all they can to kill it. The third para of the Wikipedia item on it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/INF_Treaty) sums up the Russian securocrat view.

[shep854]

According to some articles I read during the '70s, Soviet doctrine stated that a nuclear war was "winnable." Was this Western security hype or a serious conclusion?

[DKTanker]

It is ironic that one of the early successes of the post-Reagan Soviet "capitulation" was the IRBM treaty.

The treaty actually pre-dated the Soviet "capitulation". Talks sort of began on INF January of 1985, the fall of 1985 things got a bit more serious and the negotiations began. The INF treaty was signed December of 1987, a bit more than one year left in Reagan's final term of office.

[Chris Werb]

A big problem in targeting the Soviets in the 1946-55 timeframe would be lack of targeting info. That prolem wasn't greatly alleviated until the U-2 and didn't go away altogether until satellite photography.

[Alter Schwede]

The Neutron bomb was supposed to be used to stop the WP-Panzers rolling thru the densly populated West Germany, In that scenario (in theory) it would kill the Panzer crews and give the German civilians in the cellars a chance to survive a nuclear strike since the Neutron rays passed armour more easyly than concrete, and since it had a lower explosive force than a normal Nuke of the same size.

 

(according to one of the inventors, seen on TV years ago)

[John_Ford]

As for politics, the Soviets most certainly mobilized their useful idiots in western Europe, though with the triumvirate of Reagan, Thatcher, and Kohl, that tactic was a non-starter.

 

 

 

Had a Scout Platoon Leader who was Site Security for Pershings when he was enlisted. He was there during the best of those times and even shot a guy off the wall who was climbing the perimeter fence. Der Herr showed up, threw the guy in a Polizi car and he never heard another thing about it.

[Bearded-Dragon]

So, was Angola primarily run out of Moscow or was it an independent Cuban foray with some input from the Kremlin?

 

Depends who you read. According to the Reaganites, it was purely a Soviet run operation (but then they saw Russia's hand in everything, in true Cold War Warrior view). According to the Cubans, it was initially a Cuban foray, although later came to be controlled by the Kremlin. According to the Soviets at the time, it was purely a Cuban operation. Later revelations, post-Cold War are that it was closer to the Cuban version. Apparently Castro did not consult with Moscow very much. It was, according to many Cuban watchers in line with previous Cuban "solidarity" efforts in Africa, where during the 1960s, into the early 1970s, large Cuban units were deployed, including as I understand it, a Cuban armoured brigade in Northern Africa.

[Gunguy]

Another funny side-point is that the considerable expenditure of the soviets on Italian communists was used for everything BUT pacifist activities They basically recapitalized the Italian CP just as it was beginning its long road to becoming a social-democratic party. Hah!.

On a personal note, I’ve always been nauseated by the mix of mendacity / naivete’ of the then pacifist movement and the fact that no one in Europe ahs ever been brought to account for all that Soviet money they took.

 

You left out the extensive buying of the US Congress. The Black Caucus or whatever it was called was mostly pro-communist. The Democrats had been entirely hood winked by the Soviets. They believed that communism was the the wave of the future and we (The USA) was evil and standing in the way of a great humanitarian communist progression taking place all over the world. The Dems could not get photo ops with Castro or any other communist quick enough. They CONSTANTLY had papers and research drawn up for them by communist sources. Soviet funded "think tanks" pushed out all kinds of garbage that was used to "prove" how good the Soviet system was...... The Dems were ready to sell our country down a river if given the chance at all. The only thing stopping them was the Republicans who would have done whatever it took to stop the Dems. OK, OK, the Republicans (a few of them) did do whatever it took and paid the price. Anyway, you all know my personal opinions on this era of US history. The biggest pro-Soviet idiots who could do the most damage were in Washington D.C. Liberal Dems......

 

Dang it, this topic hit my hot button again. I'll cool off now.....

[jakec]

Depends who you read. According to the Reaganites, it was purely a Soviet run operation (but then they saw Russia's hand in everything, in true Cold War Warrior view). According to the Cubans, it was initially a Cuban foray, although later came to be controlled by the Kremlin. According to the Soviets at the time, it was purely a Cuban operation. Later revelations, post-Cold War are that it was closer to the Cuban version. Apparently Castro did not consult with Moscow very much. It was, according to many Cuban watchers in line with previous Cuban "solidarity" efforts in Africa, where during the 1960s, into the early 1970s, large Cuban units were deployed, including as I understand it, a Cuban armoured brigade in Northern Africa.

According to the Mitrokhin Archive Vol 2:

p.450-453: USSR had little initial confidence in the 1970s in the leadership of the MPLA. Castro was much more enthusiastic and by early summer 1975 250 Cuban officers were in Angola advising the MPLA. Castro put pressure on the USSR to up its military aid, but the Foreign Ministry and International Dept of the CPSU were still wary of getting involved too deeply and initially hoped MPLA would revive coalition government with opposition including UNITA. Yet prospect of MPLA losing Luanda to CIA-funded rebels saw USSR change tune and offer substantial support by end 1975 - a massive airlift began. At the same time CIA support was cut off, and USSR drew conclusion that US "lacked will in Africa" just as in SEAsia. This apparent success emboldened USSR later in other parts of Africa like Ethiopia.

p.454 In 1976 advisors from DDR's Stasi arrived to help set up secret police in Angola.

[FlyingCanOpener]

They CONSTANTLY had papers and research drawn up for them by communist sources. Soviet funded "think tanks" pushed out all kinds of garbage that was used to "prove" how good the Soviet system was......

 

The Soviets wrote those there Soviet Military Power booklets back in the 1980s?!?!